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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Katherine Kondor 
On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of radical right social movement 
organisations in Hungary and Great Britain 
(Under the direction of Dr. Mark Littler*, Dr. Carla Reeves*, and Dr. Simon Green**) 
 
*University of Huddersfield, School of Human and Health Sciences, Department of 
Behavioural and Social Science, Applied Criminology and Policing Centre  
**University of Hull, School of Education and Social Sciences, Centre for Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 
 
 This project examines questions of collective action, namely why people seek to 
participate in social movement organisations and why they maintain membership in those 
organisations. This study looks specifically at radical right organisations in Hungary and 
Great Britain, and asks why individuals adopt nationalist views. Two groups were 
compared: The Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM) and the English Defence League 
(EDL). 
 Three methodologies were used for comparison. Secondary survey analysis was 
conducted in order to provide insight into the Hungarian and British social context and 
some factors which move people to adopt right-wing and far-right views. Online analysis 
was conducted on organisations’ websites and social media accounts to examine methods 
utilised by the organisation to recruit members and to explore their movement identity 
formation. Finally, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with movement 
members, specifically examining how they developed radical right views, why they joined 
the organisation, and why they maintain membership. 
 Findings of the statistical analysis showed that in both Hungary and the UK, those 
with politically right-leaning attitudes and those with far-right attitudes generally had a high 
satisfaction with their lives. It was also shown that in both the UK and Hungary those with 
far-right views believe immigrants have a negative effect on their country’s cultural life, 
although these feelings were slightly stronger in the UK sample. In Hungary, results suggest 
that those on the far-right believe immigrants negatively impact the economy, whereas in 
the UK this was not found to be a significant factor. Findings of the online analysis revealed 
the importance of social media to both MÖM and EDL, in terms of recruitment, promoting 
emotion, and strengthening solidarity among supporters. Qualitative interviews with MÖM 
members and textual interviews with EDL supporters gave insight into pathways into the 
movement and the importance of solidarity and emotion. 
This study demonstrates the advantage of mix-methods and cross-national 
comparative studies. This project challenges the idea that radical right supporters are 
unsatisfied with their lives. The results demonstrate that relative deprivation theory is not 
enough to explain support; it is rather a person’s fear of losing what they already have that 
can drive them to seek collective action. This study has challenged the idea of strain theory; 
in a nationalist context, strain theory could be applied to concern over other fellow nationals 
and not the individual self. This project clearly shows the central importance of the online 
sphere, especially social media, in the development of movement identity, in the fostering 
of views and attitudes, and in soliciting support that is not geographically-limited. Finally, 
this is the first study of its kind and the first study to have access to the Hungarian Defence 
Movement. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This project will examine collective action in radical right street-level organisations 
in Hungary and Great Britain. There are three main questions which will frame the focus 
of this investigation: why individuals come to have radical right feelings and attitudes, why 
individuals choose to join radical right organisations (and specifically the ones they have 
joined), and why individuals choose to maintain membership in these organisations. 
As both recruitment into a movement1 and an individual’s experience of activism 
are dependent on social context, it is important to consider a comparative approach to these 
questions to better identify cross-cutting issues (Klandermans, 2013). Hungary and Great 
Britain were chosen for several reasons, mostly due to their contrasting nature in terms of 
history and politics. Both countries can be considered outliers of Europe, and the study can 
be framed in somewhat of an ‘east vs. west’ dichotomy. As will be seen through the 
overview of the countries’ histories, Great Britain is very much defined by its imperialist 
past, while Hungarian national identity is very much influenced by centuries of foreign 
rule. Great Britain sees varying degrees of questions of ‘Britishness’ and ‘Englishness’, and 
a reconfiguring of what it means to be British (further discussion at the end of Section 
1.2.1). Hungarian nationalism, on the other hand, is firmly rooted in an identity centred 
around Hungarian history and irredentism – the desire to reunite lost Hungarian lands and 
those ethnic Hungarians inhabiting them. Both countries share a dubious perspective of 
membership in the European Union, as evidenced by the UK's recent referendum voting to 
leave the EU and by the Hungarian government's constant challenges to EU values and 
 
1 Movement, or social movement (see Chapter 2), refers to a larger group of individuals with shared attitudes 
and goals. Organisations refer to smaller organised groups within movements, with shared attitudes, goals, 
and under one leadership. There can be several organisations within one social movement. Both terms will 
be used throughout this study. 
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laws. Lastly, radical right movements and right-wing political parties have generally had 
difficulty surviving in Great Britain, while they are strengthening in Hungary. 
It is worth noting here the use of both ‘the United Kingdom’ and ‘Great Britain’. In 
this project, the UK will be used to describe the nation-state, particularly when discussing 
political issues such as laws, membership in the European Union, and Brexit. When 
discussing nationalism and radical right organisations in the area, however, Great Britain 
will be used as a point of reference. Northern Ireland will be largely excluded from 
discussion due to their different political and social identities, closely tied to religion 
(Mitchell, 2005) and history. Indeed, YouGov surveys have shown that less than 50 percent 
of people in Northern Ireland identify as British, compared to 82 percent in England, nearly 
80 percent in Wales, and nearly 60 percent in Scotland (Devenport, 2018). Only 4 percent 
of those from a Catholic background identify themselves as British. While some radical 
right organisations do demonstrate in Northern Ireland, the politics of Northern Ireland are 
not the focus here and would detract from the focus of discussion on Great Britain and 
Britishness. However, while this project largely deals with Great Britain, survey datasets 
used for the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 did include Northern Ireland in their sample, 
hence discussing the UK for that methodology, not Great Britain.  
Cross-national comparisons are important in criminology (Beirne & Hill, 1991; 
Farrington & Wikstrom, 1994; Nivette, 2011; Vagg, 1993), politics (Castano, 2004; 
Jackman, 1985), nationalism studies (Brubaker, 2001; Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; 
Dekker, Malová, & Hoogendorn, 2003; Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Weiss, 2003) and social 
movement research, especially to better understand mobilisation (Hanspeter, Koopmans, 
Duyvendak, & Giugni, 2015; Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). Much of the European 
empirical data, however, offer cross-national comparisons between Western European 
countries; few look to Eastern Europe (save some exceptions, for example Dekker et al., 
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2003; Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Weiss, 2003) and even fewer produce comparisons between 
Eastern and Western European countries (Dekker et al., 2003 being one exception). The 
present study will offer a cross-national comparison between Western and Eastern 
European2 countries, bringing a unique element to social movement studies and 
investigations of radical right organisations. 
The two groups that will be examined in this study will be the English Defence 
League (EDL) and the Hungarian Defence Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom, 
MÖM). These groups were chosen, aside from the accidental synchronisation of their name, 
for several reasons. The EDL was chosen as it is still one of the largest radical right protest 
organisations in Great Britain that is still active,3 and relatively moderate in comparison to 
some of their more extreme counterparts. In Hungary, MÖM was chosen as they are a larger 
radical right organisation who are regularly active and are not as extreme as some of their 
counterparts. Additionally, both groups have relatively large membership numbers and, 
perhaps most important to this study, are both very active online. 
 This project has three major phases, which will be used in an attempt to shed light 
on the research questions. These questions are why individuals adopt nationalist attitudes, 
why they join radical right movements, and why they maintain membership in these 
movements. The first phase of this research will be secondary survey analysis of European 
Social Survey data, in order to help set the context of causation of right-wing and far-right 
attitudes in Hungary and the UK. Next, an online analysis will provide insight into how 
these organisations attempt to recruit and how they wish to display the image of their 
organisation. Lastly, qualitative interviews will be presented with organisation members, 
 
2 While Hungary is often referred to as a Central European country, here it will be referred to as Eastern due 
to its nature as a post-Eastern bloc country. 
3 While the EDL is still an active organisation, as of April 2019 they have been permanently banned from 
most social media platforms including Facebook and Instagram. 
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to look further into why individuals join radical right movements and maintain 
membership.  
To begin, a discussion of terminology surrounding the far-right, radical right, and 
extreme right will be presented in order to clarify terminology used throughout this project. 
Then, to set the stage for a comparison of radical right organisations in both countries, a 
short introduction to modern British and Hungarian history will follow. Following that, a 
short overview of the current landscape of the British and Hungarian radical right 
movements will be provided to better situate the organisations at the centre of this study.  
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1.1 DESCRIPTION OF TERMINOLOGY 
The following section will attempt to provide clarification on terminology 
surrounding the radical right and its relationship to other key terms, such as the far-right, 
and explain the terminology that will be used throughout this study. Following this section, 
a brief history of events leading to the formation of a far-right in both Great Britain and 
Hungary will be overviewed. Then, the landscape of the radical right in both Hungary and 
Great Britain will be presented, including an introduction to the two organisations at the 
centre of this study. 
The discussion of political activism, regardless of ideology, is often framed in a 
left-right dichotomy. While there is not yet a consensus on the proper terminology for 
collective action organisations that are the subject of this research, they are unequivocally 
placed on the right-end of the political spectrum. The use of the left-right dichotomy began 
in 1789 France, where a seating pattern emerged in the new French National Assembly 
(Eatwell, 1989a). The nobility and clergy positioned themselves to the right, and those 
demanding constitutional limitation of the King’s power sat to the left. Roger Eatwell 
(1989a) defines the main oppositions of the right and left. Historically, the right defended 
the absolute monarch while the left looked to democratic systems to elect a representative 
body. Economically, the right was in defence of feudal systems and governmental 
monopoly, while the left defended the free market and protection of the poor. Socially, the 
right defended the role of the Church and placed importance on authority and tradition, 
while the left tended to be secular and placed reason above mysticism. 
Several authors have attempted to better define the left-right dichotomy.  In the 
1960s, the right was characterised as an acceptance of the importance of established 
authority, the acceptance of only advanced institutions, and an emphasis on the individual 
rather than social rights and needs (Pickles, 1964).  In the 1980s, the right was defined by 
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several characteristics: conservative and perhaps authoritarian doctrines; the importance of 
obedience, legitimacy, and piety over contract, consent, and justice; the reluctance to 
separate law and morality; cultural conservatism; respect for heredity and inflexible rights; 
belief in private property; the belief in elementary freedoms; the belief that free enterprise 
and capitalist economy are the only systems that can work with human freedom; and belief 
in original sin (Scruton, 1982). Clearly these definitions are problematic, as they use vague 
key terms and do not clearly define why an ideology is ‘right’ as opposed to ‘left’ (Eatwell 
1989b).  According to Eatwell, while they do not solve the issue of the left-right dichotomy, 
several major themes can be seen in the definitions of the right. These are authority and 
authoritarianism; freedom and liberty; equality, egalitarianism, and elitism; nationalism, 
racism, and militarism; and human nature (Eatwell 1989b). As British conservative 
politician Ian Gilmour once said: the right “cannot be exactly defined [but], it is, like the 
elephant, easily recognized when it is seen” (Gilmour, 1977: 12). 
In 1985, British political scientist Nigel Ashford described the right as being 
associated with hostility to minorities, racism, and xenophobia (in Eatwell, 1989a). While 
this may be true for some of those on the right, it is not a defining factor for the whole of 
the ‘right’. Here, then, lies the problem. Eatwell (1989c) divided the right into five styles 
of thought: reactionary, moderate, radical, extreme, and new. The first two types, 
reactionary and moderate right, can be traced back to eighteenth century thought, namely 
to an emphasis on freedom and the individual, and the idea that society and people could 
be made perfect. The following two types, radical and extreme right, are developments of 
the last two centuries and are a response to the rise of social movements. Finally, the new 
right was created as a response to socialist governments.  
There is no consensus as to the appropriate terminology for these groups, as the 
landscape of far-right activism is ever-changing: continuously creating new types of 
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organisations and making others obsolete. While in no way an exhaustive list, the 
ideologies of organisations and parties similar to those at the centre of this study - 
combining forms of nationalism, nativism, xenophobia, racism, and authoritarianism - have 
been described in numerous ways, such as extreme right (Caiani and Parenti, 2013; 
Wolfreys, 2013), far-right (Akçalı and Korkut, 2012; Mieriņa and Koroļeva, 2015; Pirro 
and Róna, 2018), radical right (Bar-On, 2018; Buštiková, 2018; Goodwin and Dennison, 
2018), right-wing radicalism (Minkenberg, 2002), right-wing populism (Wodak, 
KhosraviNik, and Mral, 2013), far-right extremism (Treadwell, 2013), right-wing 
extremism (Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins, 2013; Williams, 2013), extreme right activism 
(Klandermans and Mayer, 2006; Jackson, 2015), racist extremism (Mudde, 2005), anti-
minority mobilisation (Busher, 2016), anti-Islamic mobilisation (Rosenberger and Hadj-
Abdou, 2013), among others. Thus, some examples of terminology used to describe those 
types of organisations and parties subscribing to the above-mentioned attitudes are radical 
right (Minkenberg, 2002), far-right (Castelli Gattinara and Pirro, 2018; Froio and Ganesh, 
2018), extreme right (Mudde, 2000; Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins, 2012), populist radical 
right (Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2014; Grimm & Pilkington, 2015), and populist street 
movements (Bartlett, Birdwell, and Littler, 2011).  
It is clear that there is no consensus on terminology for these types of organisations, 
movements, and parties. Far-right will be here considered as an umbrella-term (Feldman 
and Stocker, 2017) encompassing several types of organisations. Far-right can include 
political parties, and refer to organisations that have nationalist, nativist, anti-democratic 
and xenophobic attitudes, among others, and most importantly who do no directly insight 
violence.  Within this umbrella of the ‘far-right’ is the radical right, referring to the wide 
range of organisations who are often protest movements and those that can, on some level, 
insight violence due to their paramilitary nature. Most often, violent organisations will fall 
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into the extreme right category, discussed below; radical right organisations most often 
prefer electoral politics (such as Britain First) or street-level protests (Feldman and Stocker, 
2017). The English Defence League and Hungarian Defence Movement both fall into the 
broader category of radical right organisations.4 
The term radical right is not without problems, however.  It can be problematic as 
there is little agreement on its use (Eatwell, 1989c), and because it can have an ambiguous 
connotation due to its original American usage and reference to non-partisan organisations, 
which are not necessarily anti-systemic: “This definition is too ideographic and too loose 
to account for right-wing political organizations in contemporary Europe” (Ignazi, 2003: 
28). Radicalism as a concept is quite important, however, as it focuses on activism and 
seeks to justify something which does not yet exist (Eatwell, 1989c). What is considered 
‘radical’ is indeed dependent on the political culture and context of a country (Mudde, 
2007). While this is clearly problematic in a country like Hungary - where the government 
promotes ideas of illiberal democracy, xenophobia, and nativism – the term ‘radical right’ 
will be understood as a family of organisations believing in certain attitudes, irrelevant of 
cultural context. At its base, the definition of ‘radical’ can be understood as an “opposition 
to fundamental values of liberal democracy” and ‘right’ as “the belief in a natural order 
with inequalities” (Mudde, 2007: 26).   
Part of the difference between the far-right and radical right lies in “the paucity of 
its intellectual tradition” (Eatwell, 1989c: 71): while the reactionary, moderate, and perhaps 
even far-right have generated noteworthy political theorists, the radical and extreme rights 
 
4 It must be mentioned that while these organisations are referred to as ‘radical right’ throughout, the statistical 
analysis of survey data (Chapter 3) refers to the ‘far-right’. This is because the statistical analysis utilises a 
political left-right scale ranked from 0-10, with 9 and 10 being considered ‘far-right’. Measures used for the 
statistical analysis look at the political standpoint of respondents, not their attitudes and ideology. Hence, it 
can be said that individuals fall on the ‘far-right’ of the political scale, but not that they necessarily subscribe 
to a radical right ideology. However, it can be assumed that if one places themselves at the far-right of the 
scale, they likely subscribe to many of the values held by the radical right, such as more radical nationalism, 
nativism, and xenophobia. 
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have tended to produce propagandists - telling people what to think and not how. The 
radical right has a significant mythology, centring mainly around nationalism and racism 
(Eatwell, 1989c). It refers to political movements characterised by, among other things, an 
allegiance or rejection of pluralism and democratic institutions, an inclination toward 
authoritarian modes of rule, a fundamental chauvinistic nationalist orientation, a tendency 
to have a biological understanding of ‘race’ and ethnicity, and xenophobia (Szayna, 1997). 
While often used to refer to political organisations (for example, Minkenberg, 2007; 
Rydgren, 2007; Mudde, 2012), the term radical right has been used by several scholars 
(Minkenberg, 2002; Bar-On, 2018; Buštiková, 2018; Goodwin and Dennison, 2018) to 
refer to those organisations mentioned above, who often rely on protest, who are less violent 
than those on the more extreme fringes, and who subscribe to nationalist, nativist, 
xenophobic, and racist attitudes. While political parties can fall under the term radical right, 
this should be approached with caution; those parties bridging the line between political 
party and protest movement can be included in this category, such as Britain First in the 
UK and Mi Hazánk in Hungary, but larger electorally-significant and mainstream parties 
fall rather under the ‘far-right’ heading. 
The term ‘populist right’ has also recently been gaining popularity when discussing 
far-right political activism, especially in electoral politics. Populism is fundamentally a 
radical understanding of democracy as a government by the people (Pelinka, 2013). It can 
simply be described by the famous words of Abraham Lincoln: a “government of the 
people, for the people, and by the people.” However, this begs the question: who decides 
who belongs “to the people’? Again, this term does have political connotations and implies 
a group’s desire to govern. 
Those organisations on the more extreme fringes of the radical right are referred to 
as extreme right organisations. They are often quite violent, hold a white-power ideology, 
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and subscribe to neo-Nazism. These are the most violent of organisations, but 
simultaneously the smallest organisations. In the UK and Hungary these would include 
international organisations such as Blood and Honour and Combat 18. Eatwell (1989c) 
describes the extreme right as referring to any form of right-wing thought that does not 
conform to the notion of ‘normality’. By definition, ‘extremist’ views lie outside the 
mainstream of society, whatever the issue or dimension (Wintrobe, 2006). One significant 
issue with the term is that ‘extreme right’ “seems to imply that movements are rather like 
the non-extreme right, but just a bit more so” (Billig, 1989: 146). The term ‘extremism’ can 
also be quite ambiguous in its meaning, as it can refer to any form of extremism. For 
example, in the twentieth century the term defined the civil rights movement in the United 
States and anticolonialism in the UK (Wintrobe, 2006).  
While part of the appeal of the left-right spectrum lies in its ability to operate as 
both a duality and a continuum (Eatwell 1989a), this is also part of the danger of using ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ as descriptive terms. In Britain especially, the left-right spectrum has only 
relatively recently been accepted as the norm in political discourse. Indeed, in surveys 
conducted in the 1960s, only 25 percent of respondents placed themselves in a left-right 
political spectrum (Butler & Stokes, 1969). By 1985, this percentage had grown to 82 
percent (Heald & Wybrow, 1986). Probably one of the greatest examples of this ambiguity 
is fascism. According to Piero Ignazi, there are many types of extreme right, and “by 
extreme right we mean that political/ideological space where fascism is the key reference” 
(1997: 49). But can fascism really be placed in the right of the political spectrum? 
 
1.1.1 Fascism 
The term fascism describes the ideology of a wide variety of far-right movements, 
especially in the 1930s and 40s, but still seen today (see, for example, Koronaiou, Lagos, 
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Sakellariou, Kymionis, and Chioraki-Poulo, 2015). It is commonly held that the original 
meaning of Fascism derives from the latin fasces, denoting a bundle of elm or birch rods 
which were carried by Roman lictors and symbolising unity and authority (Wilkinson, 
1987). However, according to Roger Griffin (1998), it derives from the word fascio, 
meaning league, and was chosen by Mussolini to describe his cellular movement of 
revolutionaries called the Fasci di combattimento.  
Fascism, with a small ‘f,’ remains a term difficult to define, and an ongoing 
academic debate. Wilkinson describes fascism as combining “mass revolutionist strategies 
with reactionary ideologies compounded of virulent ultra-nationalism, exaltation of 
irrationality, illegality, violence and fanatical anti-communism” (Wilkinson 1987: 227). 
Eatwell claims fascism is “a form of thought which preaches the need for social rebirth in 
order to forge a holistic-national radical Third Way” (Eatwell, 1995: 11). Sternhell claims 
fascism of the early twentieth century “was a synthesis of organic nationalism and anti-
Marxist socialism, a revolutionary movement based on rejection of liberalism, democracy 
and Marxism,” and he asserts that it rejected “materialism-liberalism, democracy and 
Marxism” (Sternhell, 1987: 148). 
Generally, the most accepted definition is Roger Griffin's description of fascism as 
“a form of palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism” (1995: 4), whereby palingenesis is a 
total transformation of state, economics, and society, from the governmental through to the 
cultural level (Szele, 2012). Accordingly, generic fascism “is identified with a whole range 
of forces which crush any genuine human creativity of word or deed: totalitarianism, 
brainwashing, state terror, social engineering, fanaticism, orchestrated violence, blind 
obedience” (Griffin, 1995: 1). 
Researchers have long sought to define a ‘fascist minimum,’ that is, the lowest 
common denominator of the defining features of fascism (Griffin, 1995). Indeed, Griffin 
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himself struggles with its definition, and has continued to modify his original elegant 
definition of fascism. In 1998 he stated that researchers seem to agree on the following 
definition: “fascism is a genus of modern, revolutionary, ‘mass’ politics which, while 
extremely heterogeneous in its social support and in the specific ideology promoted by its 
many permutations, draws its internal cohesion and driving force from a core myth that a 
period of perceived national decline and decadence is giving way to one of rebirth and 
renewal in a post-liberal new order” (Griffin 1998:14). Later in 2004, Griffin defined 
fascism as a “revolutionary form of nationalism bent on mobilizing all ‘healthy’ social and 
political energies to resist the onslaught of ‘decadence’ so as to achieve the goal of national 
rebirth, a project that involves the regeneration (palingenesis) of both the political culture 
and the social and ethical culture underpinning it” (Griffin and Feldman, 2004: 6). 
According to Cas Mudde's survey of 58 differing approaches of fascism in academic 
studies (1996; 2000), five features were common to nearly all the authors surveyed: 
nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and a strong state. However, it seems 
that there can never be an objective definition of fascism since, as also seen in Mudde's 
survey, this definition at most is an ‘ideal type.’ Therefore, this term is too abstruse for the 
current study, but if and when the term does arise Roger Griffin's definition will be 
understood. 
 
1.1.2 Nationalism  
Found at the centre of the attitudes of these organisations, regardless of the 
terminology used to describe them, is undoubtedly a radical form of nationalism. For this 
reason, nationalism deserves discussion. The definition and origin of nationalism is 
something that has occupied many a scholar and theorist. While this is not the place for an 
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in-depth discussion of the debate, some of the key points relating to this study will be 
overviewed. 
Firstly, it should be clarified what is meant when discussing a ‘nation’, the concept 
which is central to that of nationalism. ‘Nation’ is indeed different from ‘nation-state’, the 
later term describing the political borders surrounding a country. The UK provides a great 
example for this: The UK being the nation-state and Great Britain a nation. A subjective 
definition of the nation is, as Benedict Anderson famously put it: “an imagined political 
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1983: 6). Nations 
are often seen as relatively homogeneous entities occupying one homeland and sharing 
common myths and stories. According to Ernest Gellner (1983), individuals belong to one 
nation if they share one culture and, crucially, recognise one-another as belonging to the 
same nation. Nation, here, will be considered as a shared culture; one can be considered as 
belonging to a nation if one feels they belong to the nation, in other words if they identify 
as such. According to the attitudes of the right, however, a shared history and ethnicity is 
crucial to one’s belonging to a nation: if one is not born into a nation, they will never 
become part of the nation. 
Anthony Smith, often regarded as the founder of nationalism studies, defined 
nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining identity, unity and 
autonomy for a human population” (Smith, 1995: 13). Nationalism offers a symbolism and 
language to grasp a special vision of the world (Smith, 1995). Nationalism can be 
understood as an organising political principle that places high importance on national 
homogenisation and gives priority to national values and ‘interests’ in aiming to achieve 
‘national goals.’ Gellner, on the other hand, saw more importance in the idea of nation 
versus nation-state, defining nationalism in terms of political legitimacy, requiring “that 
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ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” and that those ethnic boundaries 
“should not separate power-holders from the rest” (1983: 1). 
Dekker and colleagues described nationalism as one element on the cline of 
‘national attitudes,’ whereby an attitude is described as an amount of affection towards 
something (Dekker, Malová, & Hoogendoorn, 2003). They describe a ‘neutral’ attitude as 
a feeling of belonging to one’s country. Positive national attitudes are liking one’s country, 
feeling pride in one’s country, preferring one’s country to others, feeling that one’s country 
is superior to others, and ultimately nationalism, which is essentially a sense of belonging 
to a particular ‘nation’ with a common origin and a desire to keep the ‘nation’ pure. They 
also describe possible negative feelings towards one’s nation. Here, the term ‘nation’ can 
be thought as being community occupying a homeland, having common myths, a shared 
history, and a common public culture (Smith, 2001). 
Often confused with the term nationalism is patriotism, which must be understood 
as a separate, yet related, concept. Adorno and colleagues defined patriotism as “blind 
attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with prevailing group 
ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, 
& Sandford, 1950: 107). More recently, Schatz et al. defined patriotism as “a sense of 
positive identification with and feelings of affective attachment to one’s country” (Schatz, 
Staub, & Lavine, 1999: 152). They also divided the concept of patriotism into two levels: 
constructive and blind patriotism. According to Schatz and colleagues (1999), constructive 
patriotism is an attachment to one’s country where the individual still questions and 
criticises current group practices that are intended to be positive. Blind patriotism, on the 
other hand, is characterised by a positive evaluation of one’s country that is beyond reason, 
absolute allegiance, and by an absolute inability to accept criticism about one’s nation. 
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According to Smith (1995, 2001), there are two types of nationalism: civic, or 
territorial, nationalism and ethnic, or genealogical, nationalism. The first type is usually 
found in Western Europe; the nation is seen as a territorial community whose members are 
subject to common laws and institutions. These citizens are united by an over-arching and 
common culture. The latter has been generally found in Central and Eastern Europe from 
the nineteenth century onward and can alternatively be called ethno-nationalism. The 
nation is viewed as a community of descent, whose members are related by fictive kinship 
ties to a supposed ancestor through compelling origin myths, nativistic history, folk culture, 
and a populist political philosophy. This type is often seen in post-independence 
movements, irredentist movements, and ‘pan’ nationalisms. In the ethnic and genealogical 
type, the nation will seek to grow by including ethnic ‘kinsmen’ outside the present 
boundaries of the ‘ethno-nation’ and the lands in which they live (Smith, 2001). This can 
often be represented as irredentist movements, as seen in Hungary. Crucially, if considering 
Smith’s typology, both types of nationalism are seen in the UK. Civic nationalism was 
evidenced in the Brexit referendum and can be seen when considering one’s identity as a 
member of the UK, while ethnic nationalism is seen in those identifying as British. The UK 
presents an interesting discussion for theories of nationalism, as both ethnic and civic 
nationalism can also be found regionally within the country. Further discussion of this issue 
will be provided at the end of Section 1.2.1. 
If one takes Smith’s (1995) approach, it is ethnicity which is one possible answer 
to the ambiguity in the concept of nationalism. In this case, one should take the French 
concept of ethnie, with its basis in common racial, cultural, religious, and historical 
experience. This approach then leaves no room for immigrants, people with their own 
cultural practices, new religions, or anyone else who poses a perceived ‘threat’ to the 
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nation. Hence, from an ideological point of view, the groups in question can be considered 
ethno-nationalist.  
Nationalism, however, is still too broad a term to distinguish the organisations at 
the centre of this study from others; it is indeed difficult to make the distinction between 
more ‘moderate’ nationalists and the ‘radical’ nationalists in question. Hence, the term 
nativism has been employed to draw the distinction (Mudde, 2007). Taken from 
anthropology, nativism encourages power returning to the natives of a given area, a 
resurgence of native culture, and the decline of any colonisers who may be present (Mudde, 
2007). Its essence is truly a “preference for the native exclusively on the grounds of its 
being native: (Michaels, 1995: 14). Indeed, Mudde (2007: 19) defines nativism as “an 
ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native 
group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally 
threatening to the homogenous nation state.”  
Before presenting a larger discussion of ideology and attitudes of such 
organisations, a discussion of activist organisations themselves is warranted. As a 
framework, a discussion of Roger Griffin’s (2003) idea of a groupuscule will be presented.  
 
1.1.3 The Groupuscule 
 As this study will not focus on populist political parties, it is necessary to discuss 
the terminology of the smaller non-governmental activist organisations. In an age of 
relative political stability, these smaller groups are ideally suited to the task of perpetuating 
revolutionary extremism (Griffin, 2003). One suggestion for the naming of these groups, 
as proposed by Roger Griffin, is groupuscule. 
The French word groupuscule refers to an organisation whose primary 
characteristic is its small size (Bale, 2002). Groupuscules are intrinsically small, politically-
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motivated (but not party-political), revolutionary, and activist-oriented, “with an ultimate 
goal of overcoming the decadence of the existing liberal democratic system” (Griffin, 2003: 
30). It must also be made clear that ‘groupuscule’ does not apply to factions of larger groups 
or individual units of larger-scale organisations, but to individual autonomous groups 
(Griffin, 2003). That being said, a groupuscule can form another groupuscule as a separate 
entity of the original, much like a ‘rhizome’ or a tree, “constantly producing new shoots as 
others die off in an unpredictable, asymmetrical pattern of growth and decay” (Griffin, 
2003: 34).  
This ‘rhizomic nature’ offers several advantages to the groups (Virchow, 2004). 
Firstly, these smaller groups can be so diverse that all ideologies can be catered to; these 
smaller groups can coexist, and there is no need to combine them into a larger organisation.  
A second advantage is that these smaller groups of varying ideologies give a larger basis to 
recruit followers. Thirdly, new groupuscules can easily be created to satisfy new interests 
and ideologies without bureaucratic difficulties. Lastly, these smaller groups make it much 
more difficult to rid of the movement in its entirety, as there is no hierarchy or organisation. 
More specifically, Griffin defines a groupuscule as “a movement whose natural 
habitat is uncivil society, rather than political or even civil society, and that it is both 
polycratic and rhizomic in character” (Griffin 2003: 35). In this definition, uncivil society 
refers to that section of civil society which personifies extra-parliamentary protest, anti-
liberal ideology, and anti-systemic politics. The term ‘polycratic’ is used to sharply 
differentiate from ‘monocratic’ movements, which have only one point of power, 
emphasising the groups’ heterogeneous and loosely coordinated nature. 
There has been a general tendency to ignore the study of political groupuscules due 
to their small size, which is often equated with insignificance, in favour of larger electoral 
parties (Bale, 2002; Griffin, 2003). However, most European far-right groups, and those 
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extremist groups important throughout history, fall into this category, and ignoring them 
“can only result in total failure to appreciate the historical significance of the post-war 
radical right” (Bale, 2002: 25). This ‘groupuscular right’ is not characterised as a political 
party movement, but rather as an ideological counter-culture, and “is ideally adapted to the 
task of perpetuating revolutionary extremism, however utopian in pragmatic terms” 
(Griffin, 2003: 30). 
 
1.1.4 Conclusion 
The organisations at the centre of this analysis will collectively be referred to as 
radical right organisations, which can be considered as radical right groupuscules or activist 
organisations. The ideology of both organisations, the English Defence League and the 
Hungarian Defence Movement, are naturally not the same, however, and is discussed 
below.  
This study will at times, however, refer to organisations and groups as far-right or 
extreme right. The term far-right, implying something ‘right of the right,’ will generally be 
used to describe the version of radical nationalism that is seen in the political sphere, 
especially in Hungary. This will especially be true in the chapter on secondary survey 
analysis, as a political motivation had to be defined to conduct the quantitative analysis. 
The term ‘extreme right’ will be used when reviewing the literature on motivations to 
extremism.  
 The following section will present an overview the important aspects of both British 
and Hungarian history, in order to better explain the unique forms of nationalism and 
nationalist attitudes present in both countries. This will be followed by an overview of the 
current landscape of the radical right in both countries.  
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1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
An overview of the history of the Great Britain and Hungary will be presented. This 
is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to highlight historical events and trends that have 
influenced the ideology of nationalism and the radical right. A basic familiarity of the 
history of both countries will facilitate the understanding of radical right ideology and aid 
in developing a comparative framework for this study. An awareness of the popularly 
accepted version of histories of both countries is also important for the contextualisation of 
interviews later in this study. 
This overview will cover a modern history of Great Britain, beginning in the 
eighteenth century and extending to modern times. This period is important for the 
development of British national identity as it sees the development and destruction of the 
British Empire, which is critical to the understanding of twentieth century ethnic tensions. 
A brief overview of contemporary events galvanising some political activist groups will 
also be reviewed. 
The review of Hungarian history will begin with the conquering of the Carpathian 
Basin and foundation of the state. It is important to briefly overview the entire history of 
Hungary as Hungarian nationalism heavily relies on its early history, or the time of the 
‘true’ ethnic Magyars. A review of its subsequent history will reveal that a notion of a 
genetically and ethnically pure Magyar is unfounded, although it is central to the ideology 
of not only radical right organisations in Hungary but the political radical right as well. 
Additionally, this review will show the history of foreign rule in Hungary, setting a basis 
for a perceived ‘need’ by the far-right to rekindle Hungarian national identity. 
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1.2.1 Great Britain 
Great Britain and British Empire 
To better understand ethnic tensions in Great Britain, it is important to understand 
Britain’s colonial and imperial past. A review of the major events in British history leading 
to the influx of immigration seen in the mid-twentieth century will be provided, followed 
by a history of the far-right political sphere in Britain in the twentieth century. Lastly will 
be a discussion of the contemporary far-right in British politics; radial right street-level 
organisations will not be discussed here but in Section 1.2, where the EDL will also be 
introduced.  
The modern history of Great Britain really begins on May 1, 1707 when the 
Kingdom of Great Britain came into being; England, Wales, and Scotland were then united 
(Colls, 2002; Lang, 2011), to which Ireland was added in 1800 to create the United 
Kingdom. Britain claimed rule of the Indian port of Bombay (Mumbai) in the seventeenth 
century, after King Charles II (r. 1660-1685) received it as a wedding gift (Robbins, 1998; 
Lang, 2011). The East India Trading Company, which was created on the very last day of 
the seventeenth century, about half a century later defeated the French East India Company 
and claimed control of Bengal. By the 1770s the Company was nearly bankrupt, and after 
the failure of the Company to properly govern India, in additional to a famine killing five 
million Indian people, the government of Britain decided to assume rule over India. 
In the seventeenth century, the English began to take interest in the harvesting of 
sugar, which is why the English were so keen on gaining control from France of the West 
Indies. This led to a triangular African slave trade: Britain traded goods for African slaves, 
those slaves were transported by ship to the West Indies where they were sold, and that 
profit was used to buy sugar that was shipped back to Britain. The slave trade was 
eventually abolished in 1806 and outlawed in the British Empire, but slavery remained legal 
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in British colonies until 1833 (Lang, 2011). The slave trade in Britain, as in the United 
States, greatly influenced, and at the time strengthened, the archaic European idea of 
Africans and people of colour as inferior and ‘barbaric’. 
The British Empire grew quickly, and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw 
colonisation by most of the world’s current greatest powers. Colonies in the Americas 
began in the sixteenth century in parts of what is now the United States of America, while 
colonisation of today’s Canada began in the eighteenth century. In the late eighteenth 
century, Britain began sending prisoners to Australia and New Zealand after they could no 
longer be sent to America, which gained independence from Britain in 1776. Britain also 
gained control of Hong Kong and Beijing, China through interests in the opium trade and 
gained interest in several areas of Africa.  Some of the British colonies eventually grew to 
govern themselves. Canada gained independence in 1867, Australia in 1901, and New 
Zealand in 1907 (Lang, 2011).  
 A major economically and socially significant event that took place in Britain 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was the Industrial Revolution, which 
involved the transition from an agrarian economy to one of new manufacturing processes 
involving machinery and factories. As these factories were located in cities and many 
farmers lost common land, urbanisation occurred with many people moving from the 
countryside into towns and industrial cities. During the Industrial Revolution, which lasted 
from about the 1770s until the 1830s (although these dates are subject to debate), the 
population of Britain more than doubled. This was not primarily due to immigration, but 
rather to factors such as earlier marrying age and improvements in health care, meaning a 
lower rate of infant mortality. As urban dwellers, people lived in closer proximity to 
strangers than ever before in the agrarian past, even as an influx of immigrants entered 
Britain in the twentieth century.  
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Great Britain and the Question of Immigration in the Twentieth Century 
Immigration into Britain began mostly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries with the influx of Irish immigrants into several parts of England (Solomos, 1993). 
Numerically, Irish immigrants have far exceeded any other group of immigrants into 
Britain in the last few centuries (Solomos, 1993). The late-nineteenth century also saw a 
large number of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe; anti-Semitism was often used as 
a scapegoat to explain unemployment and poverty (Solomos, 1993). At the same time The 
end of the nineteenth century also saw the immigration of Black seamen to some port-towns 
of England and Wales; the Black community further grew during the Second World War, 
when Black workers and soldiers came from the colonies to help in the war effort (Solomos, 
1993).  
After British colonialism continued to crumble in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, conflicts began in India where a nationalist movement led by Mahatma Gandhi 
was growing. After considerable tensions, India gained its independence under a British 
Labour government in the 1940s. Although Gandhi wished for one united India, the Muslim 
population demanded their own state; as a result, Pakistan was created in 1947. Many of 
the old British colonies, like India, Pakistan, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, remain 
part of the Commonwealth, which set the stage for mass movements of people into Britain. 
 At the end of the 1940s, the British government passed the Nationality Bill, which 
stated that all persons who were citizens of any of the Commonwealth countries should be 
British subjects (Boyce, 1999). At this time, free entry into Britain was allowed for Indian 
and Pakistani citizens. In 1945 Churchill ‘warned’ about the consequences of permitting 
free entry of British subjects into the UK, saying that it would likely lead to a continual 
increase in the number of “coloured people” (Boyce, 1999). 
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 The years after the Second World War saw a large increase in immigrants, 
especially from the West Indies. The first shipload of immigrants, on the Empire Windrush, 
arrived in 1948 with just over 400 people, subsequently creating many social problems in 
the areas where they settled (Thurlow, 1987).  The Commonwealth Immigration Act was 
passed in 1962 to control immigration, requiring immigrants to either have a specific job, 
have a recognised skill or job that was in short supply, or have served in the British forces 
during the war in order to obtain priority treatment for immigration (Solomos, 1993). Even 
with these controls, immigration rose from 2,000 people in 1953 to 136,000 in 1961 
(Thurlow, 1987). The end of the 1950s saw several race riots, especially in Nottingham and 
Notting Hill against the Black communities, and in 1965 the parliament passed the Race 
Relations Act which sought to outlaw racist speech and behaviour.  
On April 20, 1968, the Conservative MP for Wolverhampton, Enoch Powell, gave 
his famous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, where he warned that the volume of immigrants 
coming to the UK would end in disaster, and that it would undermine the common bonds 
of national identity: “I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood” (quoted in 
Boyce, 1999: 249; Driver, 2011). Powell spoke out against the large number of immigrants 
coming to Great Britain from Asia and Africa, claiming the English were now “strangers 
in their own land” (Whipple, 2009). This was a ground-breaking speech, as it was the first 
time a leading politician referred to the impact of the new ethnic communities in an 
inflammatory way, stating that the immigrant population should be re-emigrated (Eatwell, 
1996). Fifty years on and this speech is still creating controversy in the UK (Sweney, 2018). 
 The Immigration Bill was passed in 1971, which was the first permanent legislation 
dealing with immigrants from Commonwealth countries (Boyce, 1999). The Bill stated that 
immigrants from the Commonwealth would henceforth be treated as aliens, with the need 
to apply for work permits allowing only temporary residence. Additionally, in 1986 the 
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Nationality Act was passed, which stipulated that from that point forward only the British-
born children of British-born or naturalised British parents would receive British 
citizenship (Boyce, 1999).  
  
The British Far-Right in the Politics of the Twentieth Century 
After the First World War, Oswald Mosley entered parliament as a Conservative 
MP, but in 1929 he joined the Labour party to become junior minister (Driver, 2011). In 
1931, the frustrated Labour MP created the New Party. Mosley’s party offered massive 
government spending, work for the unemployed, and national revival. After a tour through 
Italy, he returned in October of 1932 to rename his new party the British Union of Fascists 
(hereafter BUF). In early 1934, BUF had just around 50,000 members, though later that 
dropped to between 5,000 - 10,000 (Eatwell, 2000). After France fell to the Nazis in 1940, 
the British state took action and imprisoned more than 800 leaders in the fascist movement, 
including Mosley, and proscribed the BUF (Macklin, 2006). This was a huge blow to the 
British fascist movement and “marked a ‘watershed’ in its history. Never again was British 
fascism representative of a mass movement” (Macklin, 2006: 288). 
Mosley launched the Union Movement in 1948, which continued the politics of 
BUF: small meetings, harassment of Jews, and conflicts with anti-fascists (Eatwell, 1992). 
After 1948, the number of immigrants grew rapidly, initially mainly from the West Indies 
and later from the Indian sub-continent. Hence, the Union Movement was again revived in 
the 1950s due to the opposition to ‘coloured’ immigration (Eatwell, 1992). 
In 1954, the League of Empire Loyalists was founded by conservatives who wanted 
to keep the British Empire from dissolving, which contributed to the founding of the 
National Front in 1967 by John Tyndall and Martin Webster (Eatwell, 1992; Mammone & 
Peace, 2012). The ideology of the National Front was ‘Britain for the British’, with 
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traditional National Socialist themes of ultra-nationalism, anti-Semitism, and white 
supremacy (Driver, 2011). National Front’s prime was the late 1970s, when conflicts with 
anti-fascists were common and they often marched in the streets. In 1975 the membership 
of the National Front numbered about 20,000, but by 1980 fell to about 5,000 (Driver, 
2011).  In general, in the 1960s and 1970s there was extensive support for radical right 
principles, such as a desire for strong leadership and nationalist views. According to a 
survey, twenty-five percent of participants agreed with compulsory repatriation of non-
white immigrants (Eatwell, 1992). 
In the early 1980s a split occurred in the National Front, which resulted in the 
foundation of the British National Party (hereafter BNP) in 1982, led by John Tyndall. At 
the time, however, the BNP was considered “by many as nothing more than a joke,” as they 
were just a small group of “extremists with no serious hope of electoral success” 
(Mammone & Peace, 2012: 291), and its membership was never more than 3,000 (Eatwell, 
2000). The modernization process of the BNP started in 1999 when Nick Griffin, the new 
leader of the party, attempted to dampen the violent and threatening image of the BNP: the 
party no longer used overt racist language, and “even the term 'race' was replaced by the 
term 'identity'” (Mammone & Peace, 2012: 291). They then created a genuine electoral 
strategy based on grassroots campaigning and took advantage of local issues and 
complaints. 
  
The Contemporary Far-Right in British Politics 
In 2001, under the leadership of Nick Griffin, the BNP’s candidates averaged 3.6 
percent of the vote in the national elections (Goodwin & Dennison, 2018). The party’s 
rhetoric centred around problems of immigration and the threat of Islamic immigration, 
which resonated with working class voters. By 2009 the BNP reached 6.3 percent of votes 
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and won two seats in the European Parliament. After not winning any seats in parliament 
in the 2010 national elections, subsequent financial hardships, and infighting, the BNP fell 
apart. Now, under new leadership, they are still involved in electoral politics with very little 
support. 
As eloquently stated by Goodwin and Dennison, the far-right “in the United 
Kingdom has traditionally been associated with failure” (2018: 521). Until about 2010, the 
attitudes of the far-right in the UK were centred around biological racism, anti-Semitism, 
and a hostility toward parliamentary democracy (Goodwin & Dennison, 2018). After the 
BNP dissolved, two new parties arose: UKIP and Britain First. The United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), originally founded in 1993, had the main goal of pulling the 
UK out of the European Union. UKIP won nearly 13 percent of the vote in the 2015 UK 
national elections and played a significant role in the 2016 Brexit referendum, most 
especially with their anti-immigrant “Vote Leave” campaign. After achieving success in 
the Brexit referendum, effectively losing their identity in their devotion to the UK leaving 
the EU, the party fell apart. Now under the leadership of Gerard Batten, UKIP has employed 
Tommy Robinson, founder of the EDL and the UK chapter of PEGIDA, as an advisor. 
Britain First was created out of the BNP by James Dowson and is now led by Paul 
Golding, with one-time co-leader Jayda Fransen leaving the party in early 2019. The 
organisation was launched in 2011 via a website and claimed their aim to be the protection 
of British and Christian morality (Allen, 2014). They identify Islam as a highly destructive 
element in the UK and claim it must be opposed. Britain First has stood candidates in both 
local and European elections, without much success.  
In the last decades, several events, both in Great Britain and overseas, have fuelled 
further negative feelings towards immigrants and most especially towards Islam. The world 
first took real notice of Islamic terrorism with the attacks on the World Trade Center’s Twin 
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Towers in New York City, on September 11th, 2001. However, from the perspective of 
Great Britain, the London bombings of July 7, 2005 struck closest to the British heart. Three 
British Islamic men and Germaine Lindsay, a recent convert to Islam, left for London early 
in the morning of July 7th. Three of the bombers detonated their bombs on underground 
trains leaving King’s Cross Station, and one on a double-decker bus. Fifty-two people were 
killed, and hundreds injured, marking it as the biggest terrorist atrocity to occur on British 
soil (Rodgers, Qurashi & Connor, 2015). 
An event that really highlighted the issues between white and Islamic communities 
in Britain was the so-called Bradford Race Riots in Bradford, England in early July 2001. 
The riots involved clashes between far-right groups, law enforcement, and people of the 
Asian community. A group called the Anti-Nazi League organised a protest march against 
the National Front, mainly attended by around 500 of the Islamic community. The riots 
lasted several days, from July seventh to the ninth, and in the end involved attacks on police 
officers as well. This riot followed others in Burnley and Oldham which happened a few 
weeks and months earlier. 
 Lastly, the event probably most cited by the British far-right is the 2013 murder of 
Lee Rigby, a drummer for the British army, who was run over by two Jihadists and stabbed 
to death. Images of the attack were displayed everywhere in British media, horrifying 
people around the country. This instantly sparked a backlash; in the following days two 
mosques were attacked, another firebombed, and an Islamic centre burned down (Feldman 
& Stocker, 2017). Hate crimes against Muslims nearly quadrupled in the week following 
the attacks. Radical right protest organisations organised demonstrations after the attack, 
and it is still regularly exploited by the radical right. All of these events served to justify 
anti-Islamic feelings among the British radical right. 
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 For the past few years the most important event in British politics, both for the 
general public and the radical right, has been the Brexit referendum. Anger and hostility 
from the far- and radical right amounted to the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox just a week 
before the referendum vote in June 2016. Since the referendum, in which the UK voted to 
leave the European Union by a margin of under four percent, hostility has been rising from 
the radical right. Indeed, there are fears of potential rioting or violence if decisions are 
delayed further (Doffman, 2019; Mackey, 2019). However, crucially, while the referendum 
result reflects a general fear of immigrants, surveys have shown declining feelings of 
negativity toward immigration since 2011 in the UK.  While one YouGov poll showed 
people have largely become more supportive of their vote on 2016 (Smith, 2019), others 
have shown that the opposite outcome would be reached if there were a second referendum 
(James, 2019). 
 
The Question of Britishness and Englishness 
 Crucial for any further discussion of identity in Great Britain is the question of 
‘Englishness’ and ‘Britishness’. Indeed, the words ‘English’ and ‘British’ are clearly seen 
in the names of many radical right organisations in the area (English Defence League, 
Britain First, British National Party, For Britain). Even so, there is quite a bit of confusion 
and distortion between the lines of what is English and British, and the identities with which 
individuals identify. Indeed, as will be seen later in Chapter 5, even those in the EDL 
identify themselves as British more often than English. 
 While the question of British identity and nationalism is a crucial one, there was 
truly little discussion of English nationalism before the last twenty years (Kumar, 2000). 
British nationalism can be considered the nationalism of imperial states, which is not 
unique to Great Britain. For this reason, it may seem for the English as though they do not 
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have a nationalism of their own (Kumar, 2000). The English, then, are currently in the 
predicament of having to redefine themselves as a nation and normalising their own form 
of nationalism (Kumar, 2000).  
Imperial nationalism is crucial in any discussion of Britishness. Rather than 
stressing ethnic identity, as can be seen in ethnic forms of nationalism, it rather stresses 
“the political, cultural, or religious mission to which they have been called” (Kumar, 2000: 
579-80). Britain’s primary identity and sense of belonging in the world is indeed linked to 
its imperialist past. Here, there are both internal and external identities at play.: the internal 
being that of Great Britain and the UK, while external are the colonies. 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, Britishness was seen as far more important 
than Englishness. Especially after the union with Scotland in the early eighteenth century, 
efforts were made to promote this new political identity (Kumar, 2000). People were not 
Britons, not separately English, Welsh, or Scottish. Britain and the British were quickly 
identified with the crown, parliament, the empire, and even religion. The eighteenth century 
saw a resurgence of English nationalism, however, with the “cultivation of a distinct 
English historiography, the clarification and codification of the English language,” more 
emphasis on English literature, and “the celebration of a particular type of landscape as 
quintessentially English” (Kumar, 2000: 592). With the Second World War, however, this 
emphasis on English identity shifted again. As the UK fought together with the 
Commonwealth, an insistence on English nationalism would have been both distasteful and 
dangerous (Kumar, 2000).  
In other words, the identity of the British, or Britishness, is firmly rooted in 
imperialism. It is an identity which many can claim, whether English, Welsh, Scottish, or 
even Northern Irish. It is an identity tied to territory, akin to Smith’s civic nationalism 
(1995, 2001), and engrained in history. In other words, to be English, Scottish, or Welsh 
40 
 
refers to culture, whereas British refers to an allegiance (Crick, 2018; Mann, 2011). 
Englishness, on the other hand, is more difficult to define. To be English is often conflated 
with British, and the English often have difficulty distinguishing themselves from others of 
the UK (Kumar, 2003). The English, in turn, “seem to have found it best to turn in on 
themselves. Never have they had an identity as an ethnic group, never having needed one, 
they are now…in the process of inventing one” (Kumar, 2000: 593). Throughout their 
history the English have never really had to define who they were, or what counts as English 
(Mann, 2011), until now. 
  
1.2.2 Hungary 
From Foundation to the Eighteenth Century 
 To fully understand contemporary nationalistic ideology and attitudes in Hungary, 
it is important to have a grasp of Hungary’s turbulent history. Modern ideas of Hungarism, 
irredentism, and turanianism, all ideologies at the core of the Hungarian extreme right, are 
closely tied to the country’s foundation and history. This section will provide a brief 
overview of Hungarian history leading to the twentieth century, followed by a more focused 
look at the political history of the twentieth century in Hungary. Lastly will be a discussion 
of the contemporary far-right in Hungarian politics; radical right street-level organisations 
will not be discussed here in detail but in Section 1.2, where the Hungarian Defence 
Movement will also be introduced.  
The history of Hungary begins in 895 C.E., when the nomadic Magyar tribes arrived 
from the East and settled in the Carpathian Basin.  For the next several centuries, the 
descendants of the Magyar chieftain Árpád ruled the territory. Hungary officially became 
a country around Christmas of the year 1000, when King István (Stephen) was crowned. 
Since the Magyars were originally a pagan people, Stephen then completed the country’s 
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transition to Christendom that his father had begun, and for this he was proclaimed a saint 
in 1083 (Benda 1986; Ignotus, 1972; Macartney, 1962; Engel, 2001). The following two 
centuries saw many short reigns and struggles for power in Hungary. In 1241 the Mongols 
invaded and this, along with the plague and the starvation which followed it, cost Hungary 
much of its population (Bolla, 1982; Szűcs, 1993; Benda, 1986; Engel, 2001). The 
following several centuries focused on the reconstruction of the country and Hungarian 
society. 
In 1526 Hungary was occupied again when the Ottomans conquered the country, 
marking the end of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary. Not long after, while still under 
Ottoman rule, Hungary was divided between Hungarians and the Austrian Habsburgs. The 
areas were ruled as Ottoman tributaries, and after 150 years of military confrontation 
between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, the Ottomans left Hungary in 1718 (Ágoston & 
Masters, 2009; Macartney, 1962; Simon, 1998). By this time, well over a quarter of the 
country’s population was lost (Simon, 1998). People immigrated from several other parts 
of Europe, specifically Russia, Austria, Italy, Germany, and France, to such an extent that 
ethnic Hungarians only made up thirty-five percent of the total population by 1786.  
According to one source (Király, 1969), the population of Royal Hungary in 1720 was 
1,717,861, and by 1787 it had risen to 6,467,829. This increase in population was due to a 
major civic building program and to encouragement of agricultural workers to settle in and 
around towns (Fletcher et al., 2003).   
In the 1784-1787 census, the state numbered 23.3 million individuals, 9.5 million 
of whom lived under the Hungarian Crown, or historical Hungary, which included 
Transylvania and Croatia. By the 1804, the population had increased to 10.5 million: “once 
again, Hungarian demography was level with England, as it had been prior to the Ottoman 
wars” (Molár, 2001: 148).  
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Revolution and War: Hungary in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
 The early nineteenth century saw a golden age of Hungarian art and literature and 
was also a time of intelligentsia, a golden time that has formed a large part of Hungarian 
identity. Indeed, Count István Széchenyi (1791-1860) founded the Academy of Sciences 
and Club of Magnates, and developed ideas about banking, credit, and industry, which he 
attributed to his numerous visits to England. Széchenyi was a reformer and saw equalizing 
civic duties and imposing taxes on the nobility as a way of progress (Molnár, 2001). Also, 
he saw the danger in the more radical views of Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894). The debate 
between Széchenyi and Kossuth was rooted in nationalism: Széchenyi held “that 
assimilation would come about through the beneficial effects of general progress” (Molnár, 
2001: 173), while Kossuth believed in a general ‘Magyarisation’ and separation from 
Austrian rule. Indeed, Kossuth has been referred to as “no more or less than the ‘precursor 
of Hitler and Mussolini’” (Molnár, 2001: 174). Széchenyi warnings to Kossuth that his 
views would lead to revolution became reality in the revolutionary war of 1848-1849. 
The Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy was formed in 1867, lasting until the end of 
the First World War. After October 1918, Hungarians were left both enthusiastic for their 
new-found independence and nostalgic for the days of the Habsburgs. Naturally the anti-
Habsburg tradition was retained in the Hungarian collective memory, while the kings of 
Austria were venerated (Molnár, 2001). The anniversary of the 1848 revolution was 
remembered, as was October 6th, the day thirteen generals were executed during the War 
of Independence. At the same time, Kossuth’s anti-Habsburg assertions began to fade from 
the collective memory. 
 The federalisation of Austria was declared in October of 1918, marking the end of 
the Austro-Hungarian empire. This meant that Hungary, too, would be federalised and 
would lose most of its national minorities: Slovaks, Romanians, Germans, Croats, Serbs, 
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and Ruthenians (Molnár, 2001). After the Treaty of Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920, 
Hungary went from a population of eighteen million to a small country of just less than 8 
million (Hajdú & Nagy, 1990). Hungary had lost about two thirds of its territories and three 
fifths of its inhabitants; parts of northern Hungary went to the Slovaks and Czechs, the 
south went to the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenians, and Transylvania became part of 
Romania (Molnár, 2001). 
 Hungary was now “the most nationally aggrieved state in all of Europe” due to “the 
great proportion” of land and people that the country had lost (Payne, 1980: 110). Indeed, 
the Treaty of Trianon and anti-Habsburg sentiments are at the core of Hungarian radical 
right ideology. The signing of the treaty deeply disturbed Hungarian society, as it was the 
biggest loss the country had seen in 500 years. All of Hungary was against the Treaty, but 
there was division on where the country’s borders should be: the Social Democrats and 
bourgeois Left demanded settlement along ethnic lines, while many desired the borders of 
pre-war Hungary to be reinstated (Hajdú & Nagy, 1990). 
 The period following the signing of the Treaty was characterised by a power 
struggle between the three major ideas concerning the structure of the new state. The first 
group believed in the old parliamentary form of government. The second believed that a 
parliamentary system was no longer useful, and rather that a dictatorship should be 
introduced; that Christian Hungarians should take over the economic roles and other 
occupations of Jewish people. This group, led by future prime minister Gyula Gömbös, 
lead to the establishment of The Hungarian National Defence Association and the 
Association of Awakening Hungarians (Ormos, 1990). The final group rejected both the 
re-establishment of old ruling circles and the formation of a rightist dictatorship. 
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Fascists and Soviets 
One of the most important figures in the Hungarian interwar era was Miklós Horthy, 
regent to the Kingdom of Hungary from March 1920 until October 1944.  His influence 
quickly grew in the 1920s, and Horthy’s anti-liberal and dictatorial character became all 
the more apparent (Hoensch, 1988). Stanley Payne described Horthy’s regime as a 
moderate conservative authoritarianism, “governed by a restrictive parliament of limited 
suffrage, headed by a monarch or in this case regent (Horthy) as surrogate” (Payne, 1980: 
111). Racist slogans tied to revisionist and irredentist ideology contributed to a type of 
cultural arrogance and also “resulted in a militant rejection of liberalism, democracy and 
socialism, all of which were viewed as ‘alien to the Hungarian spirit’” (Hoensch, 1988: 
114). Hoensch argues that it would be incorrect to characterise Horthy’s regime as fascist, 
as “despite its anti-liberal, conservative-authoritarian political system, it never attempted to 
employ demagogic methods to mobilise the masses or…to overthrow the system” (1988: 
114). 
However, several fascist and national socialist parties emerged in the 1920s and 
particularly in the early 1930s. They were proponents of a kind of moderate fascism, 
inspired by Italy, or were national socialist parties representing a more radical imitation of 
German national socialism (Payne, 1980). In the early 1920s, the Egységes Párt (Unity 
Party), for which Gömbös was vice-chairman, gained support. It went as far as to receive 
45.5 percent of the vote in the 1922 elections. His party called for a remodelling of Hungary 
based on national and Christian values (Hoensch, 1988). Gömbös and his supporters left 
the Unity Party on August 2nd, 1923 and founded the right-wing Fajvédő Párt (Party of 
Racial Defence). The party never succeeded in gaining much power, but Gömbös became 
obsessed with Turanianism, the idea that the ancestors of the Magyars came from Asia and 
that Hungarians have closer ties to Asia than to Europe. Gömbös eventually rejoined the 
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Unity Party in 1928, strengthening the Unity Party’s liberal-conservative wing (Hoensch, 
1988). 
On October 1, 1932 Gyula Gömbös, the first politician to openly label himself as 
‘Hungarian National Socialist,’ took power and began his fascist government. He visited 
both Mussolini and Hitler, attempting to convince them of a German-Italian-Hungarian-
Austrian alliance (Hoensch, 1988; Ormos, 1990). Hitler offered Czechoslovakia to 
Gömbös, but Gömbös would only be satisfied with gaining Transylvania. After the violent 
election of 1935, Gömbös’ Party of National Unity gained 170 of 245 seats in Parliament, 
which meant the extreme right now dominated Hungarian politics (Ormos, 1990). Gömbös, 
however, quickly lost support of his followers. Horthy was to dismiss the prime minister, 
but rather waited until his natural death on October 6, 1936. 
 At this time, the extreme right started to centre around Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the 
newly-formed Nemzet Akaratának Pártja (Party for National Will). The party was 
characterised by militant anti-Semitism and suggested bringing all people of the Carpathian 
Basin, who were separated with the Treaty of Trianon, together under Hungarian leadership 
(Hoensch, 1988). Szálasi professed that his movement was not anti-Semitic, but rather ‘a-
Semitic’, meaning that he advocated all Jews leave Hungary for elsewhere (Holdsworth & 
Kondor, 2017; Payne, 1980). Szálasi was arrested in April 1937, and his party dissolved. 
The Racial Defence-Socialist Party was formed shortly thereafter by László Endre, and on 
October 24th, 1937, eight other right-wing groups joined it to form the Magyar Nemzeti 
Szocialista Párt (Hungarian National Socialist Party) (Hoensch, 1988). The new Hungarian 
National Socialist Party subscribed to Szálasi’s ideas of Hungarism, which had strong 
Christian, spiritual, and economic values (Hoensch, 1988). Unfortunately for Szálasi, who 
was once again imprisoned in November 1937, his new party was banned on February 21, 
1938. That year, Hungary’s National Socialists were greatly encouaged by Germany’s 
46 
 
annexation of Austria, and they formed the new Nemzeti Szocialista Magyar Párt – 
Hungarista Mozgalom (Hungarian National Socialist Party – Hungarist Movement). Their 
idea was that for the Hungarians to be the leading world-race all ‘Judeo-plutocracies,’ such 
as Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, should be dissolved, and 
instead Latin, German, Slavic, Islamic, and Hungarian nations should form their own 
Lebensraum (Kürti, 2006). The Nyilaskeresztes Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom (Arrow Cross 
Party – Hungarist Movement) was founded on March 9, 1939 with a relatively moderate 
programme whose only radical feature was anti-Semitism, but was a conscious imitation 
of German Nazism (Hoensch, 1988; Kürti, 2006). This led to the party’s substantial success 
in the May 1939 elections, gaining a quarter of the vote. Altogether in those elections, 
fascist candidates received more than forty percent of the vote in Buda and Pest counties 
(Kürti, 2006).   
The Prime Minister of Hungary at the beginning of the Second World War, Pál 
Teleki, said Hungary would remain a peaceful country. He did not allow the Germans to 
freely come through Hungary’s borders “and opened Hungary’s borders to more than 
150,000 Polish military and civilian refugees” (Hoensch, 1988: 148). However, Szálasi 
took over the merged United National Socialist Party and the Arrow Cross upon his early 
release from prison in October of 1940. He received considerable support from Germany, 
and again founded the Hungarian National Socialist Party on September 18, 1941. After its 
fusion with the Party of Hungarian Revival a few days later, it became the Hungarian 
Revival and National Socialist Alliance led by Jenő Rátz (Hoensch, 1988). At this point, 
the only way Teleki could retain power was to himself adopt right-wing policies, but he 
was eventually replaced.  
 From 1940 on, Jewish men were forced to work in ‘labour companies,’ while the 
women, children, and old men were left behind. Smaller deportations of Jews began in 
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Hungary in August 1941, beginning with 787,000 people at that time. Hungary was invaded 
by the German Nazi army on March 19, 1944. In the following months, nearly half a million 
people were deported to extermination camps, helped by the Arrow Cross and the 
Hungarian army. Ferenc Szálasi was again appointed Prime Minister and, in the winter of 
1944-1945, he and the Arrow Cross brought down a reign of terror on the remaining Jews 
who had not yet been deported (Hoensch, 1988).  
 In January of 1945 the Russians entered Budapest, liberating Hungary from the 
Germans and marking the beginning of 45 years of Socialist rule. Hungary was newly 
plunged into a new period of terror, this time lasting decades. Those who opposed the party 
and regime were tortured, executed, or sent to gulags in the East. Learning Russian became 
mandatory in school, religious schools were nationalised, religious leaders were 
government-appointed, travel was nearly impossible, and every aspect of people’s lives 
was controlled by the State. 
 Even by the 1950s, the Hungarian people were becoming restless under the yoke of 
oppression. Beginning in October of 1956, students began to meet at Hungarian 
universities. They drew up a list of demands: “a free press, the immediate withdrawal of 
Soviet troops, the creation of a genuine multi-party system, guarantees of civic rights and 
personal freedom, an end to the country’s economic exploitation and the punishment of 
those responsible for the terror of the Stalinist era” (Hoensch, 1988: 216). Revolution broke 
out on October 23, 1956, launched by shots fired by the revolutionaries from atop the Radio 
Budapest building during a peaceful protest. Fighting continued for weeks until November 
11th, when the revolutionaries were defeated by the Soviets.  After October 31st, under the 
leadership of János Kádár, Hungary remained Socialist but pursued a policy of neutrality. 
This began the Kádár era of the so-called ‘goulash communism.’ Hungary remained under 
Soviet occupation for nearly the rest of the twentieth century. After the country’s liberation 
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in 1990, known as rendszerváltás in Hungarian (‘system change’), nationalism and the far-
right underwent somewhat of a rebirth. This will be covered in the following section. 
  
Nationalism and the Far-Right in Post-Soviet Hungary 
At the end of the 1980s Hungary saw a renaissance of far-right organisations due to 
the changing political climate (Karsai, 1999). The first major far-right political party to 
emerge after Kádár was removed from power in 1988 was the anti-Semitic Magyar Igazság 
és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party; henceforth MIÉP). The party was founded 
by nationalist writer and journalist István Csurka in 1993 (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). 
MIÉP argued that the post-communist transition was being led by people who were ‘anti-
Hungarian,’ which led those on the far-right to connect Jews with liberalism, the Soviets, 
and Bolshevism (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Around this time, Albert Szabó created the 
Hungarian Welfare Association (Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség, MNSZ), a political party that 
included a skinhead youth faction, which ultimately disbanded in 2000.  
 In the 1998 national elections, MIÉP received 5.5 percent of the vote and 14 seats 
in parliament; in 2002 they only received 4.4 percent of the vote. In 2005 the party joined 
forces with the new Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom; 
hereafter Jobbik). Jobbik was originally founded in 2003 as a neo-fascist political party, 
which openly had close links to radical right movements and paramilitary organisations 
(Kyriazi, 2015), namely the Hungarian Guard (see Section 1.2). Joining forces in the 2006 
elections, Jobbik and MIÉP together received 2.2 percent of votes. Jobbik, however, 
quickly became the third-largest political party in Hungary with 16.67 percent of the vote 
in the 2010 parliamentary elections, growing to 20.22 percent in 2014.  At this point their 
ideology was openly anti-liberal and anti-EU, and their rhetoric was generally homophobic, 
anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma (Bartlett, Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield, & Győri, 2012; 
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Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Following the 2014 national elections, Jobbik attempted to 
change their image and adopt a ‘softer’ and more moderate tone (Holdsworth & Kondor, 
2017). The party’s leader, Gábor Vona, even described his new vision for Jobbik as a 
‘modern conservative party’ (Thorpe, 2016).  
This image change did not succeed as well as Jobbik had hoped, as in the 2018 
Hungarian national elections they achieved only 19.06 percent of the vote and 26 seats in 
parliament. Although a fall in percentage, Jobbik did become the second largest party in 
the Hungarian parliament. However, immediately following the election, Vona kept his 
promise to his party: if they lost the election, he would step down. His resignation sparked 
a fractioning of the party, and several left in June of 2018 to form a new radical right 
political party, the Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom). This party is led by 
László Toroczkai, the founder of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (see Section 
1.2), which has openly expressed desire for a ‘white’ Hungary (ECHO TV, 2018). 
The current Hungarian far-right government, Fidesz, a one-time conservative party, 
was founded in 1988 as an anti-communist party called the Alliance of Young Democrats 
(Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége). Led by the now infamous Viktor Orbán, in the past the 
party has been described as a “mainstream conservative party with radical right policies” 
(Mudde, 2015); now, however, it can be argued that they are firmly situated in the far-right. 
In the period after Fidesz’s election in 2010 and their second consecutive term re-election 
in 2014, they rewrote the Constitution, erected a fence along the country’s southern borders, 
led a highly xenophobic campaign against ‘migrants,’ and turned Hungary into “a culture 
within which racist speech and prohibited far-right paramilitary activities are tolerated” 
(Fekete, 2016: 40). In 2017, Fidesz began an aggressive campaign against the Jewish 
Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros and has endeavoured to close the Central 
European University, which he founded.  
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Fidesz won the 2018 Hungarian elections by a landslide, with 49.3 percent of the 
vote, and 133 of the 199 seats in the Hungarian parliament. Not only that, but Fidesz has 
managed to nearly decimate their opposition, leading Hungary dangerously close to a 
single-party state. They have managed to do this through nearly full control of the media, 
especially in rural areas, control over the education system and the content of school 
textbooks, and through large-scale propaganda campaigns. Hours after their election win, 
Fidesz announced plans to enact a ‘Stop Soros’ bill, obviously intended to crack down on 
NGOs, intelligentsia, and opponents of Fidesz. Prior to the elections, Fidesz announced that 
they had created a list of 2000 ‘Soros agents,’ of which 200 names were published in the 
pro-Fidesz Figyelő magazine immediately following the April 2018 elections. On this list 
were people working for various humanitarian NGOs in Hungary and academics at the 
Central European University in Budapest. The gravity of this list remains questionable, 
however, as among other names are those of at least two deceased individuals. In June of 
2018, the ‘Stop Soros’ bill was approved in parliament, effectively criminalising any act or 
organisation which helps refugees in Hungary. 
In addition to now being obviously far-right, the Fidesz government has also 
legitimised many aspects of far-right ideology. In primary schools, important texts from 
Hungarian Jewish authors have been removed from the reading curriculum, while the works 
of anti-Semitic writers of the interwar period are on suggested reading lists (Fekete, 2016; 
Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Even more recently, kindergartens are to teach ‘Christian 
culture’ and ‘strengthen national identity,’ beginning in September of 2018 (Dull, 2018). 
The party also has a reputation of presenting awards to people of questionable moral 
standards. For instance, journalist Zsolt Bayer who received the 2016 Golden Cross of 
Merit had, a few years earlier, written that many Roma are “not fit to live among human 
beings. They are animals and behave like animals,” and suggested that drivers should step 
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on the gas if they have the chance to hit a Roma child (Goulard, 2016). The 2013 prize for 
journalism was given to a TV broadcaster who once described Roma as ‘apes,’ and the 
2013 Golden Cross of Merit was given to János Petrás, the lead singer of the nationalist 
band Kárpátia (Fekete, 2016; Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Far-right and xenophobic 
views have now become the mainstream in Hungarian political rhetoric (Holdsworth & 
Kondor, 2017), serving to further legitimise the ideology the Hungarian radical right.   
  
1.2.3 Discussion of History 
 The purpose of this section was to offer the reader a background of both countries, 
to better understand the placement of some attitudes and ideologies held by the 
organisations under investigation in this study. When considering the histories of these two 
countries, it becomes clear that they are different in significant ways.  
Firstly, Great Britain has a past as an empire, as a force that colonised a large part 
of the world. Hungary, though once much larger, has a history of being conquered by 
outside forces and cultures.  The history of immigration into both countries is also quite 
different. In Great Britain, much of the influx of immigration happened in the second part 
of the twentieth century, which is recent enough to remain fresh in many people’s minds. 
In Hungary, on the other hand, much of the immigration into the country occurred between 
the medieval period and the eighteenth century, sufficiently long ago to be forgotten by all 
but academics. The perception of supposed dangers posed by immigration is a third area of 
difference between the two. In Great Britain, the influx of immigrants, and Islam in 
particular, in the late twentieth century is perceived as a threat to an established national 
British identity by the far-right, especially in low-income areas. In Hungary, the fear of 
immigrants, especially so-called ‘illegal migrants,’ has been encouraged by the Fidesz 
government and is increasingly on the rise. However, this fear is rather seen in the 
52 
 
conservative right rather than in radical right culture; the desire to re-establish a long-lost 
cultural identity remains one of the strongest characteristics of the Hungarian radical right. 
In Great Britain, on the other hand, the radical right is concerned with national identity as 
it relates to immigration and Islam in particular.  
Although the dream of a strong national identity remains a strong driver of 
nationalism and the radical right in both Great Britain and Hungary, each looks to a 
different ideal.  In Great Britain, the radical right looks to a 'golden era' of Imperialism, a 
time when Great Britain ruled many of the world’s current major powers. In Hungary, the 
radical right harkens back to a mythic time when Hungarians were ‘pure’ Magyars. The 
beginnings of xenophobia are another area of difference between the two. In Great Britain, 
xenophobic attitudes began with the movement of people into urban centres during the 
Industrial Revolution and were further heightened by the influx of immigrants from the 
Commonwealth in the mid-twentieth century, followed by more recent economic migrants 
from EU countries. Hungary, on the other hand, had a much different history in the 
twentieth century as half of it was spent under Soviet rule. During that time, immigration 
was at a stand-still; xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes are just now on the rise. 
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1.3 THE LANDSCAPE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND HUNGARY 
 This study will look at one group from both Hungary and Great Britain in a 
comparative context. The groups were specifically chosen as extra-parliamentary activist 
movements. In Hungary, interviews will be conducted with members of the Hungarian 
Defence Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom; MÖM). In the UK, the English 
Defence League (EDL) will be the subject of this study. This section will present an 
overview of attitudes and the landscape of the British and Hungarian radical right, to better 
situate the two groups. 
 
1.3.1 The Landscape of the British and Hungarian Radical Right 
Much of radical right ideology is rooted in history, to a time when the nation was 
supposedly more ethnically and culturally ‘pure’. In Great Britain it incorporates a strong 
sense of xenophobia and Islamophobia, inflamed by the magnitude of immigration into the 
more impoverished towns and areas in the mid-twentieth century and further fueled by 
current global events. The ideology of the far-right today is carried on through a lineage of 
far-right groups, from Mosley’s Blackshirts, to the National Front, to the BNP. This is quite 
a contrast to the Hungarian situation, which only had about twenty-five years to develop 
but draws from its early twentieth century history. 
Much of Hungarian radical right attitudes look back to the time of the Magyars 
when the nation was ‘ethnically pure.’ This can be somewhat confusing, however, as radical 
right movements in Hungary see the European Christian identity as one of their centre-
points, which is in direct conflict with the idea of the Shamanistic Magyars.  
Hungarian nationalism can also be characterised by some common attitudes, 
although all radical right organisations identify with these to different degrees. The 
strongest radical right attitude in Hungary is that of irredentism. The Treaty of Trianon 
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conjures negative emotion in many ethnic Hungarians, and Hungary’s pre-Trianon borders 
are referred to as ‘Greater Hungary’ by radical right supporters. In connection with the idea 
of the ‘pure’ Magyar, pan-Turanism, a term that stems from the Iranian term turan referring 
to a region of Central Asia, is the concept of the unity of ancient Central Asian people. This 
serves to differentiate the Hungarians from their mostly Slavic neighbours in Central and 
Eastern Europe and situates them as ethnic Asians. Still seen in some movements and in 
far-right politics is anti-Semitism, especially in the form of Holocaust revisionism which 
involves the idolisation of Szálasi and the idea that Horthy was actually helping the 
Hungarian Jews, and not an ally of Hitler. The Fidesz government has adopted a platform 
of Holocaust revisionism, even erecting a revisionist statue5 in Budapest’s Freedom Square, 
and has fuelled xenophobia in Hungary. Anti-Semitism has also been recently evident in 
the Hungarian government through the large-scale anti-Soros campaign and subsequent 
‘Stop Soros’ bill. 
One of the largest characteristics of the Hungarian far-right is antigypsyism, which 
occurs throughout much of Eastern Europe. This refers to negative sentiments and feelings 
toward the Roma, an ethnic minority living in much of Europe. It is thought that the Roma 
first arrived in Hungary around the eleventh century, followed by more migrations lasting 
until about the fourteenth century. By the sixteenth century, many of the Roma were 
musicians and craftsmen. As they were not professional, so to speak, they were placed as 
the lowest class by the Ottomans who occupied Hungary. The Roma have suffered much 
persecution and continue to do so today. Indeed, the term cigánybűnözés, ‘gypsy 
criminality,’ was successfully reawakened by the Jobbik party (Juhász, 2010), and many 
do indeed believe that Roma are genetically programmed to be criminals. Roma remain the 
 
5 A statue was erected in April 2014, directly following the national elections, depicting the Archangel Gabriel 
(Hungary) being attacked by a large eagle (Germany). This statue was met by a huge amount of protest and 
has been heavily criticized for being revisionist given the implication that Hungary was innocent in the 
Holocaust and in itself a victim, while the country was indeed allied with Germany.  
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most threatened minority in Hungary, with several hate crimes being committed against 
them including a series of murders between 2008 to 2009 (Halász, 2009) and large-scale 
civil patrols of Roma villages in 2011 and 2012 (Ahmari, 2012).    
 
Symbolism 
 Radical right groups also adopt symbols, and these are most often entrenched in 
history. The British radical right often makes use of British symbolism such as the Union 
Jack, English bulldog, and major figures such as Winston Churchill. With regard to the 
English Defence League (see below), the symbolism becomes a bit more intricate. They 
generally fly the Knight’s Templar battle flag, which is a black cross on a white background 
with the red St. George’s cross in the centre (Pilkington, 2016). The colour symbolism here 
is important, making use of white, black, and red – the colours of England, not the UK. 
Most critical, however, is the use of Christian symbols and the symbol of the crusader, 
presumably as a symbol of a war against Islam. Also seen are words and certain phrases 
such as ‘no surrender.’ These symbols can be seen on clothing and flags, and often times 
as tattoos on supporters. 
In Hungary, a prominent symbol of the radical right is the Árpád Flag, which 
consists of alternating red and white horizontal stripes, originally the flag of the Magyar 
tribes and of the first Hungarian Dynasty. Revived by the Arrow Cross Movement in the 
1930s, the flag was banned by the Soviets less than two decades later. After the end of 
Soviet rule in Hungary, however, the flag has seen a rebirth in the Hungarian radical right.   
Other noticeable symbols of Hungarian radical right supporters are the wearing of 
a tarsoly,6 the use of ancient Hungarian runic writing, and the image of turul (mythical 
 
6 A leather pouch with ornate designs of animals or flowers, made to be hung from a belt. They were originally 
used by the Magyars to carry flint. 
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ancient Magyar bird). Most of the symbolism used by the radical right harkens back to the 
pre-Christian times, when there is a perception that Hungarians were the ‘pure’ Magyars. 
It is worth noting that other important national symbols to the Hungarian people that arise 
out of later periods have not been adopted by the Hungarian radical right; for instance, the 
raven with a ring in its beak as a sign of King Matthias Corvinus (r. 1458-190), one of the 
most highly regarded Hungarian kings, has not been appropriated. 
 As mentioned, one of the strongest radical right attitudes in Hungary is irredentism; 
hence, the most important symbol of Hungarian nationalism is that of Greater Hungary. 
The symbol is recognised in the form of an idea, with the concept of ‘Greater Hungary’ 
symbolising the reunification of all ethnic Hungarians. It can also be represented physically 
by the image of present-day Hungary set within the pre-Trianon borders of the country, 
which often appears on decals, jewellery, and clothing. In another incarnation it appears as 
a common chant used by all radical right groups: “Vesszen Trianon!” or “Down with 
Trianon!” 
 
1.3.2 Current British Radical Right Organisations 
 The landscape of the British radical right is ever-changing, especially as groups 
begin to dissolve and new ones form in their place. The far-right has historically been 
electorally unsuccessful, as demonstrated by the disintegration of the British National Party 
and by the very small support of Britain First. UKIP were the most electorally successful 
far-right (or near far-right) political party in Britain but it disappeared after their success 
with the Brexit referendum. Anti-Islam activist and co-leader of Pegida UK, Anne Marie 
Waters, founded a new political party called For Britain after her defeat in the leadership 
elections for UKIP, but the party is very minor on the British political scene. The party’s 
website boasts a motto of “For the forgotten majority” and policies include placing the 
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interests of British people over the citizens of other nations. Britain does have some radical 
right protest movements and fringe organisations, which will be briefly reviewed. 
 This overview will start with the English Defence League, the UK organisation at 
the centre of this study. A few other organisations will also be discussed, such as National 
Action, which was originally intended to be the focus of this research but disbanded one 
year after it began, and some fringe organisations. As mentioned previously, radical right 
organisations have had trouble surviving in the UK. An examination of the current 
organisations in the UK shows how small the radical right is there, in sharp contrast to the 
Hungarian radical right discussed in the following subsection. 
 
The English Defence League 
The English Defence League (EDL) was founded in 2009 in response to a street 
protest by an Islamist group against a homecoming celebration of British troops in Luton 
(Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). The EDL was formed as an anti-Jihadist street movement 
and has always had a strong single-issue identity. While not an exhaustive list, the EDL 
have been referred to as ‘new far-right’ with “an aggressive, anti-Muslim agenda” (Jackson, 
2011: 5), as an “Islamophobic new social movement” (Copsey, 2010: 5), a populist street 
movement (Bartlett et al, 2011), an anti-Islamist movement (Pilkington, 2016), and as an 
anti-Muslim protest group (Busher, 2016). 
The launch of the EDL was announced on June 27th, 2009, on Facebook (Busher, 
2016). Thanks to extensive media coverage, the EDL experienced a rapid growth in 
membership in 2010. This in turn encouraged the group's leaders to “adopt a more strategic 
approach to their activities by forming group hierarchies, splitting the management and 
administration of the group along area-based and thematic divisions” (Bartlett and Littler 
2011: 10). However, the EDL has no formal membership, which makes it difficult to 
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estimate levels of support (Pilkington, 2016). In 2016, the EDL’s national Facebook page 
had 181,000 ‘likes’ (Pilkington, 2016), but now has just under 5,000 due to new Facebook 
takedown rules around hate speech. There are several regions with their own Facebook 
pages, the largest of which has just over 20,000 ‘likes.’ Since April of 2019 the EDL, along 
with Britain First and the BNP, have been permanently banned from Facebook (Hern, 
2019). 
The organisation was originally led by Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll, who 
resigned in late 2013. Shortly thereafter the movement was run by a committee of regional 
organisers until Ian Crossland was elected as leader of the EDL in December 2015 
(Pilkington, 2016). The group is known for its public demonstrations and clashes with anti-
fascist organisations. Somewhat contrary to the Hungarian situation, the EDL has tried to 
distance itself from other far-right groups, especially the British National Party. They 
openly reject the far-right label and want to distance themselves from explicit ‘extreme 
right’ activity (Jackson, 2011a). The EDL promotes a commitment to human rights and a 
support for democracy, while being openly anti-Islamic, with an over-arching 
encouragement of the maintenance of traditional English culture (Bartlett and Littler, 2011). 
 
National Action 
Self-identifying as Britain’s premier radical right street movement, National 
Action, founded in 2013, described themselves as a National Socialist youth organisation 
with members who are “clean, intelligent, and ambitious people typically in their late teens 
or twenties” (National Action website, no longer exists). Paul Jackson described them as a 
“small, neo-Nazi groupuscule” (2015: 100). They very adamantly stated that they were not 
extremist, but radical. According to their now-defunct website, if they were extremist, they 
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would resort to illegal violence to achieve their goals. Rather, they were radical as they 
only advocated legal violence through state power and the complicity of state institutions. 
National Action were quite a secretive organisation and had rules preventing their 
members from speaking directly about the organisation. The founder and leader of the 
movement was 25-year-old Benjamin Raymond, a Politics graduate from Essex University. 
Other members of the movement have also been known to attend British universities and 
actively campaign on British university campuses. Their founders openly used their real 
identities, but, according to their old website, a need for anonymity arose for future 
members when the authorities and media betrayed their good intentions. 
Their first strategy document was published on their website in September 2013. 
Their stated goal was to “bring honesty to the political process” (National Action website). 
Their efforts were mostly aimed at correcting the ‘broken right-wing’ so that it could 
become an effective political institution. The factor that distinguished National Action from 
other British radical right groups, however, was their open anti-Semitism (Jackson, 2015). 
Within the openly anti-Semitic and wider neo-Nazi groups National Action differentiated 
themselves through a unique style, and often criticised other British far-right groups for 
failing to have an exciting aesthetic style (Jackson, 2015).  
National Action was proscribed in December of 2016. Later, in September of 2017, 
the home secretary additionally banned two related organisations, Scottish Dawn and 
NS131 (Travis, 2017). After National Action were banned, their website and social media 
pages quickly disappeared. 
Other organisations 
 The British Movement is a white power neo-Nazi organisation with close ties to the 
National Front (Feldman & Stocker, 2017). Their Twitter profile, which at this point has 
not been updated since the end of December 2017, states that they do not promote the hatred 
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of any race, only love for their own people. This statement is followed by ‘14W,” which is 
widely known to refer to the ‘Fourteen Words’ of the white power movement: “We must 
secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.” The movement and 
party were formed in the early 1960s, with support growing in the 1970s and 1980s after 
the fragmentation of the National Front. In 2015 they had a membership base larger than 
that of the white power Combat 18 and its splinter-group Racial Volunteer Force, but now 
number around 50 members (Feldman & Stocker, 2017). 
 The Democratic Football Lads Alliance split in 2018 from the Football Lads 
Alliance, originally formed in 2017 as an ‘anti-extremist’ movement. The organisation has, 
however, increasingly become associated with the radical right. Their marches have been 
met with anti-fascist protestors and have erupted in violence, going as far as threatening to 
kill a police officer (Forrest, 2018). While they claim to be anti-racist and anti-violent, 
several anti-Islami speakers have spoken at their marches and they openly support Tommy 
Robinson (Keoghan, 2018).  
 Another organisation is the German Pegida movement, of which the UK chapter 
was founded by Tommy Robinson in at the beginning of 2016, although without the 
approval of the original German chapter. Pegida stands for Patriotische Europäer Gegen 
die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, or ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the 
West,' and is heavily anti-Islam. After a few protests and some initial interest from other 
British radical right groups like the BNP and EDL, the organisation fell apart. The 
organisation is still attempting to hold demonstrations both in the UK and in the rest of 
Europe, but interest has seriously dwindled. 
Several white power and skinhead movements exist in Britain, although now with quite 
low numbers of supporters. Combat 18, for instance, were founded in 1992 as bodyguards 
for BNP leaders and currently have between 30 to 50 members (Feldman & Stocker, 2017). 
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The ‘18’ of their name is white power symbolism where ‘1’ represents the letter ‘A’ and 
‘8’ represents the letter ‘H’, or AH, Adolf Hitler. The organisation has now spread overseas 
to the United States and around Europe. They are extremely violent and their members are 
barred from working in prisons or joining the police force. In 2002 the Racial Volunteer 
Force (RVF) split from Combat 18, who are essentially a small ultra-violent splinter group. 
The group Blood and Honour has links to Combat 18 and was also founded in 1987 in 
the UK. It is both a political group and, in largest part, a white power music promotion 
network, organising white power concerts and festivals. The name comes from the motto 
of the Hitler Youth, and they often use the number 28 (BH) as a symbol for their name. 
They have chapters in countries outside of the UK but have, for example, been banned in 
some countries, such as Germany and Spain. 
 
1.3.3 Current Hungarian Radical Right Organisations  
 The landscape of the Hungarian far-right is quite broad. It can essentially be divided 
into three main groups of organisations: the political movements (the far-right), the social 
movements (radical right), and the fringe movements (extreme right). The political 
movements have been previously described here; they are political parties that can be 
situated in the far-right, namely Jobbik, Fidesz, and the new Our Homeland movement. The 
second groups are those larger radical right organisations that may have a political 
affiliation, but do not take part in politics. The last group includes more extreme fringe 
movements and organisations with smaller membership numbers, including chapters of 
international skinhead organisations. Several of the prominent radical right social 
movement organisations will be introduced here.7 This should not be seen as an exhaustive 
 
7 Four of these organisations – The New Hungarian Guard, the Hungarian Defence Movement, the Sixty-
Four Counties Youth Movement, and the Outlaw Army – were covered in a 2017 policy publication, 
written by the author for this project and utilised for the policy report. Those descriptions will bear 
resemblance to what is found here. See Holdsworth and Kondor (2017) for the publication. 
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list, as it must be remembered that the landscape of the far-right is ever-changing and 
fluctuating. Quite small fringe groups, like the Hungarian chapters of Combat 18 and Blood 
and Honour, will not be covered in this overview. Additionally, smaller organisations with 
little relation to the Hungarian Defence Movement, such as Pax Hungarica, the Guardians 
of the Carpathian Homeland Movement, and the Hungarian National Front will not be 
covered herein. 
This subsection will first look at the Hungarian Defence Movement, the 
organisation at the centre of this study. Then other organisations will be introduced, 
beginning with the New Hungarian Guard as they are the organisation which the Hungarian 
Defence Movement essentially grew out of. The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement and 
the Outlaw Army will also be discussed as both have ties to the Hungarian Defence 
Movement, and they will be mentioned again later in this study. 
Contrary to the situation in the UK, most of the larger groups in Hungary exist in a 
tight network with each group filling a different role. The New Hungarian Guard is 
somewhat of an ‘old boys’ club; the Hungarian Defence Movement is an anti-Roma 
organisation which values community and volunteer activities; the Sixty-Four Counties 
Youth Movement has the youngest membership profile, organises demonstrations, and has 
a strongly irredentist identity; and the Outlaw Army is an organisation of violent muscular 
men who often serve as security at events. Several of these organisations are also tied to 
political parties. Gábor Vona, ex-leader and founder of Jobbik, was a member of the 
Hungarian Guard. Several members of the Hungarian Defence Movement are also 
members of Jobbik, and the two groups often organised charity events together. László 
Toroczkai, founder of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, was a mayor for Jobbik 
in the town Ásotthalom and has now formed a new party, the Our Homeland Movement. 
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The Hungarian Defence Movement 
The Hungarian Defence Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom) was formed in 
October of 2014 out of the organisation For a Better Future Hungarian Self-Defense (Szebb 
Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem; henceforth Better Future), originally For a Better Future Civil 
Guard Organisation (Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület). The Better Future movement was 
founded in 2010 after the fragmentation of the Hungarian Guard following its proscription. 
Founded and led by Attila Tibor László, the Better Future Movement was disbanded in 
2014 for activities in Gyöngyöspata, Kunhegyes, Cegléd, and Devecser. The Better Future 
Movement became nationally famous in 2011 for incidents in the village of Gyöngyöspata, 
where the group patrolled the village for several weeks terrorizing Roma residents. The 
movement was accused of threatening the rights and safety of people in Cegléd, and at 
events in Kunhegyes and Devecser they likened Roma to criminals, using terms like 
“vermin, spawn of Satan, and rats” (Janecskó, 2014). 
Currently, the Hungarian Defence Movement is quite active online, with a 
regularly-updated website, a Facebook presence, and an Instagram account. Their 
Facebook page, where they identify themselves as an NGO, has nearly 5,400 supporters; 
having gained about 3,000 supporters in the last year alone. They seem to be present at 
most radical right demonstrations and the group’s leader is regularly photographed with 
other major figures in the Hungarian radical right movement, especially Zsolt Tyirityán 
(Outlaw Army, Strength and Dedication) and László Toroczkai (Sixty-Four Counties 
Youth Movement, Our Homeland Movement). 
The group regularly organises events and music festivals supporting Hungarian far-
right bands. The group presents an image of a community organisation, organising food 
and clothing drives and depicting families along with children on their Facebook page. 
They organise an annual summer camp for children who are taught about Hungarian history 
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and presumably radical right values, and which serves as a community-building event. 
There is also a paramilitary section of the organisation, which offers combat training to 
members.  The Hungarian Defence Movement still regularly patrol streets of areas with 
high Roma populations, who they refer to as ‘pigs’ on their website. They strongly feel that 
nothing is being done to protect the ‘Hungarian’ population around Hungary, and that it is 
their duty to do so.  
 
The New Hungarian Guard 
The Hungarian Guard Movement was formed in 2007 with 56 members, a number 
chosen to commemorate the 1956 revolution (LeBoer, 2008). The Hungarian Guard was 
dissolved by the government in 2009 for civil soldier marches in Tatárszentgyörgy, a 
village with a high population of Roma. The group was re-formed as the New Hungarian 
Guard Movement (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom) only three weeks later and is now 
strategically split into local chapters.  They now have chapters in most of Hungary’s 
nineteen counties but are seemingly less active than in the past. 
The Hungarian Guard are a radical right organisation whose members pledge to 
defend Hungarian values and culture and consider themselves “a self-defence alliance that 
transcends parties and borders” (Új Magyar Garda Mozgalom, 2013). Their seven tenets 
are: honour, ‘Hungarianness,’ trust in God, fellowship, helpfulness, bravery, and loyalty to 
the organisation. According the Hungarian Guard’s website, their goals can only be those 
which abide by the official Hungarian constitution (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom, n.d.1).  
At the same time they profess that their goals must abide by the ancient rights of freedom 
and ancient traditions. They say they only have one rule: to protect the Hungarian state and 
the interests of the Hungarian nation. 
According to their website (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom, n.d.2) membership in the 
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Hungarian Guard is open to anyone who is at least eighteen years old, believes in God, 
identifies as a member of the Hungarian nation, speaks Hungarian, is familiar with and 
respects Hungarian tradition and history, promises to protect Hungarian national identity, 
and will not allow anyone to differentiate between true Hungarians. It should be mentioned 
that the latter point is an irredentist nod to those ethnic Hungarians living across national 
borders (in areas of pre-Trianon Hungary) and emphasises the idea that Roma are not part 
of the Hungarian nation.  Ironically, according to their initial introduction letter, anyone can 
join the Hungarian Guard, regardless of nationality, religion, political affiliation, or ethnic 
minority, as long as they love Hungary and sympathise with the goals of the movement. 
The organisation has also revitalised fascist symbols of the 1944-1945 Arrow Cross, by 
using the red-and-white striped Árpád flag in their emblem and wearing a uniform of black 
boots, black pants, black military waistcoats, white shirts, and a black cap emblazoned with 
the Árpád stripes. The symbolism is quite prominent, and, according to one author, could 
be “a homage to Mussolini, if not Hitler, and to the fusion between race, state, and national 
unity” (LeBoer, 2008: 34). 
  
The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement 
 The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági 
Mozgalom; henceforth: HVIM), self-identify as a radical youth nationalist movement. 
Founded on April 21st, 2001 by László Toroczkai, the movement’s name is an homage to 
the sixty-four counties of Hungary, excluding Croatia, before the signing of the Treaty of 
Trianon. Their slogan is “Faith, loyalty, bravery,” their symbol is the royal orb, and their 
ideology is strongly irredentist. 
 They believe that the centre of Hungary is not Budapest, but indeed lies in Csongrád 
county. This area in southern Hungary is believed to be where the original Blood Oath was 
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made, which according to legend was the official pact between the original seven tribes of 
Hungary. The area is also one of the areas where ancient burial mounds can be found. 
Additionally, it is the birthplace of Sándor Rózsa, the Hungarian Robin Hood, who in 
reality was a highwayman who led his own company into battle in the 1848 Hungarian 
Revolution. Lastly, the River Tisza flows through the county, which is said to be ‘the most 
Hungarian river’ as it used to lie entirely in Hungary – now crossing several national 
borders. As Szeged is Csongrád county’s County Town, it is held as the main seat for both 
HVIM and the related, yet more violent, paramilitary Outlaw Army (Betyársereg). 
 The founders of HVIM came from Hungary, Germany, and the Hungarian region 
of Serbia: Szeged, Hódmezővásárhely (the only Székely town outside of Transylvania), 
Budapest, Stuttgart, and Subotica. Their original meeting place was a farm with old ruins, 
owned by Toroczkai, in the very town where Sándor Rózsa went into hiding. One of the 
strongest ideologies of HVIM is irredentism and  the desire for autonomy for Hungarian 
lands outside of Hungary’s borders. Indeed, after only one year of existence, in 2002 they 
entered Székelyföld, or the Szeklerlands, where they show their support for Szekler 
autonomy and clash with police. In 2018, two members of their Szekler chapter were 
sentenced to five years in jail for terrorism, for allegedly planning to set off homemade 
bombs in 2015 at a Romanian national celebration (Horváth, 2018). 
The origin of the Székely, or Szekler, people is constantly under debate, but one 
theory is that they were a separate tribe who originally came to the Carpathian Basin with 
the ancient Magyars. Another theory states that they went the area of today’s Szeklerland 
in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries. Regardless, they are considered by most Hungarians 
to be somewhat ‘ultra-Hungarian,’ and to have retained the ancient culture of the 
Hungarians before the series of invasions. The area is found in eastern Transylvania, 
originally belonging to Hungary until the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, and today belonging 
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to Romania. Many Szekler people now actively seek autonomy from the Romanian state, a 
fight which HVIM has very quickly joined. The leaders of HVIM are regularly banned 
from entering Romania. They also have several chapters in Slovakia, where László 
Toroczkai was declared a persona non grata for five years in 2006. 
 Since their foundation in 2001, HVIM has been incredibly active in organising 
various conferences, organising meetings and protests in Hungarian regions of surrounding 
countries, organising anti-Trianon and other demonstrations, and even holding an annual 
music festival and annual youth camp.  Their Facebook page had nearly 13,000 supporters 
in 2015. After Facebook deleted their page as part of their sweep of radical right 
movements, a new Facebook page had over 3,600 supporters before being banned under 
Facebook’s new crackdown on radical right organisations. The most recent deletion of their 
Facebook page and of their old website has prompted the banner “They can erase us from 
the internet, but we’ll meet on the streets!” on the latest incarnation of their website. 
 
The Outlaw Army 
Formed in 2008, the motto of the Outlaw Army (Betyársereg) is “Ne bánstd a 
magyart, mert pórul jársz!” which loosely translates to “Don’t hurt Hungarians, or else!” 
Their online self-description states that they do not believe in the laws of the state, rather 
in the ancient laws of the puszta, or Hungarian plains. Like the outlaws of days past, they 
say they have been forced by the powers that be to act outside of the law. In other words, 
they say they are not outlaws by choice, but by necessity. The Outlaw Army is closely tied 
to other radical right organisations, and often provide ‘security’ for different protests and 
radical right events. They are very popular among the Hungarian radical right, even selling 
their own merchandise.  
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The Outlaw army is led by Zsolt Tyirityán, who is one of the most well-known 
figures in the Hungary radical right scene. They assert that they are a loose alliance or 
society of self-organised clans that work under the traditions of Eurasian civilisations – 
thus avoiding the ascription of ‘army’ or ’organised group’ so they cannot be dissolved. 
According to an interview with Tyirityán conducted in February of 2016, the group has 
approximately 300 members spread out across the country, divided into 10-15 clans 
(Kittensinurface, 2016). He claims that the Outlaw Army is merely a defence organisation 
that tries to draw criminal, dangerous, and anti-social elements of society to the attention 
of law enforcement. Tyirityán stated that one must have right-wing values to become a 
member of the Outlaw Army, which to him mean patriotism (patriotizmus) and communal 
spirit (közösségi szellem). Potential members of the organisation must also have a strong 
history in either martial arts or strength training. The group has repeatedly claimed to not 
be a threat and to only exist to aid Hungarians and protect the country in ways the 
government cannot. 
 
Other Organisations 
The Identitarian movement has also appeared in Hungary with two separate and 
unrelated organisations. The short-lived Identitesz was formed in September 2015 at a 
university in Budapest, originally under the name of the Conservative Student Society. The 
organisation was led by Balázs László and claimed to build a ‘new right’. Identitesz has 
since dissolved, after announcing an intent to become a political party and, ultimately, 
joining forces with the Outlaw Army. On 8 July 2017, the two organisations formed a 
coalition movement called Strength and Devotion (Erő és Elszántság), at which time Balázs 
László resigned as the leader of Identitesz. Strength and Devotion has since essentially 
disappeared. 
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The other organisation is the Hungarian branch of the Generation Identity 
movement (Identitás Generáció). The Hungarian Generation Identity was formed in 2014 
and seemingly in 2017 had about 100 members (Kulcsár and Halász 2017). Along a 
different line from the more traditional radical right organisations in Hungary, Generation 
Identity see an importance in protecting both a European and Hungarian identity, namely 
against migration and the ‘threat’ of Islam. They claim to not have any issues with any one 
particular group of people, Muslims included, but are against the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe. 
They are concerned with a supposed replacement of European people by migrants and 
refugees, and subscribe to ethnopluralist views. Their actions around Budapest have 
included displaying large banners in public areas that read things like, for example, 
“Islamisation kills!” (Dezse 2017) and organising a demonstration commemorating the 
Siege of Buda on 2 September 1686. This is particularly important as it commemorates a 
defeat of Ottoman forces and is now reinterpreted as freeing the Hungarians from Islam. 
toward the future and the goal of “making Hungary more European” (Sellner 2017).  
 Lastly is the newer Hungarian Legion (Légió Hungária) formed in the summer of 
2018. As they are a fairly new organisation not much is known; it can be assumed by the 
black Celtic Cross flags displayed at their events that they are part of the white power 
network, and their logo is essentially the Celtic Cross formed out of a laurel wreath and 
two crossed swords. Their organisation is based on three fundamentals: tradition, 
consciousness, and community. They see traditional family as crucially important and have 
a close relationship with the Outlaw Army.  
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1.4 CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has overviewed the modern histories of both Great Britain and 
Hungary to set a context for comparison in this study. Then, the landscape of the far-right 
in Hungary and the Great Britain was provided, again to help set context for this study. 
Lastly, a discussion of terminology was provided to clarify choices of terminology for this 
study 
 The two groups which will be examined in this study will be the English Defence 
League and the Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM). These groups were chosen, aside 
from the accidental synchronisation of their name, for several reasons. The EDL was 
chosen as it is one of the only radical right organisations in Great Britain which is still 
relatively moderate; other groups are considered to be more extreme. In Hungary, MÖM 
was chosen as they are a larger radical right organisation who are regularly active and are 
not as extreme as some of their counterparts (such as the Outlaw Army, for example). 
Additionally, both of these groups have relatively large membership numbers, and perhaps 
most importantly, were both very active online. 
 This project has three major phases, which will be used in an attempt to shed light 
on the research questions. These questions are: why individuals adopt nationalist attitudes, 
why they join radical right movements, and why they maintain membership in these 
movements. The first phase of this research will be secondary survey analysis of European 
Social Survey data in order to help set the context of causation of right-wing and far-right 
attitudes in the UK and Hungary. Next, an online analysis will provide insight into how 
these organisations attempt to recruit and how they wish to display the image of their 
organisation. Lastly, qualitative interviews will be presented with organisation members to 
look further into why individuals join radical right movements and maintain membership. 
First, however, an overview of the literature will be presented. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 As mentioned, this study will examine three overarching research questions: why 
individuals adopt radical right attitudes, why individuals join social movements, and why 
they maintain membership in these movements. These questions will be approached from 
the framework of radical right social movement organisations in Hungary and Great 
Britain. All of these questions are extremely involved and must be approached from several 
different angles; an attempt to provide a comprehensive review of these approaches from 
different disciplines will herein be provided. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this 
project, there is a huge body of literature to draw from and it is accepted that there will be 
omissions. There has been no directly analogous research previously conducted; the most 
cognate pieces of work were chosen to frame the current study. 
 The first section will look at why people adopt extremist views. Why someone 
adopts extreme views does not explain why they join a group, and this question must be 
considered separately. The second section will then look at what drives people to political 
action, namely why people join social movements and organisations.  
There have also been several studies examining questions of the adoption of 
extremist attitudes and the motivation to join groups, both of which will be discussed 
further below. However, most of these studies have focused heavily on Western Europe 
(especially Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands), while Eastern Europe 
has been largely ignored. There has also not yet been a study exploring these questions of 
group membership in Hungary. Therefore, this work will attempt to fill several holes in the 
literature, namely an exploration of the Hungarian radical right, thus furthering the study 
of radial right protest movements as social movement organisations (SMO), and comparing 
two differing social and ideological contexts in terms of radical right social movement 
organisation (NSMO) participation and adherence.  
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2.1 WHY DO INDIVIDUALS ADOPT EXTREMIST VIEWS? 
 The first part of this review will focus on why individuals adopt extremist views 
and, specifically, radical right-wing attitudes. Scholars in many fields have attempted to 
confront this question, many drawing from social psychology but also from political and 
social studies. This section will first look to theories of extremist and deviant attitudes from 
the point of view of social psychology, political and social studies, and criminology. Lastly, 
a brief discussion of extremist attitudes will be provided. 
 
2.1.1 Personality and Politics 
The question of extremist attitude is one that has troubled researchers for much of 
the twentieth, and now the twenty-first, centuries. Early social psychologists were 
concerned with the idea of a so-called authoritarian personality being the explanation for 
people adopting extremist views. Right-wing authoritarianism can be considered as the 
combination of three basic characteristics in one individual (Altemeyer, 1996): 
authoritarian submission, which is a high degree of submission to the authorities who are 
seen to be established and legitimate in one’s society; authoritarian aggression, which is 
general aggressiveness directed against various persons; and conventionalism, which is a 
high degree of adherence to traditional social norms (Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer, 1996). 
One of the first and most well-known works in the field is Adorno et al. (1950) The 
Authoritarian Personality. Here, Else Frenkel-Brunswick traced ‘Fascist potential’ to early 
childhood experiences. The thought was that future authoritarians were raised by 
threatening and forbidding parents who punished improper behaviour severely and 
seemingly randomly. This has since become a stereotype, but scientific evidence is 
unconvincing (Altemeyer, 1988). Naturally this is a very difficult theory to test, as it 
requires a long period of follow-ups with participants. Bob Altemeyer did test the theory in 
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his 1981 Right-Wing Authoritarianism and found that there was no correlation between 
childhood experiences and potential to authoritarianism. This was also shown to be 
unsupported by evidence by Hyman and Sheatsley (1954). 
 The original measure of authoritarianism was the F scale, dubbed as such because 
it was designed to predict fascist tendencies (Adorno et al. 1950; Christie, 1954). The idea 
of an authoritarian personality is still used by some researchers. Bob Altemeyer conducted 
several surveys based on his Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale, mostly on 
university students. The RWA scale is a thirty-item attitudinal scale, where choices range 
on a scale from -4 (very strongly disagree) to +4 (very strongly agree) with no neutral 
choice. A number of characteristics of authoritarian aggression have come to light from 
these surveys. For example, those with High RWA scores are more likely to be hostile to 
homosexuals, tend to be the most ethnically and racially prejudiced people in samples, 
would be the first to help if the government decided to wipe out some group, tend to be 
more mean-spirited, adhere to more traditional religious teachings,  and, if male, are more 
likely than most to assault women (Altemeyer, 1996). It is also important to consider, as 
Altemeyer (1996) points out, that major social events can shift an individual’s level of 
authoritarianism at any point in their adult lives. 
While a person’s nature and biographic experience are important in their personality 
formation, social psychology has also shown “how easily situations trump individual 
difference” (Altemeyer, 1996: 8). This was shown, admittedly with research methodology 
that would not be reproduced today due to ethical constraints, by Stanley Milgram in the 
1960s (Milgram, 1974). The experiment involved three individuals: the Experimenter, the 
Teacher, and the Learner. The Experimenter and Learner were both part of the research 
team, while the Teacher was the subject. The Teacher was told that the Learner must 
memorise word-pairs and would receive an electric shock every time a mistake was made. 
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The Experimenter then ordered the Teacher to push numbered buttons, which the Teacher 
believed were delivering electric shocks to the Learner, growing ever more powerful as the 
numbers got higher. In reality, no shock was delivered and pre-recorded sounds were 
played at each interval. The final shock of the experiment was a lethal 450-volt electric 
shock, which an astonishing 65 percent of the Teacher subjects administered. Subjects were 
under obvious stress throughout the experiment and visibly uncomfortable. This 
experiment was groundbreaking in showing the power of obedience and how a great 
number of people are willing to carry out orders that conflict with their own moral code. It 
also showed that those who do traditionally ‘authoritarian’ actions, or seemingly embody 
those attitudes, do not necessarily have an ‘authoritarian personality,’ showing the need for 
research in teasing out why individuals adopt extremist (or radical right) attitudes and 
ideologies. 
Others have attempted to approach this question from the perspective of politics. 
Rudolf Heberle (1951), in his Social Movements, outlines the various theories of 
personality types as related to politics. In the 19th century, Swiss political scientist Johann 
Bluntschli correlated four party types with temperament; progressive with sanguine 
temperament, conservative with phlegmatic, radical with choleric, and reactionary with 
melancholic (Heberle, 1951). Before Bluntschli, Lord Macaulay correlated political 
attitudes with temperament (Macaulay, 1986 [1848-1861]), and Friedrich Rohmer 
correlated political parties with age group: the radical party with boyhood, the liberal party 
with adolescence, the conservatives with manhood, and the absolutistic with old age 
(Heberle, 1951). 
In the early twentieth century, Eduard Spranger (1928) distinguished the political 
and social types from the ‘contemplative-scholarly,’ economic, aesthetic, and religious 
types (Heberle, 1951). While now jumping ahead, it should be mentioned that Spranger 
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also differentiated between those people who lead movements and those who join them, 
claiming that ‘political attitudes’ were more characteristic of the more active participants 
of social movements and of the leaders of political parties, whereas ‘social attitudes’ were 
more prevalent among the ‘joiners’ of social movements (Heberle, 1951). The ‘political 
types’ are those people for whom power is the highest value, to which everything else is 
inferior and subservient. The ‘social type,’ on the other hand, is motivated by sympathy 
and a genuine interest in others. These are referred to as an ideal type, which may be used 
in empirical studies to understand political leaders and their followers (Heberle, 1951). 
Heberle (1951) also discusses the concept of frustration. Those people who are 
prevented, by conditions that may be out of their control, from attaining their goals may 
react to their situation in two ways: face the facts and try to fix the situation, or “they may 
become frustrated, that is, develop attitudes of aggression” (Heberle, 1951: 107). 
Politically, if an individual seeks change or has views outside of the norm, they may 
become frustrated and aggressive if they do not feel they are heard. This aggression is not 
only manifest physically but can also influence a person’s online behaviour, and ultimately 
cause a strengthening of their views and attitudes.  
There is also a growing body of research into radicalism, which can be defined as 
“increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict. Descriptively, 
radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that 
increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of that group” 
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 416). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) differentiate 
between individual, group, and mass radicalisation; here, the focus is on individual 
radicalisation. They describe four types: individual radicalisations by personal 
victimisation, individual radicatisation by political grievance, individuals being gradually 
radicalised by a persistent radical group or organisations, and radicalism that occurs 
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through the love and closeness felt for group members after joining a radical organisation. 
In the latter case, individuals are often recruited to the group through personal contacts. Of 
course, it must be remembered that there are both radical actions, in other words the 
behaviour of an individual, and radical attitudes, which are their aims and perceptions 
(Della Porta & LaFree, 2012). While they are linked, radical attitudes do not always lead 
to violence (Della Porta & LaFree, 2012).  
It is also crucial to understand the social and political context in which radicalised 
individuals live. In a study of national variation in support for far-right political parties in 
Western Europe, researchers discovered that there were several factors which encouraged 
far-right voting (Wilcox, Weinberg, & Eubank, 2003). Far-right voting was found to be 
higher in countries where: people believe they have little control over their lives, people 
are more dissatisfied with their lives as a whole, people are more religious, people are less 
likely to trust their own fellow citizens, and people are less likely to agree that scarce jobs 
should be shared with disadvantaged groups (such as women, immigrants, the elderly, and 
the disabled). In these same countries, people were more likely to believe that if their fellow 
citizens live in need, it was because of laziness and a lack of willpower. 
 
2.1.2 Criminological Theory 
 Criminologists have long been interested in why people turn to deviance and crime. 
While a right-wing extremist and/or political activist is not necessarily a criminal, they can 
generally be considered a deviant in most societies (Haslam & Turner, 1998). Most 
criminological theories of deviance can then, in turn, be applied here. It is important to 
remember that crime itself is a social construct, and deviance itself is indeed ‘in the eye of 
the beholder’ (Treadwell, 2013). There is nothing inherently criminal about any act 
(Treadwell, 2013), so the context of the society in which the crime is committed must be 
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considered. This is the same for extremist views: an extremist view in one society may not 
be so extreme in another. 
 Some early theories of why people turned to crime were found in a biological 
approach. One of the earliest crime theorists, Cesare Lombroso (1836-1909), believed that 
there were ‘born criminals’ and he promoted the idea that behaviour is biological 
(Treadwell, 2013). In the same vein, Johannes Lange (1931) suggested that criminal 
behaviour was inherited from one’s parents. These biological theories were then later 
applied to psychological theories of crime and criminality. For instance, Hans Eysenck in 
his Crime and Personality (1964) proposed that personality was biologically determined. 
He suggested that personality was composed of three major factors: extroversion, 
neuroticism, and psychoticism. Hereditary brain abnormalities could, he suggested, affect 
one’s ability to learn from, and adapt to, the environment around them. This, then, would 
lead to the exaggeration of one of these personality types, leading to criminal behaviour. 
Of course, this was shown in the previous section to be highly unlikely, as several scholars 
have discussed the importance of personality and social conditions on extremist attitudes 
and behaviour. Others, including James Wilson and Richard Herrnstein (1985), have 
suggested that early social circumstances and family influences can affect someone’s 
propensity toward criminal behaviour through a development of a “defective personality” 
(Treadwell, 2013: 42).  
 The largest number of theories of crime and deviance have come from sociology. 
As there are an extensive number of theoretical viewpoints, only those which can be 
applicable to political activism will be overviewed. Some major theories will, as a result, 
be left out of this review, with a focus rather on those which can be applied to membership 
in radical right movements: differential association, strain theory, status frustration, and 
labelling theory. 
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Sutherland and Cressey (1978) suggested that criminal behaviour could be learnt 
and transmitted or could be invented by an individual. Criminal behaviour could be learnt 
through social interaction, often within intimate social groups (Treadwell, 2013). This 
theory is known as differential association and emphasises the idea that a person’s 
subculture heavily influences their attitudes and ideas. This then presents somewhat of a 
‘chicken and egg’ problem when later discussing membership in social movement 
organisations: does an individual join a group because they share common ideologies, or 
do they develop those ideologies after joining a group? 
 Somewhat akin to the ideas of relative deprivation in social movement theory 
(discussed below) is Robert Merton’s strain theory (1938; 1968). Merton suggested that an 
inequality is felt between the culturally-approved goals in a society “and the means of 
achieving those goals” (Treadwell, 2013: 51). This discrepancy between the means and 
goals could encourage those individuals deprived of legal means to turn to illegal ones. 
Merton argued that people are encouraged to place a high importance on the goal of 
financial success (Agnew & Brezina, 2010). Many individuals are prevented from 
achieving those goals (for example, due to belonging to a lower class, or having low 
education), resulting in frustration. This frustration and resentment can cause individuals 
to adapt by choosing deviant routes to success, and hence are motives for criminal 
behaviour. Later, Robert Agnew (1992) elaborated on Merton’s theory to put more focus 
on the psychological impacts of this discrepancy on an individual. 
 A theory that has been applied to gang and subculture studies is that of status 
frustration (Treadwell, 2013). Status frustration theory is descended from strain theory and 
looks at ways in which illegal activities (rather than legal) have been endorsed by some 
groups. Albert Cohen (1955) looked at crimes of delinquent boys who often offended 
together, and he speculated that being denied status in society can lower self-esteem. He 
79 
 
suggested that young boys growing up in a city often formed groups, and would experience 
common problems, be “exposed to common stereotypes and stigmas, subject to similar 
formal controls…setting themselves against common others who might disrespect or attack 
them” (Rock, 2012: 69). 
 Criminology’s labelling theory derives from the sociological concept of symbolic 
interactionism, which suggests that people respond to their idea of the world and that 
individuals derive their sense of self through interaction with others (Rock, 2012). 
Labelling theory proposes that those labels given to deviants by those in power can 
reinforce or create criminal identity (Treadwell, 2013). It is questionable to what extent this 
can be applied to radical right organisations, at least for this study, as both organisations 
have openly denied common labels such as ‘extreme right’. 
 Again, this was not meant to be a comprehensive view of all theories of criminal 
behaviour. Rather, those criminological theories were reviewed which could be applied to 
the study of political activism and social movement analysis. Particularly important to this 
study are those theories which come from sociology. It is likely not just one theory that is 
correct, but a combination. For instance, strain theory could play an important role as many 
people may feel as though they do not have the same means of achieving their goals as 
others. If they then begin to move in certain circles, differential association suggests that 
individuals can be influenced by those around them. Cohen’s idea of delinquency suggests 
that people can band together against a threatening ‘other’, and labelling theory proposes 
that once an individual is labelled as a delinquent, ‘fascist’, ‘nazi’, or extremist, they may 
begin to believe it of themselves. 
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2.1.3 Extremist Attitudes 
Several authors have focused specifically on extremist attitudes, their sources, and 
their implications in social groups. Ronald Wintrobe describes three definitions of 
extremism (2002). The first is an extremist person or group, which is one who sees the 
centre position as not in the interior of a dimension (for example, a political left-right scale) 
but at a corner. The second is an extremist move, which is a move away from the centre 
and towards one of the extremes in the aforementioned dimension. Lastly, a political 
extremist can be seen as one who uses extremist methods, “for example, bombings, 
inflammatory language, terrorist activity, and so forth, but whose platform is or may be 
centrist rather than extremist in political (left-right) space” (Wintrobe, 2002: 25).  
 Wintrobe argues that extremist behaviour can be understood using a rational choice 
approach, and that aspects of extremism (passion, conformity, leadership, and loyalty) are 
consistent with rational choice (Wintrobe, 2002; Wintrobe 2006). He considers extremism 
to be a form of political competition, since social movements, including extremist 
movements, are seen “as the main vehicle for excluded people to gain access to and 
influence within an established political system” (Wintrobe, 2002: 24).  
Sunstein (2009) points out the importance of confidence in extremist behaviour, as 
cautious people tend to choose a midpoint between extremes and moderate their views. 
However, if people become more confident as they see that other people seem to share their 
views, they may be more inclined to move in a more extreme direction. In the same vein, 
if an individual is a member of a group that believes the same ideology that they do, they 
will hear relatively few opposing views and their ideas will only be reinforced (Sunstein, 
2009). In such a case, most group members are likely to be affected, and most will shift 
further in the direction of extremism by merely being a member of such a group. This is 
also emphasised by norms of exclusion, in other words that those people with the right 
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characteristics and views are allowed into a group, while others are excluded (Hardin, 
2002). Hence, the less committed members of a group leave while the extremists remain. 
Similarly, as extremists are strongly committed to their beliefs, if they hear evidence 
contrary to their views “they can become still more committed, not less so” (Sunstein, 2009: 
51). This isolation from other views and members of society can generate paranoia, where 
people begin to suppose the worst of all others from outside their social group and from 
those with whom they are not in direct contact (Hardin, 2002). 
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2.2 WHY INDIVIDUALS SEEK COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 The question of why individuals seek collective action is intricate and complicated, 
and encompasses a number of issues. The first is that of why people seek collective action, 
and why people feel the need to join an organisation of like-minded peers. Similarly, it is 
important to consider the question of why some people join organisations and others do 
not, although they may share similar attitudes and ideologies. Secondly, it is crucial to 
consider the factors behind group involvement. Some consider that the reason people join 
groups is rooted in psychology and personality, of which a key question is whether certain 
identity traits influence group involvement (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Others see the 
roots of involvement in social and economic factors, such as relative deprivation or social 
capital. Likely, however, the answer is found in some combination of all potential aspects. 
Many scholars have used historical and political contexts to explain protest, but this 
approach has been criticised as ignoring cultural context (Jasper, 1997). Thirdly, the 
question of whether protest is a rational choice or an irrational and emotional reaction has 
been a large source of debate among researchers: on one side, “theorists have demeaned 
protestors as irrational, altogether outside normal flows of life; at the other they have 
assumed an extreme form of self-interested rationality that equally divorces protestors from 
their cultural contexts” (Jasper, 1997: 19). Lastly, the question can also be seen from the 
perspective of the organisation, and why they succeed in recruiting certain supporters but 
fail to recruit others.  
 This section will give a brief overview of the theoretical attempts at answering these 
questions. It will begin with an overview of social movement analysis, as this is the field 
which first began a serious exploration of the issue of group involvement. Following that, 
I will discuss specific theoretical perspectives of differential recruitment, such as the theory 
of relative deprivation, social capital, and social psychological factors such as identity and 
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an individual’s personal biography. The last section will outline general empirical studies 
on differential recruitment, with some studies of specifically extremist groups. There is 
quite a large body of work on social movement and organisational membership, but this 
area is somewhat lacking in studies of extreme right groups. 
 
2.2.1 Approaches to Social Movement Analysis 
 McCarthy and Zald define a social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a 
population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure 
and/or reward distribution of a society” (1977: 1217-1218). As the definition is subject to 
some controversy, it has more recently been defined as “collectivities engaged in 
noninstitutionalized discourses and practices aimed at changing the existing condition of 
society” (Garner, 1997: 1). The emphasis in both of these definitions is change: a social 
movement exhibits a conscious commitment to promote change, has a minimum degree of 
organisation, and has normative commitment and participation (Wilkinson, 1971). While 
much of the literature does deal with social movements in general, this project will be 
examining smaller social movement organisations (SMO). A SMO is a “complex, or 
formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social 
movement…and attempts to implement these goals” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1218). The 
goals of social movements can include public challenges directed toward the state as well 
as a large variety of actions carried out by smaller entities as part of a struggle for social 
change (Whittier, 2002). The specific, or target, goals of an SMO can range anywhere from 
obtaining equal rights for women (Taylor & Whittier, 1992) to the eradication of all Islamic 
people from Britain (Solomos, 2013). 
 Early social movement researchers in the 1940s and 1950s mostly focused on the 
irrationality of movements (Garner, 1997). The focus of analysis was the individual rather 
than that of a group; the answer to why and how an individual joined an organisation was 
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seen to lie within the individual themselves, in their personality, predispositions, and 
propensities. Social psychology was at the forefront, and beliefs were seen to be shaped by 
personality or by informal micro-pressures (Garner, 1997). 
 In the mid-1960s, social movement analysis began to use more specific 
organisational and political arguments to explain social protest, transforming what was an 
earlier focus of collective behaviour to one of collective action, social movements, and 
social movement organisations (McAdam & Scott, 2005; Gamson, 1968; Gamson, 1975; 
Zald & Ash, 1966). Collective action can be understood as an idea that encompasses an 
extremely wide array of empirical phenomena, “from raising an army to raising a barn; 
from building a bridge across a gulf separating states to building a faith community that 
spans the gulf between races; from organizing a business cartel to organizing a small 
partnership to compete in a crowded market; from the food riots of revolutionary France to 
the progressive dinners of charitable New York” (Marwell & Oliver, 1993: 1-2). The 
important thing is that these represent mutual interests and the possibility of some benefit 
from this action. In simpler terms, collective action can be defined as “actions taken by two 
or more people in pursuit of the same collective good” (Marwell & Oliver, 1993: 4). 
Much of the work on social movements built on the ideas of Philip Selznick, who 
used an institutional perspective to analyse the relationship between value commitments 
and concerns surrounding survival in the development of an organization (McAdam & 
Scott, 2005; Selznick, 1948; Selznick, 1952). The understanding of protest changed from 
one of irrational behaviour to one of instrumental action and began to focus on instruments 
of mobilisation rather than common grievances (McAdam & Scott, 2005). Movement 
behaviour was now seen as rational action within structural constraints, or in other words, 
a set of rational responses to the social environment (Garner, 1997; Oberschall, 1973; 
Gamson, 1975). 
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 In the decades that followed, several new theories emerged in the fields of social 
movement analysis and organisational studies. In the 1970s, John McCarthy and Mayer 
Zald began to publish on resource mobilisation, a newer economistic approach to social 
movement analysis (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & McCarthy 1987). This approach 
stressed that movements require some form of organisation to be sustained, whether that is 
strong leadership, structure, incentives for participation, or something else, as well as a 
means for obtaining resources.  
Shortly before McCarthy and Zald, Oberschall (1973) also began to suggest 
alternatives to the collective behaviour approach by introducing the concept of resources. 
According to Oberschall (1973), people and groups can manage resources in different 
ways, including exchanging them for others, borrowing them, or recalling earlier 
investments. Group conflict can also be seen from this perspective of resource 
management, and resource “mobilization refers to the processes by which a discontented 
group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals” (Oberschall, 1973: 
28). Additionally, conflicting groups are often in competition for the same resources. Group 
members possess different resources required to produce the ‘collective good,’ such as time 
and money, and the contribution of these resources is necessary for collective action 
(Marwell & Oliver, 1993). Resource mobilization theory began to be criticised by the mid-
1980s, however, for straying too far away from social psychology in the analysis of social 
movements (Klandermans, 1984). 
The importance of the social, economic, and political environments in which an 
organisation is situated began to gain attention, and other works stressed the importance of 
power and politics within organisations and in its relation to the environment (Gamson, 
1975; Zald & Berger, 1978). The political process perspective began to be pursued by 
Charles Tilly and colleagues, placing emphasis on ‘political opportunities’ (Tilly, 1978; 
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Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975), and the combination of an ‘external’ focus on the political 
environment with an ‘internal’ analysis of grassroots settings (for example, work and the 
local area) in facilitating collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). 
 The two major fields in this area to develop in the late-twentieth century are those 
of organisations studies (OS) and social movement (SM) analysis. Initially OS paid more 
attention to structure (formal and informal) within and among organisations, and only 
recently have OS scholars looked at the actual creation of organisations. SM theorists, 
while embracing the concepts and arguments of OS, concentrated on social processes, the 
mobilisation of people and resources, the construction and reconstruction of identities, the 
building of alliances, and the creation of ideologies and cultural frames to support and 
sustain collective action (McAdam & Scott, 2005). SM scholars place much emphasis on 
the determination of those conditions under which new (movement) organisations arise and 
do or do not succeed. Scholars are rather movement-centric, sometimes focusing on a single 
movement organisation or on organisations of the same type (an organisational population). 
McCarthy and Zald (1977) appropriated the concept of industry (organisational field) from 
OS, which was generally used to examine the effects of other, sometimes rival, movements 
on a central movement organisation. Additionally, while OS places emphasis on 
organisations as systems of domination, SM theories have always highlighted the crucial 
role of power and politics in social life. 
Organisational studies stress forces and factors affecting economic regulation, 
while social movement analysis has a focus on movements aimed at influencing social 
regulatory policies. OS is characterised by an emphasis on stability, existing forms of 
movements, prescribed politics (the activation and reproduction of established authority), 
and specific systems (McAdam & Scott, 2005; McAdam, 1999). On the other hand, SM 
emphasises change, emerging forms of movements, contentious politics, and society-wide 
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systems (McAdam & Scott, 2005). Both methods of analysis have their own important and 
unique perspectives, which is highlighted by the growing convergence between OS and SM 
scholarship. 
 
2.2.2 Economic theories 
 Several scholars have drawn from economic theories to explain membership in 
social movements. Social scientists seeking to explain human behaviour are generally 
interested in the knowledge or beliefs of those people. Hardin (2002) suggests that an 
economic theory of knowledge would address this question. “Such a theory would not focus 
on the object of belief but on the ways people come to hold their beliefs” (Hardin, 2002: 
5). There are three features of an economic theory of knowledge: knowledge is a resource 
and has value, and therefore is an economic good, the acquisition of knowledge often entails 
costs (resources, time, etc.), and “happenstance knowledge is in various ways fortuitously 
available when we use it” (Hardin, 2002: 6). It is because of this high cost of knowledge 
that individuals often rely on authorities for most of their knowledge. 
One borrowed economic theory is that of social capital, which adapted to the 
political and sociological literature, and “generally refers to the set of norms, networks, and 
organizations through which people gain access to power and resources, and through which 
decision making and policy formulation occur” (Grootaert, 2001: 10). In other words, by 
connecting to others, people are able to accomplish things they either could not achieve by 
themselves, or only could with great difficulty. “People connect through a series of 
networks and they tend to share common values with other members of these networks; to 
the extent that these networks constitute a resource, they may be seen as forming a kind of 
capital” (Field, 2008: 1). The more people one knows, and the more they share common 
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values and identity with those people, the “richer [they] are in social capital” (Field, 2008: 
1) and the more effectively they can “pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 1996: 66).  
 Social capital is simultaneously both individual and collective, “a private face and 
a public face” (Putnam, 2000: 20). It is both the ‘worth’ of an individual that is built up by 
social contacts, and the social ties than an individual has. Putnam (2000) describes two 
types of social capital: bridging social capital and bonding social capital. Bridging social 
capital generates broader identities, and “encompass people across diverse social 
cleavages” (Putnam, 2000: 22). More important for this research and for social movements 
in general, however, is bonding social capital, which is “inward looking and tend[s] to 
reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups” (Putnam, 2000: 22). 
 Of course, this works in the face of the rational choice model, which “assumes a 
highly individualistic model of human behaviour” where people only try to “serve their 
own interests, regardless of the fate of others” (Field, 2008: 24). Economist Eli Berman has 
suggested there is a rational basis for movement membership and radicalism through the 
application of the club goods model. The model, borrowed from economics, states in the 
‘club’, or group, “the actions of other members appear in each others’ objective functions,” 
but any effects on external actors is ignored as they only apply to club members (Berman, 
2000: 906). Berman has used this club goods model to rationally explain some interesting 
features of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture in Israel (Berman, 2000), as well as membership 
in volunteer religious organisations such as Hamas and the Taliban (Berman & Laitin, 
2008).  
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2.2.3 Social Psychology of Collective Action 
Identity and Solidarity 
 Social psychological factors of group involvement have always been of great 
interest to scholars, especially the question of whether various identity traits influence 
decisions to move to action, and how they do so. The “presence of feelings of identity and 
of collective solidarity makes it easier to face the risks and uncertainties related to collective 
action” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 94).  
Identity theory is essential in order to understand the mechanisms underlying an 
individual’s decision to be involved in collective action and join SMOs (Della Porta & 
Diani, 2006; Stryker, 2000). Jasper (1997) outlines three types of identity. Personal identity 
is “a sense of who one is, a sense of self,” and emerges “from the idiosyncratic biographies 
of individuals” (Jasper, 1997: 85-86). Collective identity “consists of perceptions of group 
distinctiveness, boundaries, and interests” (Jasper, 1997: 86) and “concerns the mesh 
between the individual and cultural systems” (Gamson, 1992: 55). It “is an act of the 
imagination, a trope that stirs people to action by arousing feelings of solidarity with their 
fellows and by defining moral boundaries against other categories” (Jasper & McGarry, 
2015: 1). This is similar to what Tajfel labels as social identity, which is “that part of the 
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social 
group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership” (1981: 225). It is a “shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or ‘we-ness’ anchored in real 
or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity 
and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of ‘others’” (Snow, 2001: 
2213). 
 Lastly, Jasper (1997) distinguishes collective identity from movement identity, 
which “arises when a collection of groups and individuals perceive themselves (and are 
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perceived by others) as a force in explicit pursuit of social change” (1997: 86). It is 
important to note that in this model, personal identity is of a biographical nature, collective 
identity is influenced by the cultural context of an individual, and movement identity comes 
from the interaction between the culture of one’s society and the internal culture of a 
movement (Jasper, 1997). 
There is a general tendency to focus on the collective identity of an individual in 
the context of social movement research, but it is important to consider that a person’s 
involvement cannot be fully understood by collective identity alone. Also, the collective 
concepts of identity for analysis of movements as ‘wholes,’ or comparative analysis 
crossing movements, are problematic for analysis of variable behaviour of members within 
movements (Stryker, 2000). One should be careful not to treat movement identities as 
existing in isolation from other identities. Collective identity can also pose important 
strategic dilemmas: the same identity that attracts some recruits may turn other away and 
may also cause negative attention from outsiders (McGarry & Jasper, 2015). 
A recent perspective is that a collective search for identity is an essential movement 
activity (Stryker, 2000). Collective identity derives from common interests, experiences, 
and a ‘we-feeling’ of a group, which is created, activated, and sustained through their 
interaction in the movement (Taylor, 1989; Stryker, 2000). This is important to maintaining 
membership in organisations, as in order to devote time and effort to protest, people 
generally must feel excited to be part of a larger group they think can help (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 2015). 
This ‘we-feeling’ can be considered group solidarity, which “concerns the mesh 
between individuals and the social system” and importantly involves “how individuals 
develop and maintain loyalty and commitment to collective actors – that is, to groups or 
organizations who act as carriers of social movements” (Gamson, 1992: 55). Solidarity is, 
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of course, closely related to collective identity, but it is possible to have one without the 
other (Gamson, 1992). An individual can identify with the ideology of a movement but feel 
alienated by an organisation. Also, someone can feel personal loyalty to an organisation 
(through personal ties, family, etc.), but not identify with their ideology. The question, then, 
is what promotes solidarity to a movement and/or organisation. As with the previous 
discussion about recruitment, it is quite likely that pre-existing social relationships are one 
of the biggest factors promoting solidarity (Gamson, 1992; Snow et al. 1980). 
 
Differential Recruitment 
One of the major questions of social movement analysis has been, and continues to 
be, that of differential recruitment (Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson, 1980). Before the 
1960s, protestors were seen as acting in abnormal and irrational ways due to frustration 
with their own lives (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015). It was thought that marginalised and 
alienated members of society were more likely to join social movements (Kornhauser, 
1959). However, since the 1960s the rationalist perspective has been dominant in social 
movement research, to the point where emotions and other elements are ignored (Della 
Porta & Diani, 2006; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b; Marwell & Oliver, 1993; 
Oberschall & Kim, 1996). It is important to remember that social actors act and make 
decisions within a system of interdependence with other actors (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). 
Several scholars have emphasised the importance of considering nonrational elements like 
emotions (anger, fear, disgust, joy, and love), feelings, and affections to research on politics 
and protest (Flam, 1990; Jasper, 1997; Goodwin & Jasper, 2001b; Goodwin et al. 2001).  
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Emotions 
Emotions have increasingly become a popular research area in the study of social 
movements (van Troost, van Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2013). In the past, emotions 
have been seen in direct opposition to rationality, but this idea has been refuted (Aminzade 
& McAdam, 2001; Gould, 2009; van Troost et al., 2013). Aminzade and McAdam (2001) 
suggest that the definition of emotion should include five main points: thoughts and 
cognitions (about a situation), feelings, actions, interpretation (one’s own cultural 
viewpoint), and thought and affect (how one is affected by a situation). When considering 
how emotions are affected by different cultural contexts, it is important to consider 
appraisal theory. The first and most important tenet of appraisal theory is that “emotions 
propel behaviour but different emotions propel different behaviour” (van Troost et al., 
2013: 187). The second is that different people can evaluate, or appraise, the same event in 
different ways “and consequently have different emotional responses” (van Troost et al., 
2013: 187). Emotions are important to activism in all stages, from recruitment, to continued 
participation, to, perhaps, even withdrawal. 
It has been suggested that activists and movement organisers work to create moral 
outrage in order to provide a target for common emotions, especially anger (Goodwin et 
al., 2001b; van Troost et al., 2013). The importance of moral outrage was described by 
Nepstad and Smith (2001) in their study of Central American peace movements in the 
1980s. Americans were moved to help people in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, 
likely through American religious communities. These communities had access to 
information, network ties, and importantly helped shape a Christian identity. Moral outrage 
is certainly a strong motivation for protest when there is someone or something to blame 
for a perceived injustice (Nepstad & Smith, 2001). 
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One important tool used by movements to create moral outrage, common identity, 
and recruit new participants is the use of 'frames,' which can be metaphors, symbols, and 
cognitive cues. Activists should “frame issues in ways that resonate with the ideologies, 
identities, and cultural understandings of supporters and others who might be drawn to their 
cause” (Campbell, 2005: 48). The use of frames in social movement studies was mostly 
derived from the work of Goffman (1974; Benford & Snow, 2000). Goffman described 
schemata that aid people in interpreting the world around them, and to identity, perceive, 
and label occurrences and experiences (Goffman, 1974).  
 
Framing 
As these frames are used to drive people to collective action, they are generally 
referred to as collective action frames. Framing is essentially the calculated creation and 
manipulation of shared understandings and views of the world. This is somewhat of a 
‘filtering lens’ to highlight a specific frame: who should act, why, and how (Campbell, 
2005; Goodwin & Jasper, 2015; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; van 
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Snow and Benford (1988) outline three types of 
framing important for successful recruitment: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. 
Diagnostic framing is used by movements to convince potential recruits that a problem 
must be addressed, prognostic framing is used to persuade potential participants of 
appropriate strategies and tactics, and motivational framing encourages them to get 
involved in these activities. These can also be explained in terms of mobilisation: consensus 
versus action mobilisation. Movements can disseminate information and manipulate 
emotions to create a shared definition, or frame. As a drive to action, individuals must 
“sympathize with the cause, need to know about the upcoming event, must want to 
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participate and they must be able to participate” (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2013: 
895; emphasis in original). 
One effective form of framing is to convince potential participants that they are 
being deprived of something to which they are entitled. This phenomenon is known as 
relative deprivation (RD), which can be defined as a term used “to denote the tension that 
develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value 
satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence” (Gurr, 1970: 23). In the view of some 
authors, it is some source of dissatisfaction combined with a feeling of deprivation which 
encourages people to join social movements, “[t]hat is, people must be dissatisfied because 
they believe they have been deprived of what is their due” (McLaughlin, 1969: 70). In other 
words, it is an inconsistency between value expectations, which refer to the goods and 
conditions to which people feel they are entitled, and value capabilities, which are the goods 
and conditions which people feel they are able to obtain and keep (Gurr, 1970). The 
emphasis here is on the perception of deprivation: a person can be subjectively deprived of 
something with reference to their expectation, although it may be seen differently by an 
objective observer. Similarly, someone experiencing absolute deprivation (in other words, 
abject poverty) may not consider themselves deprived (Gurr, 1970). An individual’s 
original point of reference is important, and can be anything from their own past, to an 
abstract ideal, or even to values articulated by a group leader (Gurr, 1970). 
 
Social ties 
Other important aspects to group recruitment are the social ties that an individual 
has and the social networks of which they may be associated (Diani & McAdam, 2003). 
One of the leading theories as to why an individual joins a movement is quite simply 
because they already know someone in the movement. “The vast empirical literature 
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prompts the contention that the presence of a network tie to someone already engaged in a 
movement is one of the strongest predictors of individual participation in that movement” 
(Snow & Soule, 2010: 120). Indeed, the first and most commonly cited fact about social 
ties and activism is that the individual was drawn into the movement by someone they 
already knew (Gould, 2003; Snow et al., 1980; McAdam, 1986; Klandermans & Oegema, 
1987). An individual can sympathise with the ideologies of a movement without joining, 
but a social relationship (for example, with a friend or relative) to someone in the movement 
can help them overcome any obstacles between sympathising and participating (Gould, 
2003).  
Doug McAdam (2003), however, suggests that we should reject the overly 
simplistic idea that people only get involved in a movement because they already know 
someone. His first point is that when a movement first forms, there are no ‘others’ to pull 
individuals into activism. Hence, this explanation would only be useful for a portion of 
members, and not for initial members of an organisation. McAdam, importantly, also points 
out that this explanation fails to account for the fact that people “invariably possess a 
multitude of ‘prior social ties’” (2003: 286). Issues also exist in research methodology, 
especially with the dependent variable, as research is mostly done on activists already in a 
movement. Lastly, McAdam emphasises that “showing that these activists were linked to 
the movement by some prior social tie does not prove the causal potency of that tie” (2003: 
286). However, McAdam does contest that any model of individual action must consider 
the social nature of humans and suggests that perhaps shared involvement in a movement 
or organisation can be seen as a way of enhancing an already existing close relationship. 
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Efficacy 
 Efficacy refers to the idea that it is possible to achieve social change through protest 
(van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) 
describe two types of efficacy: group and political. Group efficacy drives people to action 
as they believe that larger group-related problems can be solved by collective effort. 
Political efficacy is similar but is the belief that political action affects political processes. 
The more effective a person believes their participation in collective action could be, the 
more likely they are to participate (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013).  
One problem for mobilisation to social movements can be the free rider problem as 
described by Olson (1965). Some individuals will assume that others will work toward the 
public good, and therefore not join a group if they feel they can gain the benefits without 
participating (Olson, 1965). In other words: Why do only certain individuals participate in 
social movement activity, while other people in similar social and economic situations sit 
on the sidelines (Snow & Soule, 2010)? It is quite logical to assume that supporters will 
choose not to expend their resources, such as time, energy, and money, if there will still be 
a similar outcome from the collective action of others. As Olson (1965) pointed out, this is 
only true of larger movements and does not apply to smaller group sizes. In smaller groups, 
everyone must participate, but in larger groups it is more difficult for an individual to 
recognise their personal efficacy, that is, to see that their individual actions are making a 
noticeable difference to the public good.  
 
2.2.4 Biographical Factors Influencing Group Involvement 
 Another important aspect to be considered is one’s own personal biographical 
factors, that is, a person’s life experiences that now influence how they view the world. 
These factors are outside the cultural ones which influence all individuals: “the implicit and 
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explicit mental constructs that [one] shares with others are cultural; those [one] does not 
share are biographical” (Jasper, 1997: 54). Snow and Soule describe these personal 
constructs as resonant socialization experiences, that is the combined experiences of 
“learned values, norms, motives, beliefs, and roles of the groups and society with which 
one is associated,” and “changes in value orientation, beliefs, and identity during one’s life 
course” (2010: 126). Biographical factors are concerned with the first one of these 
processes, especially intergenerational transmission (Snow & Soule, 2010). That is, the 
information passed from parents to their children. Research has shown the importance of 
family and parental influence. In a study of political activists from the left and right, 
Rebecca Klatch (1999) discovered both sides of the political spectrum were heavily 
influenced by their parents and upbringing. There were differences in the backgrounds of 
the two sides, but similarities in the way they were brought up. This research shows the 
importance of the level of political interest of parents, regardless of ideology. If parents are 
encouraging of an interest in politics, participation in political events and movements are 
not foreign to their children. 
 Another important biographical factor is prior engagement in politics and 
movements (Snow & Soule, 2010). A person’s attitude to movement participation is 
influenced by their prior level of political involvement, whether that is simply political 
interest, knowledge of politics, or actual movement activity. Lastly, an important 
biographical factor is biographical availability, which are the various personal factors that 
can influence one’s availability such as “being married, having children, and being 
employed full time” (Snow & Soule, 2010: 130). According to Snow and Soule (2010), 
empirical research on biographical factors has been difficult to assess properly, partly due 
to the unavailability of data in relation to different stages of movement participation, and 
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because these factors can influence willingness to participate but do not necessarily 
determine movement participation. 
 
2.2.5 Empirical Studies of Differential Recruitment 
 There has been an incredibly large body of work written in the last century on social 
movements. This is especially true for studies on differential recruitment, which have been 
undertaken by several authors. 
 Differential recruitment has fascinated social movement scholars for decades, and 
there is an ever-increasing body of work examining the relationship between support for a 
movement and the drive to participate and move to activism. These studies have revolved 
around several different types of movements and organisations with widely differing 
ideologies, ranging from senior citizens movements (Simon, Loewy, Sturmer, Weber, 
Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, & Spahlinger, 1998), gay movements in the US (Simon et al., 
1998), Dutch farmers (Klandermans & de Weer, 2000) peace movements (Oegema & 
Klandermans, 1994), grassroots environmental movements (Kitts, 1999), striking workers 
(Dixon & Roscigno, 2003), civil rights movements of the American south (McAdam 1986), 
US Sanctuary activists (Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991), women in extremist organisations 
(Blee, 2002), the Swiss solidarity movement (Passy & Giugni, 2001), homeless movements 
(Corrigall-Brown, Snow, Smith, & Quist, 2010), to anti-hunger movements (Barkan, Cohn, 
& Whitaker, 1995; Cohn, Barkan, & Whitaker, 1993), just to name some of the wide range 
of movements. 
 Klandermand and Oegema (1987; 1994) looked at participants in a Dutch peace 
movement against the deployment of cruise missiles. They found that about 75 percent of 
the community under study were sympathetic to the goals of the movement, but only about 
one of every twenty people actually participated in the movement’s protest. Klandermans 
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and Oegema ascribe this low ratio of participation to three factors: not all of these 
sympathisers were targeted, only one-sixth of those targeted had motivation to participate, 
and only a third of those who had a desire to participate actually did. Non-participation by 
supporters was attributed to various obstacles, such as work or family commitments. This 
study shows that a willingness to participate does not, indeed, guarantee actual involvement 
in a movement.  
 This study also demonstrates that an individual may not participate in a movement 
because of certain social or personal obstacles, but also because of the simple fact that they 
were not asked to participate. Similarly, Schussman and Soule (2005) conducted an 
analysis with a survey administered in 1990 to adults in the United States who had recently 
taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration. They found that “being asked to” 
participate “was found to be the strongest predictor of participation” (Schussman & Soule, 
2005: 1081).  
 There is a growing body of work on available on radical right protest movements. 
More systematic studies of individual radical right activists are relatively rare, but several 
exist (Billig, 1978; Bjørgo, 1997; Blee, 2002; Busher, 2015; Pilkingon, 2016). In the 1990s, 
Linden and Klandermans (2007) conducted life-history interviews with 36 extreme right 
activists in the Netherlands. Depending on the types of stories they told and their 
trajectories into activism, interviewees were given one of four labels: the revolutionaries, 
the wanderers, convert, and compliants. Revolutionaries were those who wanted to change 
the world and meet others with the same motivations. Wanderers were simply looking for 
others who shared their ideology and where they could feel ‘at home’. Converts had 
undergone some traumatic event and were generally angry; they were not so much driven 
by ideology. Lastly, compliants were those who identified with others in the movement and 
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participated mainly to maintain relationships with family and friends. Some of the 
interviewees clearly were a combination of these types. 
 One study comparing the life histories of extreme right activists across national 
contexts appears in Klandermans and Mayer’s (2006) book Extreme Right Activism in 
Europe. They and a team of researchers asked the question ‘Who joins the extreme right 
and why?’ and interviewed extreme right movement members in five countries: the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, and Germany. They conducted life history interviews 
in an attempt to understand how motives to join develop during a person’s life, critical 
events that may have encouraged them to join, and to what extent these (or other) motives 
function to maintain commitment to the organisation (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). They 
aimed to interview people at different levels of the movement, but mostly at the lower 
levels, and deliberately oversampled women. The book provides detailed chapters on the 
extreme right activists of each individual country sampled. They found that participants in 
the study were not as extreme as originally thought: they appeared to be normal, socially 
integrated people. Almost all participants were anti-immigrant, but most avoided openly 
racist and anti-Semitic comments, and few considered themselves to be ‘extreme right’ 
(Klandermans and Mayer, 2016a). 
 
Great Britain 
 As this research will specifically focus on radical right activists in the Great Britain 
and Hungary, a brief overview of research published in those areas will now be provided. 
In Great Britain, several scholars have attempted to gain access and insight into radical 
right protest movements. Most of what does exist is focused on the British National Party 
(Ford & Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin, 2011; Goodwin, 2012; Rhodes, 2011), the English 
Defense League (Allen, 2011; Busher, 2015; Goodwin, Cutts, & Janta-Lipinski, 2016; 
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Jackson, 2011; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2014; Oaten, 2014; Pai, 2016; Pilkington, 2016; 
Treadwell & Garland, 2011; Winlow, Hall, & Treadwell, 2017), both the BNP and EDL 
(Richardson, 2013), and a very few on other extreme right groups (Allen, 2014; Jackson, 
2015). 
 Extensive work has been done on the EDL as they are the largest radical right 
protest movement in Great Britain. Several authors have gained access to interview 
members (for example, Busher, 2015; Pai, 2016; Pilkington, 2016; Treadwell & Garland, 
2011; Winlow et al., 2017), others have analysed the EDL in the online sphere and social 
media (Allen, 2011; Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Jackson, 2011), offered a discourse analysis 
of the EDL’s publicly available texts (Kassimeris & Jackson, 2014), and theoretically 
analysed the nature of the organisation (Alessio & Meredith, 2013; Jackson & Feldman, 
2011; Oaten, 2014). Three of these works (Busher, 2015; Pilkington, 2016; Winlow et al., 
2017) will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5, Qualitative Interviews. 
 Studies investigating factors influencing far-right and radical right support in Great 
Britain have often looked at support for the British National Party. As Matthew Goodwin 
found (2012), support for the BNP is strongest in areas in which people feel deprived, and 
those who are generally less-educated members of the working class. These supporters feel 
under threat from immigrants, particularly those from Muslim countries (Goodwin, 2012). 
In his book New British Fascism, Goodwin (2011) asks the question ‘who votes BNP?’ In 
order to answer this question, he conducted life history interviews with BNP supporters. 
Goodwin discovered that the most important predictors for someone supporting the BNP 
are hostility toward immigration and dissatisfaction with the other major political parties. 
The interviews revealed that “supporters are overwhelmingly concerned about 
immigration, settled Muslim communities, and the impact of minority ethnic groups on 
wide society” (Goodwin, 2011: 175). Interestingly, BNP supporters are highly concerned 
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about Muslims and immigrants, but are becoming less concerned with other minority 
groups who are now slowly becoming accepted in British society.  
 
Hungary 
 There is very little empirical evidence on radical right movements in Hungary. What 
scholarly works do exist are focused around the history of the extreme right in Hungary 
(Bernáth, Miklósi, & Mudde, 2005; Szayna, 1997; Szele, 2012), authoritarian attitudes 
among Hungarians (Todosijević & Enyedi, 2008), an overview of nationalism in Hungary 
(Krekó & Juhász, 2018), the political party Jobbik (Bartlett, Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield, & 
Győri, 2012; Kovács, 2013), and, very occasionally, the Hungarian Guard (LeBoer, 2008). 
One study that directly involved radical right supporters in Hungary was a documentary 
video entitled All for Hungary (van Iterson & Heezen, 2013), in which university-aged 
Jobbik voters were interviewed. What became clear from this video is that Jobbik voters 
were not always as radical as was generally believed, rather many voted because of a 
perceived lack of other option. A thesis was also completed at a Hungarian university on 
history through the lens of ‘radical nationalists’ in 2009, in which several members of 
HVIM were interviewed (Várhalmi, 2009). A book entitled The Hungarian Far Right 
(Krekó & Juhász, 2018) was recently published as the first comprehensive book on the 
Hungarian far-right in English. The title is misleading, however, as the book is focused on 
Jobbik with little mention of far-right, or radical right, organisations. 
 A study was published by Bartlett and colleagues surveying Jobbik followers on 
Facebook (Bartlett et al. 2012). These surveys discovered several interesting things about 
Jobbik supporters. For instance, a significant percentage have university education: they 
make up 22 percent of Jobbik Facebook supports, as opposed to only 15 percent of general 
Jobbik voters. This can likely be accounted for by the tendency of Jobbik voters to reside 
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in the more impoverished areas of Hungary, and hence be less likely to have access to a 
computer and the internet. Bartlett and colleagues also found that Jobbik Facebook follower 
under 30 are less likely to be unemployed than the national average. The top concerns of 
Facebook Jobbik supporters are integration of Roma (28 percent) and crime (26 percent, as 
compared to the 3 percent national average). One of the biggest differences found among 
Jobbik Facebook followers and European extreme right activist movements is a lack of 
concern among Jobbik supporters over immigration and Islamic extremism, which are the 
top two concerns in Western European movements (Bartlett et al. 2012). Interestingly, there 
is a low level of trust among Jobbik Facebook followers; 26 percent think people in general 
can be trusted and 42 percent think they cannot. The latter statistic is the interesting one, 
however, as the Hungarian national average for thinking that people cannot be trusted is 79 
percent. Considering this, Jobbik supporters seem to be more trusting of others than are 
average Hungarians. 
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
 As evidenced by this overview, the area of social movement research is vast and 
encompasses many disciplines and areas. This is also true for the specific questions of 
differential recruitment to and participation in social movements.  
 There is a vast body of literature dealing with all aspects of radical right protest 
movements and the far-right in Europe, but fewer examining these groups from the 
perspective of social movement analysis. The exceptions are mentioned above. Among 
those studies dealing with the radical right, fewer yet are focused on differential recruitment 
to, and participation in, those social movements, especially in Eastern Europe, or to 
comparative contexts.  
While there are several studies on the EDL, the Hungarian context is very much 
lacking a focus on non-political radical right organisations. Most of what is written about 
the Hungarian far-right is focused around the political party Jobbik. There are no articles, 
as yet, approaching the question of movement membership in Hungarian street-level social 
movements and organisations, and no one has yet attempted an analysis of differential 
recruitment to any groups in a Hungarian context. 
Additionally, as can be seen in the overview of empirical work, very few studies 
attempt in-depth or life history interviews with extreme right movement activists. These 
can be quite difficult to conduct due to issues of access and trust, but can provide incredibly 
valuable insight. 
 This study will add to the growing body of literature on protest movements, from 
the perspective of social movement and criminological theory. This research will continue 
the discussion of differential recruitment and participation in the framework of social 
movement organisations. It will also contribute to knowledge of radical right organisations, 
specifically in terms of their movement membership. This study will examine a group in 
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Hungary that has not yet been studied academically, and it will be one of few studies that 
have conducted in-depth interviews with radical right social movement activists. 
 While this chapter has overviewed much of the literature relating to the current 
study, there will still be some omissions due to its decidedly interdisciplinary nature. Even 
so, several gaps in the literature can be identified, which this research will attempt to fill. 
There is a need to further study motivations in seeking collective action in a radical right 
framework; a very timely topic considering the current political climate. There is also 
further need to study these questions in a cross-national comparative framework and, 
crucially, on street-level protest movements rather than political parties. While members 
and supporters of political parties can offer insight into questions such as why people seek 
collective action, they will likely have political motives and will not provide a clear and 
unbiased sample. There is also a need to further study methods of recruitment, especially 
in the online sphere, as well as the use of social media and its effects on movement 
participation. These gaps will all be addressed in this project using secondary survey 
analysis, online analysis, and qualitative interviews, which will make for the first mixed-
methods interdisciplinary study of this kind. 
 
Overview of the Study  
This research examines radical right social movement organisations from three 
aspects. Firstly, it asks what factors influence an individual to adopt far-right and radical 
right views. Secondly, it endeavours to discover what motivates individuals not only to 
support political activism, but also to join a radical right movement organisation. In other 
words, why is it that organisations can differentially recruit members, that is, why can they 
inspire certain people to join over others who do not. Thirdly, this research ventures to 
uncover what factors encourage individuals to maintain membership in these movement 
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organisations. This project will take a comparative approach and look at radical right social 
movement organisations in two different countries to see how these factors diverge in 
differing contexts. 
To explore these research questions, three different methodologies were utilised: 
secondary survey analysis, online analysis, and qualitative interviews. Mixed methods can 
often be difficult as they necessitate a knowledge of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Mixed methods research is not to be confused with multimethod research studies, 
in which research questions are explored through the use of two or more research methods 
from the same quantitative or qualitative tradition (Campbell and Fisk, 1959). In mixed 
methods research, on the other hand, both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to 
explore one research question, in either parallel or sequential phases (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2003). Mixed methods research can provide several advantages: it can answer 
research questions that other cannot, it can provide stronger inferences, it allows for 
research to develop in a more comprehensive way, it provides the opportunity to present a 
larger diversity of views, and the field of analysis is less likely to be restricted by the 
methods themselves (Morse, 2003; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). The potential weakness 
of mixed methods research, however, is that data is not as saturated and the smaller analyses 
are not as in-depth as they normally would be if they were a single-method study (Morse, 
2003). Even so, mixed methods are quite valuable as they can strengthen the validity of 
results and contribute to knowledge creation (McKim, 2017). These particular methods 
were carefully chosen to provide a more well-rounded study and to gain a better 
understanding of the phenomena in question in two different contexts.  
To first explore the question of what predisposes people to be on the political right 
and on the far-right, secondary survey analysis was conducted using the European Social 
Survey to explore the attitudes of the general public in the United Kingdom and Hungary, 
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on two separate rounds of the survey. It is very difficult to narrow the reasons for extremist 
attitudes and behaviour, or even deviancy, into just a few variables. This depends very 
much on the context of a particular country, including feelings toward immigration, the 
political situation, and other cultural influences (Bjorgo & Witte, 1993; Sutton & Wright, 
2009). Especially in the case of a cross-national comparison, it is critical to draw out the 
similarities and differences between the two countries.  This, then, provides a cultural and 
social base on which to form a context for later analysis.  
 The chapters following secondary survey analysis will present the second and third 
phases of the project. Online analysis of the websites and social media of the EDL and 
MÖM will be examined, in order to explore how these organisations attempt to recruit 
members and how they present their collective and movement identities. Both organisations 
at the centre of this study were quite active online and used the online sphere for 
advertisement and recruitment, hence providing an excellent tool for analysis. 
Following that, questions of why individuals seek activism, join these movements, 
and why they maintain membership in these organisations will be explored through semi-
structured in-depth interviews and textual interviews with organisation members. Indeed, 
individuals in an organisation have different motivations for seeking collective action; the 
best way to understand why individuals act is to speak to them directly. The focus of the 
interviews and creation of the interview schedule were informed by the research questions, 
while also taking into account the results of the secondary survey analysis (sociopolitical 
context) and online analysis (identity and attitudes of the organisation). Survey analysis 
examined the sociopolitical context of each country, allowing for a deeper understanding 
of several attitudes found expressed in the online analysis and during interviews. The online 
analysis gave insight into the identity and attitudes of the organisations; these were crucial 
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to the deeper understanding of qualitative interviews, particularly from the perspectives of 
identity formation and levels of support for the organisations.  
Rather than a traditional organisation of methodology, results, and discussion, each 
of these sections will be covered individually within each phase of the study. These three 
phases are intended to be smaller studies in their own right, all adding up to inform the 
research questions from different perspectives. Each methodology approaches the research 
questions from a special angle and lends to the understanding of the phenomenon in 
different ways. For an idea of how these methodologies intersect, see Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Depiction of the intersection of research methodologies and which themes 
they will analyse.  
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CHAPTER 3: SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides an investigation into theories of strain theory, arguing that 
perceived deprivation can lead to support for the far-right. It employs quantitative analysis 
to explore the role of a range of factors, namely satisfaction with life and opinions on 
immigration, in influencing an individuals right-wing and far-right identity in two differing 
contexts.  
The focus of this chapter is the factors that predispose individuals to adopt right-
wing, and specifically far-right, political identities. To explore this, the chapter presents the 
results of analysis using Hungarian and UK survey data from Rounds 7 and 8 of the 
European Social Survey (ESS). Results of this analysis were used to shape enquiry 
undertaken in later chapters, specifically framing the design of research questions on the 
recruitment and retention of members by the social movement organisations (SMOs) that 
are the focus of this thesis. 
To explore the question of how social and political outlooks predispose individuals 
to endorse far-right views, insights were drawn from several theoretical models common 
in Criminology. These largely address the impact of relative deprivation and economic 
exclusion on the exhibition of extreme and far-right tendencies. In this context, 'relative 
deprivation’ is defined as “the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ 
and … ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction” (Gurr, 1970: 23); or, in lay terms, the gap 
between expectations of goods and circumstances and how their actual availability is 
perceived. Important here is the emphasis on perception in the context of deprivation, as a 
person can be subjectively deprived of something only with reference to their expectations; 
it remains possible that it may be seen differently by an objective observer.  
In order to test the impact of these perceptions of deprivation this chapter will focus 
on the relationship between right-left political affiliation and measures of income, 
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employment, level of education, satisfaction with life, and pro/anti-migrant sentiment. 
Employment and years in education were both used as control measures in regression 
analyses. Because of this perception of deprivation, ‘satisfaction with one’s life’ will be 
used as a variable to test this theory. Additionally, immigrants are often condemned by 
governments as the source of economic issues. This is especially true in Hungary, as was 
seen in the major anti-migrant billboard campaigns organised by the Fidesz government 
(for example, see HVG, 2015). Because of this, ‘immigrants are good or bad for the 
country’s economy’ was also used as an independent variable, along with ‘immigrants 
undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life.’ 
Similarly, Robert Merton’s strain theory (1938; 1968) suggests that an inequality is 
felt between the culturally-approved goals in a society “and the means of achieving those 
goals” (Treadwell, 2013: 51). Merton, although looking specifically at the context of the 
United States, argued that people are encouraged to place a high importance on the goal of 
financial success (Agnew & Brezina, 2010). Many individuals are prevented from 
achieving those goals (for example, due to belonging to a lower class, or having low 
education), resulting in frustration. For these reasons, along with those mentioned above, 
‘immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy’ and ‘immigrants undermine or 
enrich a country’s cultural life’ were used as independent variables to test this theory. 
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3.1 HYPOTHESES 
To answer the broad research question that is the focus of this chapter, the following 
hypotheses were tested: 
H1: Low satisfaction with life as a whole correlates with a right-side placement on 
the left-right political scale. 
H2: Believing that immigrants are bad for the economy correlates with a right-side 
placement on the left-right political scale. 
H3: Believing that immigrants undermine cultural life correlates with a right-side 
placement on the left-right political scale. 
 
The following hypotheses were tested with relation to placement on the far-right of 
the left-right political scale: 
H4: Low satisfaction with life predicts a far-right placement on the left-right 
political scale. 
H5: Believing that immigrants are bad for the economy predicts a far-right 
placement on left-right political scale. 
H6: Believing that immigrants undermine cultural life predicts a far-right placement 
on the left-right political scale. 
 
3.1.1 Null hypotheses 
In order to accord with Popper’s (1963) arguments regarding falsifiability, the following 
null hypotheses were also tested: 
H01: Low satisfaction with life as a whole does not correlate with placement on the 
right side of the left right political scale. 
112 
 
H02: One’s opinion on whether immigrants make one’s country a worse or better 
place to live does not correlate with a right-side placement on the left-right political 
scale. 
H03: One’s opinion about whether immigrants undermine cultural life does not 
correlate with a right-side placement on the left-right political scale. 
H04: Low satisfaction with life as a whole does not predict far-right placement on 
the left-right political scale. 
H05: One’s opinion on whether immigrants make one’s country a worse or better 
place to live does not predict far-right placement on the left-right political scale. 
H06: One’s opinion about whether immigrants undermine cultural life does not 
predict far-right placement on the left-right political scale. 
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3.2 METHODOLOGY  
 
3.2.1 Data 
 The data analysed in this chapter are drawn from European Social Survey (ESS), a 
major pan-European study of social and political attitudes collected every two years. 
Analysis made use of round 7 (collected in the United Kingdom between September 2014 
to February 2015 and October to December 2015, and in Hungary between April and June 
of 2015) and round 8 (collected from September 2016 to March 2017 in the United 
Kingdom and between May to September of 2017 in Hungary) data, details on the 
demographic spread of which are presented in table 3.1, below. Hungary is still considered 
as part of the 2016 survey round although the data was collected in 2017 and released in 
2018. It must be noted that, longitudinally, these two data sets do not offer a perfect 
comparison as data was not collected at precisely the same times (see below) and different 
samples of respondents were surveyed in each Round. This analysis does, however, give a 
broader understanding of the social contexts of the two countries over several years. 
 It should also be noted that the data were collected across the United Kingdom, 
including Northern Ireland, and it is consequently extremely difficult to disaggregate data 
collected exclusively in Great Britain. Therefore, in this chapter the comparison will be 
between the political and social contexts of Hungary and the United Kingdom; the 
remainder of this thesis focuses on Great Britain, with the exclusion of Northern Ireland 
(as mentioned previously).  
Half of the questionnaire is repeated every round of surveys. All Rounds of the 
surveys cover three broad categories: value and ideology (including religion, political 
views, and morality), cultural and national orientations (national and ethnic identity), and 
the social structure of their society (class, education, social exclusion) (Fitzgerald & Jowell, 
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2010). The 2014 survey covered more specific questions of immigration and the 2016 
questions covered questions of climate change. For the purposes of this study, variables 
under the categories of socio demographics, politics, and the broad category of ‘subjective 
well-being, social exclusion, religion, national and ethnic identity’ were used. 
Participants were all residents in private households, regardless of nationality, 
citizenship, or language, and were aged 15 years or older, with no upper age limit imposed 
on inclusion; all were selected by strict random probability methods. A fuller exploration 
of sampling is provided in the European Social Survey technical report (for the current 
sampling guidelines, see Lynn et al., 2018).  
 The Hungarian Round 7 data sample was made up of 1698 individuals. Several 
individuals were removed from the sample prior to statistical analysis as they were under 
18 years of age. This resulted in a total of N = 1663 individuals for the analysis, with 704 
males (42.33%) and 959 females (57.67%), with an average age of 46.9 (see Table 3.1). 
The Hungarian Round 8 data sample was made up of 1614 individuals, with a total of N = 
1576 individuals used in analysis; of these respondents, 662 were male (42.01%) and 914 
were female (57.99%), with an average age of 49.  
 The UK Round 7 data sample was made up of 2264 individuals. Several individuals 
were removed from the sample prior to statistical analysis as they were under 18 years of 
age. This resulted in a total of N = 2206 individuals for the analysis, with 995 males 
(45.10%) and 1211 females (54.90%), with an average age of 47.3. The UK Round 8 data 
sample was made up of 1959 individuals, with a total of N = 1892 individuals used in 
analysis; of these respondents, 845 were male (44.7%) and 1047 were female (55.3%), with 
an average age of 48.  
 
115 
 
Table 3.1: Demographic description of all ESS Rounds in both Hungary and the United 
Kingdom, showing distribution by gender, mean age of each sample, and standard 
distribution.  
 
Country Round Male 
(N) 
Male 
(%) 
Female 
(N) 
Female 
(%) 
Age 
Mean 
Age SD 
HU 7 704 42.3 959 57.7 46.9 19.1 
HU 8 662 42.0 914 58.0 49.0 18.2 
UK 7 995 45.1 1211 54.9 47.3 17.8 
UK 8 845 44.7 1047 55.3 48.0 18.2 
 
 
3.2.2 Analysis 
Analysis made use of previously-collected survey data, which is generally freely 
available online. This method of survey analysis has several advantages. It saves resources 
by eliminating the need for a large research team, as is generally needed in cross-national 
surveys such as the ones utilised here. It also saves time, as the surveys are already 
completed and available. Lastly, it also circumvents data collection problems as data is 
already computerised as machine-readable survey data (Kiecolt & Nathan, 2004). 
 However, there are also limitations. Researchers can have problems locating 
specific information that is needed, especially in vast data archives (Kiecolt & Nathan, 
2004). Data may also not be available in the format that is needed for specific research, 
depending on the original intentions of those who conducted the survey. Also, errors made 
in the original survey are no longer visible; any typos and coding errors have disappeared 
into the survey and been forgotten (Kiecolt & Nathan, 2004). Lastly, surveys also rarely 
contain all the values of interest to a secondary researcher. 
Keeping in mind these issues, secondary survey analysis was found to be the best 
method for this research as the data was already freely and readily available. Additionally, 
the same set of questions was asked of both the Hungarian and UK respondents. The ESS 
also covered the questions that were essential for this study, namely those surrounding left-
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right political scale placement, satisfaction with life, views on immigrants, and the proper 
demographic information.  
 Three methods of analyses were used to explore the relationship between self-
positioning on the left-right political scale, life satisfaction, and views on immigration: 
bivariate correlation, linear regression, and binary logistic regression. In all cases 
positioning on the scale was the dependent variable. This analysis will begin with bivariate 
correlation, in order to explore whether a relationship exists before continuing to more 
complex analyses. Linear regression will then be applied, to gain a level of complexity by 
the addition of control measures. This allows to see whether demographic factors, such as 
age, gender, education, partnership, and employment, have any effect on the correlation, or 
if differences are purely due to the independent variables. Finally, this analysis will 
specifically explore far-right views, defined as values 9 and 10 on the political scale, 
through binary logistic regression. All analyses were conducted through SPSS and data was 
weighted using post-stratification weights in order to reduce the effects of sampling error 
and non-response bias. 
Initial bivariate analyses were completed to find general relationships between 
dependent and independent variables. All correlations were completed using SPSS with 
Spearman’s rho, as questionnaire answers were completed on a Likert scale and are at an 
ordinal level of measurement. Some questions could have been interpreted at an interval 
level of measurement, but a nonparametric test was necessary as variables were not found 
to have normal distributions.  
 To gain levels of complexity, linear regression analysis was completed with the 
addition of control measures. This second level of analysis explored the same hypotheses 
as for the bivariate analysis (H1, H2, and H3). Predictors were gender, age, employment, 
partnership, and years in education. Gender and employment were transformed into binary 
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measures, while partnership was found by combining those individuals with legal marital 
status and those cohabiting with a partner. Age and years in education are scale measures. 
 Hierarchical linear regression was run using SPSS. Regressions were run in two 
steps: the first including only control measures, with the second step introducing the key 
independent variable. The results of the two models were then compared to measure the 
effect of adding the independent variable. Results were compared between the Hungarian 
and UK samples. 
Bivariate analysis and linear regression explored the relationship between the 
independent variables and placement on the left-right political scale. In order to go one step 
further, binary logistic regression was employed to explore the relationship between the 
independent variables and far-right placement on the political scale (H4, H5, H6), while 
utilising control measures. Individuals were classed as far-right if they identified as a 9 or 
a 10 on the left-right political scale, which ranged from 0-10.  
Several control measures were transformed to be binary in nature. For gender, males 
were transformed to ‘1’, while all others ‘0’. Similarly, for employment, those who were 
employed at the time of the survey were ‘1’, all others ‘0’. Partnership was found by 
combining those individuals with legal marital status and those cohabiting with a partner: 
these were given ‘1’, all others ‘0’. 
 Logistic regression was run using SPSS in a stepwise fashion, with the first step 
testing for demographic predictors and the second step including one independent variable. 
Goodness of fit was tested using the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, the Omnibus test showing the 
effect of the model, and Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 showing the relationship between the 
predictors and the prediction of the model. Results were compared between the Hungarian 
and UK samples. 
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A 10 percent alpha level was used for all tests. It was decided that a significance 
level of p = .1 would be used mainly due to the preliminary nature of this analysis. 
Conventionally there is a reliance on the 5%, or even 1%, significance level, but that is now 
thought to be merely arbitrary (Gerber & Malhotra, 2008). Since these research questions 
were chosen to examine a new theoretical perspective on these samples, it can be argued 
that the risk of a false positive outweighs the consequences of incorrectly identifying a 
relationship. Once this new theoretical perspective has been established, further testing is 
possible at lower alpha levels in the future. 
 
3.2.3 Ethics 
Some attention must now be turned to examining the ethical considerations of 
secondary survey analysis. The European Social Survey (ESS) data is freely available on 
the Internet, including an online analysis tool, hence permission for further use is implied. 
However, the ESS does have one condition for the use of their data: they require a ‘deposit,’ 
meaning that users are required to register all bibliographic information in all forms of 
publication referring to ESS data to an online ESS bibliography database. This condition 
will be fulfilled once this research is submitted, and once any of this analysis is published. 
The ESS have anonymised their data, so it is impossible to trace the data back to 
any individuals. However, even when data has been anonymised there can still be a risk 
that a participant may be identified (ESRC, 2012). While it is appreciated that this must be 
considered in any data dealing with individuals and possible risk, it would still be very 
difficult to trace a specific participant through ESS data. It would be especially impossible 
to trace a participant through the analysis in this study, as no specific participant numbers 
or correlated information is shared. Individual cases will not be discussed, and this research 
aims to find macro-level trends. 
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3.3 DATA DISTRIBUTION  
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable Distribution 
Before looking at the correlation analyses, it is important to understand the 
distribution of self-placement on the left-right political scale. Five was the most common 
placement number for both countries, in a range from 0-10 with 0 being ‘left’ and 10 being 
‘right.’ In Round 7 of the Hungarian sample, 305 individuals did not give a response, and 
in Round 7 of the UK sample 231 individuals did not respond. Round 7 of the Hungarian 
sample showed that 526/1388 individuals, or 39.73%, chose the middle value. In the UK 
sample, 765/1938 individuals, or 39.47%, chose the middle value. It can be said, then, that 
more than a third of the survey respondents were unsure of their political leanings, and/or 
were likely not overly involved with the country’s political situation. Also, 18.72% of 
Hungarian respondents and 10.65% of UK respondents either refused to answer entirely or 
were unsure of their answer in Round 7. In Round 8 of the Hungarian sample, 285 
individuals did not give a response, and in Round 8 of the UK sample 151 individuals did 
not respond. Round 8 of the Hungarian sample showed that 346/1291 individuals, or 26.8%, 
chose the middle value, almost exactly 10% less than in Round 7. In the UK sample, 
696/1741 individuals, or 39.98%, chose the middle value. The distribution of the Hungarian 
sample for both rounds 7 and 8 can be found in Table 3.2 and of the UK sample in Table 
3.3. 
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Table 3.2: Distribution of left-right political scale self-placement in Hungarian sample Rounds 7 & 8 
 
Scale  
Placement 
Total Number 
R7 
Percentage 
(%) 
Total Number 
R8 
Percentage 
(%) 
0 (Left) 59 4.46 54 4.18 
1 20 1.51 26 2.01 
2 51 3.85 50 3.87 
3 82 6.19 86 6.66 
4 70 5.29 71 5.5 
5 526 39.73 346 26.8 
6 118 8.91 134 10.38 
7 153 11.56 174 13.48 
8 126 9.52 160 12.39 
9 43 3.25 61 4.73 
10 (Right) 75 5.66 129 10.0 
TOTAL 1324 100 1291 100 
 
 
Table 3.3: Distribution of left-right political scale self-placement in UK sample Rounds 7 & 8 
 
Scale  
Placement 
Total Number 
R7 
Percentage 
(%) 
Total Number 
R8 
Percentage 
(%) 
0 (Left) 61 3.14 39 2.3 
1 47 2.43 21 1.24 
2 81 4.18 100 5.9 
3 207 10.68 164 9.67 
4 189 9.75 230 13.56 
5 765 39.47 693 40.86 
6 201 10.37 178 10.5 
7 204 10.53 136 8.02 
8 117 6.04 85 5.01 
9 32 1.65 17 1.0 
10 (Right) 35 1.81 33 1.95 
TOTAL 1938 100 1696 100 
 
 There is a clear difference between the distributions of the two samples. The UK 
sample, as can be seen, is relatively evenly distributed between left-wing (0-4) and right-
wing (6-10) self-placement for both Rounds 7 and 8. The Hungarian sample, on the other 
hand, shows a different trend: for Round 7, 21.3% of the sample self-describes as 
somewhere on the left-side of the spectrum, while 38.9% describe as being on the right-
side of the left-right political scale. For Round 8, 22.22% of the sample self-describes as 
falling on the left-side of the scale, while 50.98% place themselves on the right-side of the 
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political scale. Of these, 14.73% self-describe as what is being considered for the purposes 
of this study as far-right, up from 8.91% two-years prior. 
 The results of the UK show that distribution of the scale stays fairly consistent from 
Round 7 to Round 8. The distribution is also centred around the middle of the scale showing 
lower values on the extremes of the scale. The results, however, showed a slightly larger 
change in Hungary between 2015 and 2017. Firstly, more than 10% less people chose the 
middle-value in 2017. While could be due to differences in the sample, this could also be 
taken to mean that around 13% of people were more confident in their political leanings. 
These were firmly applied to the right-side of the scale, with all values increasing; most 
notable, “10” nearly doubled, from 5.66% to 10%. This could be due to differences in 
sampling, as they did not sample the same respondents for both rounds, but could also 
indicate a shift to the right in the Hungarian population. Additionally, this could mean a 
different interpretation of ‘10’ in the Hungarian population: this could be interpreted by 
respondents as highly conservative (a Fidesz supporter), for example, and not as far-right. 
 Comparing the Hungarian and UK samples highlights the more centrist tradition in 
UK politics. This is reflective of the party tradition in the UK, of the moderate-right Tories 
and moderate-left Labour. It could very-well be that answers to this question are more along 
the line of political voting preference in the minds of respondents, hence self-identification 
reflecting the political identity of the party they tend to support, not necessarily perfectly 
reflecting their own attitudes and political ideology. This would also explain the higher 
amount of far-right self-identification in Hungary, given the constant shift towards the far-
right of the Fidesz party. 
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3.3.2 Independent Variable Distribution 
 The three independent variables used in these analyses were satisfaction with life, 
opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy, and opinion of 
whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life.  
 Satisfaction with life was measured on an 11-point scale, with 0 being ‘extremely 
dissatisfied’ and 10 being ‘extremely satisfied.’ Table 3.4 shows the variable distribution 
for the both rounds 7 and 8 for the Hungarian sample and Table 3.5 for the UK sample, 
showing both the total number of respondents and corresponding percentages for each 
value. By looking at the percent distributions, it becomes obvious that respondents in the 
UK sample were largely more satisfied with their lives than in the Hungarian sample, which 
is true across both Rounds.  
 
 
Table 3.4: Distribution for satisfaction with life for both rounds of the Hungarian sample, where 0 
is extremely dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied. 
 
 Frequency R7 Percentage R7 Frequency R8 Percentage R8 
0 38 2.36 22 1.41 
1 20 1.24 17 1.09 
2 94 5.83 52 3.32 
3 146 9.06 86 5.5 
4 126 7.82 102 6.52 
5 336 20.86 216 13.8 
6 200 12.41 230 14.7 
7 271 16.82 328 20.96 
8 222 13.78 302 19.3 
9 80 4.97 105 6.71 
10 77 4.78 105 6.71 
TOTAL 1611 100 1565 100 
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Table 3.5: Distribution for satisfaction with life for both rounds of the UK sample, where 0 is 
extremely dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied. 
 
 Frequency R7 Percentage R7 Frequency R8 Percentage R8 
0 21 .97 13 .69 
1 14 .65 18 .95 
2 33 1.52 25 1.32 
3 60 2.77 52 2.75 
4 76 3.51 76 4.02 
5 203 9.36 143 7.57 
6 179 8.26 148 7.83 
7 432 19.93 337 17.83 
8 562 25.92 548 28.99 
9 351 16.19 309 16.35 
10 237 10.93 221 11.69 
TOTAL 2168 100 1890 100 
 
 
Opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy was 
measured on an 11-point scale, with 0 being ‘bad for economy’ and 10 being ‘good for 
economy.’ Table 3.6 shows the variable distribution for both Rounds 7 and 8 for the 
Hungarian sample and Table 3.7 for the UK sample, showing both the total number of 
respondents and corresponding percentages for each value. The distribution reveals that 
Hungarian respondents were largely more pessimistic about immigrants’ effect on the 
economy than were UK respondents. Again, while these data sets cannot provide a perfect 
comparison, observing the results of Rounds 7 and 8 reveals a marked increase in 
pessimism among the Hungarian sample and an increase in optimism in the UK sample, 
which will be discussed in more detail below. 
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Table 3.6: Distribution for opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for economy for both 
rounds of the Hungarian sample, where 0 is ‘bad for the economy’ and 10 is ‘good for the economy.’ 
 
 Frequency R7 Percentage R7 Frequency R8 Percentage R8 
0 186 12.32 308 21.1 
1 103 6.82 141 9.66 
2 215 14.24 154 10.55 
3 251 16.62 204 13.97 
4 169 11.19 184 12.6 
5 347 22.98 260 17.81 
6 120 7.95 119 8.15 
7 46 3.05 59 4.04 
8 35 2.32 17 1.16 
9 5 .33 1 .07 
10 33 2.19 13 .89 
TOTAL 1510 100 1460 100 
 
 
Table 3.7: Distribution for opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for economy for both 
rounds of the UK sample, where 0 is ‘bad for the economy’ and 10 is ‘good for the economy.’ 
 
 Frequency R7 Percentage R7 Frequency R8 Percentage R8 
0 161 7.51 79 4.24 
1 98 4.57 44 2.36 
2 168 7.83 79 4.24 
3 189 8.81 133 7.14 
4 173 8.07 127 6.81 
5 485 22.61 430 23.07 
6 230 10.72 222 11.91 
7 300 13.99 318 17.06 
8 212 9.88 247 13.25 
9 59 2.75 98 5.26 
10 71 3.31 87 4.67 
TOTAL 2145 100 1864 100 
 
Opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country 
was measured on an 11-point scale, with 0 being ‘cultural life undermined’ and 10 being 
‘cultural life enriched.’ Table 3.8 shows the variable distribution for both Rounds 7 and 8 
for the Hungarian sample and Table 3.9 for the UK sample, showing both the total number 
of respondents and corresponding percentages for each value. The distribution pattern is 
largely the same for both data sets, with Hungarian respondents being somewhat more 
unsure than UK respondents (given the higher percentage of the middle-choice ‘5’) in 
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Round 7. This is likely due to the lower frequency of immigration into Hungary than into 
the United Kingdom.  
In Round 8, the UK sample is strongest around values 5-8, suggesting a moderate 
optimism about the effects of immigrants on cultural life. These results are not strikingly 
different from the results of Round 7: we do see a drop by half in the zero-value from 7.9 
percent to 4 percent along with a rise in positive values and decline in negative values, but 
the changes are relatively marginal. Indeed, these results support similar findings by large-
scale surveys in the UK, such as findings by Ipsos MORI that Britons are becoming more 
positive about the impacts of immigration on the UK (Kaur-Ballagan, Gottfried, and 
Holden, 2019). However, according to Goodwin and Milazzo (2017), negative feelings 
towards immigrants began to be more pronounced after the 2004 accession of Central and 
Eastern European countries to the European Union, after which many people came to the 
UK. A decade later, after 2015, these concerns were strengthened by the refugee crisis, 
especially given the anti-EU and anti-immigrant campaigning by parties like UKIP 
(Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). The results here, however, show the opposite effect: that 
views toward immigration, at least in terms of its effect on cultural life, are becoming more 
positive since 2015. 
The Hungarian sample, however, paints a different picture. The Round 7 results 
reveal an uncertainty among people about immigrants and whether they have an effect on 
cultural life. In Round 8, however, the results become markedly pessimistic. The 0-point, 
suggesting immigrants undermine cultural life completely, went from 4.61 percent in round 
7 to 16.86 percent in round 8. The rest of the values at the lower-end of the scale, number 
2-4, increased in percentage while the rest lowered. This suggests that the xenophobic and 
nativist nation-wide anti-migrant campaigns of the authoritarian Fidesz government, 
beginning in the summer of 2015, indeed worked to influence the Hungarian people. This 
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is also a frightening demonstration of the lack of alternative dialogue and discourse in 
Hungary, especially in the media, leading to the indoctrination of a large percentage of 
Hungarians. 
 
Table 3.8: Distribution for opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life 
of a country for both rounds of the Hungarian sample, where 0 is ‘undermine cultural 
life’ and 10 is ‘enrich cultural life.’ 
 
 Frequency R7 Percentage R7 Frequency R8 Percentage R8 
0 63 4.17 248 16.86 
1 28 1.86 97 6.59 
2 134 8.91 134 9.11 
3 196 12.99 196 13.32 
4 161 10.67 180 12.24 
5 435 28.83 295 20.05 
6 158 10.47 144 9.79 
7 172 11.4 102 6.93 
8 85 5.63 44 2.99 
9 21 1.39 6 .41 
10 57 3.78 25 1.7 
TOTAL 1509 100 1471 100 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9: Distribution for opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life 
of a country for both rounds of the UK sample, where 0 is ‘undermine cultural life’ 
and 10 is ‘enrich cultural life.’ 
 
 Frequency R7 Percentage R7 Frequency R8 Percentage R8 
0 153 7.16 73 4.0 
1 92 4.31 43 2.35 
2 170 7.96 77 4.22 
3 234 10.96 121 6.63 
4 193 9.04 135 7.39 
5 380 17.79 337 18.46 
6 203 9.5 201 11.01 
7 259 12.12 301 16.48 
8 237 11.1 296 16.21 
9 115 5.38 122 6.68 
10 101 4.73 120 6.57 
TOTAL 2136 100 1826 100 
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3.4 CONTROL MEASURES 
As a range of demographic factors can influence placement on the left-right political 
scale, control measures were used in both multivariate analyses. All control measures were 
recoded before running statistical tests and missing data was excluded, in order to conserve 
degrees of freedom within the model. 
Predictors included gender, age, employment, partnership, and years in education 
(Table 3.10, Table 3.11, and Table 3.12). Gender and employment were transformed into 
binary measures, while partnership was found by combining those individuals with legal 
marital status and those cohabiting with a partner. Age and years in education are scale 
measures. Predictors were tested for multicollinearity by examining Variable Inflation 
Factors in SPSS. No predictors or independent variables showed multicollinearity in either 
the Hungarian or UK sample. 
 
Table 3.10: Transformation of control variables 
Control 
Variable 
Original 
Variable 
ESS 
Variable 
Type Recoding 
Gender  gndr Categorical Male = 1,  
Female = 0 
 
Age 
 
 age Scale No 
Employment  emplrl Categorical Employed = 1,  
Unemployed = 0 
 
Partnership Marital 
Status 
 
marsts Categorical Combination of legal 
marital status and those 
cohabitating with a 
partner = 1,  
No partner = 0 
 Cohabitation 
with Partner 
 
icpart1 Categorical 
Years in 
Education 
 eduyrs Scale No 
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Table 3.11: Control variables for multivariate analysis for ESS Round 7 
Control Variable Mean 
HU 
Mean 
UK 
Mode HU Mode UK SD HU SD UK 
Gender N/A N/A Female Female N/A N/A 
Age 50.58 52.80 41 40 17.87 17.94 
Employment N/A N/A Employed Employed N/A N/A 
Partnership N/A N/A Partner Partner N/A N/A 
Years in 
Education 
12.64 13.86 12 11 6.25 5.79 
 
Table 3.12: Control variables for multivariate analysis for ESS Round 8 
Control Variable Mean 
HU 
Mean 
UK 
Mode HU Mode UK SD HU SD UK 
Gender N/A N/A Female Female N/A N/A 
Age 51.49 52.02 42 67 18.24 18.32 
Employment N/A N/A Employed Employed N/A N/A 
Partnership N/A N/A Partner Partner N/A N/A 
Years in 
Education 
12.18 14.34 12 11 4.77 6.9 
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3.5 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 Three variables - satisfaction with life as a whole, opinion on whether immigrants 
are good or bad for the country’s economy, and opinion on whether immigrants undermine 
the cultural life of the country - were individually correlated with placement on the left-
right political scale. Correlations were conducted using Spearman’s rho; a 10 percent alpha 
level was used for all correlations.  
 
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1 
ESS Round 7 
 Hypothesis 1 tests whether satisfaction with life influences respondents’ placement 
on the left-right political scale. In the Hungarian sample, satisfaction with one’s life and 
left-right scale placement were moderately positively correlated, r(1197) = .13, p < .001. 
This indicates that the more satisfied they are with their life as a whole, the more likely 
they are to place on the right side of the left-right political scale.  
 In the UK sample, satisfaction with one’s life and left-right scale placement were 
moderately positively correlated, r(1932) = .13, p < .001. This indicates that the more 
satisfied they are with their life as a whole, the more likely they are to place on the right 
side of the left-right political scale. 
 It is striking that in both the Hungarian and UK samples, a higher satisfaction with 
one’s life is positively correlated with right-side placement on the left-right political scale, 
rejecting H1 and supporting the null hypothesis in both cases. This is likely due to the right-
side scale placement including moderately conservative and conservative individuals, as 
well as those on the far-right of the scale. This is by no means a measure of individuals on 
the far end of the scale, for which further tests are necessary. 
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ESS Round 8 
In Round 8 of the Hungarian sample, satisfaction with one’s life and left-right scale 
placement were moderately positively correlated, r(1290) = .27, p < .001. This indicates 
that the more satisfied they are with their life as a whole, the more likely they are to place 
on the right side of the left-right political scale.  
 In the UK sample, satisfaction with one’s life and left-right scale placement were 
moderately positively correlated, r(1566) = .13, p < .001. This indicates that the more 
satisfied they are with their life as a whole, the more likely they are to place on the right 
side of the left-right political scale. Both of these results are quite similar to the results of 
Round 7, which were r(1385) = .16, p < .001 for the Hungarian sample and r(1976) = .12, 
p < .001 for the UK sample. 
 
3.5.2 Hypothesis 2 
ESS Round 7 
Hypothesis 2 tests whether opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the 
country’s economy influences self-placement on the left-right political scale. In the 
Hungarian sample, individual opinion on whether immigrants are bad or good for the 
economy is marginally negatively correlated, at r(1152) = -.09 p = .002. In the UK sample, 
individual opinion on whether immigrants are bad or good for the economy is marginally 
negatively correlated with placement on the left-right political scale, r(1911) = -0.11, p < 
.001. This suggests that those individuals who believe immigrants to be worse for the 
country are slightly more likely to place on the right-side of the left-right political scale.  
When looking to attitudes towards immigration, the Hungarian sample showed a 
slight negative correlation, indicating that those individuals believing that immigrants are 
bad for the country’s economy are slightly more likely to fall on the right side of the left-
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right scale, supporting H2 and rejecting the null hypothesis. The UK sample results showed 
a slight negative correlation, indicating that those individuals believing immigrants are bad 
for the country’s economy are slightly more likely to fall on the right side of the left-right 
scale, supporting H2 and rejecting the null hypothesis. 
 
ESS Round 8 
Much like the results of the Round 7 data, the results of Round 8 of the Hungarian 
sample show a significant correlation between opinion of whether immigrants are bad or 
good for the economy and scale placement. For the Hungarian sample these variables are 
moderately negatively correlated, r(1566) = -.16, p < .001. In the UK sample, individual 
opinion on whether immigrants are bad or good for the economy is also moderately 
negatively correlated with placement on the left-right political scale, r(1696) = -0.14, p < 
.001. This suggests, like Round 7, that those individuals who believe immigrants to be 
worse for the country are slightly more likely to place on the right-side of the left-right 
political scale.  
 
3.5.3 Hypothesis 3 
ESS Round 7 
Hypothesis 3 tested whether respondents’ opinion of whether immigrants 
undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life influenced their self-placement on the left-
right political scale. Opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life 
of a country was marginally negatively correlated with left-right political scale placement 
in the Hungarian sample, r(1144) = -.11, p < .001. This indicates that those who believe the 
country’s cultural life to be undermined by immigrants are slightly more likely to place on 
the right side of the left-right political scale.  
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In the UK sample, opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural 
life of a country was moderately negatively correlated with left-right political scale 
placement, r(1919) = -.15, p < .001. This indicates that those who believe the country’s 
cultural life to be undermined by immigrants are more likely to place on the right side of 
the left-right political scale.  
 Results were only slightly negatively correlated for beliefs of cultural life in the 
Hungarian sample, indicating that those who believe the country’s cultural life to be 
undermined by immigrants are slightly more likely to place on the right side of the left-
right political scale, supporting H3 and rejecting the null hypothesis. In the UK sample, 
results also showed a negative correlation, also supporting H3 and rejecting the null 
hypothesis, though the results were stronger than in the Hungarian sample. 
 
ESS Round 8 
For Round 8, opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life 
of a country was moderately negatively correlated with left-right political scale placement 
in the Hungarian sample, r(1249) = -.23, p < .001. In the UK sample, opinion of whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of a country was moderately negatively 
correlated with left-right political scale placement, r(1566) = -.24, p < .001. These results 
indicate, as in Round 7, that those who believe the country’s cultural life to be undermined 
by immigrants are more likely to place on the right side of the left-right political scale.  
 
3.5.4 Discussion of Bivariate Results 
 As findings rejected Hypothesis 1 in both Round 7 and Round 8 data, this suggests 
that low satisfaction with one’s life does not correlate with a right-side placement on the 
left-right political scale. Indeed, it seems that a higher satisfaction with life makes it 
133 
 
somewhat more likely that an individual will place to the right. While this does not support 
the theoretical perspectives of relative deprivation and strain theory, it must be remembered 
that placement on the right-side of a left-right political scale is not the same as placement 
to the far-right of the scale. These findings could suggest significant implications 
considering previous empirical findings, which will be further discussed following the 
results of the regression analyses. The only potentially significant result between the Round 
7 and Round 8 data is found in the Hungarian dataset, where life satisfaction is more 
positively correlated in the Round 8 data (r(1290) = .27, p < .001) than in the Round 7 data 
(r(1385) = .16). This could indicate a slight change in the way Hungarians identify with 
their political position between spring 2015 and summer 2017, but could also simply be 
due to the fact that these datasets sampled different respondents. Longitudinal results from 
datasets with different samples must be approached carefully as they do not represent a 
perfect comparison. 
Hypothesis 2 was supported for both the Hungarian and UK Round 7 and Round 8 
datasets, indicating that right-side placement on the political scale correlates with opinion 
on the effect of immigrants on the economy at the p = .1 significance level. The Hungarian 
sample was found to have a very marginal correlation in Round 7 at r(1152) = -.09 p = 
.002, which rose to a moderate correlation (r(1225) = -0.26, p < .001) in Round 8. The 
correlation in the UK data rose slightly between rounds, from a very marginal correlation 
(r(1954) = -0.08, p = .001) in Round 7 to a slight correlation (r(1696) = -0.14, p < .001) in 
Round 8. The change in the Hungarian data between spring 2015 to summer 2017 could 
indicate the effects of the migrant crisis of the summer of 2015 and subsequent anti-migrant 
campaign by the Hungarian Fidesz government, but again it should be reiterated that this 
must be approached cautiously as it is not a perfect comparison. Similarly, the change in 
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the UK Round 7 and Round 8 data could should the effects of the anti-immigrant nature of 
the ‘Vote Leave’ Brexit campaign. 
When examining Hypothesis 3, results for Round 7 indicate that feelings were 
stronger in the UK sample (r(1958) = -.14, p < .001) than in the Hungarian sample (r(1313) 
= -.08, p = .005) regarding the right when it comes to whether immigrants undermine the 
cultural life of the country. This difference is worth noting and could be due to the cultural 
context of the countries. The United Kingdom has a much larger percentage of immigrants 
than Hungary, with a steadily increasing influx of immigration over the last decade and-a-
half (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). This is especially true after 2004, when an increasing 
number of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe began to immigrate to the UK. In 
2014-2015, when Round 7 of the survey was run, tensions were rising in the UK due to 
immigration as well as a number of other reasons, eventually leading to the 2016 Brexit 
referendum. However, the results of the Round 8 datasets show the opposite relationship, 
as feelings are slightly stronger in the Hungarian sample (r(1249) = -.23, p < .001) than in 
the UK sample (r(1695) = -.21, p < .001) regarding the question of whether immigrants 
undermine the cultural life of the countries. This change can likely be attributed to the 
migrant crisis of 2015, when thousands of refugees crowded the train stations of Hungary’s 
capital. Tensions rose sharply as, subsequently, the right-wing Fidesz government launched 
an ‘anti-migrant’ billboard campaign across the country. 
All correlation relationships are stronger and more significant in Round 8 than 
Round 7, with most having considerably stronger correlations. Again, results of 
longitudinal studies conducted with differing datasets must be approached with caution. 
This does not allow for a perfect comparison but does give some idea of cultural context in 
both countries before and after major contemporary political moments; more specifically, 
the migrant crisis of summer 2015 in Hungary and the Brexit referendum, held 23 June 
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2016, in the UK. Results, in both the UK and Hungary, show stronger life satisfaction, 
stronger negative feelings about immigrants in relation to the country’s economy, and 
stronger negative feelings about immigrants in relation to the culture of the country among 
respondents who place themselves on the right-side of the political scale in the Round 8 
datasets. Results also indicate stronger correlations for all of these variables in the 
Hungarian Round 8 datasets as compared to the UK Round 8 datasets. 
As these relationships are complex and multifactorial, bivariate analysis does not 
provide a sufficient platform for properly analysing these relationships. These ideas and 
values are shaped by a range of influences that cannot be controlled for during bivariate 
tests. As regression analysis allows to control for other factors, and the left-right scale is a 
scale-level variable, we will move to linear regression to gain a level of complexity. 
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3.6 LINEAR REGRESSION 
 A hierarchical linear regression was calculated in the Hungarian and UK samples 
to predict placement on the left-right scale based on satisfaction with one’s life, opinions 
on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy, and opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life. Predictors were gender, age, 
employment, partnership, and years in education. Gender and employment were 
transformed into binary measures, while partnership was found by combining those 
individuals with legal marital status and those cohabiting with a partner. Age and years in 
education are scale measures. Predictors were tested for multicollinearity by examining 
Variable Inflation Factors in SPSS. No predictors or independent variables showed 
multicollinearity in either the Hungarian or UK sample. 
 
3.6.1 Hypothesis 1 
Hungarian Sample 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if life satisfaction 
significantly predicted respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale in the 
Hungarian sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.13). All R-value and ANOVA tables can be 
found in Appendix A. The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five 
predictors explained 5.2% of the variance (R2 =.052, F(5,1308) = 14.31, p < .001). It was 
found that gender significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale (β = .09, p = 
.001), as did age (β = -.21, p < .001) and employment (β = .06, p = .029). The second step 
indicated that the addition of life satisfaction to the five predictors explained an additional 
1.0% of the variance, at 6.2% (R2 =.062, F(6,1307) = 14.34, p < .001). It was found that 
gender (β = .1, p < .001), age (β = -.2, p < .001), and employment (β = .07, p = .017) 
significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale, as did life satisfaction (β = .1, p 
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< .001). As the standardised coefficient (β = .1) indicates a positive relationship between 
life satisfaction and right-side placement on the political scale, H1 is rejected and the null 
hypothesis is supported in the Hungarian sample. 
 
Table 3.13: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of life 
satisfaction on the model on the Hungarian sample Round 7 (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 6.00 .35  0 
 Employment .48 .22 .06 .029 
 Partner .18 .38 .01 .635 
 Gender .43 .12 .09 .001 
 Age -.03 .004 -.21 0 
 Education 0 .02 0 .991 
Step 2 (constant) 5.48 .37  0 
 Employment .52 .22 .07 .017 
 Partner .14 .38 .01 .719 
 Gender .44 .12 .1 0 
 Age -.02 .004 -.2 0 
 Education -.02 .02 -.03 .400 
 Life Satisfaction .11 .03 .1 0 
Note. R2 = .05 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .06 for Step 2.   
 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if life satisfaction 
significantly predicted respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale in the 
Hungarian sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.14). The results of the first step of the 
regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.5% of the variance (R2 =.035, F(5,1284) 
= 9.22, p < .001). It was found that employment significantly influenced placement on the 
left-right scale (β = .08, p = .008), as did partnership (β = .05, p = .076) and age (β = -.18, 
p < .001). The second step indicated that the addition of life satisfaction to the five 
predictors explained an additional 4.8% of the variance, at 8.3% (R2 =.083, F(6,1283) = 
19.43, p < .001). It was found that employment (β = .08, p = .006) and age (β = -.14, p < 
.001) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale, as did life satisfaction (β = 
.23, p < .001). As the standardised coefficient (β = .23) indicates a positive relationship 
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between life satisfaction and right-side placement on the political scale, H1 is rejected and 
the null hypothesis is supported in the Hungarian sample. 
 
Table 3.14: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of life 
satisfaction on the model on the Hungarian sample Round 8 (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 6.15 .41  0 
 Employment .92 .35 .08 .008 
 Partner .26 .15 .05 .076 
 Gender .09 .14 .02 .506 
 Age -.03 .004 -.18 0 
 Education -.01 .02 -.01 .644 
Step 2 (constant) 4.23 .46  0 
 Employment .92 .34 .08 .006 
 Partner .13 .14 .03 .348 
 Gender .16 .14 .03 .242 
 Age -.02 .004 -.14 0 
 Education -.02 .02 -.04 .153 
 Life Satisfaction .28 .03 .23 0 
Note. R2 = .04 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .08 for Step 2.   
 
UK Sample 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test whether life satisfaction 
significantly predicted respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale in the UK 
sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.15). The results of the first step of the regression indicated 
the five predictors explained 3.1% of the variance (R2 =.31, F(5,1925) = 12.43, p < .001). 
It was found that gender (β = .11, p < .001) and age (β = .14, p < .001) significantly 
influenced placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of 
life satisfaction to the five predictors explained an additional 1.3% of the variance, at 4.4% 
(R2 =.044, F(6,1924) = 14.69, p < .001). It was found that gender (β = .11, p < .001) and 
age (β = .13, p < .001) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did life 
satisfaction (β = .11, p < .001). As the standardised coefficient (β = .11) indicates a positive 
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relationship between life satisfaction and right-side placement on the political scale, H1 is 
rejected and the null hypothesis is supported in the UK sample. 
 
Table 3.15: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of life 
satisfaction on the model for the UK sample Round 7 (adapted from Field, 2013). 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 3.83 .3  0 
 Employment .18 .22 .02 .416 
 Partner -.01 .22 0 .983 
 Gender .41 .09 .11 0 
 Age .02 .003 .14 0 
 Education .001 .01 .002 .934 
Step 2 (constant) 3.16 .32  0 
 Employment .17 .22 .02 .435 
 Partner .01 .22 .001 .954 
 Gender .42 .09 .11 0 
 Age .02 .003 .13 0 
 Education -.004 .01 -.01 .763 
 Life Satisfaction .11 .02 .11 0 
Note. R2 = .03 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .04 for Step 2.   
 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test whether life satisfaction 
significantly predicted respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale in the UK 
sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.16). The results of the first step of the regression indicated 
the five predictors explained 3.8% of the variance (R2 =.038, F(5,1689) = 13.34, p < .001). 
It was found that partnership (β = -.07, p = .002), gender (β = .21, p = .019), and age (β = 
.02, p < .001) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale. The second step 
indicated that the addition of the life satisfaction variable to the five predictors explained 
an additional 1.4% of the variance, at 5.2% (R2 =.052, F(6,1688) = 15.57, p < .001). It was 
found that gender (β = .2, p = .025) and age (β = .02, p < .001) significantly predicted 
placement on the left-right scale. The variable measuring life satisfaction was found to be 
significant (β = .11, p < .001) in the Round 8 sample. As the standardised coefficient (β = 
.11) indicates a positive relationship between life satisfaction and right-side placement on 
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the political scale, H1 is rejected and the null hypothesis is supported in the Round 8 UK 
sample. 
 
Table 3.16: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of life 
satisfaction on the model on the UK sample Round 8 (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 3.77 .26  0 
 Employment .27 .22 .03 .209 
 Partner .17 .1 .04 .079 
 Gender .21 .09 .06 .019 
 Age .02 0 .16 0 
 Education -.01 .01 -.04 .124 
Step 2 (constant) 3.0 .3  0 
 Employment .31 .22 .04 .145 
 Partner .1 .1 .03 .313 
 Gender .2 .09 .05 .025 
 Age .02 0 .16 0 
 Education -.01 .01 -.04 .112 
 Life Satisfaction .11 .02 .12 0 
Note. R2 = .04 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .05 for Step 2.   
 
 
3.6.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hungarian sample 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether 
immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy significantly predicted respondents’ 
placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 7 (See Table 
3.17). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 
5.3% of the variance (R2 =.053, F(5,1256) = 13.96, p < .001). It was found that gender (β 
= .09, p = .001), age (β = -.21, p < .001), and employment (β = .07, p = .015) significantly 
predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of 
opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy to the five 
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predictors explained an additional 1.0% of the variance, at 6.3% (R2 =.063, F(6,1255) = 
14.02, p < .001). It was found that gender (β = .09, p = .001), age (β = -.21, p < .001), and 
employment (β = .07, p = .014) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as 
did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy (β = -.1, p 
< .001). As the standardised coefficient (β = -.1) indicates a positive relationship between 
opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy and right-side placement 
on the political scale, H2 is supported in the Hungarian Round 7 sample. 
 
Table 3.17: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of 
opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy on the 
model for the Hungarian sample Round 7 (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 5.98 .36  0 
 Employment .55 .22 .07 .015 
 Partner .16 .39 .01 .683 
 Gender .43 .13 .09 .001 
 Age -.03 .004 -.21 0 
 Education -.002 .02 -.002 .938 
Step 2 (constant) 6.31 .36  0 
 Employment .55 .22 .07 .014 
 Partner .17 .39 .01 .667 
 Gender .43 .13 .09 .001 
 Age -.03 .004 -.21 0 
 Education .004 .02 .01 .822 
 Immigrants Economy -.11 .03 -.1 0 
Note. R2 = .05 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .06 for Step 2.   
 
 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether 
immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy significantly predicted respondents’ 
placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 8 (See Table 
3.18). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 
3.9% of the variance (R2 =.039, F(5,1219) = 9.85, p < .001). It was found that employment 
(β = .08, p = .012), partnership (β = .06, p = .031), and age (β = .02, p < .001) significantly 
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predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of 
opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy to the five 
predictors explained an additional 5.6% of the variance, at 9.5% (R2 =.095, F(6,1218) = 
21.25, p < .001). It was found that employment (β = .05, p = .078), partnership (β = .05, p 
= .079), and age (β = -.18, p < .001) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, 
as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy (β = -
.24, p < .001). Because of this, H2 is supported in the Hungarian Round 8 sample. 
 
Table 3.18: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the Hungarian sample 
Round 8, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for 
the country’s economy on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 6.22 .44  0 
 Employment .93 .37 .08 .012 
 Partner .32 .15 .06 .031 
 Gender .12 .15 .02 .421 
 Age -.03 .004 .02 0 
 Education -.01 .02 -.02 .457 
Step 2 (constant) 7.13 .44  0 
 Employment .63 .36 .05 .078 
 Partner .26 .15 .05 .079 
 Gender .17 .14 .03 .238 
 Age -.03 .004 -.18 0 
 Education .002 .02 .004 .896 
 Immigrants Economy -.26 .03 -.24 0 
Note. R2 = .04 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .1 for Step 2.   
 
 
UK Sample 
 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether 
immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy significantly predicted respondents’ 
placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 7 (See Table 3.19). 
The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 3.1% 
of the variance (R2 =.031, F(5,1906) = 12.26, p < .001). It was found that gender (β = .11, 
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p < .001) and age (β = .14, p < .001) significantly predicted placement on the left-right 
scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether immigrants are 
good or bad for the country’s economy to the five predictors explained an additional 0.8% 
of the variance, at 3.9% (R2 =.039, F(6,1905) = 12.79, p < .001). It was found that gender 
(β = .12, p < .001) and age (β = .13, p < .001) significantly influenced placement on the 
left-right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s 
economy (β = -.09, p < .001). Hence, H2 is supported in the UK Round 7 sample. 
 
Table 3.19: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement, showing the effects of 
opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy on the 
model for the UK sample Round 7(adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 3.84 .3  0 
 Employment .19 .22 .02 .192 
 Partner 0 .22 0 .013 
 Gender .42 .09 .11 0 
 Age .02 .003 .14 0 
 Education 0 .01 .001 .918 
Step 2 (constant) 4.02 .3  0 
 Employment .19 .22 .02 .384 
 Partner .004 .22 0 .986 
 Gender .46 .09 .12 0 
 Age .02 .003 .13 0 
 Education .01 .01 .02 .317 
 Immigrants Economy -.07 .02 -.09 0 
Note. R2 = .03 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .04 for Step 2.   
 
 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether 
immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy significantly predicted respondents’ 
placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 8 (See Table 3.20). 
The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors explained 4.1% 
of the variance (R2 =.041, F(5,1672) = 14.31, p < .001). It was found that partnership (β = 
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.17, p = .074), gender (β = .22, p = .012), and age (β = .02, p < .001) significantly predicted 
placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on 
whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy to the five predictors 
explained an additional 1.0% of the variance, at 5.1% (R2 =.051, F(6,1671) = 14.98, p < 
.001). It was found that partnership (β = .18, p = .063), gender (β = .25, p = .005), and age 
(β = .02, p < .001) significantly influenced placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions 
on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy (β = -.08, p < .001). As 
the standardised coefficient (β = -.08) indicates a negative relationship between opinion of 
whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy and right-side placement on the 
political scale, H2 is supported in the UK Round 8 sample. 
 
 
Table 3.20: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the UK sample Round 8, 
showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants are good or bad for the 
country’s economy on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 3.72 .26  0 
 Employment .26 .22 .03 .235 
 Partner .17 .1 .04 .074 
 Gender .22 .09 .06 .012 
 Age .02 0 .17 0 
 Education -.01 .01 -.04 .13 
Step 2 (constant) 4.18 .28  0 
 Employment .29 .22 .03 .175 
 Partner .18 .1 .05 .063 
 Gender .25 .09 .07 .005 
 Age .02 0 .15 0 
 Education -.01 .01 -.02 .338 
 Immigrants Economy -.08 .02 -.1 0 
Note. R2 = .04 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .05 for Step 2.   
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3.6.3 Hypothesis 3 
 
Hungarian Sample 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life significantly predicted 
respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 
7 (See Table 3.21). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors 
explained 5.1% of the variance (R2 =.051, F(5,1248) = 13.52, p < .001). It was found that 
gender (β = .1, p = .001), age (β = -.2, p < .001), and employment (β = .06, p = .033) 
significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the 
addition of opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life 
to the five predictors explained an additional 1.6% of the variance, at 6.7% (R2 =.067, 
F(6,1247) = 15.02, p < .001). It was found that gender (β = .09, p = .002), age (β = -.21, p 
< .001), and employment (β = .06, p = .033) significantly predicted placement on the left-
right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s 
economy (β = -.13, p < .001). Hence, H3 is supported in the Hungarian Round 7 sample. 
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Table 3.21: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the Hungarian sample 
Round 7, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich 
the country’s cultural life on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 5.86 .36  0 
 Employment .49 .23 .06 .033 
 Partner .39 .39 .03 .318 
 Gender .44 .13 .1 .001 
 Age -.03 .004 -.2 0 
 Education .01 .02 .01 .76 
Step 2 (constant) 6.45 .37  0 
 Employment .49 .23 .06 .033 
 Partner .4 .38 .03 .305 
 Gender .4 .13 .09 .002 
 Age -.03 .004 -.21 0 
 Education .02 .02 .02 .431 
 Immigrants Economy -.13 .03 -.13 0 
Note. R2 = .05 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .07 for Step 2.   
 
 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life significantly predicted 
respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale in the Hungarian sample for Round 
8 (See Table 3.22). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors 
explained 3.5% of the variance (R2 =.035, F(5,1243) = 9.08, p < .001). It was found that 
partnership (β = .05, p = .069), age (β = -.18, p < .001), and employment (β = .08, p = .01) 
significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the 
addition of opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life 
to the five predictors explained an additional 4.2% of the variance, at 7.7% (R2 =.077, 
F(6,1242) = 17.29, p < .001). It was found that age (β = -.17, p < .001) and employment (β 
= .05, p = .064) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on 
whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy (β = -.21, p < .001). Hence, 
H3 is supported in the Hungarian Round 8 sample. 
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Table 3.22: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the Hungarian sample 
Round 8, showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich 
the country’s cultural life on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 6.21 .43  0 
 Employment .93 .36 .08 .010 
 Partner .27 .15 .05 .069 
 Gender .12 .15 .02 .392 
 Age -.03 .004 -.18 0 
 Education -.01 .02 -.02 .442 
Step 2 (constant) 7.11 .44  0 
 Employment .66 .36 .05 .064 
 Partner .21 .15 .04 .155 
 Gender .17 .14 .03 .237 
 Age -.02 .004 -.17 0 
 Education -.002 .02 -.003 .922 
 Immigrants Economy -.21 .03 -.21 0 
Note. R2 = .04 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .08 for Step 2.   
 
 
 
UK Sample 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life significantly predicted 
respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 7 (See 
Table 3.23). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors 
explained 3.3% of the variance (R2 =.033, F(5,1912) = 13.21, p < .001). It was found that 
gender (β = .11, p < .001) and age (β = .15, p < .001) significantly predicted placement on 
the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life to the five predictors explained 
an additional 2.0% of the variance, at 5.3% (R2 =.053, F(6,1911) = 17.87, p < .001). It was 
found that gender (β = .11, p < .001) and age (β = .13, p < .001) significantly predicted 
placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad 
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for the country’s economy (β = -.15, p < .001). Hence, H3 is supported in the UK Round 7 
sample. 
 
Table 3.23: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the UK sample Round 7, 
showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the 
country’s cultural life on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 3.83 .3  0 
 Employment .18 .22 .02 .403 
 Partner -.002 .22 0 .992 
 Gender .43 .09 .11 0 
 Age .02 .003 .15 0 
 Education 0 .01 -.001 .971 
Step 2 (constant) 4.14 .3  0 
 Employment .17 .22 .02 .421 
 Partner .03 .21 .003 .893 
 Gender .44 .09 .11 0 
 Age .02 .003 .13 0 
 Education .02 .01 .04 .101 
 Immigrants Economy -.11 .02 -.15 0 
Note. R2 = .03 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .05 for Step 2.   
 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to test if opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life significantly predicted 
respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale in the UK sample for Round 8 (See 
Table 3.24). The results of the first step of the regression indicated the five predictors 
explained 3.9% of the variance (R2 =.039, F(5,1671) = 13.43, p < .001). It was found that 
gender (β = .21, p = .015) and age (β = .02, p < .001) significantly predicted placement on 
the left-right scale. The second step indicated that the addition of opinions on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life to the five predictors explained 
an additional 4.2% of the variance, at 7.1% (R2 =.071, F(6,1670) = 21.29, p < .001). It was 
found that age (β = .13, p < .001), partnership (β = .16, p = .089), and gender (β = .23, p = 
.007) significantly predicted placement on the left-right scale, as did opinions on whether 
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immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy (β = -.14, p < .001). As the 
standardised coefficient (β = -.14) indicates a negative relationship between opinion of 
whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life and right-side placement on the 
political scale, H3 is supported in the UK Round 8 sample. 
 
 
Table 3.24: Linear model of predictors of left-right scale placement for the UK sample Round 8, 
showing the effects of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich the 
country’s cultural life on the model (adapted from Field, 2013).   
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1 (constant) 3.75 .26  0 
 Employment .27 .22 .03 .215 
 Partner .15 .1 .04 .112 
 Gender .21 .09 .06 .015 
 Age .02 0 .17 0 
 Education -.01 .01 -.04 .145 
Step 2 (constant) 4.6 .28  0 
 Employment .29 .21 .03 .169 
 Partner .16 .09 .04 .089 
 Gender .23 .09 .06 .007 
 Age .13 0 .13 0 
 Education 0 .01 -.01 .699 
 Immigrants Economy -.14 .02 -.19 0 
Note. R2 = .04 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .07 for Step 2.   
 
3.6.4 Discussion of Linear Regression Results  
Linear regression was used to control for demographic variables and their effects 
on the model, adding a level of complexity to the analysis. The effects of the control 
measures on the samples in each country are worthy of consideration. More specifically, in 
the Round 7 data for both samples, age and gender show statistically significant results for 
their influence on the dependent variable. However, in the Hungarian sample, employment 
status is also a significant predictor of placement on the left-right scale, while in the UK 
sample employment status is not a significant predictor. In both samples, years in education 
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is not shown to be a significant predictor. In Round 8, age is a significant predictor in both 
the Hungarian and UK data. Employment status is also a significant predictor of placement 
on the left-right scale in the Hungarian data, as is partnership in one instance. Education is 
not a significant predictor in the Hungarian Round 8 data. In the UK data, gender and age 
are both significant predictors, as is partnership in two instances. Employment status and 
education are not a significant predictor in the UK data. 
 Hypothesis 1 was rejected in both the Hungarian and UK samples for both Rounds 
7 and 8, similar to the results of the bivariate analysis. This shows that a higher level of 
satisfaction with life is a predictor of right-side political scale placement, which is not 
influenced by demographic factors. According to a study of life satisfaction among 
Republicans and Democrats in the United States, it was found that life satisfaction is greater 
when the political climate is favourable rather than unfavourable (Mandel & Omorogbe, 
2014). This result is also seen in the Hungarian context by the upswing in right-wing views 
in the political sphere and the election of the Fidesz party. Similarly, in the United Kingdom 
the Conservative party was in government at the time of the surveys. Other studies based 
in North America have shown greater life satisfaction and happiness among conservatives 
versus liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008; Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012).  
 Hypothesis 2 stated that believing immigrants are bad for the country’s economy 
predicts a right-side placement on the left-right political scale, which was supported in both 
the Hungarian and UK samples for both Round 7 and Round 8. Results of the Hungarian 
and UK Round 7 and 8 results supported H2 in bivariate tests. This indicates that feelings 
of immigrants being bad for the country’s economy was a predictor for right-side placement 
on the political scale, exclusive of demographic factors, in both Hungary in spring 2015 
and the United Kingdom in 2014-2015. Again, while a longitudinal comparison must be 
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approached cautiously, the Hungarian summer of 2017 and UK 2016-2017 survey 
respondents showed similar results. 
 Hypothesis 3 was also supported in both the Hungarian and UK Round 7 and Round 
8 samples, similar to the results of the bivariate analysis. This suggests that the opinion that 
immigrants undermine a country’s cultural life is a predictor of right-side political scale 
placement, which is not influenced by demographic factors. This result in unsurprising 
given the political climate in both Hungary and the United Kingdom even in 2014, with the 
increasingly radical right Fidesz in Hungary and the imminent Brexit referendum in the 
UK. Especially around 2015 and 2016, both Hungarian and British media were overrun by 
anti-immigrant discourse, with Fidesz’ migrant campaign and UKIP’s leave campaign. 
 Bivariate analysis and linear regression provide insight into the effects of these 
independent variables on political scale placement. In all cases, correlations were found to 
be quite moderate. As the interest here is rather on those individuals with far-right views, 
it is necessary to measure the effects of those responses, to see if they are indeed influencing 
the results of the correlation analyses. To do this, we now turn to binary logistic regression.  
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3.7 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
 Bivariate analysis and hierarchical linear regression examined the effects of three 
variables - life satisfaction, opinions on whether immigrants are better or worse for the 
country’s economy, and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country - 
on respondents’ placement on the left-right political scale. As this research explores the 
factors that predispose people to develop right-wing attitudes, binary logistic regression 
can aid in measuring the effects of these three independent variables on whether a person 
is on the far-right of the left-right scale. Far-right, here, is defined as placing oneself at a 9 
or a 10 on a scale ranging from 0-10. This placement was then transformed into a binary 
measure, with 9 and 10 being ‘far-right,’ and 0-8 being ‘other.’  
 As the first three hypotheses focused on the influence of independent variables on 
right-side placement on the left-right political scale, a new set of hypotheses was necessary. 
This binary logistic regression will explore hypotheses H4, H5, and H6. 
 
3.7.1 Hypothesis 4 
Hungarian Sample 
 Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political 
scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. 
Satisfaction with life was added as an independent variable in the second step of the 
regression. For Round 7, a test of the full model against a constant only model was 
statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set 
reliably distinguished between ‘far-right’ respondents and others (χ2(6) = 37.12, p < .001). 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the 
model, χ2(8) = 6.38, p = .605. 
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 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of life satisfaction, from χ2(5) = 29.51, p < .001 to χ2(6) = 37.12, p < .001. 
As Table 3.25 shows, gender (p < .001), age (p = .028), employment (p = .062), and life 
satisfaction (p = .007) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that satisfaction with 
one’s life does have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the 
Hungarian sample. However, this effect is positive, rejecting H4 and supporting the null 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.25: Logistic regression values of life satisfaction for Hungarian Round 7 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed .59 .36 2.64 .104 1.8 
 Partner .41 .53 .6 .44 1.5 
 Gender .84 .20 17.33 0* 2.32 
 Age  -.02 .01 5.95 .015* .99 
 Education .01 .03 .09 .765 1.01 
Step 2 Employed .69 .37 3.49 .062* 1.98 
 Partner .33 .53 .38 .538 1.39 
 Gender .88 .20 18.91 0* 2.42 
 Age -.01 .01 4.82 .028* .99 
 Education -.01 .03 .16 .693 .99 
 Life 
Satisfaction 
.13 .05 7.38 .007* 1.14 
Note. pseudo R2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 37.12, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
 
For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically 
significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably 
distinguished between ‘far-right’ respondents and others (χ2(6) = 83.11, p < .001). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, 
χ2(8) = 5.05, p = .75. 
 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .1 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
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with the addition of life satisfaction, from χ2(5) = 18.95, p = .002 to χ2(6) = 83.11, p < .001. 
As Table 3.26 shows, employment status (p = .015) and life satisfaction (p < .001) had a 
significant effect on the model, indicating that satisfaction with one’s life does have an 
effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. 
However, this effect is positive, rejecting H4 and supporting the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.26: Logistic regression values of life satisfaction for Hungarian Round 8 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed 1.17 .53 4.77 .029* 3.21 
 Partner .35 .17 4.46 .035* 1.42 
 Gender -.004 .16 0 .982 1.00 
 Age  -.01 .01 1.84 .175 .99 
 Education .03 .01 4.14 .042* 1.03 
Step 2 Employed 1.32 .54 5.98 .015* 3.74 
 Partner .22 .17 1.59 .207 1.24 
 Gender .09 .16 .34 .563 1.10 
 Age -.001 .01 .05 .832 1.00 
 Education .02 .01 1.97 .161 1.02 
 Life 
Satisfaction 
.34 .05 54.22 0* 1.40 
Note. pseudo R2 = .1 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 83.11, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
 
UK Sample 
Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political 
scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. 
Satisfaction with life was added as an independent variable in the second step of the 
regression. For Round 7, a test of the full model against a constant only model was 
statistically significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set 
reliably distinguished between ‘far-right’ respondents and others (χ2(6) = 32.08, p < .001). 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the 
model, χ2(8) = 10.69, p = .22. 
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 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of life satisfaction, from χ2(5) = 26.76, p < .001 to χ2(6) = 32.08, p < .001. 
As Table 3.27 shows, gender (p = .001), age (p = .001), and life satisfaction (p = .028) had 
a significant effect on the model, indicating that satisfaction with one’s life does have an 
effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. However, 
this effect is positive, rejecting H4 and supporting the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.27: Logistic regression values of life satisfaction for UK Round 7 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed -.18 .67 .07 .787 .84 
 Partner -1.81 1.45 1.56 .212 .16 
 Gender .91 .27 11.4 .001* 2.48 
 Age  .02 .01 11.69 .001* 1.03 
 Education .03 .03 .6 .44 1.03 
Step 2 Employed -.19 .67 .08 .776 .827 
 Partner -1.79 1.45 1.53 .217 .17 
 Gender .92 .27 11.61 .001* 2.51 
 Age .02 .01 10.09 .001* 1.02 
 Education .02 .03 .4 .53 1.02 
 Life 
Satisfaction 
.16 .07 4.8 .028* 1.17 
Note. pseudo R2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 32.08, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically 
significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably 
distinguished between ‘far-right’ respondents and others (χ2(6) = 23.38, p = .001). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, 
χ2(8) = 6.67, p = .57. 
 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of life satisfaction, from χ2(5) = 14.58, p = .012 to χ2(6) = 23.38, p = .001. 
As Table 3.28 shows, gender (p = .049), age (p = .006), and life satisfaction (p = .004) had 
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a significant effect on the model, indicating that satisfaction with one’s life does have an 
effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. However, 
this effect is positive, rejecting H4 and supporting the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.28: Logistic regression values of life satisfaction for UK Round 8 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed .92 1.13 .66 .418 2.5 
 Partner -.02 .31 0 .956 .983 
 Gender .58 .3 3.82 .051* 1.79 
 Age  .03 .01 8.99 .003* 1.03 
 Education -.01 .03 .1 .747 .99 
Step 2 Employed 1.01 1.13 .79 .374 2.74 
 Partner -.17 .32 .29 .588 .84 
 Gender .59 .3 3.88 .049* 1.8 
 Age .02 .01 7.6 .006* 1.02 
 Education -.01 .03 .18 .675 .99 
 Life 
Satisfaction 
.27 .1 8.15 .004* 1.31 
Note. pseudo R2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 23.38, p = .001. * p < 0.1 
 
 
3.7.2 Hypothesis 5 
Hungarian Sample 
Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political 
scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. 
Opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy was added as 
an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full 
model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the 
predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between ‘far-right’ 
respondents and others (χ2(6) = 50.25, p < .001). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for 
satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, χ2(8) = 13.35, p = .100. 
 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .08 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
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with the addition of opinions of whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy, from 
χ2(5) = 25.66, p < .001 to χ2(6) = 50.25, p < .001. As Table 3.29 shows, gender (p < .001), 
age (p = .010) and opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy (p < 
.001) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether immigrants 
are good or bad for the economy does have an effect on whether a respondent could be 
classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. As this effect is negative, H5 is supported 
in the Hungarian sample. 
 
Table 3.29: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the 
economy for Hungarian Round 7 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed .49 .36 1.85 .174 1.64 
 Partner .43 .53 .65 .42 1.53 
 Gender .79 .20 14.98 0* 2.21 
 Age  -.02 .01 5.78 .016* .99 
 Education .007 .03 .05 .83 1.01 
Step 2 Employed .48 .36 1.73 .189 1.61 
 Partner .51 .54 .89 .345 1.66 
 Gender .79 .21 14.83 0* 2.21 
 Age -.02 .01 6.71 .01* .98 
 Education .02 .03 .51 .473 1.02 
 Immigrants Economy -.23 .05 22.85 0* .8 
Note. pseudo R2 = .08 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 50.25, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically 
significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably 
distinguished between ‘far-right’ respondents and others (χ2(6) = 79.97, p < .001). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, 
χ2(8) = 10.07, p = .26. 
 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .1 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of opinions of whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy, from 
χ2(5) = 19.29, p = .002 to χ2(6) = 79.97, p < .001. As Table 3.30 shows, partnership (p = 
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.026), education (p = .027) and opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for the 
economy (p < .001) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether 
immigrants are good or bad for the economy does have an effect on whether a respondent 
could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. As this effect is negative, H5 is 
supported in the Hungarian sample. 
 
Table 3.30: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the 
economy for Hungarian Round 8 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed 1.07 .54 3.99 .046* 2.92 
 Partner .42 .17 6.06 .014* 1.53 
 Gender .02 .16 .01 .919 1.02 
 Age  -.01 .01 2.99 .084* .99 
 Education .02 .01 2.76 .097* 1.02 
Step 2 Employed .85 .54 2.44 .118 2.33 
 Partner .39 .18 4.93 .026* 1.48 
 Gender .06 .17 .15 .698 1.07 
 Age -.01 .01 2.28 .131 .99 
 Education .03 .02 4.87 .027* 1.03 
 Immigrants Economy -.29 .04 53.22 0* .75 
Note. pseudo R2 = .1 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 79.97, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
 
UK Sample 
Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political 
scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. 
Opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy was added as 
an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full 
model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the 
predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between ‘far-right’ 
respondents and others (χ2(6) = 27.14, p < .001). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for 
satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, χ2(8) = 10.49, p = .233. 
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 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .05 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of opinions of whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy, from 
χ2(5) = 35.06, p < .001 to χ2(6) = 27.14, p < .001. As Table 3.31 shows, only gender (p = 
.001) and age (p = .001) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on 
whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy does not have an effect on 
whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. Results reject H5, 
supporting the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.31: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the 
economy for UK Round 7 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed -.2 .67 .09 .767 .82 
 Partner -1.8 1.45 1.55 .214 .17 
 Gender .88 .27 10.55 .001* 2.4 
 Age  .02 .01 10.91 .001* 1.02 
 Education .03 .03 .71 .398 1.03 
Step 2 Employed -.20 .67 .09 .762 .82 
 Partner -1.84 1.45 1.6 .206 .16 
 Gender .91 .27 11.28 .001* 2.48 
 Age .02 .01 10.48 .001* 1.02 
 Education .04 .03 1.42 .233 1.04 
 Immigrants Economy -.07 .05 2.09 .148 .93 
Note. pseudo R2 = .05 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 27.14, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically 
significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably 
distinguished between ‘far-right’ respondents and others (χ2(6) = 14.34, p = .026). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, 
χ2(8) = 7.37, p = .497. 
 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .04 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
only very slightly with the addition of opinions on whether immigrants are good or bad for 
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the economy, from χ2(5) = 14.22, p = .014 to χ2(6) = 14.34, p = .026. As Table 3.32 shows, 
only gender (p = .043) and age (p = .005) had a significant effects on the model, indicating 
that opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy does not 
have an effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. 
Results reject H5, supporting the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.32: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the 
economy for UK Round 8 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed .88 1.13 .6 .438 2.4 
 Partner -.01 .32 0 .964 .99 
 Gender .6 .3 4.03 .045* 1.82 
 Age  .02 .01 8.3 .004* 1.02 
 Education -.01 .03 .1 .748 .99 
Step 2 Employed .89 1.13 .62 .432 2.43 
 Partner -.01 .32 0 .974 .99 
 Gender .61 .3 4.1 .043* 1.83 
 Age .02 .01 7.84 .005* 1.02 
 Education -.01 .02 .07 .786 .99 
 Immigrants Economy -.02 .06 .11 .737 .98 
Note. pseudo R2 = .04 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 14.34, p = .026. * p < 0.1 
 
 
3.7.3 Hypothesis 6 
Hungarian Sample 
Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political 
scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. 
Opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life was added as 
an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full 
model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the 
predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between ‘far-right’ 
respondents and others (χ2(6) = 70.65, p < .001). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for whether 
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immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life indicated a goodness of fit for 
the model, χ2(8) = 14.02, p = .081. 
 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .11 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s 
cultural life, from χ2(5) = 27.53, p < .001 to χ2(6) = 70.65, p < .001. As Table 3.33 shows, 
gender (p < .001), age (p = .018) and opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich 
a country’s cultural life (p < .001) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that 
opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life does have an 
effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. As 
the effect is negative, H6 is supported. 
 
Table 3.33: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich 
cultural life for Hungarian Round 7 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed .64 .39 2.67 .102 1.89 
 Partner .42 .53 .63 .427 1.52 
 Gender .85 .21 16.58 0* 2.34 
 Age  -.01 .01 4.88 .027* .99 
 Education .01 .03 .13 .72 1.01 
Step 2 Employed .53 .39 1.8 .18 1.69 
 Partner .46 .54 .72 .395 1.59 
 Gender .77 .21 13.28 0* 2.17 
 Age -.02 .01 5.58 .018* .99 
 Education .03 .03 .86 .354 1.03 
 Immigrants Culture -.3 .05 40.44 0* .74 
Note. pseudo R2 = .11 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 70.65, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically 
significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably 
distinguished between ‘far-right’ respondents and others (χ2(6) = 50.97, p < .001). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test for satisfaction with life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, 
χ2(8) = 9.18, p = .328. 
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 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life, from 
χ2(5) = 15.06, p = .01 to χ2(6) = 50.97, p < .001. As Table 3.34 shows, partnership (p = 
.073), education (p = .072) and opinions on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a 
country’s cultural life (p < .001) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that 
opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life does have an 
effect on whether a respondent could be classified as far-right in the Hungarian sample. As 
the effect is negative, H6 is supported. 
 
Table 3.34: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich 
cultural life for Hungarian Round 8 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed 1.02 .57 3.63 .057* 2.77 
 Partner .35 .17 4.19 .041* 1.41 
 Gender .04 .16 .08 .781 1.05 
 Age  -.01 .01 1.74 .188 .99 
 Education .02 .01 2.15 .142 1.02 
Step 2 Employed .83 .54 2.36 .124 2.29 
 Partner .31 .17 3.22 .073* 1.36 
 Gender .09 .16 .32 .573 1.10 
 Age -.01 .01 1.26 .261 1.00 
 Education .03 .02 3.25 .072* 1.03 
 Immigrants Culture -.20 .03 33.67 0* .82 
Note. pseudo R2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 50.97, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
 
UK Sample 
Binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict far-right placement on the political 
scale, using employment status, partnership, education, gender, and age as predictors. 
Opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life was added as 
an independent variable in the second step of the regression. For Round 7, a test of the full 
model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the 
163 
 
predictors and independent variable as a set reliably distinguished between ‘far-right’ 
respondents and others (χ2(6) = 34.68, p < .001). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test for opinion 
of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life indicated a goodness of fit for the 
model, χ2(8) = 9.88, p = .273. 
 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .07 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life, from 
χ2(5) = 26.64, p < .001 to χ2(6) = 34.68, p < .001. As Table 3.35 shows, gender (p = .001), 
age (p = .001), and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural 
life (p = .005) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life does have an effect on whether a 
respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. As the effect is negative, H6 
is supported in the UK sample. 
 
Table 3.35: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich 
cultural life for UK Round 7 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed -.14 .31 .21 .651 .87 
 Partner .29 .25 1.38 .241 1.34 
 Gender .80 .25 10.46 .001* 2.22 
 Age  .03 .01 12.98 0* 1.00 
 Education -.007 .03 .07 .794 .99 
Step 2 Employed -.22 .67 .11 .742 .8 
 Partner -1.82 1.45 1.57 .211 .16 
 Gender .92 .27 11.63 .001* 2.51 
 Age .02 .01 10.42 .001* 1.02 
 Education .05 .03 2.03 .154 1.05 
 Immigrants Culture -.14 .05 7.95 .005* .87 
Note. pseudo R2 = .07 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 34.68, p < .001. * p < 0.1 
 
For Round 8, a test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically 
significant, indicating that the predictors and independent variable as a set reliably 
distinguished between ‘far-right’ respondents and others (χ2(6) = 23.38, p = .001). The 
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Hosmer-Lemeshow test for opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural 
life indicated a goodness of fit for the model, χ2(8) = 6.67, p = .573. 
 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 of .06 indicated a very moderate relationship between 
prediction and grouping. The Omnibus χ2 indicated that the effect of the model increased 
with the addition of opinion of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life, from 
χ2(5) = 14.58, p = .012 to χ2(6) = 23.28, p = .001. As Table 3.36 shows, gender (p = .051), 
age (p = .015), and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural 
life (p = .003) had a significant effect on the model, indicating that opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life does have an effect on whether a 
respondent could be classified as far-right in the UK sample. As the effect is negative, H6 
is supported in the UK sample. 
 
Table 3.36: Logistic regression values of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich 
cultural life for UK Round 8 sample. 
  B SE B Wald χ2 p OR 
Step 1 Employed .89 1.13 .62 .432 2.43 
 Partner -.02 .31 .06 .944 .98 
 Gender .58 .3 3.78 .052* 1.78 
 Age  .02 .01 8.92 .003* 1.03 
 Education -.01 .03 .1 .752 .99 
Step 2 Employed .99 1.13 .75 .387 2.66 
 Partner .02 .31 0 .959 1.02 
 Gender .58 .3 3.81 .051* 1.79 
 Age .02 .01 5.96 .015* 1.02 
 Education 0 .02 .21 .884 1.00 
 Immigrants Culture -.17 .06 9.01 .003* .85 
Note. pseudo R2 = .06 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 23.38, p = .001 * p < 0.1 
 
 
3.7.4 Discussion of Logistic Regression Results 
 These analyses present a clear picture in respect of the factors that predict far-right 
identification. When considering three independent variables – satisfaction with life, 
opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy, and opinion on 
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whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s cultural life – in the Hungarian 
sample, all three variables are shown to be predictors of far-right placement on the left-
right political scale for both Rounds 7 and 8. However, in both the UK Round 7 and Round 
8 models, opinion on immigrants and cultural life as well as life satisfaction are shown to 
be significant predictors, while economic concerns about immigrants is not.  
 As results show for Round 7, gender significantly predicted far-right placement in 
all cases, and age in all but one. Findings show that partnership, employment status, and 
years in education did not affect far-right placement. In Round 8, however, findings show 
that in the UK data gender and age significantly predict far-right placement for all variables. 
In the Round 8 Hungarian data, employment status significantly predicted far-right 
placement for the life satisfaction variable, while partnership and education significantly 
predicted far-right placement for variables dealing with opinions on immigration. 
 Satisfaction with life did significantly predict far-right placement in both Rounds 7 
and 8 of both the Hungarian and UK samples. However, positive life satisfaction predicted 
far-right views, not negative life satisfaction as originally thought, hence rejecting H4 and 
supporting the null hypothesis. This is contrary to empirical findings of nonsignificant 
results for the relationship between right-wing attitudes and psychological well-being 
(Onraet, van Heil, & Dhont, 2013) and life satisfaction (Butler, 2000). Particularly 
interesting here is the consideration of those on the far-right, as they are indeed often 
portrayed as “angry white men” upset about not having all they should. Considering that 
those on the far-right may be actually more satisfied with their lives paints a completely 
different picture of even those radical right activists in the movements being examined 
here-in. This does not necessarily mean that relative deprivation theory is wrong, but 
perhaps that it is applied in some other way and ties in to another sense of identity, as will 
be explored later. This could also, additionally, allude to the mainstreaming of right-wing 
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and far-right values and the larger acceptance of self-identification as someone with right-
wing views.  
 Views on whether immigrants are good or bad for the country’s economy 
significantly predicted far-right placement in the Hungarian sample (supporting H5), but 
not in the UK sample (rejecting H5 and supporting the null hypothesis). The same results 
were found for both Round 7 and Round 8 datasets. Crucially, when looking at the UK 
data, economic concerns over immigration show significant correlations with those on the 
right-side of the left-right political scale, but not with those on the far-right. At the same 
time, as will be shown below, cultural concerns over immigration are indeed linked to a 
far-right placement on the scale. This indicates that a placement on the far-right of the scale 
could be more ideologically based, tying more into ideas of nativism, nationalism, and 
homogeneity than with fiscal political concerns. In Hungary economic concerns over 
immigration are shown to be significant even in the far-right, likely as the entire discourse 
and media are dominated by similar rhetoric. 
 Lastly, H6 was supported in both the Hungarian and UK samples for both Rounds 
7 and 8, indicating that believing immigrants undermine the cultural life of one’s country 
is a predictor of far-right views. Indeed, several authors have linked concerns over 
immigration to far-right voting and sentiments in Europe (for example: Cochrane & 
Nevitte, 2012; Froio & Ganesh, 2018; Halla, Wagner, & Zweimüller, 2017; Mudde, 2007; 
Pirro, 2015; Stockemer, 2015). The results of this study serve to strengthen this idea in the 
contexts of Hungary and the United Kingdom. In Hungary, concerns over refugees and 
‘migrants’ has become one of the biggest current political issues, especially adopted by the 
Fidesz government. In the United Kingdom concerns over immigration have become 
central, especially considering the results of the 2016 Brexit referendum. 
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3.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This analysis examined aspects of relative deprivation and economic strain theories, 
with relation to predictors of right-wing views. To test this, three independent variables 
were used: satisfaction with life, opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for the 
country’s economy, and opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich a country’s 
cultural life. These variables were tested for their predictive power of right-side political 
scale placement, and later for far-right placement. These factors were tested using European 
Social Survey Round 7 and Round 8 data from Hungary and the United Kingdom. These 
survey datasets do not offer a perfect longitudinal comparison given that they sampled 
different respondents, but do offer some general insight into views of respondents in those 
particular time-periods and places. 
Firstly, bivariate correlations were conducted to test for factors influencing left-
right political scale placement. The next step was to conduct linear regression in order to 
include demographic factors on left-right scale placement. Finally, binary logistic 
regression was conducted to attain a deeper understanding of the relationships between the 
independent variables and placement on the far-right of the left-right scale. Five control 
measures were used: age, gender, employment status, partnership, and education. In nearly 
all Round 7 tests, age and gender were found to show statistically significant results for 
their influence on the dependent variable. In the Hungarian sample, employment was also 
a significant predictor for placement on the left-right scale, whereas, in the UK sample, 
partnership was found to be significant. Findings show, however, that partnership, 
employment status, and years in education did not affect far-right placement.  
In Round 8, age is a significant predictor in both the Hungarian and UK data. 
Employment status is also a significant predictor of placement on the left-right scale in the 
Hungarian data, as is partnership in one instance. In the UK data, partnership and education 
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are also all significant predictors in addition to age, as is gender in two instances. 
Employment status is not a significant predictor in the UK data. When it comes to far-right 
placement, findings show that in the UK data gender and age significantly predict far-right 
placement for all variables. In the Hungarian data, employment status significantly 
predicted far-right placement for the life satisfaction variable, while partnership and 
education significantly predicted far-right placement for variables dealing with opinions on 
immigration. 
 When considering the bivariate analysis of the samples, in both Round 7 and Round 
8 datasets of both the Hungarian and UK samples, a higher satisfaction with one’s life is 
positively correlated with right-side placement on the left-right political scale. This is likely 
due to the right-side scale placement including moderately conservative and conservative 
individuals, as well as those on the far-right of the scale. In both the Hungarian and UK 
samples for Round 7 and Round 8, results indicated that high satisfaction with life is not 
only a predictor of politically right attitudes, but also of far-right attitudes. This is contrary 
to the theory that individuals with far-right values have low satisfaction with their lives and 
also to previous empirical findings.  
For both the Hungarian Round 7 and 8 data, opinion on immigrants being bad for 
the economy predicted a politically right identity when factoring in demographic measures 
in linear regression. It was also found that an opinion of immigrants being bad for the 
economy predicts a far-right identity. In both the Round 7 and Round 8 UK datasets, it was 
found that opinion on immigrants being bad for the economy predicted a politically right 
identity but did not predict a far-right identity. The results suggest that opinions on the 
effect of immigrants on the country’s economy is not a reliable indicator of far-right 
political scale placement, but could be of left-right political scale placement.  
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Opinions on immigrants undermining a country’s cultural life was a predictor of 
both right and far-right political identity in both the Hungarian and UK samples, in both 
Round 7 and Round 8 datasets. Round 7 results were only slightly negatively correlated for 
beliefs of cultural life in the Hungarian sample, indicating that those who believe the 
country’s cultural life to be undermined by immigrants are slightly more likely to place on 
the right side of the left-right political scale. Round 8 results, however, yielded a much 
stronger correlation, indicating a possible change in general pessimism towards 
immigrants. The UK Round 7 sample showed the same trend as the Hungarian sample when 
it came to beliefs about immigrants and cultural life, but results were much more 
significant; the Round 8 results, however, were less significant than those of the Hungarian 
sample.  
 From these results it seems obvious that those on the far-right of the political scale 
seem to be highly satisfied with their lives in the UK and Hungary. This is, of course, 
contrary to the idea that those with far-right views are dissatisfied with their lives. It was 
also shown that in both the UK and Hungary, those with far-right views believe immigrants 
have a negative effect on their country’s cultural life. These feelings were slightly stronger 
in the 2014-2015 UK dataset than the spring 2015 Hungarian dataset, which saw a change 
in the subsequent two years. The summer 2017 Hungarian dataset showed quite a jump 
from the results from two years prior and was found to be more significant than the UK 
2016-2017 data. This likely indicates the effectiveness of the national anti-migrant 
campaign of the Fidesz government in Hungary, indicating much stronger feelings against 
refugees in 2017 than in the spring of 2015. 
In Hungary, results suggest that those on the far-right believe immigrants negatively 
impact the economy, whereas in the UK this was not found to be a significant factor. These 
factors will be kept in mind during the second phase of the research, looking to online 
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analysis to explore how the organisations recruit members and how they portray their group 
identity. 
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CHAPTER 4: ONLINE ANALYSIS  
 Several questions were explored in this research; most importantly, the main 
purpose of this analysis was to determine what draws people into radical right 
organisations, and particularly how the use of the internet encourages individuals to join 
such movements. Of the two groups analysed in this study, the English Defence League 
(EDL) is much more active online than Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM) and 
presents a more sophisticated online profile. Indeed, EDL members are often more active 
online than they are on the streets (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). While MÖM has a Facebook 
page that is updated regularly, as well as an Instagram page, website, and some videos on 
their YouTube ‘news’ channel, the EDL has a professional website, Facebook page (until 
April 2019), Instagram page, Gab feed (after the suspension of their Twitter account), 
discussion forum, Tumblr, and YouTube channel. The EDL’s Gab feed, forum, and Tumblr 
were not covered in this analysis as they had no counterpart for MÖM. 
The initial research for this chapter was conducted using the official websites, 
Facebook pages, Instagram pages, and YouTube channels of the EDL and MÖM. Radical 
right groups are particularly active online; most organisations have their own websites and 
are active on social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Gab. The 
personal webpages of these groups tend to be outdated, though some are regularly updated. 
Although the Facebook page of each organisation had several thousand followers each 
when conducting the initial research for this project, it has recently8 become increasingly 
difficult to carry out research of some radical right organisations using Facebook, as 
Facebook has been attempting to inhibit and deter these groups by deleting the pages of 
such movements and organisations. Following the Unite the Right rally in the United States 
 
8 It is worth noting that these issues arose after the start of this project, which began in late 2015. Hence, 
these issues were not factored into the initial plan of the research. 
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in the summer of 2017, the company stated that they would commit to removing and 
banning those pages which violate their hate speech policy (Umoh, 2017): “content that 
attacks people based on their actual or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, 
sex, gender or gender identity, sexual orientation, disability or disease is not allowed” 
(Facebook, 2018: online). Although this only removes a fraction of this type of group from 
their platform (Heilweil, 2017), it meant that after the summer of 2017 the official Facebook 
page of the EDL was taken down, though a new page emerged with a few thousand 
followers. The pages of the separate EDL chapters did not seem to be affected by this 
removal. The EDL’s new national Facebooks page and MÖM’s original Facebook page 
were quite active until spring of 2019, and both groups also had regularly updated websites 
in this time.  
In April 2019, however, the UK proposed new regulations on the online space, 
legally requiring social media companies to protect users from hate speech (Doffman, 
2019). Because of this, Facebook permanently banned the most significant radical right 
organisations in the UK from their platform, including the EDL, Britain First, the BNP, and 
the National Front, as well as some prominent radical right figures in the UK (Doffman, 
2019; Griffin, 2019; Hern, 2019). The EDL’s official Facebook page, along with local 
chapter pages, were removed from the platform; the organisation is now unable to create 
replacement pages and their name does not appear in searches. Additionally, the EDL’s 
Instagram account had also seemingly been removed in spring of 2019, as they no longer 
appear in any Instagram search results. 
 This chapter is structured into three sections. The first section will outline the 
methodologies used in conducting online analysis of websites, social media, and YouTube, 
including ethical considerations of such research throughout. The second section will 
present the results, which will be given separately for each group and for each online 
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platform. This will be followed by section three, the discussion and comparison of the 
findings. First, however, a brief review of some relevant research on the radical right’s use 
of the online space will be provided. 
 
The Radical Right Online 
 The radical right has made use of the online space since the early development of 
the internet (Burris, Smith, & Strahm, 2000; Perry, 2000; Berlet, 2001), using the online 
space for radicalisation, recruitment, message dissemination, community-building, general 
activism, merchandising, and financing. Radical right organisations have recently been so 
successful in their strategic use of the online space that, in specific instances, they have 
even influenced elections in some European countries, such as Italy and Sweden (Colliver, 
Pomerantsev, Applebaum, & Birdwell, 2018; Ebner & Davey, 2018). While indeed much 
of the scholarship examining radicalisation online has focused on Islamic extremism (for 
example, Conway & McInerney, 2008; Silber & Bhatt, 2017; Yasin, 2017), there is a 
growing body of work focused on online radicalisation into right-wing extremism (for 
example, Berlet, 2001; Koehler, 2014; Fielitz & Thurston, 2019). 
 In problem-focused interviews with eight ex-radical right members in Germany, 
Koehler (2014) found that the use of the online space by activist organisations allows for a 
few key factors. First, the internet is cheap and efficient for communication, allowing for 
more communication, organisation, and integration of potentially geographically disparate 
members. Second, the online space allows for more of an ideological development and 
progression as an infinite amount of people can be involved in a given theoretical 
discussion; this also allows organisations to better monitor the attitudes of their members. 
Third, the online space is not constrained and allows for anonymity; people tend to speak 
and act more radically online than they do offline (Dobratz, 2001; Koehler, 2014). Finally, 
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Koehler (2014) also found that the online space offers the organisations the chance to 
directly reflect the effect of their propaganda and to adapt to the demands of their target 
group. 
 As suggested by van der Waak and Wagenaar (2010), the internet cannot be 
regarded as a causal factor in radicalisation but rather strengthen and accelerate the process; 
suggesting that those individuals engaging with radical organisations online have already 
been radicalised by external factors. While the analysis of the online sphere is now crucial 
in the study of radicalisation and radical right activism, it is crucial to keep in mind that 
individuals are likely to already be radicalised by the time they seek out these organisations 
online.  
The online space also offers an opportunity to cover all possible factors of 
radicalisation, allowing organisations to attract membership, whether they are more 
personal factors such as frustration, loneliness, or a need for excitement; or  external factors 
such as a shocking event; or group-related factors such as an attractive image of the 
organisation and ideological recognition (van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). The online 
space allows for lower costs of communication and more effective idea dissemination 
(Perry, 2000; Van Laer, 2011; Koehler, 2014), and facilitates the building of an internal 
network within the organisation while simultaneously reaching out to those outside the 
organisation (Pfeiffer, Greven, & Grumke, 2006).  
However, a danger of this so-called “e-activism” for activist organisations is that 
the online space creates ‘users’ rather than ‘members’ (Earl & Schussman, 2003). This 
identification as a ‘user’ rather than actual organisation-member suggests a lower level of 
support than traditional street-level activists (see textual interviews with EDL supporters, 
Chapter 5, for further discussion of this issue). This can also suggest lower levels of loyalty 
to the organisation; the more an organisation relies on online support, the more fragile the 
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organisation’s membership becomes. Crucially, while is it easier for an individual to 
become a supporter through the Internet, it is just as easy for them to opt out of the 
organisations (Earl & Schussman, 2003). 
 More research is needed on strategies used for recruitment and support maintenance 
by radical right organisations themselves and on the use of “non-political online structures” 
such as Facebook (Koehler, 2014). Activist organisations, including radical right 
organisations, increasingly make use of the online space for recruitment, and indeed the 
online space serves as a gateway into a movement’s beliefs, ideals, and culture (Bowman-
Grieve, 2013). Among studies focused specifically on the radical right, few directly analyse 
recruitment strategies of specific organisations rather than general radicalisation processes. 
For example, Ray and Marsh II (2001) examined the attempted recruitment of children and 
adolescents by ‘white extremist groups’, finding that these online extremist organisations 
do not pose a large threat to children as they are not found in the mainstream of the online 
space and are not well-organised. Wong, Frank, and Allsup (2015) found that recruitment 
was one of the main reasons organisation members used white supremacist forums, along 
with information dissemination and networking. Others (Back, 2002) have emphasised the 
importance of the online space in recruitment, as online supporters are likely to become 
involved in online support activities and eventually become drawn further into the 
movement.  
 Finally, several authors (Wojcieszak, 2010; Tarrow, 2011; Adams & Roscigno, 
2015; Simi & Futrell, 2015; Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2018) have discussed the 
importance of the online space in solidarity building and identity formation. Indeed, Tarrow 
(2011) identified emotions and collective identities as two of the main frames, or ‘powers 
in a movement’, that encourage action in a movement. Others have also discussed the 
importance of the online space in building a sense of unity and collective identity around 
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perceived grievances (Wojcieszak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2015; Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 
2018). Adams and Roscigno (2015), with a textual analysis of white supremacist websites, 
found that the online space helped to create collective identities among different 
organisations due to common attitudes and concerns.  
 As radical right messaging so easily permeates into the mainstream, it is becoming 
increasingly important to understand these organisations’ use of the online space. Indeed, 
the internet has made radical right discourse more accessible to broader society (Brown, 
2009); ideas are no longer just kept between organisation members but are on public 
platforms for anyone to see. This not only allows for the further dissemination of radical 
right ideology and messaging in an already-fragile socio-political context but allows 
organisations to recruit a larger base of supporters, although supporters may be less 
involved than in the past. Additionally, rhetoric once relegated to the radical right have 
been adopted by some governments in Europe and America (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), 
such as anti-immigration and anti-EU messages, further normalising these attitudes in 
certain areas. Because of this, it has become now, more than ever, crucial to analyse the 
ways in which the radical right use the online space, most specifically to spread their 
messages and recruit supporters of their organisations. 
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4.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
Through the analysis of these websites and social media sites, two main questions 
were investigated. The first question is how these groups try to portray themselves to the 
public; for example, do they provide a narrative of power and aggression, or rather present 
as more politically-oriented and peaceful? How do they define their ideology: for instance, 
do they present a radicalised, nationalist, and nativist image, or do they confine themselves 
to anti-Muslim rhetoric? The internet offers a good venue for organisations to present their 
ideal image of themselves through carefully placed text and images. The second question 
investigated the methods which these groups use to attract and recruit new members and 
supporters. Are the organisations open to recruiting anyone in order to grow their numbers, 
or do they consider themselves to be more exclusive? What standards do they set for their 
potential members? 
 In order to address the first question of how these groups wish to portray themselves 
to the public, a document analysis of their public websites and social media pages was 
conducted. The focus of this analysis were keywords relating to ideology and self-
description, as well as image analysis of their main website. This was done through text 
and image content analyses, and the thematic analysis of websites and social media pages. 
The second question of how groups attempt to recruit new members was explored through 
the examination of the organisations’ public websites and social media pages to determine 
what they expect of new members and how new members can apply.  
 Most data was collected over several months in August and September of 2017.9 
Over this time, the websites, Facebook pages, and YouTube channels were examined for 
both the English Defence League and the Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM). Data 
 
9 A second round of data collection was to be run in spring of 2019 but was impossible due to the EDL 
being removed and banned from using Facebook (see above). 
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from the organisations’ Instagram pages was collected in February of 2018. Data was stored 
in separate labelled folders on a password-protected personal computer and external storage 
device. 
 
4.1.1 Internet-Based Research 
 Internet-mediated research (IMR) has been used for more than twenty years for 
several types of qualitative and quantitative analyses. The first researchers to use the 
internet for research purposes in the 1990s used earlier technologies such as email and 
discussion groups (Hewson, 2014). The internet was primarily used by researchers to 
conduct interviews and focus groups, as well as for observational analysis. In the last fifteen 
years, much has changed with the development of Web 2.0 (Hewson, 2014). The internet 
today is much more interactive, with users commenting and posting on blogs, websites, and 
social media. Additionally, with the ubiquitousness of mobile telephones and tablets, the 
internet is constantly accessible, and most users find a sense of attachment to its information 
and social media platforms (Hewson, 2014). This sense of attachment, combined with the 
ability for users to engage directly with others, has allowed the creation of virtual 
communities on the internet; it has generated a new way for individuals to interact with the 
world and form relationships.  
 The internet is a very effective and efficient way to disseminate information. 
Indeed, most information for social gatherings and events can be found online, either as a 
‘flier’ on websites or as an advertisement on social media such as Facebook and Twitter. 
Social movements and political organisations, such radical right organisations, have caught 
on to this trend. Indeed, most have websites for their organisations, stating information like 
their goals, traditions, contact information, and events. Most groups are also present on 
social media such as Facebook and Twitter, either as an official page run by the group itself, 
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or as a ‘fan’ page run by a supporter. Importantly, social media websites and certain search 
engines (such as Google) allow for targeting of potential audiences or supporters. This can 
lead to virtual connections between internet users, and aids in growing a community, 
organisation, or social movement. 
 Hence, the internet provides a host of readily available and searchable content for 
analysis. This online space also offers a good venue for social movement organisations to 
present an ideal image of themselves through carefully placed text and images, in order to 
disseminate their ideology and recruit more members and supporters. While the internet 
can be used for interviews and focus groups, it can also be used for participant observation, 
non-participant observation, and data analysis. It is the last two types that will be the 
methodological focus here. The specific data sources used for this study will be outlined, 
followed by a discussion of non-participant observation (online observation) and data 
analysis (online document analysis).  
 
4.1.2 Data Sources  
 Most organisations and movements have an online presence, and this is no different 
for radical movements and specifically radical right organisations. Recently, social media 
websites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube have begun to shut down the 
accounts of certain types of organisations considered to be disseminating radicalised 
messaging. This means that certain pages, especially those belonging to some radical right 
organisations like the ones under study here, have been removed from Facebook, as well 
as Instagram and YouTube. Twitter has also begun briefly blocking and warning members 
who search for radical right movements, as personally experienced in this research.  
This has complicated document analysis for this project, as fair comparisons will 
be more difficult to conduct. The EDL had a strong presence on Facebook, as evidenced 
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by the fact that on February 22, 2016 they had 287,492 ‘likes’ (followers) on their page. In 
July of 2016, the EDL’s Facebook page seemed to have been deleted, but their 
“automatically generated” page “based on what Facebook users are interested in” 
(Facebook notification) had 38,391 likes. Their Facebook page reappeared and was 
functional in the summer of 2017 when the initial research was conducted. It was then 
deleted again for violating Facebook’s hate speech rules, but subsequently resurfaced. In 
February of 2018, the EDL’s main Facebook page had nearly 2,000 supporters. They also 
had several other pages dedicated to geographic chapters, the biggest of which was the 
North East English Defence League with nearly 11,000 followers. In April of 2019, 
however, the EDL was permanently banned from Facebook (Doffman, 2019; Griffin, 2019; 
Hern, 2019), which means the organisation may no longer have any form of presence on 
the social media platform.10 
The EDL also had a presence on Twitter, with nearly 6,000 followers and over 
15,000 ‘tweets’ between June of 2014 and the summer of 2017. In December of 2017 
Twitter suspended the EDL’s account (Roberts, 2017). They have since regrouped on Gab, 
a social media platform that claims to defend free speech. Besides their official webpage, 
the EDL also has their own forum and YouTube channel. Their YouTube channel had over 
1,200 subscribers in the summer of 2017, with 30 videos dating from August 17, 2015 until 
October 7th, 2016. Older videos, from 2014 and earlier, can be found on ‘Tommy old EDL 
channel Robinson’. The EDL also operates an Instagram account, which seems to have 
been created at the beginning of 2017 as their first photo was posted on January 25, 2017. 
 
10 It was intended that a second round of research be conducted in spring of 2019, examining the responses 
of supporters of these pages. The EDL’s Facebook page was removed, and permanently banned, just prior 
to this planned phase of research. There are lessons here about taking screenshots when researching social 
media pages and the urgency of this type of online analysis, which will be further covered in the limitations 
section in Chapter 6. 
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The account had 417 followers in February of 2018, and now seem to post about once every 
one or two weeks. 
 MÖM has a strong presence on Facebook. At the time this research was conducted, 
in August of 2017, their main page had around 2,800 supporters. By February of 2018, this 
number had grown to around 5,000 supporters, and in spring of 2019 to over 6,000. Many 
local chapters of the group also have Facebook pages, ranging from 90 supporters to around 
2,000. A MÖM supporters page also exists, with around 5,500 followers. While other 
Hungarian radical right organisations have had their Facebook pages suspended, MÖM 
have seemingly avoided this by being vigilant about not posting material that constitutes 
‘hate speech’, rather posting about events and their community endeavours.  
 MÖM is most active on Facebook, but they do have a personal website that is 
regularly updated with news of the group’s activities. They also have a YouTube channel, 
which in August of 2017 had 35 subscribers, growing to 42 subscribers by February of 
2018, and 56 in summer of 2019. All of the videos found on their YouTube account can 
also be found on their Facebook page, while there are several videos found on Facebook 
that are not cross-posted to YouTube. MÖM also has an Instagram account, created in late-
2017. Their Instagram account had 279 followers in February of 2018 and seems to average 
about two to five posts per week. In summer of 2019 the organisation’s Instagram account 
had grown slightly to 317 followers, but no posts were made since May 4th, 2018. 
 While both the EDL and MÖM have Facebook pages for the main group and for 
local chapters, only the main Facebook pages will be analysed for this research. The main 
pages are more likely to be maintained by the core leadership of the groups, hence better 
reflecting their core attitudes and recruitment philosophy. Also, not all local chapters 
maintain a Facebook page, making comparison of local chapter pages between the EDL 
and MÖM difficult. 
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Although there is not much data on the subject, it can be speculated that these 
websites and social media platforms are visited and ‘followed’ by group members, 
supporters, and sympathisers. Research conducted by Bartlett and Littler (2011) showed 
that 81 percent of supporters of the EDL’s main Facebook page were male, and 19 per cent 
female (n = 38,200 in September 2011). Seventy-six per cent of the sample considered 
themselves to be members of the EDL, while 23 per cent did not. Fifty-two per cent of 
respondents to the study considered themselves to be involved in ‘online activism’, while 
44 per cent attended local demonstrations. Importantly, 41 per cent of respondents stated 
opposition to Islam as their main reason for joining the EDL. The second most common 
reason, at 31 per cent, was related to English identity and preserving national values. No 
such data is available for MÖM.  
Both the EDL and MÖM were quite active online, at least until the EDL was banned 
from Facebook in April of 2019. In Great Britain, Britain First is quite active in the online 
sphere, but portray themselves as more of a ‘pro-British’ political party with anti-Islamic 
views. The EDL is much more clearly a one-issue group, as will be seen below. In Hungary, 
other larger radical right organisations have an online presence, but none of these more 
central organisations, aside from MÖM, are currently active on Facebook or Instagram11. 
While many videos of these groups exist on YouTube, it is not clear whether they have 
explicit central YouTube channels.  
 
4.1.3 Online Observation and Document Analysis 
Online observation involves observing exchanges between people as available on 
the internet. These exchanges are often publicly available, but some social media platforms 
 
11 Although, since October 2017 the 64 Counties Youth Movement have become quite active on Instagram. 
Their account no longer appeared on Instagram searches in spring of 2019. 
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do require membership before they can be seen. These exchanges are most often text-based, 
but most social networking sites also allow for multimedia exchanges involving pictures 
and video. Social media exchanges can also involve the use of ‘memes’: an image with 
humorous text, which is spread rapidly among users.  
Online observation can be completed in ‘real-time,’ but can also be conducted by 
looking at ‘logs’ of events (Hewson, 2014). If the observation is covert, then there is likely 
no real advantage to real-time observation and document logs should be sufficient. 
Additionally, archived materials generally contain time stamps, as do comments found on 
blogs and social media. The only advantage that real-time observation can offer occurs 
when using sites like Facebook, as they archive posts after a certain amount of time. If a 
large number of posts are posted in short periods of time, they can be archived and are 
generally only available to the public for about 72 hours. 
It is often difficult to distinguish online observation from document analysis, as 
even the most ‘static’ and seemingly unchanging online documents can be edited over time 
and have comments added to them. While online observation involves interaction between 
people, document analysis seeks to systematically analyse documents which can be either 
printed or electronic (Bowen, 2009). Online document analysis involves published 
documents such as on websites and personal homepages, blogs, new articles, and other 
forms of public media that have been created without a researcher’s involvement (Bowen, 
2009). Documents can be found by conducting a search on a public search engine, such as 
Google. Searches for content-specific information can also be conducted within a website 
or social media site, such as on Facebook or Twitter. As with all qualitative research, 
document analysis necessitates the interpretation of data in order to draw conclusions about 
its meanings and potential functions (Bowen, 2009). Indeed, document analysis is found in 
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mixed-methods studies, especially those combining both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies (Bowen, 2009).   
There are several advantages to conducting online document analysis. First, the 
information is readily available in a convenient format, saving time and resources for the 
researcher. Second, information is available regardless of geographical location, collapsing 
geographical boundaries (Hewson, 2014) and enabling special analysis and comparison. 
Third, an archive is kept of documents, so in certain cases chronological comparison may 
be possible. Finally, and most controversially, when using documents in the public domain 
disclosure is not necessary, thus simplifying the research process. 
One major ethical question that arises when considering online observation is 
whether disclosure is necessary to website owners and social network participants (For 
example: Bowker & Tuffin, 2004; Eynon, Fry, & Schroeder, 2012; Taylor 1999; Zimmer, 
2010). It can be argued that in the case of participant observation, which involves 
interaction with those individuals being observed, disclosure and consent would be 
necessary to conduct research. This is the same if the researcher must become a member of 
a private community in order to observe private information, then their motives should be 
disclosed and permission granted by the website moderator. However, in the case of radical 
right social movement websites, the information is disseminated to the public with the 
intention of reaching as many people as possible and assisting in the recruitment of new 
participants and members. This public availability negates the need for disclosure and 
permissions when conducting non-participant observations as “in cases where potential 
data can be considered to be ‘in the public domain,’ undisclosed observation is ethically 
justified and acceptable” (Hewson, 2014: 440). However, there is a difference between 
simply accessing online materials and analysing them (including the publication of that 
information). For this reason, questions of ethics do arise even in online document analysis. 
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However, there is currently no “accepted set of standards for ethics in online observational 
research” (Hewson, 2014: 442). The main question is that of researcher disclosure: if one 
is merely observing publicly-available information on the internet with the intent of 
analysis, is there a duty to disclose that to the author and obtain informed consent, at least 
in a situation where the post is not anonymous or archived. 
However, several projects have used information considered in the public domain 
without disclosure (Brady & Guerin, 2010; Bordia, 1996; Denzin, 1999). Of course, 
whenever possible the anonymity and confidentiality of contributors must be maintained 
(Hewson, 2014), although this may not be appropriate when considering websites with 
obvious institutional authors (for example, an organisation or movement’s personal 
website). Any mention of comments made by individuals on social media should be kept 
anonymous.  
 In this project, online observation was conducted on the main websites of the EDL 
and MÖM. Analysis was also conducted of the organisations’ Facebook, Instagram, and 
YouTube sites; this will be further discussed below. For this analysis, the organisations and 
site moderators were not contacted to disclose my research, as observational analysis was 
being conducted of publicly available material. I did, however, ensure to anonymise any 
information about supporters of the pages and have kept confidential any identifying 
information.   
The focus of the website analysis was to find themes in the use of colour, 
symbolism, and rhetoric. Websites were analysed in detail, with screenshots taken 
regularly. Articles (EDL) and regularly updated news posts (MÖM) were also analysed. 
Analysis was conducted in the framework of two research questions. Firstly, how do these 
groups attempt to portray themselves to the public, in terms of image and ideology. 
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Secondly, how these groups attempt to recruit new members was also investigated, 
including any guidelines they set for new members. 
 
4.1.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
 Analysis was conducted to explore two research questions. Firstly, how these 
organisations attempt to portray themselves to the public, in terms of image and ideology. 
Secondly, how these organisations attempt to recruit new members and supporters, 
including any guidelines they set for new members. Websites were analysed for text and 
image content, including symbolism such as the use of colour and historical symbolism, 
and rhetoric. Facebook posts, Instagram posts, and YouTube videos were coded for content.  
Content analysis was conducted on the official Facebook pages, Instagram 
accounts, and YouTube channels of the EDL and MÖM. The Facebook pages of both the 
English Defence League and the Hungarian Defence Movement were studied over a two-
week period, from 10th August 2017 until 23rd August 2017. Every post made by the page 
moderators from this two-week period was recorded, ensuring a systematic approach and 
limiting selection bias. Several screenshots were taken of certain posts that were randomly 
selected, and each post was given a code to represent the main topic of the post. These 
codes were then analysed to find main themes on the organisation’s Facebook page. 
Similarly, the official Instagram accounts of both the EDL and MÖM were 
analysed. Instagram posts were analysed in February of 2018, as MÖM’s Instagram 
account did not exist in the summer of 2017.  The last twelve posts of each group were 
coded, with posts receiving only one code each. Two screenshots were taken from each 
group, ensuring no faces of members were visible and hiding all personal information. A 
number of posts were chosen over a given time-period as the groups post at much different 
frequencies, and the EDL’s Instagram page came into existence earlier than MÖM’s. 
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Hashtags were also recorded from each post. These codes and hashtags were then analysed 
to find main themes. 
All videos from both the EDL and MÖM’s YouTube channels posted before 
February 2018 were examined and coded for content. Videos were often given more than 
one code each, as many were longer speeches and covered various topics. Videos were only 
used if they were posted by the group on their official channel. This research seeks to 
analyse how the groups portray themselves to the public; hence it was important to only 
use those videos which were approved and uploaded by the group officially.  
 The following section will review the findings of the online observational analysis. 
Results will be reviewed by data source, beginning with the organisations’ official 
websites, followed by their Facebook pages, Instagram accounts, and YouTube channels. 
Findings are discussed separately for each organisation by data source, followed by a 
discussion and comparison between the British and Hungarian findings for each data 
source.  
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4.2 WEBSITES 
The main focus of the content analysis of these websites was the organisations’ use 
of symbols. Symbols are “objects, acts, concepts, or linguistic formations that stand 
ambiguously for a multiplicity of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and emotions and 
impel men to action” (Cohen, 1974: ix). In the present analysis, the majority of symbolism 
that will be discussed is in the form of images, as people generally respond more strongly 
to images than to text (Bogerts & Fielitz, 2019). Virtually anything can serve as a symbol, 
given that a symbol represents something broader or unlike itself (Alvesson, 1991). 
Symbols aid in communication (Firth, 1973); some are objective and always identified in 
the same way by different people, while others evoke emotion associated with a situation 
(Edelman, 1985).  
 
4.2.1 The English Defence League 
On visiting the EDL’s official website, a repeating pattern of the EDL logo appears, 
with a scrolling main page in the centre. The banner at the top of the page shows various 
flags present at a protest, including the slogans ‘no surrender’ and ‘no more mosques’ 
written on English flags (Figure 4.1). Underneath the banner are found page headings, 
beneath which is a box of rotating news stories. To the right is a prominent PayPal 
Donations box. 
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Figure 4.1: The EDL website's homepage in August 2017. 
 
Symbolism and Identity 
 The most prominent imagery seen on their website are red crosses on white 
backgrounds. This is seen in the use of the flag of England, the Saint George’s Cross, in 
their website banner and on many EDL posters and protest signs. Also seen on their 
website, and in their logo, is a red cross fleury which can be interpreted in terms of a 
Crusader motif; indeed, this Crusader motif (especially those of the Knight’s Templar) 
among the radical right is not unique to the EDL (Koch, 2017). Several ‘Defense Leagues’ 
(including in Norway and Spain) use the cross of St. George as well as the old crusader 
slogan “In Hoc Signo Vinces” (in this sign conquer, or under this sign we conquer) (Koch, 
2017), as do the EDL.  
The EDL’s webpage and logo are both dominated by a colour theme of black, red, 
and white. Presumably these colours were carefully chosen to continue the Crusader 
imagery, particularly as the logo is divided between a black and white background (see 
Figure 4.1). This is strikingly close to the war flag of the Knight’s Templar, known as a 
Baucent, shown by thirteenth century sources as a flag with a white upper half and a black 
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lower half (Hourihane, 2012) with a red cross in the centre. The Baucent was said to hold 
a lot of power: while it was flying, Crusaders were not permitted to retreat.  
There are several advantages and functions of using such strong symbolism; 
symbols can give an organisation a seemingly larger meaning or purpose, ultimately 
drawing in individuals and evoking “powerful emotions of identification with a group” and 
can “be used as rallying points for group action” (Firth, 1973: 77). Additionally, symbols 
can promote identification with a group in several ways, as the symbol can serve as a 
representation of the group and strengthen emotional ties between an individual and an 
organisation. The symbol aids in ingroup identification, hence encouraging individuals to 
distinguish their group from another in an effort to boost self-esteem (Schatz & Lavine, 
2007). Symbols strengthen ties within a group as they, in themselves, communicate 
‘groupness’ (Schatz & Lavine, 2007).  
There is significant symbolism in the use of the cross and flag of the Knights 
Templar as the Crusades were a series of Christian religious pilgrimages and wars striving 
to take control of the Holy land from Muslim rule.12 This has a significant anti-Islam 
message, hence it’s extensive use by the counter-Jihad movement. This symbolism 
emphasises the movement identity of the EDL as protectors of a Christian Europe, or in 
this case Britain, against a Muslim threat; this presents the idea of ‘reclaiming’ land from 
Muslims, presumably here meaning to reclaim Britain from Muslims who have invaded. 
Additionally, the Knights Templar were the main fighting unit of the Crusades, suggestion 
the symbolism was carefully chosen to represent the EDL as those at the centre of the fight 
against the threat of Islam. 
Others have interpreted the black and white background of the EDL logo quite 
differently. According to Richards (2017), the emblem of the EDL, the Crusader-style 
 
12 The irony of the selection of religious symbolism is not lost, as the Crusades ultimately failed. 
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cross, is often displayed on a black and white background to “stress the importance of 
‘black and white in harmony’” (Richards, 2017: 101). This is to stress the ‘welcoming’ 
nature of the group to other minorities: black people, Jewish people, and members of the 
LGBTQ community. The existence of an LGBTQ faction of the EDL is noteworthy, as 
Islamic radicals are often portrayed as being homophobic (Richards, 2017). These types of 
interpretations show how the EDL could be trying to move away from a typically radical 
right image; however, their Crusader symbolism is undeniable. These two messages are 
disconnected, as the Crusaders were about spreading their Western Christian culture and 
not about accepting others as they were. 
 
Movement Identity and Anti-Islam Discourse 
The slogans mentioned above, combined with the colour choices and crusader 
symbolism, give a clear message that the identity of the organisation is based in the counter-
Jihad movement and clearly Islamophobic. This imagery firmly defines them as a single-
issue organisation, which could be a strategic move to avoid any accusations of racism, 
anti-Semitism, or homophobia, for example.  
The EDL’s main webpage has several overarching themes. The first, and most 
obvious, is the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim nature of the group. They indeed have an ‘Islam’ 
heading on their website (notably the only religion highlighted in this way), which contains 
several articles about Islam such as ‘Lying in Islam’, ‘Islam and Homosexuality’, and a 
constantly-updated list of all ‘Muslim grooming gangs and rape jihad convictions’. This 
anti-Islam nature is also clear in the crusader symbolism, with the use of the red and white 
colours, cross of the Knight’s Templar, the baucent flag, and crusader’s slogan. Crucially, 
this symbolism is not only about the threat of Islam itself, but about the threat it poses on 
Englishness or Britishness (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of these terms). The British way 
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of life is threatened and must be protected; indeed, many EDL supporters cite protecting 
Britain as an important element of their support for the organisation (see Chapter 5). The 
use of the war banner itself is a powerful image, calling supporters to action. 
Further pushing their image of acceptance, the first thing appearing in the ‘About 
Us’ section is a quote by Albert Einstein, who is quoted as being a “refugee from Nazi 
Germany” (EDL, 2017): “The world is a dangerous place to live in; not because of the 
people who are evil, but because of the people who don’t do anything about it.” This is 
significant both in the representation of a well-known person of Jewish descent and also in 
that the quote states that there are dangerous people in the world, and something must be 
done about them; in this case, presumably alluding to Muslims. Following this is the EDL’s 
Mission Statement, in which they state several points including “The English Defence 
League stands for human rights,” including standing “for the right of British Muslims to 
speak freely about problems deriving from Islam,” and that they educate the public about 
Islam, “lead and inspire the struggle against global Islamification,” stand for British 
tradition, and stand for democracy and the rule of law (EDL, 2017). Again, there is a clear 
attempt to portray themselves as non-racist, and crucially as non anti-Muslim. Supporters 
of the EDL have often stated that they are indeed not anti-Muslim, but anti-Islam (see 
Chapter 5). Also, significant here is the use of the term ‘British’ rather than ‘English’. This 
shows that there is not a clear consensus on the discrepancy between the terms: an 
organisation that has ‘English’ in their name claims to stand for the rights of British people 
and traditions, not English. It is clear, then, that the terms English and British are often 
muddled, showing that people in England often define ‘Britishness’ as English, excluding 
the traditions of Scotland and Wales (see Chapter 1 for further discussion).   
Under ‘EDL says’ is the statement: “A national anti-sharia strategy to reduce the 
Islamist threat.” As no one in the UK has yet put “forward a coherent, detailed program” 
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against this ‘threat’, they suggest a new ‘UK Anti-Sharia Strategy’. This strategy includes 
having open discussion about issues, holding on ‘to that which is good’, making Britain 
impervious to Sharia, and making the UK unattractive to Islamists (here, then, conflating 
the terms ‘UK’ and ‘Britain’, as well as seemingly conflating the terms ‘English’ and 
‘British’ as mentioned above). In order to do this, they advocate a long list of items 
including banning the wearing of burkas and niqabs in public, ceasing state aid for Islamic 
faith schools, ending public demonstrations that promote Islam, banning all mosque 
construction and expansion, freeing employers from any obligation to pay employees for 
prayer time, and allowing the criticism, parody, and ridicule of Islam. This is clearly 
contrary to many claims of supporters being anti-Islam, not anti-Muslim, as it would ban 
the traditions of Muslims people and allow open hate speech against them. These terms 
also show their desire to protect Britain and the ‘war’ they are taking against Islam, further 
supporting the idea that the Crusader symbolism was carefully chosen or the representation 
of the organisation. 
 
Promoting Activism 
The second overarching theme of the EDL’s official website recruitment and the 
promotion of action, in the advertising of upcoming demonstration; here, most of the 
emphasis is on the legal nature of the group and demonstrations. Under the heading ‘media’ 
is found information on demonstrations since May 2016, including announcements and 
media briefings. The media briefings outline what they are demonstrating against, and why 
they are demonstrating in a specific city. There is undoubtedly an emphasis on Islam in 
these briefings, with protests being held against sex grooming gangs and terrorism. These 
briefings are carefully laid out and seem to serve to try to convince the authorities and 
media that what they are doing is justified and right. It seems as though they are saying 
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they are not racist, and indeed in March of 2017 the EDL held a demonstration in South 
Shields against “Muslim racism.” 
From their website, it becomes quite obvious that the EDL is a single-issue 
organisation. Their main goal is to rid Britain of Islam, at any cost, and to protect Britain 
from its ‘threat’. Their ‘Join Us’ button takes the user to a list of local chapters, meaning 
that a supporter can join locally but not the organisation ‘as a whole’, so to speak. Other 
than the ‘donate’ box and this ‘Join Us’ button, there is not much emphasis on recruitment. 
The website functions to promote their anti-Islamic ideology, rather than to directly recruit 
new participants. The EDL has never had a distinct membership list or membership status, 
so this website can serve to disseminate their ideology and recruit supporters. For the EDL, 
as with many radical right organisations, social media is what serves as a recruiting tool 
over their website. 
 
Summary 
 An analysis of the EDL’s official webpage and symbolism gives a clear idea of the 
image and identity the organisation wishes to promote. Their use of Crusader symbolism is 
a clear statement against Islam; additionally, the use of the baucent in their logo, the 
fighting banner of the Knight’s Templar, demonstrates that the organisation wishes to 
promote an image of an active fight against Islam. This, then, carries through to the idea of 
protecting Britain from this external threat. These ideas will be further discussed in Chapter 
5 in the analysis of textual interviews of EDL supporters. There, however, it will become 
clear that these images and identity are promoted by the organisation, but are not held by 
all supporters of the organisation; concerns of EDL supporters indeed extend past simply 
the fear of Islam. 
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4.2.2 The Hungarian Defence Movement 
The first thing that strikes a visitor to the Hungarian Defence Movement’s website 
is the use of red, white, and green, which are the colours of the Hungarian flag. The main 
page of the website is also the news page, which is updated regularly. The top of the page 
hosts a banner: an image of the Carpathian Mountains with the red, white, and green 
‘Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom’ overtop (see Figure 4.2); the colours of course 
representing the modern Hungarian flag. 
On the left of the page is a petition for “Amnesty for Budaházy”; an image of 
György Budaházy’s face with the words “Freedom for Budaházy” and “Support jailed 
political prisoners!” In August of 2016, György Budaházy and 16 other members of his 
organisation The Arrows of the Hungarians (Magyarok Nyilai) were sentenced for acts of 
terrorism, which were conducted between 2007 and 2009 (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). 
Budaházy was sentenced to 13 years in prison, which is highly disputed among the 
Hungarian radical right. In 2017 MÖM was gathering signatures for a petition to free 
Budaházy, seen on the left of Figure 4.2 as hands breaking free of their binds and the words 
“You should also sign!” 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Homepage of MÖM's website in August 2017. 
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Symbolism and Identity 
It is crucial to consider history when exploring symbolism, especially symbolism 
used by radical right organisations, as these historical images can reference a golden age of 
heroism and root groups and nations in a mythological past (Elgenius, 2011). The most 
significant ‘golden age’ in Hungarian nationalist rhetoric and symbolism is the Conquering 
Period (895-1000 C.E.), when the Magyars migrated from the East and had not yet mixed 
with their new Slavic neighbours or adopted Christianity.13 The sides of the website’s 
banner feature the organisation’s logo of a red-and-white striped shield with a black turul 
bird, the mythical bird of the Magyars. The use of the black mythical turul bird says 
volumes about their ideology; this symbolism is widely used by radical right organisations 
to tie themselves to the ancient Hungarians and show a ‘tradition-keeping’ image. Also 
important here is the shield shape used in their logo; the shield with the red and white stripes 
is common in medieval imagery and likely serves purpose of harkening back to the Middle 
Ages when Hungarians were skilled warriors, likely demonstrating a willingness to fight 
and protect the nation. 
Moreover, the Árpád flag used as the base of the shield is a crucial element of their 
symbolism, consisting of alternating red and white horizontal stripes, originally the flag of 
the Magyar tribes and of the first Hungarian Dynasty. Originally revived by the Arrow 
Cross Movement at the very end of the1930s, the flag was banned by the Soviets just over 
a decade later. After the end of Soviet rule in Hungary, however, the flag has seen a rebirth 
in the Hungarian radical right movement; the flag is a well-known and recognised symbol 
of the radical right. While they claim to simply be a volunteer organisation, their messaging 
certainly says otherwise. 
 
13 Again, the irony of this is not lost, as Hungarian radical right organisations hold Christianity as a core 
value. 
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Recruitment and Promoting Activism 
Besides the main page, the site has six other pages: contact, videos, about the 
movement, forum, financial support, and news. The financial support button was added 
most recently and includes bank account information so that people can donate to their 
“patriotic values of social engagement and assistance to those in need.” They encourage 
people to either “stand among us or support our goals.” The forum button still says “coming 
soon,” and the videos button leads to three fairly outdated videos about the organisation.  
These videos were uploaded in October 2016, March 2017, and August 2017; the 
first two are unavailable as they are blocked on copyright grounds. The last video is about 
the organisation’s annual summer camp in 2017, the Hungarian Defence Days, which is an 
annual gathering of radical right organisations, including the Outlaw Army among others. 
The video shows pictures of this ‘self-defence’ camp, including many images of families 
and children, set to the radical right rock group Romantikus Erőszak’s (Romantic Violence) 
song 100% Magyar.14 
The ‘about the movement’ section, however, does make it clear that MÖM is not 
just simply a volunteer organisation without ulterior motives. Presumably, the purpose of 
this section of the website is to encourage individuals to support the organisation; not just 
any person, however, but those that share the same values. The organisation also veils many 
of its attitudes and much of its ideology. They state that they fight against social injustice 
and protect Hungarian national values; they are a national network of which the most 
important value is reciprocity, based on self-defence and the creation of local groups. A 
key duty of the organisation is to provide social assistance for its members, family 
 
14 By 2019, two of the three videos containing music were no longer available due to being blocked on 
copyright grounds; only the video with the song ‘100% Magyar’ was not blocked. 
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members, and fellow human beings. The main objectives of the organisation are to develop 
the physical, defence, law-enforcement, and community-building skills of its members, as 
well as to strengthen the ‘ancient warrior spirit’ that stands up for the Hungarians. MÖM’s 
main goal is to contribute to the quick rise of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin, 
so that Hungary can take its ’rightful place’ among the world’s nations for its ‘glorious’ 
history, traditions, and current values. Finally, they mention that it is the responsibility of 
the current generation to ensure the development of the country’s destiny. 
The News portion of the website was last updated on July 23, 2017. Much of the 
news on the website pertains to marches and demonstrations in areas with large Roma 
populations. The language used is extremely veiled, which provides a distinct contrast to 
the EDL’s website. MÖM do not refer, or at least rarely refer, directly to Roma in their 
articles. Similarly to the EDL, MÖM portray themselves as law-abiding and a group that 
helps the Hungarian community. Most of their news and posts show them doing 
‘community service’ and helping poor (white) Hungarians in need. Many news articles 
include community service that the group has done, such as collecting charity for an animal 
shelter, giving gifts of plush toys and scarves to a kindergarten in the Hungarian 
countryside, and collecting blood donations for one of their ill supporters. It seems that, not 
unlike the EDL, MÖM see themselves as the protectors of the Hungarian people. This is 
visible through their charity work and, most especially, through articles about their patrols 
of areas with high Roma populations. Many other news articles are about new MÖM 
chapters forming around Hungary, which seem to have increased in the summer of 2017.  
Compared to the EDL, MÖM place quite a bit more emphasis on recruitment, 
particularly on recruiting the ‘right’ type of supporters. This is due to the fact that both 
organisations have quite different levels of membership. For MÖM, they have well-defined 
membership criteria: individuals can first join as supporters until they are asked to join as 
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full members, in which case they are tested and eventually fully accepted into the 
organisation (see Chapter 5). Perhaps it is because of this that they so clearly define the 
way they would like their organisation portrayed, as a volunteer organisation that helps the 
Hungarian people. Their radical right imagery and attitudes are undeniable, however; 
anyone wishing to join the organisation would likely sympathise with these attitudes first 
and wish to help, and protect, their fellow Hungarians second.  
 
Summary 
The Hungarian Defence Movement’s website gives insight into the identity of the 
movement, particularly through symbolism and through how they portray themselves to 
the public. MÖM use their website to display a finely crafted image of the organisation, 
painting themselves as non-racist and not extremist. They use clear symbolism representing 
the identity and attitudes of the movement, including historical symbols common to the 
radical right; while they are adamant about their position as a volunteer organisation 
looking for others who wish to help their fellow Hungarians, this symbolism clearly defines 
the organisation’s ideology. The website places quite an emphasis on recruitment; it is clear 
that they seek a certain type of member, the true nature of which is cleverly veiled 
throughout. 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
 The most prominent theme seen on both websites is the historical symbolism used 
by both organisations; for the EDL the symbolism of the crusaders and Knights Templar, 
and for MÖM the symbolism of the Conquering Period Magyars and early Hungarians. 
National symbols, even historical in nature, can have great political power and evoke 
emotional expression of national identification, allegiance, and self-sacrifice (Schatz & 
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Lavine, 2007); they can induce “patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or 
humiliations” (Edelman, 1985: 6). National symbolism often makes claims to a specific 
history and sovereignty, and stress the distinctive nature of the nation (Elgenius, 2011); it 
places emphasis on a nation’s historical past that can then be glorified, romanticised, and 
mythologised (Schatz & Lavine, 2007).  
National symbols allow radical right organisations to project their image to their 
own group members as well as to others outside the organisation, giving their ideology a 
shape and form (Breuilly, 1993). There is quite a range and variation of symbolic items 
used by the radical right, but they do tend to mimic those seen in a national context. Most 
common is a flag, whether contemporary or historical, but it can also be any other item, 
piece of clothing or general appearance, slogans, chants, and even specific numbers.15 It is 
important to consider that “a symbol is under the direct authority of, or capable of being 
manipulated by, the person wishing to affect the behaviour of others” (Firth, 1973: 84). 
Particularly in a political context, symbols are selected and combined to provoke certain 
emotions and refer to specific ideas (Mach, 1993); in this case, these symbols provoke ideas 
of purity, nation, and of fighting for the homeland.  
From the perspective of symbolism and movement identity shown on their official 
websites, both organisations are fairly similar in that they have both finely crafted an image 
of a non-extremist organisation, with a few key differences. First, the EDL’s symbolism 
more clearly shows them as an organisation against something very specific, namely Islam, 
while MÖM’s symbolism simply harkens back to a historical period of ‘purity’. Secondly, 
MÖM’s symbolism is heavily rooted in Hungarian nationalism and symbols of the nation, 
 
15 For example, the number 14 representing the fourteen words of the white power slogan: “We must secure 
the existence of our people and a future for white children,” or the number 18 representing the first and eight 
letters of the alphabet, or “Adolf Hitler.” 
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while the EDL’s symbolism is not. Both give a fairly clear image of what each organisations 
stands for; and undoubtedly root themselves in traditional imagery of the radical right. 
The official websites of both organisations are on some basic level geared toward 
recruitment, but at the same time the websites do not seem to be well-maintained. MÖM is 
more focused on showing the organisation’s activities, that they are a family-oriented 
organisation who primarily work to help their fellow Hungarians. At the same time, they 
make it evident what type of individual they seek: one that feels strongly about the nation 
and in protecting Hungarians against the threat of Roma. The EDL portray themselves as 
protectors of Britain and seek people to join them in their war against Islam; their 
recruitment is mostly focused on the advertisement of demonstrations around Britain. It is 
clear that, if anything, both organisations rely more heavily on social media for recruitment 
than their websites. 
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4.3 FACEBOOK 
 In August of 2017, both the EDL and MÖM had active Facebook pages which were 
regularly updated; both groups also had Facebook pages for local chapters. MÖM 
seemingly have Facebook pages for most of their local chapters, but these pages seem to 
mostly share posts from the main MÖM Facebook page. The EDL’s local pages, on the 
other hand, were somewhat more independent of the main EDL Facebook page, generally 
sharing different material. Main pages were used for the purposes of this study, as these are 
more likely to be moderated by the central leadership of the groups and also for their ease 
of comparison. Each group has a different number of local chapters, with chapters not 
consistently active online, hence making a direct comparison quite difficult.  
 The Facebook pages of both organisations clearly have a different function than 
their official websites; the websites are a relatively static online presence (save when MÖM 
still regularly updated their ‘news’ section) while Facebook was updated regularly, indeed 
daily in the case of the EDL, and showed the current concerns and actions of the 
organisations. The main Facebook pages of the EDL and MOM were analysed from 10th 
August 2017 until 23rd August 2017.16 All posts were recorded and coded, with each post 
receiving only one code.  
 
4.3.1 English Defence League 
 The EDL’s Facebook page had 77 posts in that two-week period, posting an average 
of five posts per day, and upwards of ten posts in one day. Table 4.1 shows the codes used 
and frequency. Only page moderators post to the EDL main Facebook page, so only those 
 
16 A second round was analysis was due to be conducted in spring of 2019 incorporating post responses, but 
the EDL’s Facebook page was permanently removed and the group banned from Facebook on 18th April 18 
2019. 
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posts made directly by the EDL’s page moderators were coded. Comments to posts were 
not included in this analysis.  
 
Table 4.1: Code descriptions and frequencies for posts on the English Defence League’s 
Facebook page, from 10th August 2017 until 23rd August 2017. 
 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY % 
Migrant 
Criminality 
Suggesting that migrants are 
criminals. 
3 3.90 
Sex Gangs Anything relating to the ongoing 
investigation of Asian sex 
grooming gangs in the UK. 
6 7.29 
Muslims/Islam News sources relating to Muslims, 
but not in an obviously negative 
way. 
7 9.09 
Anti-Muslim Anything posted with purpose of 
inciting fear of or hatred toward 
Muslims. 
16 20.78 
Terrorism Referring directly to terrorist acts 
(allegedly) conducted by Islamic 
groups and/or individuals. 
10 12.99 
ISIS Referring directly to members of 
the Islamic State, or implying 
relationship of Muslims to the 
Islamic State. 
4 5.19 
Barcelona Relating to the Barcelona terror 
attacks on August 17, 2017, 
generally with a focus on suspects. 
10 12.99 
Action Generally, notices of upcoming 
demonstrations. 
5 6.49 
Politics Related to UK politics. 4 5.19 
Other Anything from emotion-evoking 
posts to random news articles, 
articles related to Lee Rigby’s 
death, complaints about Facebook 
taking down the United States 
Defence League page, and so on. 
12 15.58 
TOTAL  77  
 
 
 What becomes quickly obvious about the EDL’s Facebook page is the focus on anti-
Muslim posts, carrying on from the symbolism seen on their website. Posts are constantly 
and regularly published throughout the day, most of which incite fear, anger, and hatred. 
Many posts focus around ‘Asian’ grooming gangs and terrorist attacks, evoking fear and 
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anger in readers. Posts and news articles, which are often from questionable sources such 
as the Daily Mail, are specifically chosen to paint an image of the ‘evil’ and ‘dangerous’ 
Muslim; hence, serving to other Muslims and to show they are the enemy who they must 
take up arms against. This is done by seemingly selecting the most emotionally charged 
and negative articles possible about Muslims and migrants, and posting these at regular 
intervals. A follower of the EDL’s page would see these constantly and would quickly 
develop much stronger anti-Muslim feelings, especially if they do not follow any pro-
Muslim pages.  Their strategy largely seems to be an often-repeated one, of re-blogging 
news stories and adding their own commentary (Jackson, 2011). This serves to legitimise 
their attitudes and ideologies to a wider public; anti-Muslim feelings and ideas are hence 
normalised to the page’s followers, while at the same time inciting moral panic among 
supporters. 
As seen in Table 4.1, the largest number of posts are ‘anti-Muslim’ in nature. These 
posts range in topic, from a focus on how Islamic culture supresses and disrespects women 
(for example, alleged death threats from Islamic men for bikini pictures, Islamic men 
wanting to see girls covered in the United Kingdom, and an Uber driver locking women in 
his car), to seemingly far-fetched and absurd articles such as one claiming that Muslims put 
faeces and tuberculosis in Starbucks coffee. Those posts coded in the study simply as 
‘Muslims/Islam’ covered topics such as Muslims believing plucking eyebrows is a sin, an 
article about India’s divorce laws, and an article describing Hamou Bachir, the Paris attack 
suspect (this was not coded under ‘terrorism’ as the article made no mention of him as a 
terrorist). 
Other codes are relatively self-explanatory, as posts coded as ‘ISIS,’ ‘Barcelona,’ 
and ‘sex gangs’ were generally articles about their respective topic. Posts coded as ‘Other’ 
included a wide variety of topics, including a photo stating “Stay true to yourself, even if it 
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means standing alone.” Posts coded as ‘Action’ were all posters about upcoming demos, 
an example of which is seen in Figure 4.3. This image is quite telling, for example, as it 
shows the image of Newcastle in two hands with the words “Help me” in the palms of the 
hands. This poster is meant to evoke the feeling of helping the people of Newcastle, perhaps 
saving them from some ‘menace’ through the supporter’s attendance at this demonstration. 
“Help me” could symbolise the girls abused through grooming gangs in Newcastle; this is 
clear from the “Operation Sanctuary” in red letters, referring to the investigation into 
grooming gangs in Newcastle (Perraudin, 2018). This ties back to observations of the 
EDL’s official website, and specifically to their symbolism and identity. The EDL see 
themselves as the protectors: those who attend the demonstration in Newcastle will 
presumably be doing something to help the city and fight against those that threaten their 
way of life, or in some way the demonstrators are aiding the fight against grooming gangs.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Posted to EDL's Facebook page on August 14, 2017. 
 
 The EDL’s Facebook page, updated quite regularly, similarly to their website was 
almost wholly focused on anti-Muslim rhetoric; this rhetoric could be surrounding Muslims 
and Islam more generally, terrorism, or grooming gangs. Additionally, they did include 
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posts about other issues such as recruitment for their demonstrations, UK politics, and 
several other issues. This heavy focus on anti-Muslim rhetoric is quite interesting, as many 
of the EDL’s Facebook followers are quite concerned with other issues such as 
immigration, politics, and Brexit (see interview analysis in Chapter 5). 
 
4.3.2 The Hungarian Defence Movement 
The Hungarian Defence Movement’s Facebook page is far less active than the 
EDL’s was, but posts are still regularly published. Although the group generally posts once 
or twice daily, two days of the two-week research period had no posts. On 23rd August, 
however, the group posted five times with posts relating to Budapest and the rising black 
population. It should be noted that Hungarian radical right organisations are not often 
openly vocal about ethnic groups other than the Roma in Hungary; the posts referred to one 
area of Budapest known to be generally unsafe and quite ‘ethnic,’ and related to either the 
drug use of these individuals or to the story of one supporter who was not served at an 
African restaurant. Table 4.2 shows codes used and frequency, with posts only coded once 
each. Only page moderators post to MÖM’s main Facebook page, so only those posts made 
directly by MÖM’s page moderators were coded. Comments to posts were not included in 
this analysis as the focus of this analysis was the perspective of the organisation.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 A second phase of research was to be conducted in Spring of 2019 to include the comments and views of 
supporters, but the EDL were permanently banned from Facebook in April of 2019. 
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Table 4.2: Code descriptions and frequencies for posts on the Hungarian Defence Movement’s 
Facebook page, from 10th August 2017 until 23rd August 2017. 
 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY % 
Recruitment Posters attempting to recruit 
members, or encouraging members 
to form new chapters. 
4 21.11 
Event In this case, a video of ‘Hungarian 
Defence Days’ 2017. 
1 5.26 
Recruitment Event Event with the specific purpose of 
recruiting new members 
1 5.26 
Action Description of action the group has 
taken, usually ‘patrols’, generally 
including photos.  
5 26.32 
Praise Praise and thanks that the group 
received for one of their ‘patrols’. 
1 5.26 
Anti-Black Openly anti-black posts about the 
rising African population in 
Budapest. 
2 10.53 
Other Includes news articles, a post about 
religion, and one about the (forced) 
cancellation of a planned far-right 
commemorative event. 
5 26.32 
TOTAL  19  
 
 
 What is striking about the MÖM Facebook page is the lack of openly anti-Roma 
posts. It is well-known that the group is anti-Roma (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017), and they 
often hint at ‘white Hungarians’ being victimised by Roma. This anti-Roma sentiment is 
revealed, however, if one looks deeper into their posts and actions; for example, all “mood 
improving” patrols are conducted in areas of high Roma populations. They do not often 
make open anti-Roma comments, but have stated that they are going on patrol due to 
“norm-defying individuals” and posts have likened Roma to ‘pigs’ (MÖM, 2017). The only 
openly racist posts seen on their Facebook page were against the black population of 
Budapest, as mentioned earlier, which first appeared on any MÖM online sources on 23rd 
August 2017.  
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Figure 4.4: Example of a MÖM recruitment poster, posted on 11th August 2017  
[Join us! Let’s make our living space livable together!]. 
 
 Much like their website, MÖM’s Facebook page is largely focused on recruitment, 
either by showing their activities through posts and videos or by posting actual recruitment 
posters. On their social media they also portray themselves as a volunteer organisation 
seeking to help their neighbours, while also trying to maintain Hungarian tradition 
(especially seen through posts about their Hungarian Defence Days). Looking at their 
imagery and symbolism, in addition to their posts such as the ones about the black 
community of Budapest, there remains little doubt of the underlying attitudes of the 
organisation. 
 
4.3.3 Discussion 
 The EDL and MÖM’s Facebook pages, while different in their use, do present some 
similarities. Both organisations, similarly to the imagery seen on their official websites, 
present themselves as protectors of the nation: the EDL against a Muslim threat, and MÖM 
against the loss of national identity and against specific threats towards their fellow 
Hungarians. Both organisations also used images they often create for the purpose of 
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posting on Facebook. These images are often created to arouse emotions; for example, 
images referring to grooming gangs, to ‘taking up the fight’, or referring to ‘we need you’. 
Indeed, it has been shown that images inciting emotion are more likely to be shared; not 
only, but those provoking anger are the most likely to be shared by followers (Berger & 
Milkman, 2013). Other studies have found that virality is most strongly associated with 
positive and emotional content, as well as content that induces anger (Heimbach & Hinz, 
2016). MÖM did not seem to focus as much on the emotionally-driven and anger-inducing 
content, other than perhaps the music and images selected for their videos. The EDL, on 
the other hand, did post many images and articles aimed at inducing anger in their 
followers.  
Several other differences can also be gleaned from studying the two Facebook 
pages. First, the EDL is significantly more concerned with international events than MÖM. 
MÖM had no mention of major international events, such as the Barcelona terrorist attacks 
of 2017, while these seemed of high importance to the EDL. This is likely due to the fact 
that the EDL is very centrally focused on their anti-Islamic stance; such terrorist attacks are 
covered extensively in the media and give much material for them to post. The EDL is 
mostly focused on removing Muslims from Great Britain, but uses any ‘evidence’ they can 
from anywhere in the world to speak out against Muslims. MÖM, on the other hand, is very 
much only focused on ‘making Hungary better for Hungarians’. International events really 
have no place in their ideology, as they are so locally-focused.  
The comparison of the two Facebook pages reveals a number of additional 
differences. The second, and most obvious, difference is the frequency with which the two 
groups post updates. The EDL had vastly more posts in this two-week period, with 77 to 
MÖM’s 19. This could be strategic on the part of the EDL, or it could be because they have 
more people managing the Facebook page. Both organisations use Facebook for the 
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dissemination of their messaging and for recruitment to upcoming events. The EDL used a 
distinctive strategy to constantly bombard followers with their messaging on their 
newsfeeds; the more exposed followers are to the messages, the more the message can get 
through. MÖM did not use this strategy; rather, they rely on updates about their activities 
and recruitment posters. Clear from examining both their website and Facebook page, 
MÖM is looking to recruit a very specific type of supporter, and eventual member. Because 
of this, they do not need to bombard their followers with posts about their ideology and 
attitudes; not only that, but MÖM attempts to veil their attitudes in their online presence. 
The EDL, on the other hand, are seeking numbers; as they do not have a specific 
membership list, they may look to spread their message and recruit followers regardless of 
their level of support. 
Third, the focus of the two groups is considerably different. As evidenced from their 
online presence, the EDL’s sole purpose is to be anti-Muslim in its promotion of the hatred 
and fear of Muslims. MÖM, for the most part, use their Facebook page to show the ‘good’ 
deeds that they do while protecting white Hungarians from the ‘Roma threat.’ MÖM is not 
openly racist on their Facebook page, with the exception of a post on the last day of 
analysis; even then, this was not targeted at Roma, but at the black community. Fourth, 
MÖM uses their page for recruitment more than the EDL, as MÖM had posts with the 
specific purpose of recruiting members.  
Finally, the EDL had very little about specific group members and no word from 
their leader. MÖM, on the other hand, has many photographs on their Facebook page, 
clearly showing their members, and generally show posts from the group’s leader. This 
shows a distinctive difference in the structure and organisation of both organisations. The 
EDL is more loosely organised and likely does not have a membership list or specific 
membership criteria. MÖM, however, seem to specially select their membership, keep track 
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of their membership, and even have a process for becoming a member. This is also why 
MÖM’s Facebook page gives the feeling of an organisation being promoted, with not just 
demonstrations but recruitment events advertised. The EDL’s Facebook page gave the 
feeling that they were spreading a message, an ideology, and that people were encouraged 
to come support a ‘cause’ at specific demonstrations. 
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4.4 INSTAGRAM 
 Instagram is a popular application with youth, as teenagers now favour it over 
Facebook, according to data and research firm eMarketer (2017). Radical right 
organisations have seemingly caught on, and now have Instagram accounts of their own. 
Instagram is a photo and video sharing application allowing little room for lengthy text; 
given that Instagram has a far younger demographic than Facebook (Smith & Anderson, 
2018), it is largely less popular with the organisations analysed herein, who have older 
demographics. The official Instagram accounts of the Hungarian Defence Movement and 
English Defence League were analysed, looking at the most recent twelve posts from each 
account. The last twelve posts were analysed rather than using a date range, as MÖM and 
the EDL post at much different frequencies, with MÖM posting one to six posts per week, 
and the EDL only posting about one every week or second week.  
 
4.4.1 English Defence League 
 The last twelve posts from the time of data extraction (February 2018) included two 
coded as ‘Event/demonstration’, two coded as ‘Terrorism’ (including ISIS), three coded as 
‘Anti-Islam’, two coded as ‘sex gangs’, and three coded as ‘Other’. The images from their 
demonstrations showed photographs of two EDL supporters, both heavily built bald men. 
The interesting thing about Instagram is its use of ‘hashtags’ to sort posts into themes and 
topics. Hashtags included here were ‘#edl, #patriot, #pride, #rightwing, #nosurrender, with 
one warning against #reversecolonization. Posts coded as ‘Terrorism’ included a warning 
that “ISIS will be here soon,” and hashtags such as #allah, #isis, #jihadists, and #terror. 
Like many of the EDL’s Facebook posts, these images are likely carefully selected to elicit 
fear and anger from their followers; in the case of Instagram, however, these hashtags are 
used to further drive their message. Those posts coded as ‘Anti-Islam’ included a 
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photograph of Muslims praying in the streets, with the hashtags #disgusting and 
#islamicinvasion (Figure 4.5), and a photograph of two Muslim women walking in a street 
with a mosque in the background (Figure 4.6), with the hashtags #refugeesnotwelcome and 
#londonistan. Both of these images were carefully selected to seem as though Britain is 
being overrun by Muslims and, crucially, that the government (in this case represented by 
a police officer in Figure 4.5) is protecting and embracing Muslim culture.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Image of Muslims praying, from the official EDL Instagram account. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Image from the official EDL Instagram account. 
 
The ‘Other’ code, which included three images, included posts against liberals and 
the United States, as well as President Trump, and about Britain First. Largely, these posts 
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reflected the same imagery and identity as seen on the EDL’s Facebook page and official 
website. The difference here was that there was quite obviously less of an emphasis on the 
Crusader imagery, on the call to action that was seen on the other two platforms. Here, 
rather, it seemed images were carefully selected to insight fear, anger, and disgust in their 
followers. 
 
4.4.2 The Hungarian Defence Movement 
MÖM’s Instagram account is obviously much more recruitment-focused than that 
of the EDL. Of their twelve posts, two were coded as ‘recruitment event’, two as 
‘recruitment’, one as ‘event’, two as ‘action’, two as ‘help’, two as ‘other’, and one as 
‘donate’. MÖM is far less creative with their hashtags than the EDL, as posts all had the 
same hashtags: #Magyaronvedelem (Hungarian defence), #MOM, #Hungary, and 
#MagyarÖnvédelmiMozgalom. Some posts also included the hashtags #EU, #Csatlakozz 
(join), and #join. MÖM’s Instagram account was far less focused on inciting fear and anger 
than the EDL’s was, also reflecting results of the analysis of Facebook posts. 
It seems that in the six weeks period of this analysis there was a recruitment drive 
for the town of Győr, as most ‘recruitment’ and ‘recruitment event’ posts were centred 
around that town. One post stated that the local chapter would have three main activities: 
building a local defence unit, charitable volunteer work, and providing legal representation 
and the protection for victims. They were looking for men aged 18 and over, while those 
aged 14-18 could join the youth league. Again, while veiled, the reference to building a 
local defence unit is striking; there was no specification as to who the defence unit would 
protect against, or as to who, or what, terrorised the victims who would be protected. This 
does, however, closely align with much of the symbolism and identity evident in the 
previous two analyses, of MÖM as protectors of the Hungarians. 
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Posts coded as ‘Action’ included a photo of four individuals (three men and one 
woman) dressed in black with black boots, who had performed a patrol of Budapest’s 17th 
district, as well as a poster for a charitable clothing and food distribution drive to be held 
in Budapest’s 14th district (Figure 4.7). Posts coded as ‘help’ included a story of a man 
looking for help from the group, who often felt threatened by the ‘ethnic’ population of his 
neighbourhood, and another post asking for blood donations for a group member. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Poster advertising a clothing and food drive in the 14th district of Budapest, from 
MÖM's official Instagram page 
 
 MÖM’s Instagram largely reflected the themes seen in the previous two analyses. 
The organisation mostly represents itself as protectors and as people who strive to help their 
nation, particularly the impoverished and those who are victims of some unnamed threat. 
MÖM’s Instagram profile almost solely focused on recruitment and in presenting this 
image of a volunteer organisation. This differs from their Facebook page where there were 
posts revealing the highly nationalist and radical right ideology of the organisation, in the 
form of videos and posts with racist content. 
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4.4.3 Discussion 
While MÖM’s Instagram account is newer than the EDL’s, they were much more 
active during the analysis-period for this study.18 The themes of posts on both accounts 
differ quite a bit, while being largely reflective of posts on their respective Facebook pages. 
The EDL’s Instagram account is much more focused on the group’s attitudes and ideology, 
clearly showing their anti-Islamic views. Hashtags also include phrasing like #islamic 
invasion, #jihadists, and #refugeesnotwelcome. MÖM’s Instagram account, on the other 
hand, is much for focused on recruitment: in this case for a new chapter in Győr. Other 
posts focus on charitable events, local ‘patrols’, and ways they help other Hungarians. 
Hashtags are simply focused around the group's name, often including the hashtags 
#Csatlakozz and #join.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 MÖM’s Instagram account has no new posts since 4th May 2018, however. The EDL’s Instagram account 
has been removed, given that the EDL was banned from Facebook and Instagram in April 2019. 
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4.5 YOUTUBE 
 
4.5.1 The English Defence League 
 The EDL’s YouTube channel currently has 1,227 subscribers and 30 videos. This 
seems to be a new YouTube channel that was created in 2015, as videos from 2014 and 
earlier can be found on ‘Tommy old EDL channel Robinson.’ This is currently Tommy 
Robinson’s channel, the EDL founder and ex-leader who resigned as leader of the 
organisation in 2013 due to various concerns such as his family’s safety and his inability to 
control the group he created (Goodwin, 2013), and concerns over using violence to “counter 
Islamic ideology” (Symonds, 2013). 
 Of the 30 videos, 21 were of leaders and members giving speeches at rallies; six 
were videos of demonstrations showing images, videos, and short clips of speeches; one 
was a commemorative video for the 7/7 bombing; one was a trailer for the EDL 
documentary; and one a full-length EDL documentary. Of all 30 videos, these were the 
three that were obviously created to incite emotion in the viewers, much like many of their 
Facebook and Instagram posts. In the other videos, speeches had an overtone of anger, with 
speakers often shouting to their audience.  
Videos were coded for main themes; this proved to be difficult, however, as 
speeches and other videos had several themes contained in one video. By far the most 
overarching themes were anti-Islam, anti-Muslim, and Islamophobic sentiments, which 
were found in all thirty videos. Table 4.3 shows the various themes found in the videos; 
most videos received more than one code due to the nature of speeches. 
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Table 4.3: Code descriptions and frequencies for videos found on the English Defence League’s 
YouTube channel.  
 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY % 
Anti-Islam, Anti-Muslim  30 100.0 
Sex Gangs Anything relating to the 
ongoing investigation of 
Asian sex grooming gangs 
in the UK. 
15 50.0 
Migrants Including migrant 
criminality. 
3 10.0 
Terrorism Including attacks, ISIS. 3 10.0 
Defend England, white 
England 
 4 13.33 
English as victims  2 6.67 
Fight Anything referring to war or 
fighting, for example “wipe 
them out,” “annihilate 
Islam” 
2 6.67 
Action Generally, notices of 
upcoming demonstrations. 
2 6.67 
Anti-left  6 20.0 
Politics  Regarding UK politics. 5 16.67 
TOTAL VIDEOS  30  
 
 
Some other themes also became apparent, but were not included in Table 4.3 as 
they were not found mentioned in any significant amount.  One theme was the depiction of 
the EDL as a charitable and caring organisation, which is interesting when contrasted with 
MÖM given that they mainly represent themselves as a volunteer organisation. Videos also 
made mention of the police not working to their full potential, which emphasises the idea 
of the EDL and protecting Britain and doing work that should be done by the police; this 
theme is also found in MÖM’s online content. Some videos also made mention of the EDL 
closing mosques around the country, showing that the organisation seeks to promote the 
‘good’ deeds they are accomplishing.  
Another theme that was seen was anti-EU and anti-Merkel sentiments, unsurprising 
as these videos were created after 2015 and the start of the Vote Leave campaign. Other 
themes included mention of the new Pegida UK organisation (once), the EDL documentary 
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and trailer, patriotism toward the EDL, and speaking specifically about the town or city that 
they were currently in. Speaking about the city in which they are demonstrating likely has 
the strategic purpose of inciting emotion among demonstrators and listeners, given as most 
likely reside in that area. 
As the most recent video was from September of 2016, it is obvious that the EDL 
do not any longer use their YouTube channel. It seems that the channel serves as an archive 
of speeches at demonstrations, mostly showing EDL members speaking to crowds of 
supporters. Videos did not seem to have a purpose, per say, as recruitment or directly 
dissemination of their ideology.  
 
4.5.2 The Hungarian Defence Movement 
 MÖM’s YouTube channel had 35 subscribers and 12 videos at the time of this 
analysis. The group also features videos on their Facebook page, not all of which also 
feature in their YouTube account. It is unclear as to how the group decides which videos 
are featured on their Facebook page and which are featured on YouTube. Since the summer 
of 2018 a few videos have been removed. 
 One of those removed videos was MÖM’s first official YouTube video, which was 
posted on 20th April 2015. This video is a twenty-second video showing people, likely of 
Roma origin, removing a washing machine from an apartment, entitled “Those with 
disparate livelihoods video message for Hungarians.” This video has 1,051 views and is the 
only video that is specifically anti-Roma. It is unclear, but perhaps the video insinuates the 
washing machine is being stolen; it is suspicious, of course, that this video was one of the 
two removed since August 2018. 
 The other videos mostly show photographs of events and community-building 
activities, played over emotionally-charged music. Of the seven videos using songs, all of 
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them are by bands from the Hungarian far-right music scene. One uses the introduction of 
a song by MagyaRock (A play on words between Hungarian rock and Magyar, the word 
for ‘Hungarians’), one by a band called Romantikus Erőszak (Romantic Violence), two by 
the most famous far-right Hungarian band, Kárpátia (eluding to the Carpathian basin), and 
three by a relatively new band to the Hungarian radical right scene, Nemzeti Hang (National 
Voice). Hungary has a strong tradition of nationalist-themed and even radical right music, 
with some of it even making its way into the mainstream (most especially the band 
Kárpátia). Some of these videos are not unavailable due to music copyright issues.  
 Table 4.4 gives a summary of the main themes of the videos. Videos were each 
given one code each. There was some overlap between codes, for example one video coded 
‘children’ was of the children’s yearly summer camp; obviously it is an event, but with the 
main purpose of showing the group's support of children. One video, which was coded 
‘event’ as it was of the Hungarian Defence Movement Days 2017, was also distinctly about 
community-building, showing images of smiling group members and supporters. It is fairly 
obvious, however, that most of their videos are of events, though not of patrols and other 
controversial activities in which the group may be involved. The videos are intended to 
show the fun and sense of community of the group; the photographs and music are very 
specifically chosen to elicit emotion from viewers, hence, seemingly, most of these videos 
have the underlying intention of recruitment. These videos also show that the organisation 
aims to recruit a certain type of member: one that is perhaps family-oriented, likely above 
the age of 30, and who is not too extreme in their views. While videos to show radical right 
imagery, they tend not to show specific white power imagery, for example, as can be seen 
with other Hungarian radical right organisations. This is likely due to MÖM’s close 
connection to the Jobbik party; showing specific white power and distinct radical right 
imagery would likely harm the image of the party, if someone were to make the connection. 
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Table 4.4: Code descriptions and frequencies for videos found on the Hungarian Defence 
Movement’s YouTube channel. 
 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY % 
Event Videos showing images from past 
events, including speeches. 
5 41.67 
Recruitment Videos with the specific purpose of 
recruiting new members. 
1 8.33 
Community Videos with the purpose of 
community-building, including 
thank you to supporters. 
1 8.33 
Children Any videos with the distinct 
purpose of showing how the 
community supports children, and 
events they have organised for 
children. 
2 16.67 
Other Includes interviews with locals, a 
men’s choir singing, and one of 
Roma. 
3 25.0 
TOTAL  12  
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4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 This analysis set out to investigate two main research questions. The first question 
was how these groups attempt to portray themselves to the public: do they display 
themselves as violent, or rather more peaceful? Are they open about their ideology? The 
second question investigated was how these groups attempted to recruit new members, or 
the seeming importance of recruitment to these groups. 
   
Image and Identity 
Through the online activity of both organisations, it is clear that both groups present 
themselves as patriotic, making use of their respective country’s colours and historical 
symbols. This use of historical symbolism is evidence of nationalist attitudes and the idea 
of going back to a ‘better’ time of national purity. No matter how much these organisations 
attempt to portray themselves as political activists (EDL), volunteer organisations (MÖM), 
not radical right, and not racist, it is still clear that they are, at the root of it, radical right 
organisations. Also, there are likely two more reasons for the use of these symbols: the 
formation of collective identity and the incitement of emotions to encourage fear of social 
change and feelings of community. 
 When considering the formation of an ‘image’ and the recruitment of members to 
an organisation, both collective and group identity become important. Collective identity 
is based in the idea of group distinctiveness and difference, and the perception of interests 
(Jasper, 1997). The very existence of these feelings of collective identity and community 
ease feelings of risk and uncertainties related to collective action (Della Porta & Diani, 
2006). Jasper (1997) distinguishes collective identity from movement identity, which is the 
identity, perceived by the group and outsiders, of those involved in a movement seeking 
social change. Of course, both collective and movement identity must be considered from 
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the perspective of the individual and their own personal identity, and also from the 
perspective of one’s own culture and the culture in which a group exists. Therefore, it is 
impossible to know how an individual’s perception of identity will be influenced by these 
online materials, but something can be said about how the organisations wish to portray 
their identities and potential influence others. Collective and movement identity formation 
is critical for social movement organisations in order to arouse feelings of solidarity and 
define moral boundaries (Jasper & McGarry, 2015). Of course, collective identity can also 
pose important strategic dilemmas: the same identity that attracts some recruits will turn 
other away and can cause negative attention from outsiders (McGarry & Jasper, 2015). 
 In the case of these organisations, collective identity was largely defined through 
the symbolism and imagery use in their online presences. Indeed, it has been shown in the 
literature that the online space helps create collective identities as it brings together 
common attitudes and concerns (Adams & Roscigno, 2015). The EDL used strong imagery, 
most especially on their official website of the Crusades and Knight’s Templar. This 
imagery combines several important aspects of their identity: the anti-Islam nature of the 
organisation, the desire to protect their homeland from a Muslim threat, and their image as 
an organisation who is at war and fighting for the culture of their land. MÖM’s symbolism 
is similar, but perhaps not as strong and specific as the EDL’s. The use of popular national 
symbols, and specifically historic symbols, shows the important the organisation places on 
the purity of the original Magyars. This imagery combined with offline imagery, such as 
the wearing of combat boots and uniforms, demonstrated the paramilitary nature of the 
organisation; their identity as protectors of Hungary is also evident through their activity, 
such as patrols. 
 This feeling of a collective identity, even in the online sphere, can also help to 
promote ideas of togetherness and solidarity. Indeed, it is impossible to have one without 
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the other (Gamson, 1992). This allows for organisations to encourage feelings of solidarity 
on an everyday basis, easily accessible through sympathisers’ computers and mobile 
phones. There is no longer the need to attend common demonstrations, meetings, and 
events to promote solidarity; it can now happen constantly through the ubiquitous nature 
of digital media and mobiles. Radical right organisations can now promote feelings of 
solidarity even before individuals are regularly physically active with the organisation and 
can also promote these feelings to those individuals who may live further away or are 
unable to travel. It can encourage the formation of new chapters of the organisation in areas 
where the movement is not yet mobilised.  
It is also apparent that both the EDL and MÖM utilise perceived grievances to build 
this sense of unity and solidarity among supporters. Indeed, this is well documented as a 
common feature of the radical right’s use of the online space (Wojcieszak, 2010; Simi & 
Futrell, 2015; Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2018). The EDL grievances are undoubtedly 
surrounding Islam, which they made unmistakably evident through their communication 
on their Facebook page and through the imagery of their official website. Additionally, the 
EDL continually posted articles and images chosen to incite fear and anger in their 
supporters, especially aimed at Muslims. MÖM also have clear grievances but are 
somewhat more difficult to tease out of their online profile; their grievances on the surface 
seem to be against the government not helping impoverished Hungarians and not doing 
enough about crime in certain areas of the country. Looking deeper, however, one finds 
that perhaps these grievances could be against one ethnicity, namely the Roma.  
 The symbolism, imagery, and content promoted by both organisations is obviously 
calculated to incite emotion in existing and potential supporters. Emotion has been shown 
to be an important factor in promoting social movement activism (Berezin, 2001; Goodwin, 
Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b; Jasper, 1998; Tarrow, 2011; Virchow, 2007). Emotion is 
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intimately tied to moral values, which can be manipulated in order to recruit supporters. 
Emotion is also tied to moral shock, which is often the first step of the recruitment process 
(Jasper, 1998). An unexpected event or piece of information can cause extreme outrage, so 
that people may become inclined toward activism (Jasper, 1998). In addition, organisations 
can point to someone to blame for this moral shock, which can result in externally-directed 
shared emotions that are held in common by group members (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 
2001b). The EDL especially has used the moral shock of sex grooming gangs and terrorist 
events in order to place blame on the Muslim community, furthering the shared emotions 
among supporters. 
 
Recruitment 
 The online space is crucial for recruitment into social movement activism, 
especially in the case of the radical right (Back, 2002); supporters often become involved 
online and eventually become more active in the movement. While much of the EDL’s 
following is online, they place far less emphasis on recruitment than MÖM does, both on 
their website and on their Facebook page. They do heavily promote demonstrations and 
have a quite visible PayPal donation button on their website, but seem to be less concerned 
with recruiting core members. Again, this could be because the EDL does not have clearly 
defined membership criteria, and mostly seeks to grow their numbers at demonstrations 
around the country. MÖM, on the other hand, regularly have recruitment events, and often 
post both on their website and Facebook page, attempting to gain members. They have far 
fewer demonstrations than the EDL, however, and instead participate in charity events and 
‘patrols’. Most of these events are only announced after the fact as news about the 
organisation’s activities. Open MÖM events for supporters, such as the summer camp for 
children and commemorative events in conjunction with other groups, are advertised in 
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advance. When people express an interest in joining the EDL, it appears they are directed 
to local chapters. On the other hand, most MÖM recruitment posters feature the personal 
phone number and email address of the group’s leader; often supporters are encouraged to 
start new MÖM chapters if there isn’t one already in their area. 
This comparison shows that the EDL and MÖM fundamentally differ in several 
ways. MÖM seem to have a stronger membership identity than the EDL. MÖM are looking 
for hardworking, loyal, ‘God-fearing’ members who will represent the organisation well. 
The EDL, on the other hand, seem to seek supporters with the one goal of taking down 
Islam (this, however, is not the main concern of supporters; see Chapter 5). From the 
information available on their online presences, it seems as though MÖM define themselves 
based on a strong collective identity and self-image they seek to portray, while the EDL 
seem to have less of a sense of self and define themselves solely within the othering of 
Islam. While MÖM seek loyal new members and leaders to start new local chapters, while 
the EDL seek supporters and monetary donations; MÖM value loyalty and the quality of 
their members, while the EDL care about growing their army. 
 This difference is also evident in the nature of their respective YouTube accounts. 
What is striking about the EDL’s YouTube account is that most of the videos, 27 of 30, are 
of demonstrations. On the other hand, most of the videos on the official MÖM YouTube 
channel showed the organisation’s community involvement and seemed also to serve as 
recruitment tools. Evident in both the YouTube channels, Facebook pages, and Instagram 
accounts is the distinct difference between the emphasis of the two groups. The EDL have 
a very obvious emphasis on being anti-Islam, while MÖM focus more on recruitment and 
gaining supporters. The EDL attempt to grow their numbers through fear of Islam, while 
MÖM portray an image of caring for their fellow Hungarians and recruiting people who 
‘care about their country’. 
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Conclusion 
The analysis of the online presences of the EDL and MÖM explored two of the 
research questions of this study. First, the questions of what draws people into radical right 
organisations, and specifically the organisation in question. Second, this study aimed to 
explore how the use of the internet encourages individuals to join such organisations. These 
questions were approached from the perspective of the organisation; namely, how to the 
organisations present themselves to potential supporters, how do they portray their identity 
to narrow what type of supporter they attract, and the actions they take to recruit supporters. 
Both organisations present clear images of their group identity, giving a good idea 
of who they seek as supporters. The EDL presents an image of a single-issue organisation 
who demonstrate and march in the streets, all to protect the country from the threat of Islam. 
This imagery suggests that they seek people who are willing to join these marches to grow 
their numbers, but does not suggest they seek any further loyalty or solidarity from their 
members. MÖM, on the other hand, is quite the opposite; much of their imagery is family 
and community-focused. MÖM clearly seek supporters and members who will be loyal to 
the organisation and its values, and who are willing to devote their time to aiding the 
organisation in their various activities. In the case of MÖM particularly, it is clear that they 
are not attempting to radicalise supporters through the use of the online space. It has indeed 
been suggested that the internet cannot be regarded as a causal factor in radicalisation, but 
that it can strengthen and accelerate the process (van der Waak & Wagenaar, 2010). 
These differences are also shown through the recruitment strategies employed by 
each organisation. The EDL post flyers for upcoming demonstrations around the country, 
seeking to grow their numbers. If one would like to contact the organisation to join, the 
person is directed to a local chapter rather than speaking directly to leadership. In contrast, 
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MÖM seek to specifically recruit individuals who share their attitudes and views; interested 
individuals are to contact the organisation’s leader directly. In addition to flyers posted on 
their website and Facebook page, MÖM also advertises their community events and 
volunteer activities, to which people can also join. 
In the following chapter an analysis of interviews conducted with MÖM and EDL 
members will be presented. The interviews draw on themes of identity and solidarity as 
seen from the online analysis; they ask how respondents developed their radical right 
attitudes, why individuals joined these organisations, and why they maintain membership 
in the organisations. 
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
 The third methodology used, and sequentially the last, was in-depth biographic 
interviews. In-depth interviews were used to analyse all three research questions: why 
individuals adopt nationalist views, why they join radical right movement organisations 
(and specifically the ones that they have joined), and why they maintain membership in a 
radical right movement organisation. A portion of the interview schedules drew on ideas 
surrounding solidarity, loyalty, and identity as understood through online analysis (see 
Chapter 4). Analysis of the interviews was conducted with consideration for the results of 
the secondary survey analysis, namely bearing in mind ideas of life satisfaction and views 
of immigration. 
 This chapter will first overview the methodological approaches taken in this 
research, how participants were recruited (or attempted to be recruited), procedures, ethical 
considerations, and limitations of this phase of the research. A narrative of the findings of 
the Hungarian data will then be presented, followed by a summary and discussion of the 
British data. Lastly, there will be a discussion and comparison of the Hungarian and British 
data. 
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5.1 METHODOLOGY 
5.1.1 Methodological Approach 
 Taking a biographic approach to in-depth interviews aims to discover aspects of a 
person’s whole life, from their perspective. There are three basic approaches to biographic 
interviewing, which tend to overlap in practice (Miller, 2000). The first is realist, or 
inductive, which is used to come up with general principles about social phenomena. The 
interviewing method is non-structured, the researcher takes as objective an approach as 
possible, and many interviews are needed to look for common trends. Second is a neo-
positivist, or deductive, approach to biographic interviews, meaning that “pre-existing 
networks of concepts are used to make theoretically based predictions concerning people’s 
experienced lives” (Miller, 2000: 12). This deductive approach utilises semi-structure 
interviews for analysis to test hypotheses. The third is narrative, which is focused on the 
interviewee’s perspective of their own life story. The relationship between the interviewer 
and interviewee is crucial to this approach (Miller, 2000). 
 This research predominantly took Miller’s (2000) neo-positivist approach, by 
conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews. However, this methodology also overlaps 
with the other two approaches, as an attempt was made to stay as objective as possible and 
also to consider how the interviewee was constructing the narrative of their own life story, 
forming somewhat of a quasi-narrative approach. Both the realist and neo-positivist 
approaches share common trends, in that they use “responses to evaluate a pre-existing 
framework” and “use real world information in order to develop or refine abstract concepts” 
(Miller, 2000: 15). They also share the belief that micro phenomenon (such as the 
individual) can lead to information about the macro (such as social phenomena) (Miller, 
2000). Unfortunately, these approaches do not allow for the respondent’s voice to be the 
only voice heard in the analysis, as would be more the case if taking a narrative approach. 
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This was not possible, however, due to limiting factors such as time and ethical constraints 
(further discussed under Limitations, Section 5.1.6). This primarily-deductive approach 
was chosen as it best meets the aims for this phase of the research and facilitates the 
exploration of specific research questions, namely why individuals joined these radical 
right organisations and why they maintain membership. 
 Yeo and colleagues (2014) outline several core features of in-depth interviews. 
These are: the combination of structure and flexibility, an interactive methodology between 
researcher and participant, an opportunity to ‘get below the surface’ and delve into a 
participant’s experiences, the generation of new data, and a focus on how participants 
express themselves. Of course, the extent to which these features are covered is dependent 
on the interviewer as well as the interviewee (Yeo et al., 2014). As ultimately this study 
aims to find the motivating forces behind individuals, the best way to better understand 
these is to speak to movement members directly. While there are always issues surrounding 
interviews and interview techniques (see limitations section 5.1.6), they are highly 
beneficial to such a study. 
While it would have been desirable to have less structured interviews to allow 
participants to develop their own narratives, semi-structured interviews were beneficial for 
this study due to limited time and resources. Also, as in the case of MÖM interviews were 
conducted over the telephone, it was quite difficult to determine when a participant was 
finished speaking, also showing the benefits of structured questions. Telephone interviews 
have been found to be a successful and viable method to collect interview data (Cachia & 
Millward, 2011; Drabble, Trocki, Salcedo, Walker, & Korcha, 2016; Sturges & Hanrahan, 
2004).  
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5.1.2 Participant Recruitment 
 Firstly, ethics for this phase of the project was approved by the School of Human 
and Health Sciences’ School Research Ethics Panel at the University of Huddersfield. The 
ethical requirements stated that all interviews must be conducted via telephone, but not 
from a personal phone, and that participants may not see the researcher’s image. These 
precautions were put in place to safeguard the researcher’s personal wellbeing. This made 
it a challenge to find both participants and to conduct appropriate interviews, which will be 
further discussed in a section on limitations (section 5.1.6).  
As is often the case with any research, this project did not quite follow the expected 
best-case plan. In order to properly explore the research questions set out in this project, it 
would have been ideal to interview members of both the EDL and MÖM. Sadly, however, 
this did not happen due to not recruiting participants from the EDL. In order to solve this 
issue, EDL supporters completed textual interviews. While not as ideal as oral interviews, 
this had the added benefit of recruiting a large number of participants. 
For this study, it was important that those interviewed were current and full 
members of each organisation. When it came to MÖM, it was easier to define the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria. A member was defined as someone who was fully accepted into the 
organisation, receiving their official movement uniform. This was easy to determine, as all 
participants in this study were selected by the organisation’s leader (see below). When it 
came to the EDL, however, it was more complicated as they do not have any firm definition 
of membership (Pilkington, 2016). Here, those supporters were considered suitable 
participants who reside in Great Britain and follow the EDL Facebook page. All 
participants were above 18 years of age. 
 Participants in Hungary were recruited through personal contacts in the far-right. 
Contact was originally made with the leader of the organisation, who was willing to help 
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due to the ‘word’ of my personal contact. He then suggested four people who could be 
interviewed. This was both positive and negative: positive as it was easier to find interview 
participants, but negative since participants were hand-picked as those who would be loyal 
to the organisation and not say things that ‘they should not.’ This obviously, as well, did 
not allow for the option of snowball sampling; this will also be discussed further in the 
limitations section. 
 Unfortunately, no members of the English Defence League could be recruited to 
participate in telephone interviews as there was no advantage of a gatekeeper to the British 
radical right movement. First, a researcher Facebook account was set up, where my image 
would not appear. Several people were contacted through this account, chosen as supporters 
of EDL Facebook pages or having selected ‘going’ to EDL Facebook events. Only one 
person responded and communicated with me via Facebook but he was not willing to 
participate as he could not see my photograph. A Facebook advert was then set up, which 
was run for one week in March of 2018, linking to a survey. The survey was set up via 
SurveyMonkey, on which they could provide their email address for further information. 
In order to provide their email address, the respondent must click ‘yes’ to “I am at least 18 
years old,” “I am a member of the EDL,” and “I am a UK resident.” Nine people provided 
their email addresses in that week, but unfortunately, again, it did not go further. One 
potential issue could have been, as stated by one potential respondent, that the title of the 
study includes “nationalist social movements.” This particular potential-respondent 
confused this with ‘national socialist movements,’ believing the EDL was claimed to be a 
Nazi movement. Even after this individual was politely corrected, he still declined to be 
interviewed. Both the administrators of EDL pages and supporters of the pages were 
contacted via Twitter and Gab, but to no avail. Lastly, personal acquaintances with contacts 
in the EDL also attempted to recruit participants for this project, also to no avail.  
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Unfortunately, there seems to be a serious lack of trust in EDL members with any 
outside individuals. This may stem from the negative representation of the group by popular 
media sources. Even with emphasising the fact that this was an academic study and all 
respondents would remain anonymous, people were still hesitant. In order to overcome 
these issues of trust, however, textual interviews were conducted. Participants were 
recruited through Facebook 
Interview questionnaires were sent out via Facebook, specifically targeting 
individuals who ‘liked’ the EDL’s main Facebook page and who reside in the United 
Kingdom (it was not possible to only select Great Britain). This questionnaire was ‘live’ 
on Facebook for ten days, between March 11 to 21, 2019. It was clearly written above the 
textual interview that this was part of a research project, that their information would 
remain anonymous, and that they are giving permission to use this information as part of a 
doctoral project and future publications. This succeeded in recruiting respondents, as 105 
people responded to these textual interviews, of which 99 were used for analysis. The 
timeframe of this recruitment was lucky, to say the least, as the EDL was permanently 
banned from Facebook less than one month later.   
 
5.1.3 Procedure 
Hungary 
Each participant was sent an information sheet via email and given time to consider 
their participation. The information sheet emphasised that participation was voluntary and 
that they could withdraw at any time (see Appendix D). Participants were also sent a 
consent form allowing the interview to move forward, to use the information gathered for 
this thesis, and to audio-record the interview (see Appendix C). These consent forms were 
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reviewed verbally at the beginning of the interview, and verbal consent was given to all 
points by participants. 
 Interviews with Hungarian participants were conducted in March of 2018. Contact 
was originally established over email. Participants were then contacted via Skype-out call 
to their personal telephones. Interviews were audio-recorded using the MP3 Skype 
Recorder program, and participants were given explicit instructions not to give any 
identifying features about themselves. Careful notes were also taken as appropriate. 
Participants’ names were not recorded with the notes; participants were referred to as HR1 
(Hungarian Respondent 1), HR2, HR3, and HR4. Pseudonyms were later given to all 
participants during analysis.  
The audio recordings of the interviews were carefully stored on an encrypted 
storage device and on a personal computer. Data on the personal computer were deleted 
once analysis was completed, leaving only the encrypted storage device. Confidentiality of 
all data was ensured, and all data was anonymised. 
Participants were interviewed individually, and each interview lasted between 20 to 
40 minutes. As these were semi-structured interviews, an interview schedule was utilised 
which can be found in Appendix E. Interview questions emphasised description over 
explanation, in order to make participants more comfortable throughout the interview 
(Busher, 2016). This also encouraged participants not to become defensive and to speak 
more openly.  Research questions focused on why and how participants joined the 
organisation, their personal experience in the organisation, and what they gain from being 
members.  
The aim was to develop a narrative of the participant’s journey into and through 
their membership in a radical right organisation. Unfortunately, the length of the interview 
was quite limited, partly because of the nature of them being telephone interviews and 
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mostly to encourage participation. Indeed, it is suggested that qualitative interviews are 
more ideally around ninety minutes in length (Elliott, 2005). Even with limited time, 
participants were encouraged to tell stories and speak about what they wished and were 
never stopped if they veered from the questions. 
 
Great Britain 
Interviews were collected textually to avoid issues around mistrust; this way, 
respondents would not have to give their names or any contact information and also 
wouldn’t show their image. Textual interviews provide complete anonymity to the 
respondent, but do come with the disadvantage of relatively short answers and no 
opportunity to request elaboration from respondents. 
Interview questions were based on the planned interview schedule and selected as 
those which were most easy to answer textually; an example of the interview schedule can 
be found in Appendix G. Interview questionnaires were sent out via Facebook Marketplace, 
specifically targeting individuals who ‘liked’ the EDL’s main Facebook page and who 
reside in the United Kingdom (it was not possible to only select Great Britain). This 
questionnaire was ‘live’ for ten days, between 11th to 21st March 2019. During this time the 
interview questionnaire received 105 responses. Participants spent anywhere between 1:58 
and 51:40 to complete the interview questionnaire, with most participants spending less 
than 15 minutes on the interview; one participant spent over an hour (1:12:09) and another 
two and-a-half hours (2:33:47). As the latter two interviews did not have much more data 
than others, this length could be due to the interview questionnaire being open without 
participants actively working on the interview.  
Of the 105 interviews, 99 were used for analysis. The six interviews were removed 
for several reasons. Four were removed as they were clearly trying to skew the data: one 
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citing “right wing nationalism” as the biggest issue affecting Great Britain at the moment, 
another citing “white people” as an answer to the same question, another obviously having 
no interest in the EDL and answering “my socks” to what they would lose if they left the 
organisation, and another answering “cheese” (or variations thereof) to all questions. The 
other two, of the six total exclusions, were excluded as they clearly had never heard of the 
EDL before; both participants were above 70 years of age. It seemed one of these 
individuals believed the interview questionnaire to be given by the EDL, although the 
purpose of the questionnaire was clearly stated. The 99 respondents that remained were not 
necessarily all members or even direct supporters: they were individuals who agree with 
the EDL’s mission and support the organisation on some level. 
 
5.1.4 Ethical Considerations 
 Qualitative interviews, and indeed any form of research whereby the researcher 
comes into contact with human participants, is subject to many ethical issues and concerns. 
The ethics of interviewing is indeed not black and white, and sometimes researchers must 
consider what is best for all parties in a specific situation. Indeed, some researchers have 
speculated whether qualitative research is ever really ethical, as each study requires some 
level of deviation from rules and principles (Shaw, 2008). Interviewing individuals with 
unpopular and controversial views is a good example of a time when this deviation may 
occur. As much as the researcher may find these views to be wrong, in certain instances 
they may have to hide their own views; especially in instances where there has not been 
enough time for rapport to develop. 
 Participation must always be voluntary and free from coercion or pressure (Webster 
et al., 2014). It is important that participants are given all information about the research 
project, and informed that they can withdraw at any time. This, however, brings up issues 
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of deliberate deception. There may be times when giving all information to a participant 
could be harmful to the research or researchers themselves, or could sway the outcome of 
the interview.  
Another issue that arises is that of confidentiality. Confidentiality must be 
maintained at all times, except in certain cases of illegal activity. This must be outlined to 
the participant at the start of the interview. According to the British Society of 
Criminology’s Statement of Ethics (2015), researchers are legally obliged to report certain 
types of information to authorities. These are: 1) knowledge of terrorist activity or the 
financial involvement in terrorist activity, 2) money laundering, and 3) the abuse and/or 
neglect of a child. Indeed, while a researcher has a duty to abide by the guidelines and 
follow the law, this raises the question of whether it is “ever ethical to disclose information 
revealed in confidence when it is believed that the information would not have been 
disclosed but for the guarantee of confidentiality” (Finch, 2001: 42). In other words, which 
is more unethical: breaking the confidentiality promise of a research participant, or not 
disclosing knowledge of illegal activity to the authorities? Confidentiality was ensured by 
not recording the participants’ original names on the audio files or notes, but by assigning 
serial numbers to them (see above). Later, these number were converted to pseudonyms 
during analysis, again not recorded on the files. All files are stored on an encrypted USB 
device. 
 Lastly, harm must be avoided. This means anonymising all data and securing all 
data after interviews. Personal information, such as names and contact information, must 
be stored separately from research data. This includes all audio recordings and 
transcriptions of interview. This can be achieved by giving each participant a serial number, 
or pseudonym, which is then assigned to their research data (Webster et al., 2014). 
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Electronic files must be password protected and encrypted, and access limited to just the 
researcher. 
 As can be seen, the ethics involved in social science research is never simply black 
and white. It involves a delicate balance between following ethical guidelines and codes as 
closely as possible, while making the best decisions for the safety and wellbeing of research 
participants. For the interviews with MÖM members, see appendix B for this study’s ethics 
form, Appendix C for consent forms in both English and Hungarian, and Appendix D for 
information sheets in both English and Hungarian. In the case of the textual interviews with 
EDL supporters, the purpose of the interview was clearly stated at the top of the 
questionnaire (see Appendix G). 
 
5.1.5 Analysis 
Hungary  
The interviews were transcribed from the audio recording. As the interviews were 
conducted in Hungarian, they were transcribed in Hungarian; important quotes were 
translated to English. All transcribing and translating was done by the researcher, who is a 
native speaker of both English and Hungarian. Transcriptions were then reviewed by the 
researcher several times, noting observations and similarities among the transcripts. It is 
important that interviews are conducted in a participant’s native language, hence the need 
to conduct the interviews in Hungary in Hungarian. Much can be lost if interviewees are 
not speaking their native language, due to less familiarity with the language and different 
ways of expressing themselves. For this reason, it was important that the researcher 
transcribe and translated any relevant sections of the interviews in order to discern any 
nuances of the language.   
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The first approach to this analysis was to conduct a thematic analysis. This allows 
for better organisation of the data, so that later a cohesive narrative could be created about 
the participant’s journey through activism. Of course, a thematic analysis reflects the 
researcher's bias and interpretation of what was said, and can never truly be objective. 
Because this project only included four interviews, it was decided not to use an 
electronic coding program such as NVivo, but to code via Microsoft Word. Pre-Coding was 
done during the transcribing of interviews, with all important quotes being highlighted in 
bold. Notes were also taken on any observances. After transcription was finished of all four 
interviews, the first step of coding was structural coding. This structural coding was done 
by highlighting major basic groups in different colours: demographic data (grey), personal 
involvement with MÖM or other group (green), MÖM actions/structure (light blue), MÖM 
ideology/attitude (purple), and own ideas (yellow; including values, beliefs, and attitudes). 
Every part of the text was highlighted except those which had no significance to the 
interview, for example random chatter, one participant putting down the phone as the police 
drove by, and discussions about misunderstandings which were later clarified. 
The next step was to go through each of these colour-highlighted groupings and 
code. This First-Cycle coding was done both as structural coding for most categories, and 
values coding for the category ‘own ideas’. Values coding reflects “a participant’s values, 
attitudes, and beliefs, representing his or her perspectives or world view” (Saldaña, 2009: 
89). Here, a value is an importance placed on a person, thing, or idea; an attitude is how we 
think and feel about a person, thing, or idea; and a belief includes both values and attitudes, 
plus a person’s personal knowledge, experience, and interpretations of the social world 
(Saldaña, 2009). Coding was done by using the ‘comments’ feature on Microsoft Word. 
Each of these categories was coded separately, across all four interviews. First the 
demographic data was coded; then MÖM actions/structure; next MÖM ideology/attitude, 
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personal involvement with MÖM or other group; and, finally, the respondents’ own ideas 
and beliefs. This was done as it was felt to be more accurate by the researcher, as one coding 
frame could be kept across all interviews. First-cycle coding resulted in about 150 
individual codes, with several seen across multiple interviews (see Appendix F). 
These 150 codes were then exported using a Macro for Microsoft Word to export 
comments into a new Word document. These codes, along with the associated textual data, 
were then copied into Excel and then sorted by the First Cycle codes. These First Cycle 
codes were then copied into a Word document for Second Cycle coding. These codes were 
organised by pattern coding, which develop category labels identifying similarly coded 
data, in order to organise and attribute meaning (Saldaña, 2009). These 150 codes were 
then grouped and narrowed to 27 codes, which could again be grouped in Excel in order to 
have the associated textual data. These 27 categories, or themes, were created while keeping 
in mind the project's three main research questions: Why individuals found the need to join 
a radical right social movement, why they specifically chose to join this particular 
organisation, and why they maintain membership in the organisation. 
Analysis of the interviews took on a quasi-narrative approach, in which the 
fragments of the participant’s story were gathered together into one narrative for ease of 
understanding. A narrative approach can provide the point of view of the interviewee, can 
reveal information about the interviewee’s social and cultural situation, and, in this case, 
can give a sequence of experience leading to their participation in radical right movements 
(Elliott, 2005). The narrative approach is also useful with any sample size, as it focuses on 
the content of the narrative evidence (Elliott, 2005). 
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Great Britain 
While there were a large number of respondents from Great Britain, as textual 
interviews were conducted rather than telephone interviews a similar coding approach was 
taken to the analysis of the British data as to the Hungarian data. The first approach to this 
analysis was to conduct a thematic analysis. This allows for better organisation of the data, 
so that later a cohesive narrative could be created about the participant’s journey through 
activism. Of course, a thematic analysis reflects the researcher's bias and interpretation of 
what was said and can never truly be objective. 
As with the previous interviews, all coding was conducted via Microsoft Word. 
Firstly, structural coding was done by highlighting major basic groups in different colours, 
including both sources of respondents’ frustration as well as involvement in the EDL. In 
essence this was a combination of both structural coding and values coding. Values coding 
reflects “a participant’s values, attitudes, and beliefs, representing his or her perspectives 
or world view” (Saldaña, 2009: 89). Here, a value is an importance placed on a person, 
thing, or idea; an attitude is how we think and feel about a person, thing, or idea; and a 
belief includes both values and attitudes, plus a person’s personal knowledge, experience, 
and interpretations of the social world (Saldaña, 2009). The structural codes were: 
motivations to nationalism and personal ideology (yellow), motivations and pathways to 
joining EDL (red), personal views of the EDL (dark yellow), and level of involvement (dark 
grey). The values codes were: Brexit (purple), immigration (light blue), cultural/social 
concerns (including the NHS, poverty, knife crime) (light green), concerns over 
mainstream politics and media (pink), anti-EU sentiments (light grey), and Islam/Muslims 
(teal). 
This level of coding was conducted on all 99 respondents used in this study. The 
most mentioned of the values codes was a distrust in politicians and/or the political system, 
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which 71 respondents mentioned. 61 respondents mentioned immigration as an issue, 
although sometimes in a veiled context. A further 51 respondents mentioned Islam and/or 
Muslims (although some were quick to point out that Islam is the issue, not Muslims), 
Brexit was mentioned by 43 respondents, anti-EU sentiments by 29, the media by 12, and 
various other cultural and social concerns, such as knife crime and the NHS system, by 29 
respondents. This contradicts other findings where Islam was found to be the biggest 
concern of EDL activists (for example, Bartlett and Littler, 2011). 
Then, First Cycle coding was done using the ‘Comments’ function on Microsoft 
Word as well as highlight colours, with the aid of the original structural and values-based 
codes. This First Cycle coding served to explore and highlight the three research questions 
of this study, in addition to frustrations felt by the respondents. These four codes were: why 
a respondent turned to nationalism (yellow), how and why they joined the EDL (green), 
why they support the EDL specifically (light blue), and what their level of personal 
involvement is in the organisation (pink). This was level of coding was also completed on 
all 99 respondents used in the study. First Cycle coding also served to draw out those 
interviews which would be more useful to the thematic analysis. These were complete and 
partial interviews where respondents answered the interview questions, and where it was 
clear that the respondent was currently, or had been in the past, a member or supporter of 
the EDL. This resulted in 43 complete and 14 partial interviews. 
These four codes from the 57 interviews were then exported via Microsoft Word 
into new Word documents, one for each of the four codes, for Second Cycle coding (See 
Appendix H for a code map and Appendix I for a table of codes). These codes were 
organised by pattern coding, which develop category labels identifying similarly coded 
data, in order to organise and attribute meaning (Saldaña, 2009). Each of these four 
categories received their own sets of codes, which resulted in individualised thematic 
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analyses for each of the research questions, in addition to exploring respondents’ 
frustrations and potential catalysts towards nationalism. The Second Cycle codes for the 
heading ‘Turn to Nationalism’ were: immigration (light blue), veterans (green), 
disenchantment and frustration (yellow), Islam/Muslims (teal), politicians (pink), the EU 
(light grey), Brexit (purple), online activity and the media (dark yellow), and mention of 
specific events (red), such as the Luton demonstration, the murder of Lee Rigby, the 7/7 
bombings, and the Manchester attacks. The Second Cycle codes for the heading ‘Joining 
the EDL’ were: not a member/ex-member/supporter (red), member (green), supporter 
(yellow) sympathiser (blue), member of another organisation (dark yellow), heard of EDL 
online or in the news (including those who only follow online) (pink), joined through 
friends/colleagues/family (teal), and street-level involvement (dark grey). The Second 
Cycle codes for the heading ‘Why EDL’ were: immigrants (light blue), Muslims/Islam 
(teal), veterans (dark yellow), ‘making a difference’ (including things like ‘stand up for the 
little guy’ and wanting to be heard) (yellow), politicians (pink), British 
culture/identity/pride (green), and EDL as a community (red). Lastly, the Second Cycle 
Codes for the heading ‘Investment in Organisation’ were: pride (green), community (pink), 
investment (including positive and negative) (dark grey), dignity and respect (yellow), 
patriotism and hope for Britain (light blue), and those who are not members (red). The 
analysis for these textual interviews then took a thematic approach, analysing each research 
question separately. 
 
5.1.6 Limitations 
 The methodologies used in this study presented several limitations, which will be 
discussed here. Firstly, ethical constraints presented several limitations for this study. 
Initially, the project was to conduct interviews face-to-face with participants, but the 
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decision was made to conduct interviews via telephone due to several factors. Firstly, 
telephone interviews are much quicker and easier to set up, especially as this research is 
multi-cited and intended to be in two countries, hence saving research time and money. 
Secondly, although interviews were conducted via Skype-out calls which carried a cost, 
they were still much cheaper to conduct than the cost of any potential train-travel in 
Hungary, or potential flights to Great Britain and train-travel within Great Britain, in the 
instance of conducting interviews with EDL members. Lastly, and most importantly, it was 
decided that for the protection of both the researcher and participants, it would be best if 
images were kept confidential – hence not conducting the interviews via Skype video. This, 
as well, sped up the interview process as interviewees could participate in an interview 
while conducting other tasks, such as driving longer distances. 
 Of course, telephone interviews have their limitations, and perhaps the biggest 
limitations were in rapport building. It was difficult to build any meaningful relationship 
with the respondents given the 20-40 minutes of the interview and limited prior contact. 
The interviews would have been more successful if there would have been opportunity to 
meet prior to the interview and if respondents had a chance to become more comfortable, 
especially due to the sensitive nature of the topic. This was evident throughout the interview 
as respondents seemed to be much more cautious in the beginning, while most eventually 
relaxed as the interview went on. The lack of rapport-building, of course, was not only 
limited by the nature of telephone interviews, but also by time. This portion of the study 
was conducted in just a few months - a longer study spanning at least one year would have 
allowed for far more rapport building with participants. Also, as the interviews were 
conducted via telephone, most respondents did not care to spend more than 20-30 minutes 
talking. Because of this, I had to ensure that the most important questions were covered for 
this study, not allowing time for the discussion of many other possible topics. 
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 Another limitation to this study was the selection of respondents. Hungarian 
participants were found through a personal contact who then put me in touch with the 
group’s leader. The organisation’s leader then gave me the contact information of the 
respondents that he thought would well represent the organisation and encouraged those 
individuals to participate. While it was possible that other interview participants might have 
been recruited through these selected group members, none were willing to go against the 
leader’s wishes as he chose who to interview. Again, this could have been potentially 
avoided if it were possible to meet with respondents in person and conduct a longer 
ethnographic study.   
Lastly, a serious limitation to this study was the issue of access, which ultimately 
resulted in the inability to find participants for telephone interviews among the EDL. Most 
often these types of groups “tend to regard academics as untrustworthy or hostile and seek 
to prevent entry into their groups or access to members” (Pilkington, 2016: 17). As with 
the Hungarian sample, it would have been helpful to have a personal contact with access to 
the EDL. It was absolutely a detriment to be able only to contact potential participants 
online, and most especially not to be able to show the researcher’s image. Even those few 
(alleged) EDL members with whom contact was made over social media, were, in the end, 
unwilling to talk as they could not see who I was, hence mistrusting the project and 
researcher. More time would have been needed to build a relationship and trust with 
potential participants, as well as permission to meet group members and participants in 
person. 
In order to overcome this issue of access, interviews were written up and circulated 
in textual form over Facebook, utilising the Facebook Marketplace tool. The Facebook 
advert with the textual interviews targeted individuals living in the UK who ‘liked’ the 
EDL’s main Facebook page. While this method did result in 106 responses, it also had clear 
247 
 
limitations. Firstly, sampling was limited to only those individuals who supported the EDL 
on social media. This meant that those supporters who were not online were completely 
excluded from the sample and, also, that the sample contained individuals who only 
supported the EDL online and not on the streets. Secondly, there were limitations in the 
nature of the interviews themselves: textual interviews resulted in respondents more likely 
to skip questions. When they did answer questions, they were more likely to answer 
questions in one-word answers. One solution to this would be to have an option where 
respondents could answer verbally through a voice recording. Such programs were found 
to target business and marketing, but it is recommended that such a program be developed 
for the research sphere. Thirdly, textual interviews do not allow the opportunity for the 
researcher to clarify answers or to dive deeper into a respondent’s answer. Even with these 
limitations, conducting textual interviews was a solution to gaining access to this hard-to-
reach population. 
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5.2 RESULTS OF HUNGARIAN INTERVIEWS 
 Four interviews were conducted with members of the Hungarian Defence 
Movement. All participants were male and had varying positions and status in the 
organisation. All participants were given pseudonyms and any specific identifying 
information will not be discussed.  
This section will first provide an overview of the four participants and interviews, 
through presenting their narratives in response to the main research questions: the origins 
of the participants’ nationalist feelings, why participants chose to join these particular 
groups, and why participants maintain membership in these organisations.  Secondly, the 
findings from the thematic analysis of the interviews will be presented. 
 
5.2.1 Participant Narratives 
Peter 
 Peter was the oldest participant interviewed, into his fifties with adult children. He 
has a trades certificate and still works in trades. Peter was very polite and gentlemanly, and 
very obviously cautious about not saying too much. He has a leadership role in the 
organisation, hence seemingly has a responsibility to present the organisation in a specific 
way. Peter had been involved with other radical right organisations. He joined MÖM before 
it existed in its current form, when it was still the For a Better Future movement. 
 Peter only developed nationalist feelings in his forties, when he went to an annual 
event which loosely translates to Hungarian National Assembly. This meeting involved a 
celebration of Hungarian culture, including recreations of ancient Magyar culture, as well 
as lectures by revisionist Hungarian scholars. After attending this event, Peter began to feel 
that he should be proud of his Hungarian heritage. Before this, he said he was a ‘normal’ 
father taking care of his children and making money to simply move forward. He also came 
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to believe that what he had been taught in school about Hungarian history was, in fact, 
directly the opposite of the truth. 
 Peter also spoke about his childhood growing up, and about being beaten by the 
local gypsy children because he was an excellent student: “And I didn’t know what to do, 
I didn’t know how to process what was happening, just by going on living my life and being 
afraid of gypsies.” He also expressed confusion about why gypsies are so aggressive.  
Having attended the Hungarian National Assembly event and because he was seen as an 
important figure in his village, he was made aware of a situation happening in a nearby 
town. Gypsies had stolen the fence of an 82-year old woman, including the fencing around 
her pig-pen. A nine-member Roma family also moved in next to the elderly woman, as far 
as was understood, on her property. Her son then contacted Peter asking for help, after 
which Peter got in touch with the For a Better Future movement in 2013.  
 After this, Peter began attending meetings and began helping the group with 
organising events and other activities. Eventually he was asked to officially join and he 
remained a member after the For a Better Future movement was disbanded and reformed 
as MÖM. The thing that struck Peter the most about the For a Better Future movement and 
MÖM is how much they are like a family. He had met members of other radical right 
organisations, such as the Hungarian Guard and the Outlaw Army, but did not find this 
feeling of family. Peter spoke a lot about the importance of this feeling: “It’s as though 
we’re living in a family, just a national family” and “we stand up for each other, we help, 
and if anyone has a problem, we solve it.” When asked what it meant to him to be a member 
of MÖM, he answered very simply: “Pride.” 
 When asked what he would lose if he left the organisation, Peter was surprised. He 
said it would be strange, but that he couldn’t imagine it. He was also asked how he would 
feel if his children decided to leave. Peter’s response was that they are adults and can make 
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their own decisions, but “it would surely hurt if it was this way, but right now it doesn’t 
feel like they're pulling away but their ties are getting stronger.” 
 Each time after the interview questions were finished, the interview was opened up 
for participants to ask questions or discuss whatever they would like. Peter began to talk 
more about his own personal viewpoints and attitudes than he had during the interview. 
Like most participants, he held back many of his views and answered questions about the 
organisation as diplomatically as possible. At one point Peter began to speak about racism, 
and said: “So, racism doesn’t mean hatred of races, it doesn’t mean, umm, that someone 
hates every race, rather it means that someone protects their own race.” He continued along 
this line, saying:  
 
“So, the races, well, the white race is white. Black is black. There are 
anthropological markers of each. Just like the, umm, the slanty-eyed, just like those 
of Roma descent, each one has those characteristics that are, umm, characteristics. 
But the white race, it’s not, well I don’t know, well if my theory is racist, then I 
accept it. But science – why have I not heard of a Black scientist? Why are there no 
gypsy inventors? Why are there no, um, well people should get some sort of rational 
answer to these questions, no?” 
 
Although unprompted, Peter began discussing labelling of himself as far-right or 
nationalist. He conceded that, “If it’s far-right that I love my home, that I love my nation, 
then I absolutely accept it.” 
 
László 
 László is in his mid-twenties, single, and works for a security company. He’s a man 
of few words, often answering questions pointedly and not elaborating a great deal. He 
joined the organisation in 2014, shortly after its formation. László ties his nationalist 
feelings to his childhood, as he started to have strong beliefs in Christianity at six years old, 
completely independent of his family. He also remembers learning about the ancient 
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Hungarians in school: “In school, I come from the [redacted] family, and in school we 
learned about the ancient Magyars, our ancestors: Lehel, Emese, Attila, Árpád, and it filled 
me with pride that we have a one-thousand-year old past, and I have these types of 
ancestors.” He was also the only participant to state the personal importance of the Magyar 
Hiszekegy19 (Hungarian Believe in One), which is important to several radical right 
movements. 
 László knew a member of MÖM while in a men’s choir, a man who encouraged 
him to join. His friend told him stories about the organisation, but László says he had not 
heard of these types of organisations before this point. Then, a few villages over MÖM 
members were doing some volunteer work, so László went with this friend and helped out. 
Then he went to more and more organised events, until he moved to a bigger city and finally 
decided to become a member. 
 In order to become a member, László first received some information to study, 
including general citizenship knowledge, knowledge of defence and defending an area. He 
also received information on how to protect himself legally and other legal advice, for 
example how to speak to law enforcement. László then had to write a test on these topics, 
which was graded, and incorrect answers were revised orally in a meeting. Only after 
completing this testing process did László become a member of the organisation. 
 László talked about how much MÖM helps the Hungarian community, of which he 
considers the most important to be legal help. László described the ‘health-care walks’ they 
often take, saying that “sometimes if, for example if the authorities for whatever political 
reason don’t do their jobs in a given community, then we go out with ‘x’ number of people, 
 
19 The Magyar Hiszekegy is a poem written in 1920 by a general’s wife, for a competition run by an anti-
Trianon movement. It was later lengthened and put to music. It goes: “I believe in one God, I believe in one 
home, I believe in God’s eternal truth, I believe in Hungary’s resurrection. Amen.” [original: “Hiszek egy 
Istenben, hiszek egy hazában, hiszek egy Isteni örök igazságban, hiszek Magyarország feltámadásában. 
Amen.”] 
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patrol the area, sorry, go for health-care walks.” He described one particular instance where 
they helped a community: “For example, last year in [redacted] county there was a city, 
where certain types of people umm, were in public areas and during the day, doing drugs, 
selling drugs, and throwing these drug remnants in the public area. The police did nothing 
about this. So we, with our presence showed that yes, there really is a problem here, and 
the problem was solved quite quickly.” 
László also spoke several times about MÖM as a family and as a community of 
friends. While he spoke carefully throughout much of the interview, when asked what he 
would lose if he left the organisations he, without any hesitation, replied “a community. A 
community of friends. Family.”  László stressed the importance of helping fellow 
organisation members. László also spoke about the importance of raising children 
correctly: “They shouldn’t be criminals, shouldn’t do drugs, and umm, and they shouldn’t 
be aggressive, and so on.” László finds children to be so important that he takes a large role 
in organising and helping with MÖM’s annual children’s camp. While László does have 
friends outside of the organisation, he says that what he would miss most about it is this 
family and community of friends. 
 
Zoltán 
 Zoltán is middle-aged with a Secondary School diploma and has a leadership role 
in the organisation. More than with the other participants, it was evident that Zoltán knew 
what to and what not to say, and this could be felt in the careful wording of many of his 
answers. Zoltán was involved with other radical right organisations before becoming 
involved with MÖM, namely the For a Better Future movement and the Hungarian Guard, 
where he also had leadership roles.  
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Before joining, Zoltán was a working father raising his children. He says he 
originally joined a radical right organisation because he believes he was already “this kind 
of person” and because he wanted to help his fellow man. Zoltán also became very upset 
when then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány “had opinions that were openly against the 
nation and against Hungarians.” He only joined radical right organisations in his early 
thirties and said: “It’s amazing how this [nationalist feeling] is inside us naturally, that is 
genetically, and it more and more intensely came out.” 
Zoltán believes about one-quarter of Hungarians support these radical right 
organisations, which would be about “one or two million people or more.” He believes only 
a “certain layer of society is radical. This could be 20-25 percent, but not more.” Zoltán 
was also quite critical of the Hungarian government and touched on the change in the 
government’s politics: “Even though it [nationalism] was not usual here, nowadays it is 
usual, and politics has also has also seized this national feeling.” 
 Zoltán talked a lot about helping the Hungarian people. He spoke about how it is 
important to the organisation to not walk past those fellow people in need. Indeed, MÖM 
frequently organises donations and volunteer work to help poor people across Hungary. He 
also talked about protecting people: “Yes, we need to look out for each other and our fellow 
man, and we need to protect them if they get into that sort of situation.” 
 Out of all four participants, Zoltán has the most responsibility in the organisation. 
When asked about what he would do if he left the organisation, his reaction and answers 
strikingly differed from the other interviewees. He did not seem surprised by the question 
and emphasised that perhaps his life could go back to some level of ‘normality’. His 
answers made him seem as though he is tired, but he did emphasise how much he would 
miss the organisation. Zoltán also stated: “You can never leave something like this, in my 
opinion, I think.” 
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Árpád 
 Árpád was the most open of the four participants and the least cautious in his 
phrasing. He is in his early thirties, married with no children, and has a trades technician 
certificate and full-time job. He’s a reclusive type with a love for nature, and prefers to live 
away from a lot of people. He originally sought out a paramilitary organisation and had 
tried out several radical right organisations before seeking out MÖM in 2014, ultimately 
becoming more active in 2016 or 2017. 
 Árpád initially joined Jobbik in 2013 when, in his words, they were much more 
radical. He was also involved with the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, which 
'wasn’t for him,' applied to the Hungarian National Front right around the time that they 
found themselves in serious trouble,20 and also had some involvement with the Outlaw 
Army, which Árpád said was too extreme for him: “They were far too extreme for me, it 
would have been too serious.” He then learned about MÖM and got into contact with them. 
Árpád and his wife attended a children’s camp organised by MÖM, to which he also 
brought his nephew and niece. Árpád said that’s where he really initially saw the real 
community in the organisation, which was a very good experience for him. At the camp he 
met several of the group leaders and announced his intention to join. It was a slow process, 
but, as Árpád said, he knew he was a member once he was allowed into the ‘inner circle.’ 
He also added that he has not been able to be very active in the organisation as most of the 
activities happen in eastern Hungary, whereas he lives in the west:  
 
“You know, this organisation was formed in the east in Békés county, where there’s 
a pressure from gypsies, now I have to say it this way; it’s much stronger because 
of the gypsy-pressure, it’s much more active.” 
 
 
20 The group was disbanded in 2016 after their leader, István Győrkös, allegedly shot and killed a police 
officer. 
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Árpád said that he and his fellow MÖM members have discussed the origins of their 
nationalist feelings. For him it was different than for a lot of other members:  
 
“We often talk here with my comrades, that everyone usually has some ancestor, a 
father, grandfather, uncle, or someone who, you know, showed them the way, 
showed them a path, who influenced them in some way – I absolutely can’t say I 
had this.”  
 
Árpád’s brother listened to nationalist rock music, which has been popular in Hungary since 
the transition after 1990. His brother stopped at listening to that type music, as that was 
enough for him - but Árpád’s attitudes became influenced by these bands. Árpád did 
emphasise several times that he was not influenced by outside forces but felt that this is 
what he had to do. As he said: “There’s a saying, now I don’t know if this is correct or not, 
but ‘A real warrior doesn’t fight because he has to fight, but because he must fight.’ This 
is an interesting thought that no one told me to do this.”21 
 According to Árpád, there is a wide range of attitudes and ideologies in MÖM: 
“There are so many different ways of thinking in MÖM; those who are more radical, and 
those who aren’t more radical than me, as I don’t consider myself to be too radical.” Árpád 
also spoke openly about MÖM’s ideology as a group. He emphasised that there are many 
ways of thinking in the organisation: “So, here within MÖM there’s a very wide scale that’s 
covered, I think. If I had to summarise it, this national, national sympathiser line is most 
important. This Hungarian, this nationalist line - not fascist, nationalist.” As with all the 
respondents, Árpád was careful to steer away from the ‘extreme right’ or ‘fascist’ label.  
 Árpád spoke a lot about MÖM as a family and a brotherhood. He spoke about 
members going out of their way to help other members in need, often by giving them items 
like firewood, computer monitors, and so on. If he would leave the group, Árpád said he 
 
21 Perhaps ironically, this seems to be somewhat akin to the also very fitting G.K. Chesterton quote: “A true 
soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him.” 
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would most miss this community of friends, but that he likely would not feel it as much as 
others due to where he lives. 
With Árpád, too, the discussion continued after the line of interview questioning 
was finished. Here we discussed more about his attitudes and the ideology of the 
organisation, and he was much more willing than the others to open up.  
 
“Here the emphasis is more on bringing back the ancient Hungarian values and 
following them in our everyday lives. I would forget this fucking, oh sorry, this 
garbage multiculturalism, because it’s disgusting, I think.” 
 
Árpád was quite open about there being serious radicalism behind what MÖM does, saying 
it several times, but he did not open up more than that. He was very interested in the project 
and after looking up the EDL online, offered insight into a comparison between their 
organisation and the EDL: “So, we really want to regain our national identity, and are not 
trying to push another culture out.” 
 
5.2.2 Analysis 
 The first cycle of coding analysis resulted in approximately 150 codes22. Nearly all 
of the interview text was coded, save some parts where respondents were giving 
clarification, or speaking about something that did not pertain to the interview. These first 
150 codes were coded using both structural codes and value codes. Structural codes 
included, for example, ‘time joined MÖM,’ ‘MÖM protects people,’ ‘origin of nationalist 
feelings,’ ‘way joined MÖM,’ ‘self-sacrifice for MÖM,’ and so on. Value codes were coded 
based on values (V), beliefs (B), and attitudes (A), for example ‘B: Hungarians as martyrs,’ 
‘Hungarians are proud people,’ ‘Hungarians are hardworking,’ ‘V: must help own people,’ 
‘V: furthering nationalist knowledge,’ ‘A: reality of Trianon,’ and so on. 
 
22 See Appendix F (F1-F4) for a listing of codes and meta-codes by participant. 
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 These 150 codes were then grouped into 27 meta-code categories based on pattern 
coding. Seven of these meta-codes were found in all four interviews; four of them were 
seen in three interviews, seven were found in two interviews, and nine themes were seen in 
only one interview each. Meta-codes found in all four interviews were: Personal life; Origin 
of nationalist feelings; Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people; MÖM as family, community, 
brotherhood; Personal experience in MÖM; MÖM ideology; Joining MÖM. Meta-codes 
found in three interviews were: Involvement with other groups; Roma; MÖM general 
information; MÖM members. Meta-codes found in two interviews were: Media; Law 
enforcement; MÖM Paramilitary; Traditional values; Children are important; Hungarians 
as victims and martyrs; Personal views: nationalism; civilian soldiers. Lastly, those meta-
codes found in only one interview were: Hungarian government; Nationalism in Hungary; 
Disbanded nationalist groups; Personal attitudes and values; Problems in Hungary; 
Radicalism in MÖM; Comparison with EDL; MÖM outside of Hungary. 
 These 27 meta-codes could then be grouped into four overarching general themes 
(see Table 5.1). Here, personal opinions and information about the respondents themselves 
were combined with information and views about the organisation to create the themes, 
while also keeping in mind the project’s research questions. This is because, as members 
of the organisation, the respondents’ views do portray the attitudes of MÖM’s members. 
While all four respondents were careful to portray MÖM as a volunteer organisation with 
the sole purpose of aiding those in need, the analysis still reveals the radical right roots of 
such an organisation. 
 
 
 
 
258 
 
Table 5.1: General interview themes in Hungarian interviews. 
General themes Meta-Codes Description 
Being a MÖM 
member 
Personal experience in MÖM 
Joining MÖM 
MÖM general information 
MÖM members 
Involvement with other groups 
Involvement with MÖM, 
including why and how 
they joined and information 
about membership. 
Personal views Origin of nationalist feelings 
Traditional values 
Personal life 
Personal attitudes and values 
Personal views and 
attitudes, and origin of 
nationalist feelings. 
MÖM as a 
helpful and good 
organisation 
Ways MÖM helps Hungarian 
people 
MÖM as family, community, 
brotherhood 
Media 
Law enforcement 
Children are important 
Hungarians as victims and martyrs 
MÖM outside of Hungary 
Portraying MÖM as a 
helpful volunteer 
organisation and a good 
community. 
MÖM as a 
nationalist 
organisation 
Roma 
MÖM ideology 
MÖM Paramilitary 
Personal views: nationalism 
Civilian soldiers 
Disbanded nationalist groups 
Hungarian government 
Nationalism in Hungary 
Problems in Hungary 
Radicalism in MÖM 
Comparison with EDL 
Nationalist tendencies in 
MÖM, including views on 
Roma, paramilitary 
training, and acting as 
civilian soldiers. This 
theme also includes views 
on Hungarian and 
nationalism, as well as 
open discussion about 
radicalism within MÖM. 
 
 These themes provide an overview of the topics discussed throughout the interview, 
hence will be referred to as interview themes. Additionally, three overlapping themes 
pertaining to membership also become evident. These are ‘the soldier,’ ‘family and 
community,’ and ‘the social protector.’ These will be further discussed below. 
 These interviews also served to shed some light on the major research questions of 
this study: why individuals develop nationalist feelings, why they join radical right 
organisations, and why they maintain membership in these organisations. This will be 
further discussed in the next section, looking specifically at pathways into the organisation, 
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interview and membership themes, and emotional themes which became apparent 
throughout the study. 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
 It was evident while conducting the interviews that respondents were keen to 
present their organisation in a certain light: one that is non-violent, a volunteer organisation, 
and existing for the purpose of helping their fellow man. While it cannot be denied that the 
organisation does help many in need, it also became clearly evident through the coding 
process that there a very real underlying nationalism is apparent in the organisation. 
 Each respondent was given the opportunity to ask questions and discuss anything 
they wished after the interview questions were finished, something which two of the four 
respondents took advantage of (Peter and Árpád). These respondents seemed to open up 
when it was simply a casual conversation, which could also be explained by rapport 
building that occurred during the approximately thirty-minute interview. In both cases it 
became evident that respondents had both racist and far-right attitudes. 
These attitudes were also evident in the way respondents talked about Roma, 
although all tried mostly to avoid the topic. Roma were spoken of as being natural 
criminals, aggressive, and people to be afraid of (Peter: “Why are gypsies so aggressive? 
Why?”). They were described as stealing everything they could get their hands on, even 
from elderly women. One respondent spoke of eastern versus western Hungary, and how 
the ‘pressure’ from Roma was much stronger in the east (Árpád), hence explaining the 
regional strength of MÖM in that area. It should be noted, however, that these attitudes are 
common among many people in Hungary today (Todosijević & Enyedi, 2002). 
Finally, it seemed that all four respondents viewed the goals of the organisation 
somewhat differently. Zoltán, who is in a position of leadership, viewed the main goal of 
260 
 
the organisation as the work of civilian soldiers and the protection of Hungarian people, 
especially in poorer rural areas. László also expressed the importance of this vigilantism, 
and also mentioned the inability of law enforcement to do their jobs properly. Others (Peter 
and Árpád) emphasised the nationalist character of MÖM a lot more, as well as the 
importance of fostering a Hungarian identity. Árpád also expressed the importance of the 
paramilitary side of MÖM, which only Zoltán mentioned in passing. 
Looking back to the research questions of this study, namely motivations to join the 
movement and maintain membership, more attention will now be specifically paid to 
pathways into the organisation and themes of involvement in the organisation. 
 
Pathways into MÖM 
Although difficult to generate distinctive pathways into the Hungarian Defence 
Movement with only four respondents, some pathways did become evident. All four 
respondents joined the organisation of their own will and were quite adamant about 
expressing this fact. Of the participants, two joined MÖM in its current form (László and 
Árpád), and two joined in its previous form as the For a Better Future Movement (Peter 
and Zoltán). For the purposes of discussing pathways into the movement, both groups will 
be seen as the same organisation.  
Both Zoltán and Árpád were members of other radical right organisations before 
joining MÖM/For a Better Future, while Péter and László’s first radical right organisation 
was MÖM/For a Better Future. Three of the respondents (Peter, Zoltán, and Árpád) 
specifically sought out such an organisation, for various reasons such as frustration and 
seeking a paramilitary movement, while László was introduced to the idea of radical right 
organisations by a personal contact.  
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Two respondents, Peter and László, could trace the origin of their nationalist 
feelings back to childhood. It is possible however, that participants have created a narrative 
of their childhood in order to explain the present; understandably, it is impossible to verify 
those narratives. Zoltán spoke of becoming disenchanted with the current political system 
as an adult, and Árpád was unsure of how his nationalist feelings originated but did seek to 
join a more paramilitary-style organisation.  
Linden and Klandermans described three possible motives for joining an activist 
group in their study of Dutch extreme-right activists: instrumentality, identity, and 
ideology. Those labelled with the instrumentality motive are seeking to fight injustice, 
whether this fight is ideologically motivated or angry (Pilkington, 2016). Secondly, some 
seek to find a sense of identity, whether it is the wanderer in search of a like-minded 
community or a compliant who remains in the movement through identification with others 
(Pilkington, 2016). Lastly, those motivated by ideology join a movement to express a view. 
It appears all four respondents could be classified as ‘identity compliant,’ as they all find a 
sense of identity through their interaction with other organisation members. While each 
organisation member's identity differs, members within the organisation develop an 
identity as part of the organisation; they become MÖM members, and many identify as 
protectors of the Hungarian people and part of a larger radical right movement. This 
identification as an organisation member then strengthens feelings of pride. Ideology may 
also play a role in their membership, but this is not something that is openly advertised 
outside of the organisation. They also all spoke of protecting their fellow Hungarians, 
which would seemingly also imply a motive of instrumentality in their membership. 
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Themes 
Two main sets of themes arose from this study. Firstly, there are four general themes 
which resulted from the categorisation of codes. These are themes which largely encompass 
what was discussed in the interviews. The other types of themes are membership themes, 
which were interpreted from the narrative analysis of the interviews. 
The four general themes have already been discussed throughout this analysis. 
These themes are: personal views, being a MÖM member, MÖM as a helpful and good 
organisation, and MÖM as a radical right organisation. These themes helped with 
organisation, especially in reference to the study’s research questions. The last two of these 
general themes will be further discussed with reference to emotional themes. 
As mentioned, three overlapping themes pertaining to membership also became 
evident throughout each participant's narrative: ‘the soldier,’ ‘family and community,’ and 
‘the social protector.’ The first theme, ‘the soldier,’ arose because participants spoke about 
being ‘civil soldiers’ and going on patrols. One participant even sought out the organisation 
as he was seeking a paramilitary-style organisation. It seems as though members view 
themselves as somewhat of a civilian army fighting for the protection and preservation of 
a ‘Hungarian’ Hungary. The second theme of ‘family and community’ was obvious 
throughout all interviews. All participants emphasised the importance of solidarity and 
feelings of family, brotherhood, friendship, and community. Members of MÖM regularly 
help one another, which participants found important. Lastly, the theme of ‘social protector’ 
was evident through discussion of helping their fellow Hungarians. Some gave concrete 
examples of how the organisation went out and helped people. Others spoke about drawing 
the attention of law enforcement to undesirable situations. Participants spoke about not only 
of helping people physically, through their regular patrols for example, but legally as well. 
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Emotions 
It is important to consider the emotional aspects of political activism and social 
movement participation when discussing such an organisation (Jasper, 1998; Goodwin, 
Jasper, and Polletta, 2001; Pilkington, 2016). Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta (2001) describe 
two types of emotions in social movement participation. The first is ‘reciprocal’ emotions, 
which refer to the ongoing feelings of group members towards one another. These emotions 
can be felt as feelings of friendship, love, solidarity, and loyalty, and serve to bind the group 
together. The other type of emotion is ‘shared,’ which is common to all group members but 
directed externally through protest movements, most especially in the form of anger and 
outrage, or perhaps disgust or fear. Emotions can be important in both maintaining 
membership in a movement, through feelings toward fellow group-members, and in joining 
an organisation, if an individual is moved to join after attending an emotionally-charged 
event. Assemblies of people, whether at demonstrations, volunteer activities, or memorials, 
can create emotional energy in individual participants (Collins, 2001).  
When it comes to members of MÖM, reciprocal emotions are much more common, 
or at least more openly discussed, among group members than are shared emotions. As 
Árpád mentioned during his interview, there are many different attitudes and ideologies 
represented in MÖM. While there could be shared emotions of fear towards the Roma 
population, this was not explicitly expressed in the interviews. Given the evidence for 
activity in Roma-populated areas, and comments about Roma by the organisation, the 
emotion of fear can be assumed, given prior evidence of the relationship between fear and 
prejudice (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). All four respondents did, however, emphasise the 
ideas of friendship, solidarity, and family, implying that one of the reasons individuals 
maintain membership in the organisation is due to close ties with other members. 
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The main positive emotional themes that were common among respondents were 
solidarity and pride. Solidarity was quite evident in several forms. Respondents discussed 
solidarity with fellow group members: the feeling of a brotherhood, a family, and a close 
group of friends. They also discussed solidarity with the Hungarian people: “We need to 
look out for each other and our fellow man, and we need to protect them should the situation 
arise” (Zoltán).  
The theme of pride was also brought up in reference to pride in being a MÖM 
memberand pride of being Hungarian. Peter said: “It’s beautiful being Hungarian” and 
described the Hungarians as a proud, intelligent, and hardworking people. Árpád explained: 
“We know that we’re a culture that left a mark on the world.” All respondents exhibited 
pride in being members of the organisation, which was shown in several ways: in simply 
stating that they are proud to be a member, in discussing their importance and how they’ve 
gained an intimate knowledge of the legal system, in discussing their role in the 
organisation as a leader and/or teacher, and in discussion of the effects of their actions on 
encouraging law enforcement to act. 
 
Summary 
All four participants had quite different narratives of activism, while sharing 
commonalities. When it came to the origin of their nationalist views and feelings, two 
respondents traced their origins back to their childhood. This could be due, however, to a 
creation of their own narrative; it is impossible to unequivocally know whether this is 
indeed where they originated. One respondent spoke of moral outrage driving him to 
activism, and another was unsure but maintained that it was not due to family influence. 
Three of the four respondents specifically sought out such organisations. This was 
for various reasons, such as frustration and moral outrage, and one participant sought a 
265 
 
paramilitary-style movement. Only one of the fours respondents joined through a personal 
contact who invited him to his first event. 
The question of why participants maintain membership can best be answered 
through the development of a collective identity and through emotion. All participants 
spoke of similar emotions in relation to the organisation, the most important of which are 
feeling of solidarity, loyalty, and pride. 
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5.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF BRITISH INTERVIEWS 
Textual interviews resulted in 105 responses, six of which were not used. These 
were removed for several reasons. Four were removed as they were clearly trying to skew 
the data: one citing “right wing nationalism” as the biggest issue affecting Great Britain at 
the moment, another citing “white people” as an answer to the same question, another 
obviously having no interest in the EDL and answering “my socks” to what they would 
lose if they left the organisation, and another answering “cheese” (or variations thereof) to 
all questions. The other two were excluded as they clearly had never heard of the EDL 
before; both gentlemen were above 70 years of age. It seemed one of these individuals 
believed the interview questionnaire to be given by the EDL, although the purpose of the 
questionnaire was clearly stated. The 99 respondents that remained were not necessarily all 
members or even direct supporters: they were individuals who agree with the EDL’s 
mission and support the organisation on some level. Of all respondents, 13 individuals 
specifically stated they were either members or supporters of the EDL. 
Of these 99 respondents, 85 (85.86%) were male, 12 (12.12%) female, and two gave 
no answer. This discrepancy in gender was also found by Bartlett and Littler (2011), as 81 
percent of EDL Facebook supporters in their study were male and 19 percent female (n = 
38,200). A similar ratio was also found by Pilkington (2016) offline, at 77 percent male 
and 23 percent female (n = 35). Most respondents fell into the 50-59 year-old age group at 
36 individuals (36.36%), with the second largest age groups being 60-69 years old at 21 
individuals (21.21%) and 40-49 years old with 18 individuals (18.18%); two people refused 
to give their age (see Table 5.2 for demographic distribution of respondents). This sample 
seems consistent with Busher’s (2016) study of EDL activists, where 66.67 percent of 
respondents (n = 18) were between 36-65 years of age. 
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Table 5.2: Demographic distribution of British textual interview respondents. 
 
Age Group Male Female Refused TOTAL 
18-29 10 0 - 10 
30-39 3 0 - 3 
40-49 17 1 - 18 
50-59 31 5 - 36 
60-69 17 4 - 21 
70+ 5 2 - 9 
Refused - - 2 2 
TOTAL 85 12 2 99 
 
Importantly, these textual interviews show a representative sample of those 
individuals who followed the EDL’s Facebook page and supported them online, not a 
sample of definitive supporters and/or members. Of the 99 respondents who participated in 
the textual interviews, seven (7.07%) either stated that they were members of the EDL or 
discussed greater involvement in the organisation. It should be noted that several 
respondents stated that the EDL does not have a membership list, hence it being impossible 
to be an official member of the organisation. A further four people stated that they were 
sympathisers (4.04%) and 28 (28.28%) people either directly stated that they were 
supporters of the EDL or alluded to such. Six (6.06%) respondents stated that they had now 
left the EDL.  
These results are quite different from those found by Bartlett and Littler in 2011, 
where they found that 76 percent of the sample considered themselves to be members of 
the EDL, while 23 percent did not. This difference could be due to differences in defining 
who is a member, but even if supporters and sympathisers were added to those identifying 
as members in this study, that would only be 39.39 percent and far less than the 76 percent 
found in 2011. The sample sizes of the two studies are considerably different, however, 
with 99 individuals in this sample and 38,200 in the 2011 study. Also, crucial to consider 
is the departure of the EDL’s founder, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (better known as Tommy 
Robinson), in 2013. Several respondents in this study expressed less involvement in the 
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organisation since his departure; surely this had an effect on the number of individuals 
considering themselves members of the EDL, but the question remains whether it would 
account for a nearly 40 percent difference in the findings. The lower percentages of 
members and supporters found in this study shows that it cannot be assumed that followers 
of an organisation’s Facebook page are necessarily direct supporters of the group or, 
indeed, even have an idea of what the organisations stands for. 
 Of the 99 textual interviews analysed and coded, 57 interviews and partial 
interviews will be discussed herein. The remaining 42 interviews were removed as either 
they did not give any answers to the research questions, did not give enough detail to 
provide any necessary information, or in a few cases, as it was apparent that the respondent 
was not actually a supporter or sympathiser of the EDL. 
Results will be given thematically, divided by research question and underlying 
themes. The themes are categorised in four sections. First presented will be themes 
surrounding why respondents turned to nationalism; what their main concerns and 
frustrations are. Then, the three research questions will be taken in turn; namely, why 
individuals joined the EDL, what they have learned or get from the EDL, and why they 
maintain membership in the organisation. As these are textual interviews, all quotes are 
presented as they were written by the respondents; where necessary, clarification can be 
found in square parentheses.  
 
5.3.1 The Turn to Nationalism 
 While this category is not directly one of the research questions, it is crucial to 
examine those factors that drive supporters to adopt nationalist, or radical right, attitudes 
and develop a radical right identity, and to understand what drives their frustration. 
Understanding these factors aids in recognising what drives individuals to radicalism, as 
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well as what ultimately can make them more likely to support organisations like the EDL. 
Indeed, as pointed out by Busher (2016), the EDL is somewhat of a ‘lightning rod’ for 
different interests; one individual may be more interested in patriotism, while another far 
more concerned with Islam. The main themes that arose here were immigration, concern 
over Islam, disenchantment with politics and politicians, anger of the disrespect of British 
soldiers, general disenchantment and frustration, and the effects of the online space and 
specific major events. 
 
Immigration  
 Immigration is seemingly one of the biggest concerns of EDL supporters, according 
to this data, with 61 of the overall 99 respondents citing it as such. Of the 57 interviews 
ultimately used in this thematic analysis, 30 coded under ‘turn to nationalism’ suggested 
that immigration was one of their major concerns. These concerns over immigration could 
largely be divided into four groups: those feeling that immigrants had taken over their 
homes and neighbourhoods, those who felt that immigrants are given advantages over the 
native Brits, those feeling that immigrants are generally ruining the country and making it 
worse in some tangible way, and those who feel that the British way of life and British 
people are threatened by immigrants.  
 Some respondents (6, 30, and 63) expressed the idea of immigrants taking over 
working-class communities. Indeed, Winlow and colleagues (2017) found that many of the 
EDL supporters who they interviewed were frustrated as they saw their neighbourhoods 
changing and becoming more diverse, and felt that they were in turn becoming a minority.  
Respondent 63 expressed that he grew up in a poor working-class family and saw 
immigrants receive free housing. Respondent 30 expressed how he saw his neighbourhood 
changing; in his words, “the evolution of where I live.” He witnessed the “demographic 
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destruction” of his home, especially over the last five years; five years ago, there were still 
“indigenous Brits” in the area. He articulated that Syrian refugees, who do not speak 
English, “won’t be going back to where they came form.” Lastly, Respondent 30 expressed 
frustration over never having ‘been asked’ if he, and his community, wanted this to happen. 
 Others (13, 50, 56, 63, 73) seemed to express concern over immigrants and 
minorities being given more advantages and privilege from the government than the 
‘native’ British public, and that immigrants are favoured over native Brits (Respondent 13). 
These sentiments were generally found together with a negative view and distrust of the 
government and politicians, further implying that respondents blame politicians for their 
favouritism of immigrants. Respondent 63 followed his discussion about immigrants 
receiving free housing by claiming that if one is “born and bred British you can lay in a 
shop door” waiting to die, but that ‘illegal’ immigrants receive free housing, healthcare, 
and education. They will never be hungry or homeless, he claimed. Respondent 56 
expressed having bad experiences with foreigners who “abuse the system and rip me off 
and abuse my good nature.” They claim that the lives of British citizens are ‘in decline’ due 
to immigration, although it is not clear whether they are referring to the number of 
individuals, life expectancy, or quality of life. Respondent 73 similarly expressed that 
immigrants come to the country to receive free housing and benefits, “while people born 
here are struggle just to live.” 
 Few respondents (13, 63, 94) also discussed how immigrants were making the 
country worse in some tangible way. Respondent 13 said that the country was “better 
before” immigrants brought violence in; it is not clear whether this respondent believes 
there was no violence before the arrival of immigrants. Respondent 63 expressed that “mass 
uncontrolled immigration” should be stopped and that “illegal immigrants” should be 
deported – according to them, upwards of 600,000 per year. Immigrants, according to 
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Respondent 63, are the reason for both the housing crisis and the NHS crisis. Lastly, 
Respondent 94 has always been against immigration, unless the immigrants bring 
something ‘good’ to the country. He believes that “they” should not just let anyone into the 
country, and that “illegals” should be deported immediately, indeed the same day they are 
caught.  
 Lastly, a more significant proportion of respondents (30, 31, 32, 47, 52, 59, 83, 101, 
105) believed that immigrants threaten British identity and the British way of life. 
Respondent 47 expressed concern over the establishment “chipping away at our values” 
and “giving our country away.” Respondent 105 felt that British culture is being pushed 
out by other cultures, and also feels that immigrants are racist against “white British 
people.” He feels that “traditional values and culture not respected,” and expressed 
frustration over not finding British food at restaurants in London. One respondent (52) 
specifically expressed turning to nationalist attitudes when they felt that Brits “became non-
existent in our own country.” Others (32) turned to these attitudes once “non compatible 
people” began arriving. Respondent 101 felt that only bad has come from “mass 
immigration and multi culturusm [multiculturalism]” and was concerned that there are “too 
many immigrants here and changing our identity.” Similarly, Respondent 59 was concerned 
over a loss of British culture and felt that the government is allowing uncontrolled 
immigration. Similarly, Respondent 31 had concerns over uncontrolled immigration, but 
was okay with “people from the right countries.” Lastly, Respondent 83 expressed concern 
over the “systematic replacement of British people” and that the government had been 
“flooding our country with wankers.” 
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Concern over Islam  
Given that the EDL is often cited as an anti-Islam and anti-Muslim (Copsey, 2010; 
Jackson, 2011; Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016) protest movement, it is clear that Islam is 
one of the biggest concerns of EDL supporters. In this analysis it was found to be the third-
biggest concern, behind immigration and mainstream politics, with 51 of the overall 99 
respondents citing it as such. This change could likely be due to the above-mentioned 
analyses being conducted before the recent wave of immigration and subsequent Brexit 
referendum, demonstrating that the concerns of those in the British radical right are shifting. 
This is unsurprising given the recent rise in far-right protest in Great Britain, apparently the 
largest numbers seen since the 1930s (Dearden, 2019). Of the 57 interviews ultimately used 
in this thematic analysis, 27 coded under ‘turn to nationalism’ suggested that Islam was one 
of their major concerns. Some of these were mixed with concerns over immigration and 
some were quite veiled in their speech, citing concerns over ‘grooming gangs’ and 
‘religion’ rather than Islam directly.  
Some respondents (20, 35, 48) expressed concern over terrorism, and suggested that 
knowledge of terror attacks ultimately drove them to adopt far-right attitudes. Respondent 
20 read about terrorists and ‘rape gangs’ in the newspaper, while Respondent 48 saw 
Muslims killing “inisent” [innocent] people in the news. Respondent 35 expressed concern 
over the government apparently doing little about terror attacks. Respondent 87 referred to 
convicted Jihadist Anjem Choudary as a “hate preacher” who is “spewing hate on the streets 
of England.” 
Several respondents had negative views of Islam for various reasons (26, 36, 56, 
61, 85, 86, 87, 88), and seemed to take issue with the religion and people themselves. 
Respondent 36 expressed always being against organised religion but had “a special 
loathing for Islam” due to its “extreme dogma and misogyny.” Respondent 56 described 
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Muslim culture as “sick and twisted”; they had dated a Muslim man in the past, and, 
because of this, expressed having a familiarity with the culture. They explained that the 
goal of Muslims is to outnumber the natives “and control us and force Sharia onto us.” 
Similarly, Respondent 88 has a Muslims friend who opened their “eyes to what Islam is 
about and the hate preaching that is going on.” Some responses expressed much more 
immediate concern, such as Respondent 61, who claimed that Muslims say each day that 
they will behead and kill all infidels, and kill all British soldiers. Muslims, supposedly, will 
not integrate and always say: “We’re not here to integrate, we’re here to dominate.” “They 
want to change everything that is British,” said Respondent 61, “Merry Christmas. Happy 
Easter and even Valentines Day. Our Customs, Our Values our forefathers fought and Died 
for!” It seems that Respondent 61 turned to far-right attitudes after the 2017 Manchester 
and London attacks. 
Others (41, 58, 87, 93) seemed convinced that Muslims were actively attempting to 
hurt native British people or impose Islam on them. Respondent 93 referred to working 
with “people who want to change the British culture to suit themselves.” Others referred to 
the grooming or rape gangs (86, 87) of Rotherham and elsewhere. 
 Finally, two respondents referred to Muslims as victims and emphasised the 
negative aspects of Islam, not Muslims. Respondent 68 expressed that “Muslims are 
victims, victims of Islam. We should help them understand that Christianity is the way.” 
Respondent 95 expressed that his views of “Islam as a religion” hadn’t changed in some 
time, “but what people need to remember is that Islam is the problem not all Muslims.” 
 
 
Political Concerns 
The biggest concern of EDL supporters seems to be mainstream politics and 
politicians, according to this data, with 71 of the overall 99 respondents citing it as such. 
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Of the 57 interviews ultimately used in this thematic analysis, 20 coded under ‘turn to 
nationalism’ suggested that politicians were one of their major concerns. Several people 
(68, 75, 77, 83) cited corruption of politicians as a main concern. Others expressed anger 
over how Brexit was being handled by the UK government (29, 40, 53, 78). 
Some respondents (35, 52, 58, 60) felt like the government sat back and allowed the 
country to be overrun by immigrants or allowed terror attacks to happen (35). One elderly 
respondent (52) turned to nationalism when they felt Brits “became non-existent in our own 
country”; they expressed heartbreak over how the country was being run. Others (40, 47, 
53, 58) expressed disenchantment and distrust in politicians; while Respondent 40 
suspected a possible “collusion wit the EU” by the UK government. Respondent 58 felt 
that politicians were not controlling Muslims well enough, stating “the appeasement of the 
so called religion of peace” as an issue. Finally, Respondent 47 felt that the ‘establishment’ 
had been “chipping away at our values” and “giving our country away.” 
 Beyond a direct distrust in mainstream politicians themselves, several other issues 
were cited by respondents such as concerns over the EU (32, 39, 40, 56, 67, 75, 95) and 
Brexit specifically (29, 40, 53, 67, 68, 78, 84, 89, 102). These concerns closely connect to 
a distrust in politicians, as many feel the government has not been respecting the voice of 
the people since the 2016 Brexit referendum’ indeed, there has been some discussion of 
concern over the anger of the radical right if Brexit discussions are further postponed 
(Mackey, 2019). It seems that this is a fairly new concern of EDL supporters and a newer 
driver towards the radical right in Great Britain, as it has not been previously mentioned as 
a driver in the literature. It is likely that this has become a greater driver since the Leave 
campaign in 2015 and most especially since the Brexit referendum in 2016. Until now, the 
literature has discussed the influence of radical right attitudes on Brexit, but there has been 
little discussion of the impact of Brexit on radicalisation. 
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Disrespect of British Soldiers  
Six Respondents cited concern over the way veterans were treated: both in terms of 
negative treatment by Muslims (49, 58, 61) and disrespect by politicians and the general 
public (11, 73, 103). One respondent (58) discussed the “disgusting behaviour of muslims 
at returning soldiers,” and the lack of any police presence to fairly deal with the situation. 
This was also combined with the feeling that the government also did not deal with the 
situation appropriately, seemingly leading to further distrust in politicians. Respondent 58 
specifically cited the example above as the reason they sought out a radical right 
organisation to join.  
Another respondent (61) stated that each day Muslims specifically say they will 
behead all infidels and kill all British soldiers. Respondent 49 specifically referred to the 
organisation ‘Islam4UK’ (although the Respondent referred to the group as “Islam for 
UK”), a radical Islamist group proscribed since 2010, as being against soldiers. This 
comment, however, may have been in reference to the first EDL demonstration in Luton in 
2009. Another respondent (103) referred to a “witchunt of soldiers who served in NI,” 
however with no clarification of what this witch-hunt could entail. Lastly, Respondent 73 
expressed concern over soldiers being homeless on the streets, with no help from the 
government, which was combined with frustration over immigrants who receive housing 
and benefits. 
 
Disenchantment and Frustration  
 Several Respondents expressed feelings of disenchantment and frustration (12, 29, 
30, 31, 40, 56, 63, 85, 97, 101). These feelings were often combined with worry about the 
future of the country and the feeling that others were given advantages over the 
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Respondent’s own people. The latter was especially connected to feelings of immigrants 
being given advantages over British natives (13, 63). Respondent 30 expressed frustration 
over “never being asked” about immigrants and, most especially, Muslims coming into the 
country. 
 Feelings of disenchantment were generally aimed at the government: feelings of 
disappointment in the government over allowing immigrants into the country and over the 
way Brexit has been handled thus far (29, 40, 85). Respondent 40, for instance, mentioned 
a perception of weak politicians and a possible “collusion with the EU” over Brexit. Indeed 
Respondent 29 expressed that they may have turned to the far-right through a combination 
of the effects of the leave campaign (this is assumed as the respondent mentioned the 
referendum, as well as having adopted radical views after 2015) and through a 
disenchantment with British politicians. 
Other respondents (56, 63, 97, 101) seemed to be frustrated over not being able to 
speak out and say how they feel, as they are often labelled negatively for their views. 
Respondent 56 expressed that political correctness only favours Black people and Muslims, 
although they explicitly stated that they do not have an issue with Black people “but its like 
they have a problem with me. Not all blacks, just some.” This respondent seemed to be 
frustrated that they could not speak out about people of colour, but felt that they could speak 
out against white people. Respondent 101 felt that they are “patriotic which seems to be a 
sin these days”; there indeed seemed to be concern over British people not being able to 
express their patriotism. Respondent 97 began to turn to nationalism after noticing double 
standards being imposed, that people would be called fascist, racist, and Islamophobic if 
their opinions differed from ‘leftists’; he felt that it is unfair that groups like the EDL are 
vilified while ANTIFA are not. Finally, Respondent 63 voiced that those, like himself, who 
are against immigration are automatically labelled as nazis: “ironically my family fought 
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the Nazis to keep Britain free from extremists who views are not compatable to British 
democracy.” This was a crucial statement that well defines some of the issues in the 
discussion of the British radical right, particularly issues surrounding terminology and the 
changing socio-political context. 
 
References to Radicalisation 
Some Respondents made specific reference to self-radicalisation. It was not named 
as such, but described hearing about these ideas, or the moment they realised they need to 
do something about certain situations. These instances were either found through the 
internet or news media, or through some specific event that they naturally heard of through 
the media. 
 Seven respondents (16, 58, 59, 68, 75, 85, 102) mentioned being radicalised, 
although stated differently in their own words, through the internet and news media. One 
respondent (16) self-described as being radicalised through the internet, stating “Www. Eye 
opening information” to the question: “Have you always felt this way about these issues? 
Do you remember what made you begin to feel this way?” Another respondent (85) claimed 
that he found himself turning to the radical right due to more online availability of 
alternative views, and that he had not always felt this way. 
 Other respondents spoke generally about the media, not the online space. Most of 
these Respondents spoke about concerns over media bias and general distrust in the media 
(58, 59, 75, 85). Respondent 102 expressed concern that the media covered up serious 
crimes, like the “rape of children in Rotherham.” This apparently opened his eyes to many 
evils. Respondent 59 felt that the media produces propaganda and states that being an 
“English patriot if [is] racist but not if you are Welsh, Scottish or Irish.” Both of these 
concerns with the media involve the feeling of the media protecting the ‘other’ and not the 
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‘real’ English people; they protect Islamic criminals and allow the Welsh, Scottish, and 
Irish to be patriotic, which is unfair to the English.  
 Five respondents made reference to specific events affecting them to such a point 
that they turned to nationalism. Busher (2016) describes these as a type of ‘moral shock’ 
over four major events in particular: the New York attacks of 11th September 2001, the 
London bombings on 7th July 2005, an event in Barking on 15th June 2010, and an incident 
in London on 11th November 2010. Given that Busher’s research was conducted in 2011-
2012, there are newer events that also elicit this same ‘moral shock’ among respondents. 
Respondent 61 made specific reference to the Manchester and London attacks in 2017; this 
respondent was, in turn, heavily Islamophobic. Respondents 31 and 86 reference to the 7/7 
attacks: “I felt like this since the bombs went off in London” (31). Respondent 49 
mentioned attending the first EDL demonstration in Luton, and Respondent 103 
specifically mentioned joining the EDL after the murder of drummer Lee Rigby in May 
2013. 
 
Summary 
This section explored the question of what first turned respondents to nationalism 
and radical right views. The three main reasons, as stated by respondents, were 
immigration, disenchantment with politics and politicians, and Islam. Traditionally, the 
main concern of EDL supporters has been Islam; this is still seen on their website and was 
seen on their social media. As discussed in Chapter 4, much of the imagery and content of 
the EDL online did indeed concern Islam and Muslims. However, these textual interviews 
demonstrate that EDL supporters are far more concerned with immigration and politicians, 
likely due to Brexit and frustration over how it has been handled. Combined with the results 
of the statistical analysis, it becomes clear that concerns over immigration involve issues 
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of immigrants being of other cultures, particularly Muslim, and issues around politicians 
favouring immigrants over native Brits; economic concerns are less of an issue for those 
on the far-right, which was also supported by the textual interview data. Additionally, 
respondents cited concern over the disrespect of British soldiers, expressed general 
frustration, and referred to specific events as the point when they were encouraged to 
develop radical right views. 
 
5.3.2 Pathways to the EDL 
 The next analysis was of pathways into the EDL and level of membership of 
respondents; only those interviews were coded in this category who answered the questions 
about their involvement in the EDL, namely “Can you tell me how you became a 
member/supporter of the EDL and how long you've been a member/supporter? How did 
you hear about the organisation (through friends, online...)? How did you join (did you just 
show up?)?” and “What made you originally want to join the EDL?” 
 Of the 57 textual interviews which were ultimately used for this study, eight 
respondents explicitly stated not being a member or supporter, 11 were members, 22 were 
supporters, and five were sympathisers. Some of those coded as non-members were 
members of other organisations, such as Britain First (56) or the BNP (63). One Respondent 
stated that it is impossible to join the EDL as there is no membership list (38), and another 
claimed that the organisation no longer exists (97). While the organisation clearly does still 
exist, it is not nearly as successful as it was before the departure of leader Stephen Yaxley-
Lennon, more commonly known as Tommy Robinson, in 2013. 
For a respondent to be coded as ‘member’ they must have explicitly stated such; 
most referred to ‘joining’ the EDL, but some explicitly used the word ‘member’. One 
respondent (86) had been a member of the EDL for nine years and referred to himself as “a 
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active edl chap.” However, he did follow by stating that no one could officially join the 
EDL as they are a voluntary street movement; indeed, more often respondents would refer 
to themselves as supporters, not members. In one case (39), the respondent spoke as though 
they were involved with the organisation but spoke of the EDL as “they” (for example, 
“they take a stand”). This language revealed that the respondent did not see themselves as 
being a part of the organisation, hence could not be an official member (if such a thing 
exists). Generally, if a respondent did not refer to themselves directly as a supporter but 
seemed to have a lot of involvement in the organisation without explicitly stating their level 
of involvement, they were classed as a supporter. Respondent 99 indeed stated that the EDL 
has never had a members list, it is open for anyone to “turn up and show their support, 
regardless of race colour ethnicity religion etc. anyone could support this movement.” 
Those who seemed to only follow the EDL online or who agreed with the message of the 
organisation without further involvement were classed as sympathisers. 
 Some respondents did specifically refer to street-level involvement with the 
organisation (6, 11, 18, 53, 75, 87, 89, 102). These street-level events were all 
demonstrations in various cities around Britain, such as Luton (11), Rotherham (18), Brum 
(87), and Dewsbury (75). The latter demonstration was described as a “load of fun” by 
Respondent 75, for whom this was his first demonstration; he went with a school friend 
and his father. 
 Looking to the literature, several pathways into the EDL have been described. Joel 
Busher (2016) identified six major pathways into the EDL in his study interviewing 18 
activists in 2011-2012. The first pathway he described as ‘the football lads,’ who came to 
the EDL through football firms. They comprised an estimated 30-40 percent of the core 
activist community in London and Essex between March of 2011 and May of 2012. They 
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were all male, of all the same age groups, and had little or no previous involvement with 
social movement activism.  
The second pathway was those already engaged in ‘patriotic’ activism, such as 
previous members of the United British Alliance (UBA), March for England (MFE), and 
UK Patriots. These individuals distanced themselves from more political groups such as 
the British National Party (BNP) and National Front (NF), likely in avoidance of the ‘far 
right’ label, and have a preoccupation with Islam.  
The third pathway was those individuals coming from traditional far-right groups. 
This was approximately 20-30 percent of the core EDL members in London and the 
Southeast between February of 2011 and May of 2012. These individuals generally came 
to the EDL from the BNP, NF, English Democrats, or small groupuscules like Combat 18. 
Busher also mentions that a few activists identified themselves as racist, while others 
sought to distance themselves from ‘nationalist’ groups. For example, one of Busher’s 
respondents, a former BNP activist, joined the EDL because, among other things, it was 
“not a nationalist group like the BNP” (Busher, 2016: 40, emphasis in original). Similarly, 
in this study, two respondents (17 and 103) alluded to the EDL being a non-racist and anti-
extremist organisation (see below).  
The fourth pathway were those who entered EDL activism through the counter-
jihad network. This was a very small proportion of people, no more than five percent, and 
they were keen to distance themselves from the traditional far right. Despite their small 
numbers, these activists had a strong ideological influence in the organisation as they were 
seen as experts on Islam. 
Busher refers to the fifth pathway as ‘swerveys,’ and they are those individuals who 
were previously involved in some form of radical political and/or religious scene other than 
(or sometimes even opposed to) the far right. These activists eventually left their initial 
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scene and connected to anti-Muslim or ‘patriotic’ activism. This comprised about five 
percent of EDL members. These individuals were highly articulate and often engaged in 
intellectual arguments, and generally argued that EDL was not racist or far right. 
Lastly, Busher calls the sixth pathway ‘the converts,’ which is essentially an ‘other’ 
category. This category comprises people who did not have any of the previously-
mentioned backgrounds and represented about 20-30 percent of the core activist 
community. Some were involved in political action (such as animal welfare, for example), 
and others had never previously engaged in any form of social movement activism. 
Busher also describes the importance of social ties, especially in the activists’ 
accounts of how they initially entered the group. Only four of the 18 activists interviewed 
did not describe their social ties as playing an important part in their recruitment. Activists 
were also more quickly welcomed into the group if they had someone to vouch for them, 
and also talked about being welcomed and feeling part of a community. Of course, as 
Busher points out, there is a sampling bias here – the interviewees were all core members 
of the organisation, hence being more likely to have been immediately welcomed. Lastly, 
members were not expected to cut ties with other non-EDL activist individuals. 
Hillary Pilkington (2016) also discussed the respondents’ pathways into the EDL, 
which she does through using the paths and motives to extreme right activism set out by 
Linden and Klandermans (2007) in their study of Dutch extreme right activists. Three 
pathways were described: continuity, conversion, and compliance. Continuity is the result 
of prior political socialisation, which is then split into revolutionaries who have had a life-
long commitment to the movement and wanderers who have moved between organisations. 
In the conversion pathway, the newly-found activism marks a break with the past. Those 
individuals who are persuaded to become active by those already committed to a movement 
or organisation are following a compliance pathway.  
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Pilkington described the most prominent type in the EDL as ‘convert’, those who 
struggle against perceived injustice, while in the EDL’s fringe-groups the ‘revolutionary’ 
type is often seen. She also points out that nearly all of the respondents joined the movement 
through their own personal desire. Some respondents (‘converts’) associated their 
involvement with a response to national or international events, such as September 11th or 
the 7/7 bombings, while other came from ‘racist’ hometowns. According to Pilkington, and 
contrary to Busher’s (2016) findings, surprisingly few respondents discussed the influence 
of peers or friends: “the movement appears, rather, as a site for making new or ‘real’ 
friendships” (Pilkington, 2016: 79). Five respondents did say they first heard of the EDL 
through friends and attended their first event with them. The most common route into the 
EDL seemed to be football firms, which seven respondents stated as their pathway. 
Lastly, Winlow and colleagues (2017) also analysed pathways into the EDL. Some 
came to the EDL from football firms, very few had been active in other right-wing 
organisations prior to joining, and for the vast majority of respondents it was their first time 
being politically active. Some of the respondents joined the EDL still in the early days of 
the organisation, while others came later, many hearing about the group from news reports 
of demonstrations (Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell 2017). 
As this study was conducted through textual interviews, it was impossible to follow-
up with respondents about answers. Therefore, only that information which the respondent 
originally volunteered can be used for analysis. This could mean that important information 
was left out and a complete picture was not offered. With the information that was given 
from these 57 interviews, the pathways that were mentioned by Busher (2016) seen here 
were those coming from traditional radical right organisations, ‘swerveys’, and converts. 
Looking at Pilkington’s (2016) categorisation, all three pathways were seen: continuity, 
compliance, and conversion. Results seemed to largely support what Winlow and 
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colleagues (2017) found, namely that for many supporters this was their first time being 
politically active. Crucially, results of this study did not find one single mention of 
supporters coming from football firms, save one respondent who mentioned supporting the 
DFLA. What was explicitly seen was a few respondents coming from other organisation, 
many who found the group online or heard of it through news media, and several who were 
encouraged to join through friends, colleagues, and family. 
 
Member of another organisation  
 Six Respondents cited being members of other radical right organisations or 
political parties (13, 47, 56, 63, 77, 89). Most of these respondents seemed to be primarily 
members of the other organisation while supporting the EDL online. These other 
organisations included Britain First (56), the BNP (63), and UKIP (77). One respondent 
(89) specified not being a member of the EDL; they used to be a supporter of the BNP but 
were put off by their radial policies. Now they support the Democratic Football Lads 
Alliance and the Yellow Vests, but have gone to some EDL events. Respondent 47 stated 
that they were a BNP member in the past, but now support the EDL. Lastly, Respondent 
13 expressed joining the EDL through friends and past involvement with the National 
Front. These last two examples fall into Busher’s (2016) third pathway, of those individuals 
coming from other traditional far-right organisations.  
 
Heard of EDL online or in the news 
 As these textual interviews were conducted online and targeted those people who 
supported the EDL’s Facebook page, there was likely a bias toward those supporters who 
became radicalised or ‘joined’ the organisation online. That being said, 11 respondents 
explicitly mentioned hearing about the EDL online (26, 32, 37, 40, 51, 52, 67, 81, 84, 85, 
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87). A few other respondents heard about the EDL through news media and decided to join 
the organisation, one presumably though news broadcast (73) and another through the 
newspapers (101). Interestingly, one respondent (50) seemed to equate 
membership/support with following the organisation on Facebook. They discussed joining 
and spoke as they were part of the organisation, but seemed to only follow the EDL on 
social media. 
 This again broaches an important issue: the question of who can be defined as a 
member or supporter of the EDL. It now seems that a large part of their support base is 
online, with less people attending their demonstrations on the streets. Or at the very least, 
it seems as though many people are content being online supporters. In a 2011 study of 
EDL activists on Facebook, Bartlett and Littler (2011) found that 52 percent of respondents 
considered themselves as only involved in ‘online activism’, while 44 percent attended 
local demonstrations. Crucially, though, this means the organisation could promote their 
attitudes, ideology, and a sense of solidarity through the online space, without ever truly 
having to organise on the streets. This idea is supported by the anti-radicalisation efforts of 
social media companies like Facebook, who banned the organisation (and other British 
radical right organisations) in April of 2019. 
 
Joined through pre-existing relationships  
 Eleven Respondents described joining the organisation, or at least being introduced 
to the organisation, by family, work colleagues, and friends. Respondent 35, who joined 
due to concerns over “the rise of militant Islam,” heard about the EDL through family and 
just ‘showed up’; this respondent did not specify whether their family members were also 
members of the EDL. 
286 
 
 Some respondents became aware of the EDL through work colleagues (29, 68, 102). 
Respondent 29, who met EDL members through work, expressed that where he lives it is 
difficult to socialise with people who are “similar” due to “ideological differences”; 
ultimately, he joined due to “social reasons.” Respondent 68 also heard about the EDL 
through work colleagues and became interested in the organisation once some friends 
began experiencing specific things that Tommy Robinson spoke about; although 
unspecified, these issues are likely to do with Islam as he later did specify joining the EDL 
due to a complete lack of engagement by authorities against Islamic issues. Another 
respondent (102) had been a member for many years, attending several local 
demonstrations, where he “was encouraged to attend by work mates.” 
 Seven respondents were introduced to the EDL by friends (13, 20, 39, 41, 48, 75, 
87). Some simply mentioned friends asking them to join (20), others heard of the 
organisation through friends (39), others heard of the organisation both through friends and 
online (41, 48). Respondent 41 expressed that he wanted to join others who felt like he did. 
Respondent 75 showed up to an EDL march in Dewsbury with a school friend and his 
father, which he described as “a load of fun.” Respondent 87 joined after Lee Rigby was 
murdered and Tommy Robinson was arrested for doing a “charity walk”; he went to his 
first demonstration with some local “lads” who has booked a coach to go. Finally, one 
respondent (13) described joining the EDL through friends and involvement in the National 
Front; he did not specify further as to whether these friends were in the NF or perhaps were 
members of the EDL and convinced him to join. 
In contrast, as mentioned earlier, according to Pilkington (2016) surprisingly few 
respondents discussed the influence of peers or friends. Five respondents in her study did 
say they first heard of the EDL through friends and attended their first event with them. 
The most common route into the EDL seemed to be football firms, which seven respondents 
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in Pilkington’s (2016) study stated as their pathway; crucially, not one respondent in the 
current study stated coming to the EDL through a football firm.  
 
Summary 
 This section analysed respondents’ involvement in the EDL. Namely, it looked at 
their level of involvement: firstly, whether they consider themselves as members, 
supporters, or sympathisers of the organisations, and secondly whether they are active on 
the streets as well as online. It was found that 22 (38.6%) of respondents were supporters 
of the EDL, as opposed to 11 (19.3%) members and five (8.8%) sympathisers. Only eight 
(14.0%) respondents specifically discussed attending events and demonstrations. Again, 
the nature of this study naturally biased the data toward those who are active online, given 
that respondents were found through the EDL’s (now banned) Facebook page. However, 
this data does demonstrate the lack of specific membership criteria for the EDL, hence 
seemingly less of a sense of solidarity and loyalty among the organisation’s followers. 
Then, this section analysed pathways into the EDL, looking at how individuals 
joined (to whatever level they did so) the organisation. The most common pathways were 
found to be joining through pre-existing relationships, such as family and friends, and 
hearing about the EDL online; these pathways were each cited by 11 (19.3%) respondents. 
Additionally, six (10.5%) respondents cited joining the EDL after membership in other 
radical right organisations. Crucially, no respondent cited joining the EDL through a 
football firm, which had been cited in other studies (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016) as the 
most common pathway. 
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5.3.3 Why the EDL 
 The third theme examined why respondents specifically chose the EDL to join over 
other radical right organisations, and what drove them to join the organisation in the first 
place. These ideas were explored through the interview questions: “What does it mean to 
you, personally, to be a supporter/member of this organisation?” and “Can you tell me what 
you’ve learned from being a member/supporter of the EDL?” As expected, many 
respondents support the EDL due to their stance on Islam. Others mentioned what Busher 
(2016) would call ‘chronic moral outrage’, such as agreeing with their position on 
immigrants, on standing up for veterans, and on speaking out against corrupt politicians. 
Many respondents felt that they could really make a difference by being a part of the 
organisation, others felt that supporting the EDL represented British identity and pride, and 
some referred to the EDL as a community. 
While the EDL is seemingly heavily anti-Islam, it draws supporters with a multitude 
of concerns. This means that some individuals, such as Respondent 75, consider the EDL 
to not have a specific platform. This particular respondent remarked: “the more you silence 
no platform groups like EDL the more you hold the door open for more extreme neo-nazi 
groups like nationalist [National] action” (75). Here, the respondent referred to the 
organisation National Action, who were proscribed in 2016. 
 
Their stance on Islam  
 The EDL has often been described as a single-issue organisation primarily focused 
on anti-Islam (Copsey, 2010; Jackson, 2011; Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). Indeed, 21 
respondents mentioned the EDL’s stance on Islam as a reason for supporting the 
organisation. This 36.8 percent of supporters is close to Bartlett and Littler’s (2011) finding 
of 41 percent of respondents stating opposition to Islam as their main reason for joining the 
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EDL. However, in this study views on Islam was found to be the second largest issue, while 
British identity and pride was the largest (see below). Respondents felt that the EDL ‘speaks 
the truth’ about Islam (16) and is the only group who actively stands up against Muslims 
(20) and militant Islam (35); one respondent (86) expressed being proud of having helped 
“wake people up regarding militant Islam.” The EDL are “trying to stop the epidemic of 
grooming gangs (87); they highlight FGM, Sharia law courts, and “barbaric halal slaughter” 
(87).  
 Two Respondents supported the observation proposed by Busher (2016) that some 
EDL supporters view the EDL as an anti-racist movement. As mentioned earlier, one of 
Busher’s respondents, a former BNP activist, joined the EDL because, among other things, 
it was “not a nationalist group like the BNP” (Busher, 2016: 40, emphasis in original). 
Respondent 17 expressed that the EDL protests against racism, with the idea that Muslims 
are indeed the racist ones. Respondent 103 agreed with the EDL’s stand on extremism and 
expressed a belief that the EDL is an anti-extremist organisation; Muslims, in this case, 
being the extremists. 
 Other respondents are divided into two groups when it comes to support for the 
EDL due to their stance on Islam. The first group are those respondents who simply support, 
and agree with, the EDL’s views on Islam (18, 36, 49, 56, 68, 75, 93). One respondent (75) 
felt that the EDL was the only option, “the only people giving answers,” when he realised 
he didn’t like how the “Pakistanis” in his area were acting towards “others.” Other 
respondents suggested that they would like to have Islam removed from Britain and have 
every person obey the same laws (93), suggested that there is an “Islamic problem” in the 
UK23 (49), referred to the “special status being afforded to adherents of the dangerous cult 
of Islam” (36), learned through the EDL that politicians lie (68), and learned that politicians 
 
23 UK is mentioned here rather than Great Britain as respondents specifically discussed the UK. 
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do nothing about the creation of mosques and the mass influx of Muslims that drive British 
people out of their homes (56). 
 The second group are those individuals who feel that the EDL is actively doing 
something about the issues surrounding Islam in Britain (6, 59, 61, 94, 95, 102). 
Respondent 61, for example, stated that the British people “are waking up to the nightmare 
ahead that is Islam” and implied that the EDL would help save the future of the country, as 
well as English heritage. Another respondent (59) suggested that the EDL is a patriotic 
organisation “trying to prevent” their “English Christian society from disappearing.” This 
respondent was also convinced that “millions of ordinary people feel the same but are 
scared to show their feelings because of the bias of the media.” This brings up a crucial 
point: seemingly, some supporters of the EDL feel that their views are the norm. That all 
British people must feel the way they do, but that others are not brave enough to stand up 
against the establishment and ‘fight’; this ties in with the idea of the Crusader, as found in 
the online analysis (see Chapter 4), and the idea that the EDL is standing up and fighting 
for the ‘true’ British people, identity, and heritage. 
 
Their stance on various ideological issues 
 Beyond their stance on Islam, several respondents discussed supporting the EDL 
for various other ideological issues, namely their position on immigration, due to the fact 
that the EDL stands up for veterans, and because they have learned a lot about the true 
nature of British politicians from the EDL.  
 Eleven Respondents expressed supporting the EDL due to some aspect of their 
stance on immigration (6, 13, 32, 34, 51, 59, 53, 77, 81, 94, 99). Respondent 32 supports 
the EDL for “our country and future” and not, as he states, for personal reasons: “I support 
their patriotism and desire to keep Britain essentially British.” Similarly, Respondent 50 
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seemed concerned over Brits losing their identity, and Respondent 53 mentioned being 
proud of the ‘British tradition’: and the EDL is symbolic of the struggle to keep this as 
such.” These comments about protecting British identity or the struggle to keep Britain 
British are very obviously anti-immigrant sentiments, as the feeling is that immigrants 
somehow pollute, and hence dilute, British identity. Indeed, two other respondents 
mentioned standing up for the “real” (94) and “native” (77) British people. Respondent 51 
expressed that, because of the EDL, there “may be hope for the British way of life,” and as 
Respondent 13 very simply put it, the EDL will help “take back our country.” Finally, there 
seemed to also be concern over the favouring of immigrants over the native British people; 
“free speech is being taken away from TRUE BRITS,” expressed Respondent 34, and the 
country is “swamped with benefit chasers that we can’t afford.” Similarly, Respondent 99 
expressed that there is a “clear bias” towards “certain community’s over British nationals 
in this country.” 
 Secondly, three Respondents (11, 60, 97) mentioned supporting the EDL due to 
their stance on supporting veterans and those in the armed forces. One respondent (11) 
specifically mentioned becoming interested in the EDL due to the fact that they protested 
against the abuse of the troops, presumably referring to the demonstrations in Luton in 
2009. Similarly, Respondent 60 mentioned seeing the way the troops were treated in Luton, 
and how the police allowed the abuse to occur. Respondent 97, as well, mentioned that the 
EDL are patriotic people who stand up for the armed forces, as the police and government 
do little to deal with the “problem.” This anger of the apparent abuse of British military 
veterans likely ties into feelings of frustration over a perceived loss of British identity and 
culture. This views also seem to correlate with negative views on immigration and, at least 
in the case of Respondent 97, with feelings of distrust in politicians and the political system. 
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 Finally, as mentioned earlier, many respondents expressed disenchantment and 
distrust in the British political system and in politicians. It appears these issues have arisen 
since 2016, after the Brexit Leave campaign and the Brexit Referendum in June 2016. 
Respondents expressed feeling that they are not being listened to; that the people spoke 
through the referendum, but that politicians have done nothing in the past three years to 
honour the wishes of the people. In connection with this, several respondents (34, 47, 56, 
60, 68, 81, 94) expressed feeling that the EDL sheds light on the problems with politicians 
and the establishment. Respondents mention realising how corrupt and self-serving 
politicians are (34, 47, 94), feeling that the government lies and does little about Islamic 
issues (56, 68), and that politicians care more about ‘foreigners’ than British nationals (81). 
“Organisations like the EDL are showing the public what crap the politicians are prepared 
to feed us” (34). 
 
Being a Members Makes a Difference  
 Many respondents suggested that being part of the EDL is important to them as 
they, in some way, feel like they are making a difference and doing their part for the 
country. These sentiments generally revolved around the EDL giving them a voice and 
allowing them to be heard (16, 41, 55, 78, 99), the EDL standing up for ordinary people 
(47, 73, 84, 99), the EDL is protecting the country and making a difference (35, 48, 86, 89, 
102), and that the EDL speaks out and tells the truth about difficult issues (34, 51, 75, 77, 
95, 101). 
 Firstly, respondents expressed that being a part of the EDL gives them a platform 
for their voices to be heard, as the establishment and politicians do not care (16). The EDL 
are the only organisation to understand the problems; being a member means they have a 
voice and will make the “government take note that the people a fed up” (55). One 
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Respondent (99) who stated that his eyes had been opened “to a global plan that I never 
knew existed until a few years ago” expressed that the EDL gives “a place to voice the 
frustration felt by many, a place of union and solidarity.” 
 Secondly, several stated that the EDL represents and supports ordinary people. The 
EDL stands up for the “common English man even though they were made out to be the 
bad guys” (73). The organisation, according to respondents (84, 99), stands up for working 
class people. Respondent 84 expressed that no one else truly understands how he feels about 
what is happening in the country and that it makes him “sad” that he ‘must’ be a supporter 
of the organisation. As Respondent 99 stated: 
 
“The EDL was a reaction to a problem a voice for the working class who were not 
being represented by the government. Rather than listen to the reason behind the 
movement the establishment went after that movement in an aim to again stifle the 
message that the organisation represented.” 
 
 
Thirdly, respondents felt that the EDL truly makes a difference (35, 48, 86, 89, 102). 
Respondent 48 is a member of the EDL as he, along with others, is trying not to lose his 
identity and “protect what our forefathers died for”; through the EDL he has learned to 
stand up for what he believes in and to never give up. Similarly, Respondent 86 felt he is 
proud to have helped “wake people up regarding militant Islam.” There is most definitely 
a feeling among supporters of saving the country from outside evils, namely immigrants 
and Islam. However, newly, it seems supporters of the EDL are also wanting to protect the 
country from ‘inside’ issues, such as the corruption of politicians who, in turn, aid 
immigrants and Muslims. For Respondent 102, being a member of the EDL means that he 
is no longer hiding away, and that the organisation is helping to force politicians to act on 
their promises. 
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Finally, six respondents expressed that the EDL speaks out and tells the truth (77, 
95) about difficult issues. They feel that their free speech is being taken away (34) and 
“organisations like the EDL are showing the public what crap the politicians are prepared 
to feed us” (34). The EDL dare to say what many people are already thinking (101); they 
have a “back bone strong enough to talk about the real issues that the ‘politically correct’ 
cower away from” (51). Indeed, the EDL were “the only people giving answers” (75).  
 
British culture, identity, and pride  
 Twenty-four respondents mentioned supporting the EDL due to feelings of British 
pride, identity, or patriotism. In 2011, Bartlett and Littler found that the second most 
common reason for individuals to join the EDL was related to English identity and 
preserving national values, at 31 percent. In this study it was found that this was actually 
the most commonly mentioned reason, at 42 percent. 
 These feelings were often combined with a feeling that the EDL is helping to save 
the country, protect the country’s future, and to keep it ultimately British. Three 
respondents (35, 53, 89) specifically referred to the EDL as representing national pride or 
giving a sense of “English pride” (53). For Respondent 53, the EDL “is symbolic of the 
struggle to keep” the British tradition alive.  
 Other respondents referred to the EDL as a patriotic organisation (47, 59, 101), or 
simply answered “Patriotism” (81) to the question “What does it mean to you, personally, 
to be a supporter/member of this organisation?” Respondent 101 explained that the EDL 
are unfairly portrayed, they are “just patriotic people annoyed with what had happened to 
their country.” 
 The next category ties in closely with the “Being a member makes a difference” 
category mentioned above, but in this case only refers to those cases that discuss, or imply, 
295 
 
saving British culture and identity (13, 20, 38, 39, 61, 73, 77). In other words, these 
respondents see the EDL under a lens of a sort of ‘identity protectionism’; that the EDL is 
the only hope for British culture. Some respondents felt that the EDL are fighting for the 
country’s future (20); they are fighting for Britain and because they are members, they are 
also helping in this fight (77). The EDL will help save the future of the UK and English 
heritage (61), will help “take back our country” (13), helps to keep Britain safe (38), helps 
protect the country’s history (38), and stands up for the “common English man even though 
they were made out to be the bad guys” (73).   
 Finally, the EDL represents British identity and a protection of that British identity 
(16, 32, 40, 48, 50, 51, 52, 67, 87, 93). It is worth noting here that most respondents referred 
to themselves and their national identity as ‘British’; although supporters of an organisation 
called the English Defence League, few explicitly referred to themselves as English. Some 
respondents (40, 67) felt that being a member of the EDL represents being truly British. 
One respondent (50) joined as he was afraid of losing his identity and explained that being 
part of the EDL represents feeling part of his “country folk.” The EDL, to some, represents 
hope for the future (93) and can make supporters feel that there “may be hope for the British 
way of life” (51). Respondent 32 expressed that he supports “their patriotism and desire to 
keep Britain essentially British.” 
 
Community  
 Lastly, six respondents (20, 26, 29, 50, 51, 52) discussed feeling that the EDL is a 
supportive community. Respondents 26 and 50 expressed that the EDL make them feel like 
they are not alone, that there are others who feel the same way they do. Respondent 51, 
similarly, expressed that being part of the EDL helped him realise there are others who feel 
the same way he does. Respondent 52 felt that the EDL “has” their back, and Respondent 
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20 described the EDL as a family. Several authors mention the importance of feeling 
togetherness and solidarity, even specifically among the EDL (Busher, 2016; Winlow et al, 
2017). Indeed, as Respondent 85 mentioned, it is important to feel that one belongs and that 
one’s ideas are shared by other people.  
 
Summary 
 This section analysed reasons why respondents chose to specifically support, and 
in certain cases join, the EDL over other radical right organisations. The most common 
reason stated by respondents for choosing the EDL was reasons of British identity, pride, 
and general patriotism, at 24 (42.1%) individuals. This idea of the EDL as the protector of 
British values and identity ties in with observations of the EDL’s website and imagery (see 
Chapter 4), namely the Crusader imagery so strongly portrayed. It remains a question as to 
how strongly this imagery actually influences the organisation’s followers, or whether 
supporters come to the organisation seeking these values. 
The second largest reason stated as the reason or joining the EDL was the 
organisation’s stance on Islam, at 21 (36.8%) individuals. Looking at how the EDL markets 
itself online (see Chapter 4), with their predominantly anti-Islam imagery and rhetoric, this 
is unsurprising; indeed, this has been found in other studies as a common reason for 
supporting the EDL (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). Additionally, 11 (19.3%) 
respondents mentioned joining the EDL due to their stance on immigration, three (5.3%) 
referred to their support for British soldiers, and seven (12.3%) expressed that the EDL 
sheds light on current political issues in Britain. 19 (33.3%) respondents expressed that the 
EDL in some way makes a difference in British life, whether that be through standing up 
or ordinary people, protecting the country, or speaking the truth when others will not; six 
(10.5%) respondents described the EDL as a supportive community. 
297 
 
5.3.4 The Meaning of Membership 
Respondents had varying levels of investment in the organisation. Respondents’ 
involvement and commitment to the organisation was interpreted through the question: 
“What would you lose if you left the EDL?” This question gave great insight in the 
Hungarian interviews as to respondents’ personal involvement in the organisation, hence 
was utilised in the British interviews as well. Of the 44 people who in some way indicated 
involvement in the organisation, 13 showed very little or no investment in the EDL, nine 
were not members, and three had already left the organisation (Respondents 58, 73, 95). Of 
the people who showed higher level of investment, the most common themes that emerged 
were pride, dignity and respect, community, and patriotism and hope for Britain’s future.  
When asked what they would lose if they left the organisation, four respondents (6, 
13, 47, 52) stated that they would lose “pride.” Most of the respondents seemingly meant 
pride in themselves, or to do with themselves, but Respondent 47 suggested they would 
lose a sense of pride in the country. Other respondents suggest they would lose dignity (47) 
and respect (13, 35, 77, 102) if they left the organisation. Respondents 35 and 77 
specifically referred to losing self-respect, but Respondents 13 and 102 did not specify if 
this was self-respect or the respect of others. Busher (2016) discussed the importance of 
both pride and dignity, as the EDL provides activists with an opportunity “to express 
feelings of attachment to and pride in their national or cultural identity” (Busher, 2016: 59). 
They express their cultural pride in everyday life, for example by displaying flags in their 
homes. Some also showed pride in becoming increasingly well-informed about legal 
regulations. 
Six Respondents (11, 20, 40, 48, 50, 53) suggested that they would lose their 
community if they left the EDL. Respondents 40 and 48 stated that they would lose 
“support” if they left, with Respondent 48 stating that he would lose the support of 
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thousands of people who think he same but do not have the courage to stand up and say 
something. Respondent 50 suggested that they feel they are a part of something, but in an 
online community; they felt a sense of community and belonging through support on social 
media. Respondent 11 said he would lose good friends and “brotherhood,” while 
Respondent 20 seemed to also have a deeper involvement in the organisation as his friends 
were also involved. Respondent 53 stated that he would lose “brethren” if he left the EDL. 
 Pilkington (2016) described respondents discussing the importance of friendship, 
loyalty, and standing up for one another. They discussed the importance of looking out for 
other organisation members. One respondent (Euan) discussed the difficulty of considering 
departure from the EDL: “Because you’ve made friends, some real good friends you know. 
People who you’d genuinely miss” (Pilkington, 2016: 198). Others described the 
organisation as a family, as Lisa did: “It’s like a family, you are all there for the same reason 
aren’t you at the end of the day” (Pilkington, 2016: 199). Several respondents talked about 
the EDL helping them through a difficult phase in their life, from suffering from depression 
to leaving an abusive relationship. In the end, Pilkington draws a contrast with Virchow’s 
(2007) conclusion that collective emotions are strategically created and manipulated by 
organisation leaders to construct emotional collectives. She finds, rather, that these bonds 
in the EDL are “generated from the bottom-up, emerging from a sense of ‘togetherness’ 
generated through shared activism…that binds members of a movement” (Pilkington, 
2016: 202). 
 Finally, several respondents felt that the EDL offered hope for the future of the 
country represents a way to save the country from its fate. Respondent 29 stated that if he 
left, he would lose “a means to implement positive change.” Similarly, Respondent 61 
stated that he would lose his “last hope of saving my Country.” Others also felt that they 
would lose hope for the country and culture (93), would lose their chance to ‘have their 
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say’ if they left (41), that the EDL represents a belief in the country (26), and two 
respondents (87, 94) stated that they would never stop supporting the EDL. Respondent 87 
stated that they would never leave as there is too much work to do: they “need to make 
people aware of what’s going on.” Respondent 67 expressed that they would lose their 
British identity if they left the organisation. 
 
Summary 
 The last section of the analysis of textual interviews with EDL members involved 
exploring why respondents maintained membership in the organisation. As respondents 
had varying levels of investment in the organisation, only 44 were used in this part of the 
analysis; of these 44, 13 showed very little on no investment in the EDL, nine were not 
members, and three had already left. Of the remaining 19 individuals the most common 
themes for maintaining membership that emerged were pride (four respondents), dignity 
and respect (six respondents), community (six respondents), and a hope for Britain’s future 
and identity(seven respondents). It appears supporters are not particularly encouraged to 
maintain membership in the EDL, which could be done through further solidarity and 
loyalty building or making individuals feel as though they are truly part of the organisation, 
as seen in other groups. This clearly connects to the issues of not having a clear definition 
of membership in the organisation and is likely affected by this sample of respondents being 
largely online supporters.. 
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5.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 A comparison between group members of MÖM and the EDL can be made, though 
of course not a perfect one given the different interview styles and vastly different sample 
sizes. Primarily, there were only four members of MÖM interviewed as compared with the 
57 textual interviews with EDL Facebook supporters which were ultimately used. To 
facilitate comparison, similar interview schedules were used for both sets of interviews. 
The interview schedule used for the EDL textual interviews was a simplified version of the 
schedule used for MÖM members; it included those questions which yielded the most 
success in the interviews with MÖM members. The EDL respondents were found on 
Facebook and had varying degrees of participation in the organisation. Unfortunately, there 
was no direct contact between the interviewer and the respondents. In the case of MÖM, 
all participants were suggested by the group leader and interviews were conducted via 
telephone, not allowing for a good rapport to be developed. 
 A large majority of respondents were male in the EDL sample, 85 of the 99 total 
respondents, and all four of the Hungarian participants were male. This reflects the 
previously found gender-ratio of the organisations, where nearly 20 percent of the EDL is 
female (Bartlett & Littler, 2011); the gender ratio is unknown in MÖM. Images showing 
regional members generally portray mostly male members, but images of their events and 
meetings show many women present. More research is needed to determine a more accurate 
gender ratio. Members of the EDL are traditionally from the working class (Busher, 2016), 
which is similar to what is seen among the Hungarian participants: two participants had 
vocational jobs and one worked as a security guard. Several similarities and difference 
became apparent: the denial of association with the far-right is a common theme, as are 
common emotions, but pathways, attitudes, and ideologies differ somewhat. These 
similarities and differences will now be discussed in terms of themes surrounding the 
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origins of membership in the respective organisations, why respondents chose those 
specific organisations, and why they maintain membership in these organisations. 
 
5.4.1 Joining the Organisations 
The first crucial difference between the membership of the EDL and MÖM is the 
definition of membership itself. In the EDL it is not at all clear who is a member, supporter, 
or sympathiser and exactly what each of those entail. In fact, it seems even the respondents 
themselves did not have a clear idea of who was a member, with some saying that it was 
impossible to join the EDL as there was no membership list. Yet another respondent 
claimed that the organisation no longer exists. In MÖM, on the other hand, membership is 
clearly defined. While respondents were fairly cryptic about the actual process of becoming 
a member and seemed careful not to give too much information, it is clear that individuals 
do indeed become full members after a vetting process; full membership is then symbolised 
by the presentation of the MÖM waistcoat. 
 Of those 57 textual interviews which were ultimately used for this study, eight 
(14.0%) respondents explicitly stated not being a member or supporter, 11 (19.3%) were 
members, 22 were supporters (38.6%), and five (8.8%) were sympathisers. Some of those 
coded as non-members were members of other organisations, such as Britain First or the 
BNP. Clearly this is in stark contrast to the interviewees from MÖM, given that all four 
were full members. 
Although difficult to generate distinctive pathways into the MÖM with only four 
respondents, some pathways did become evident. All four respondents joined the 
organisation of their own will and were quite adamant about expressing this fact. Of the 
participants, two joined MÖM in its current form (László and Árpád), and two joined in its 
previous form as the For a Better Future Movement (Peter and Zoltán). For the purposes of 
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discussing pathways into the movement, both groups will be seen as the same organisation. 
Both Zoltán and Árpád were members of other radical right organisations before joining 
MÖM/For a Better Future, while Péter and László’s first radical right organisation was 
MÖM/For a Better Future. Three of the respondents (Peter, Zoltán, and Árpád) specifically 
sought out such an organisation, for various reasons such as frustration and seeking a 
paramilitary movement, while László was introduced to the idea of radical right 
organisations by a personal contact.  
 
Pathways to the Organisations 
A few common pathways into the EDL also became apparent through the responses 
to the textual interviews. From past studies on the EDL, it seems the most common 
pathways into the organisation are through football firms and membership in other radical 
right organisations, as well as those members who had no previous experience in protest 
movements. Crucially, results of this study did not find one single mention of supporters 
coming to the EDL from football firms, save one respondent who mentioned supporting 
the DFLA. In Hungary, while football hooliganism exists, most often associated with the 
Ferencváros team, its association is stronger with smaller white power and skinhead 
organisations. An association with football is not generally seen in the larger radical right 
organisations such as MÖM. Of the four members interviewed, two had previous 
experience with other radical right organisations, and for the other two participants 
MÖM/For a Better Future was the first radical right organisation they joined. One 
participant was looking for a paramilitary-style organisation and found several others too 
extreme, while others were looking for an organisation that helped their fellow Hungarians. 
As for the EDL, six respondents cited being members of other radical right organisations 
or political parties, such as Britain First, the BNP, UKIP, the DFLA, and Yellow Vests. 
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Two respondents in particular mentioned coming to the EDL through another organisation, 
namely through involvement the National Front and through disenchantment with the BNP. 
 Eleven respondents specifically mentioned hearing about the EDL online, while two 
others heard of the organisation through news media and decided to join. One respondent 
even explicitly equated following the organisation on Facebook with membership in the 
organisation. It could be, however, that this sample is potentially biased through those 
individuals who supported the EDL online, as these textual interviews were conducted 
online and targeted those people who supported the EDL’s Facebook page.  
This again broaches an important issue: the question of who can be defined as a 
member or supporter of the EDL. It now seems that a large part of their support base is 
online, with less people attending their demonstrations on the streets. Or at the very least, 
it seems as though many people are content being online supporters. However, eight EDL 
respondents did specifically refer to street-level involvement with the organisation. These 
street-level events were all demonstrations in various cities around Britain, such as Luton, 
Rotherham, Brum, and Dewsbury. This is in stark contrast to organisations like MÖM, 
whose identity is almost solely based on their offline activity. The organisation has chapters 
all over Hungary where members meet regularly, and MÖM regularly organises events 
from summer camps, to food drives, to remembrance ceremonies, to their so-called ‘mood-
improving walks’. 
It is clear that some people become involved in the EDL after attending a 
demonstration or other emotionally-charged event, such as a memorial; this can also be 
seen in past studies of the organisation, where it was found to be more common that in this 
study (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016).  In MÖM, while they often do attend memorial 
days, most became involved after attending either a community-building activity, such as 
the children’s summer camp, or some sort of volunteer activity like giving food to the poor. 
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This ties back to the theme of ‘social protector’ that was seen across the interviews. When 
looking at the landscape of the Hungarian radical right, it becomes apparent that MÖM do 
seemingly strive to fill this role among the organisations. 
 Eleven Respondents described joining the EDL, or at least being introduced to the 
organisation, by family, work colleagues, and friends. One respondent, who met EDL 
members through work, expressed that where he lives it is difficult to socialise with people 
who are ‘similar’ due to ‘ideological differences’. Ultimately he joined due to ‘social 
reasons’. Others mentioned friends asking them to join, hearing about the organisation 
through friends, and others yet heard of the organisation both through friends and online. 
One respondent went to a demonstration with a school friend and his father, while another 
went to his first demonstration with some local people he knew.  
 
Reasons for Joining and Radicalisation 
Linden and Klandermans described three possible motives for joining an activist 
group in their study of Dutch extreme-right activists: instrumentality, identity, and 
ideology. Those labelled with the instrumentality motive are seeking to fight injustice, 
whether this fight is ideologically motivated or angry (Pilkington, 2016). Secondly, some 
seek to find a sense of identity, whether it is the wanderer in search of a like-minded 
community or a compliant who remains in the movement through identification with others 
(Pilkington, 2016). Finally, those motivated by ideology join a movement to express a view.  
It appears all four respondents from MÖM could be classified as ‘identity 
compliant,’ as they all find a sense of identity through their interaction with other 
organisation members. While each organisation member's identity differs, members within 
the organisation develop an identity as part of the organisation; they become MÖM 
members, and many identify as protectors of the Hungarian people and part of a larger 
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radical right movement. This identification as an organisation member then strengthens 
feelings of pride. Ideology may also play a role in their membership, but this is not 
something that is openly advertised outside of the organisation. They also all spoke of 
protecting their fellow Hungarians, which would seemingly also imply a motive of 
instrumentality in their membership. 
Supporters of the EDL, however, could be primarily labelled under 
‘instrumentality’. Many respondents seemed frustrated and angry over feelings of injustice, 
often times feeling like ‘others’ were given privilege over British natives; this also led to 
feelings of anger toward politicians. Some respondents also expressed a desire to protect 
their British identity or feeling that the organisation provided them with a sense of identity. 
While supporters expressed different ideologies and reasons for joining the organisation, 
these generally came from a feeling of frustration rather than a particularly strong radical 
right ideology. 
Two respondents from MÖM, Peter and László, could trace the origin of their 
nationalist feelings back to childhood. It is possible however, that participants have created 
a narrative of their childhood in order to explain the present; understandably, it is 
impossible to verify those narratives. Zoltán spoke of becoming disenchanted with the 
current political system as an adult, and Árpád was unsure of how his radical right attitudes 
but did seek to join a more paramilitary-style organisation.  
 The EDL is indeed somewhat of a ‘lightning rod’ for different interests (Busher, 
2016); one individual may be more interested in patriotism, while another far more 
concerned with Islam. The main themes that arose in this study, namely looking at what 
drove respondents to nationalism, were numerous: immigration, concern over Islam, 
disenchantment with politics and politicians, anger of the disrespect of British soldiers, 
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general disenchantment and frustration, and the effects of the online space and specific 
major events. 
This study found that the biggest concern of EDL supporters was mainstream 
politics and politicians, with 71 of the overall 99 respondents citing it as such. Of the 57 
interviews ultimately used in this thematic analysis, 20 coded under ‘turn to nationalism’ 
suggested that politicians were one of their major concerns. Several people cited corruption 
of politicians as a main concern, while others expressed anger over how Brexit was being 
handled by the government. Beyond a direct distrust in mainstream politicians themselves, 
other issues were cited by respondents such as concerns over the EU (seven respondents) 
and Brexit specifically (nine respondents). 
 According to this data, immigration is the second biggest concerns of EDL 
supporters, cited by 61 of the overall 99 respondents and ultimately 30 of the 57 interviews 
used in the thematic analysis. These concerns over immigration could largely be divided 
into four groups: those feeling that immigrants had taken over their homes and 
neighbourhoods, those who felt that immigrants are given advantages over the native Brits, 
those feeling that immigrants are generally ruining the country and making it worse in some 
tangible way, and those who feel that the British way of life and British people are 
threatened by immigrants.  
 Surprisingly, only the third most common concern of EDL supporters was Islam, 
cited by 51 of the overall 99 respondents and 27 of the 57 textual interviews used in the 
thematic analysis. Some of these were mixed with concerns over immigration and some 
were quite veiled in their speech, citing concerns over terrorism, ‘grooming gangs’, and 
simply ‘religion’ rather than Islam directly.  
 There were several concerns mentioned by EDL supporters that were not mentioned 
by the members of MÖM. While there are obvious contextual differences, the large 
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discrepancy in sample size cannot be disregarded. Had this study interviewed a similar 
number of members of MÖM it is likely that more concerns would have arisen. That being 
said, no members of MÖM mentioned specific events as drivers to nationalism, while 
several members of the EDL did. Five EDL respondents made specific reference to events 
affecting them to such a point that they turned to nationalism. These instances of ‘moral 
shock’ tied to specific events was also described by Busher (2016) as driving individuals 
to support organisations like the EDL. Respondents in this study made specific reference 
to the Manchester and London attacks in 2017, the 7/7 London bombing, and the murder 
of drummer Lee Rigby in 2013.  
 
5.4.2 Appeal of the Organisations 
One common theme among both groups was the denial of any association with the 
far-right. The EDL have traditionally been adamant about denying any labels of extremism 
or of racism, saying they are a protest party against Islam. In the case of this study, two 
respondents alluded to the EDL being a non-racist and anti-extremist organisation. MÖM 
respondents also denied this association, except one participant who suggested he would 
accept the label for himself (but made no mention of the organisation). While the EDL is a 
protest movement, after interviewing the small sampling of members of MÖM it has 
become apparent that they are a movement with strong radical right attitudes. Their 
activities include volunteering to help poor Hungarians in rural areas, community-building, 
and vigilantism in the sense of acting as civilian soldiers.  
 The appeals of the organisations, however, differ. For the members of MÖM it 
seems as though the appeal lies in a few possibilities: those who seek out a paramilitary-
style organisation, those who seek to help their fellow Hungarians, and those who are 
looking for a community of people with similar views to their own. Three overlapping 
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themes pertaining to membership in MÖM became evident throughout each of the four 
participants’ narrative: ‘the soldier,’ ‘family and community,’ and ‘the social protector.’ 
The first theme, ‘the soldier,’ arose because participants spoke about being ‘civil soldiers’ 
and going on patrols. One participant even sought out the organisation as he was seeking a 
paramilitary-style organisation. It seems as though members view themselves as somewhat 
of a civilian army fighting for the protection and preservation of a ‘Hungarian’ Hungary. 
The second theme of ‘family and community’ was obvious throughout all interviews. All 
participants emphasised the importance of solidarity and feelings of family, brotherhood, 
friendship, and community. Members of MÖM regularly help one another, which 
participants found important. Lastly, the theme of ‘social protector’ was evident through 
discussion of helping their fellow Hungarians. Some gave concrete examples of how the 
organisation went out and helped people. Others spoke about drawing the attention of law 
enforcement to undesirable situations. Participants spoke about not only of helping people 
physically, through their regular patrols for example, but legally as well. 
 There were several themes that came up among EDL supporters, in terms of the 
reasons their support the organisation. One important contrast to MÖM is that most of these 
themes are to do with ideological issues and frustration rather than physical reasons. As 
many EDL supporters seem to only support the organisation online and not on the streets, 
this is unsurprising. The very nature of the organisations obviously affect how and why 
supporters are attracted to the organisation, hence an organisation who is largely based 
online will attract people for more ideological and philosophical reasons. 
 The most common reason cited by respondents for supporting the EDL was British 
identity, pride, and patriotism, cited by 24 of the 57 respondents. These feelings were often 
combined with a feeling that the EDL is helping to save the country, protect the country’s 
future, and to keep it ultimately British. Some respondents referred specifically to the EDL 
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as representing national pride, others as a patriotic organisation. Respondents discussed the 
EDL struggling to keep the British tradition alive and some suggested that the EDL is 
helping to save British culture and identity. In other words, these Respondents see the EDL 
under a lens of a sort of ‘identity protectionism’; that the EDL is the only hope for British 
culture. It seems that the EDL gives hope to those who fear the loss of a British identity 
and culture; as one respondent stated, he supports the EDL’s “patriotism and desire to keep 
Britain essentially British.” 
 The second most common reason cited by respondents was views on Islam. 
Respondents felt that the EDL ‘speaks the truth’ about Islam, and is the only organisation 
who actively stands up against Muslims and militant Islam. Seven respondents simply 
supported, and agreed with, the EDL’s views on Islam, while six others mentioned feeling 
that the EDL is actively doing something about the issues surrounding Islam in Britain. 
One respondent, for example, stated that the British people “are waking up to the nightmare 
ahead that is Islam” and implied that the EDL would help save the future of the country, as 
well as English heritage. It is not clear exactly how the EDL is ‘saving’ the country from 
Islam, as beyond demonstrations no street-level activities were mentioned by any 
respondents. 
 Beyond their stance on Islam, several respondents discussed supporting the EDL 
for various other ideological issues, namely their position on immigration (11 respondents), 
due to the fact that the EDL stands up for veterans (three respondents), and because they 
have learned a lot about the true nature of British politicians from the EDL (seven 
respondents). Other respondents suggest that being part of the EDL makes them feel as 
though they are making a difference and helping their country, although they do not clarify 
how they are making a difference and helping. These are people who support the EDL as 
the organisation gives them a voice and allow their grievances to be heard, the EDL stands 
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up for ordinary people, and that they speak out and tell the truth about difficult issues. 
Finally, six respondents expressed supporting the EDL as it is a community, helping them 
realise there are others who feel as they do and giving them a feeling of belonging. 
 As can be clearly seen from the results of this study, and as mentioned as well by 
Busher (2016), there are many different interests and grievances among members in the 
EDL. Some may be more patriotic, while others are far more concerned with Islam. This is 
quite like what Árpád described, in that MÖM also has many different types of people 
within the organisation. This was somewhat apparent among the respondents in this study, 
as well, as some were more concerned with the volunteer aspect of MÖM while others 
more so with radical right ideology. Many in the EDL also referred to specific traumatic 
events that lead to their political activism, such as the terror attacks of 9/11 or 7/7. This is 
not seen among the members of MÖM, likely as they are not an openly-racist, single-issue 
protest party. The members of MÖM are more concerned with protecting the Hungarian 
people, often times against a perceived non-Hungarian ‘threat’, and bringing back ‘real 
Hungarian values.’ 
 Considering these results against the results of the statistical analysis (Chapter 3), 
it becomes clear that the far-right and radical right in both countries are frustrated and 
concerned with immigration, but in slightly different ways. The statistical analysis showed 
far-right supporters in both Hungary and the UK to have concerns over immigrants and 
their effects on the culture of the country, but only Hungary showed concern over the effect 
of immigrants on the country’s economy. Hence, it becomes clear that the concern of EDL 
supporters is not over their economic situation, but rather around not being heard, feeling 
immigrants are favoured over native Brits, and politicians not delivering on their promises. 
The perceived economic threat of immigrants in Hungary could have to do with the already 
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poor economic situation of the country, especially after the transition; also, one must not 
rule out the influence of the current political climate. 
 
5.4.3 Maintaining Membership 
In order to explore why respondents maintained membership in their respective 
organisations, they were asked what they would lose if they left their organisations. This 
question was actually  quite successful, resulting in some insight into the varying levels of 
investment in the organisations. Both groups exhibit a lot of pride in both their nation and 
their organisation. Probably strongest among both groups is the obvious importance of the 
feeling of friendship, family, brotherhood, loyalty, and general solidarity with the 
movement. 
In the Hungarian interviews, this resulted in the discussion of several emotional 
themes. The main positive emotional themes that were common among respondents were 
solidarity and pride. Solidarity was quite evident in several forms. Respondents discussed 
solidarity with fellow group members: the feeling of a brotherhood, a family, and a close 
group of friends. The theme of pride was also brought up in reference to pride in being a 
MÖM member and pride of being Hungarian. All respondents exhibited pride in being 
members of the organisation, which was shown in several ways: in simply stating that they 
are proud to be a member, in discussing their importance and how they’ve gained an 
intimate knowledge of the legal system, in discussing their role in the organisation as a 
leader and/or teacher, and in discussion of the effects of their actions on encouraging law 
enforcement to act. 
When asked what they would lose if they left the organisation, four EDL 
respondents stated that they would lose “pride.” Most of the Respondents seemingly meant 
pride in themselves, or to do with themselves, but one respondent suggested they would 
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lose a sense of pride in the country. Other Respondents suggested they would lose dignity 
and respect if they left the organisation. A few respondents also expressed that the EDL 
offered hope for the future of the country, suggesting that they maintain membership 
because of this feeling of hope. One respondent went as far as to say that he would lose his 
British identity if he left the EDL, suggesting a belief that a ‘true’ Brit would be a member 
of the EDL. 
Of the 57 respondents, six suggested that they would lose their community if they 
left the EDL. Two of these respondents stated that they would lose “support” if they left, 
with one of them stating that he would lose the support of thousands of people who do not 
have the courage to stand up for themselves. One respondent in particular suggested feeling 
as though they are part of an online community, feeling a sense of belonging through 
support on social media. Finally, one respondent stated that he would lose good friends and 
“brotherhood,” and another would lose “brethren” if they left the EDL. 
From these results, it become clear that the feelings of brotherhood and solidarity 
can be tied to the level of membership in the organisation. As all the MÖM respondents 
were full members of the organisation and move deeply involved, they all expressed a 
deeper sense of brotherhood and hence solidarity and loyalty. Two EDL respondents did 
specifically say that they would lose ‘good friends’ and ‘brethren’; both of these 
respondents expressed a deeper level of involvement in the organisation, also attending 
demonstrations. As the EDL does not seemingly have such strict membership criteria, 
supporters will likely not be as invested in the organisation as if they were ‘official’ 
members and representatives. It is much easier, and presumably less dangerous, to simply 
unfollow an organisation on Facebook, as in the case of many EDL supporters, than it 
would be to hand back a MÖM waistcoat that one received after being vetted, most 
especially if that individual lives in a small community. 
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5.4.4 Conclusion 
 Qualitative interviews were completed with four members of the Hungarian 
Defence Movement (MÖM) and textual interviews collected from supporters of the English 
Defence League (EDL), of which 57 were used for thematic analysis. Interviews explored 
questions of how individuals became members of their respective organisations, why they 
chose those organisations, and why they maintained membership. It was found, in both 
instances, that individuals join radical right organisations for a variety or reasons and 
concerns. EDL supporters were found to be primarily disenchanted with politics, and upset 
over immigration and Islam, among other things. Supporters were driven to activism for a 
number of reasons including, for example, a moral shock due to terrorist events. Some 
supporters had a strong sense of attachment to the organisation, but the majority seemed to 
only be active online. Members of MÖM did not discuss specific ideology, but interviewees 
did mention things like disenchantment with the current political system, Christianity, and 
feeling like someone needed to help the Hungarian people. Respondents joined MÖM for 
a number of reasons, such as seeking out a paramilitary organisation, wanting to help their 
fellow Hungarians, and seeking out people with similar views to their own. All respondents 
emphasised the community and brotherhood aspect of the organisation, along with 
solidarity and loyalty. 
 Árpád summed it up best during our discussion of this project, comparing MÖM 
and the EDL: “So, we really want to regain our national identity, and are not trying to push 
another culture out.” MÖM is trying to recreate and reacquire an identity that was supressed 
by 45 years of socialism. There is a tendency among MÖM to view Hungarians as victims 
who have been invaded by foreigners, and they see Hungarian values and traditional culture 
as being in jeopardy.  They seem desperately afraid of losing the idea of the ‘true Magyar,’ 
which is what drives their involvement. Members of the EDL, on the other hand, see a 
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threat from the outside as well as a threat to their national identity. It is not a matter of 
regaining an identity, per se, but of trying not to lose it. This identity is now threatened by 
the influx of immigrants, most especially, it seems, from the European Union.  
Of course, these differences can be attributed to different histories, cultures, and 
social structures between the two countries. Great Britain historically has a much larger 
amount of immigration than Hungary ever has, especially in terms of people from the 
Muslim backgrounds. Hungary is still relatively homogeneous, even with the Hungarian 
government’s recent attempt to scare citizens with the ‘migrant threat’; Hungary’s Fidesz 
government led a billboard campaign against migrants during the European crisis in 2015 
and has recently criminalised the aid of refugees (Walker, 2018). Political activists in Great 
Britain are afraid they will lose their national culture and national identity to a (however 
exaggerated) influx of immigrants (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). This can even be observed 
in the broader British electorate, especially through the results of the Brexit referendum; 
the latter has especially promoted a distrust in mainstream politics in supporters of the EDL. 
On the other hand, those on the radical right in Hungary are desperately trying to regain a 
national identity which has been ostensibly weakened through decades of Soviet rule and 
membership in the European Union. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 This study aimed to explore three research questions: why individuals develop 
nationalist feelings and attitudes, why they join radical right social movements and activist 
organisations, and why they maintain membership in those movements and organisations. 
This study also aimed to offer a comparative approach through the use of Hungary and 
Great Britain, and a mix-methods approach by using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods.  
At the beginning of the study it was intended for this to be a larger project: to look 
at several radical right organisations in Hungary and Great Britain. It quickly became 
obvious, however, that this would be impossible. The first reason was that one of the 
organisations in Britain intended to be studied was National Action, who were proscribed 
in December of 2016, one year into this project. As this project was aiming to study street-
level organisations and not political parties, this left few suitable organisations in Britain. 
Due to this situation and the issue of time and money, it was decided to limit the project to 
two organisations: The English Defence League (EDL) in Great Britain and the Hungarian 
Defence Movement (MÖM) in Hungary. 
This concluding chapter will first provide an overview of the findings of the 
research, and offer a discussion synthesising the separate methodologies and findings to 
relate them back to the theory. Then, research limitations will be discussed, followed by 
broader impacts of the study, specific cultural and social contexts, and possible practice 
and policy implications. Finally, this chapter will explore future possible avenues of 
research which can branch from this study. 
 The results of this research highlight the importance of having an intimate 
understanding of the context in which a social movement is created, including society's 
culture and history, political climate, and social climate. Statistical analysis has shown that 
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supporters of the far-right are not necessarily dissatisfied with their lives, as was previously 
held by relative deprivation theorists, but indeed tend toward being happier with their 
current lives. In Hungary, people with conservative-right and far-right views tend to be 
concerned with immigration from the perspective of both culture and economy, whereas in 
Great Britain this concern is limited to culture, but not economy. Results of the statistical 
analysis indicate that there was no significant change in these concerns in light of the Leave 
campaign in Britain and the anti-migrant campaign in Hungary. 
 The centrality of the internet, and especially social media, is apparent in both the 
EDL and MÖM’s use of the online sphere. Both organisations use the internet to create a 
collective identity and to promote feelings of solidarity. As the EDL portray themselves as 
a single-issue protest movement, their use of the internet is directed more towards building 
their collective identity of anti-Islam protest. MÖM, on the other hand, portray themselves 
more so as a community organisation. Hence, while fostering a collective identity, MÖM 
had a much stronger focus on promoting group solidarity online and encouraging the 
feeling of the organisation as one big family. Through the use of the internet and social 
media, support is no longer limited geographically and potential supporters can now be 
solicited from all over the world. 
 Using semi-structured interviews with MÖM members, this study found that there 
are several pathways to collective action in Hungary, which can include both seeking 
activism and being brought in through a previous contact. Individuals were encouraged to 
seek activism through values and attitudes fostered in childhood, moral outrage felt in 
adulthood, or the motivation to find a paramilitary organisation. The main factors 
influencing all participants to maintain membership were emotions such as pride, and the 
solidarity and loyalty felt in an organisation considered to be a family, community, and 
brotherhood. Textual interviews with EDL members revealed that the organisation is not a 
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single-issue organisation as it has been portrayed, but supporters have several other 
concerns; often times concerns such as immigration and politics are stronger than anti-
Islam sentiments. Many respondents found the organisation online, while some were 
introduced through acquaintances. Individuals seemed to seek activism for a number of 
reasons, including moral outrage in adulthood and moral shock due to a specific event. EDL 
respondents, overall, did not seem as invested in the organisation as the interviewees from 
MÖM. 
 Taken together, this study demonstrates the advantage of mix-methods and cross-
national comparative studies. This project challenges existing knowledge of radical right 
social movement participation by offering new insight and uncovering new dynamics. 
Firstly, this project has shown the importance of context when studying radical right 
organisations, as motives for developing far-right attitudes are culturally, historically, and 
individually dependent. Second, it challenges the idea that radical right supporters are 
unsatisfied with their lives. The results demonstrate that relative deprivation theory does 
not fully explain this phenomenon; it is rather a person’s fear of losing what they already 
have that can drive them to seek collective action. Third, this project has challenged the 
idea of strain theory and found new application in a radical right context. Indeed, in a radical 
right context strain theory could be applied to concern over other fellow nationals and not 
the individual self, as fellow nationals can be considered an extension of an individual’s 
own national identity. Fourth, this project clearly shows the central importance of the online 
sphere, especially social media, in the development of movement identity, in the fostering 
of views and attitudes, and in soliciting support that is not geographically-limited; it 
demonstrates the need for further study in this area and for stronger regulation on social 
media. Finally, this is the first study of its kind and the first study to have access to the 
Hungarian Defence Movement. 
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6.1 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 This study used three methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, to examine 
questions of involvement in radical right social movement organisations in Hungary and 
Great Britain. The first of these were bivariate correlations and regression analyses of 
European Social Survey data. Second, a content analysis was conducted of the 
organisations’ online profiles, including their personal websites, Facebook pages, 
Instagram accounts, and YouTube channels. Lastly, in-depth interviews were conducted 
with movement members and supporters insofar as possible. The following section will 
review the findings of this study from the perspective of the main research questions: the 
development of nationalist feelings and attitudes, motivations to collective action and 
seeking social movement organisations, and maintaining membership in radical right 
organisations.  
 
6.1.1 Development of Radical Right Attitudes 
The question of how and why radical right attitudes develop was explored through 
two phases of the research. First, to place the study in a cultural context and explore some 
general questions of right-wing attitudes, statistical analysis was completed on European 
Social Survey data. This analysis tested the variables of life satisfaction and feelings 
towards immigrants, with respect to economy and cultural life, and their predisposition 
toward right-wing and, more specifically, far-right views. Secondly, qualitative interviews 
provided some insight into how respondents developed these attitudes. 
 Views of immigrants were found to be a contributing factor to far-right attitudes. In 
Hungary, concerns over immigrants affecting the economy predicted both politically right 
and far-right views, while in Britain predicted politically right but not far-right views. One 
reason for this difference could come down to semantics, as the word ‘immigrant’ could 
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have different connotations to British and Hungarian people. Great Britain traditionally has 
a long history of immigrants, and the British public, especially of the conservative right, 
has been quite open about its issues with immigration, particularly as seen in the recent 
Brexit referendum. Indeed, textual interviews showed that immigration is one of the main 
concerns of supporters of the radical right in Britain. Among the British far-right, the issues 
with immigrants, particularly Muslims, could be more of a cultural question than economic. 
In Hungary, the issue could be that Hungarians may see the Roma people as immigrants to 
the country, as Roma are considered ‘non-white.’ There is a tradition in Hungary of blaming 
Roma for abusing the welfare system and receive most of the public funds (Krekó & Juhász, 
2017), especially in terms of child support. These feelings are equally projected onto actual 
immigrants to the country (Krekó & Juhász, 2017). Additionally, the propaganda of the 
Hungarian right-wing government also encourages the Hungarian people to believe that 
‘migrants’ are ruining their way of life (for example, Nolan & Walker, 2018).   
In both Britain and Hungary, those with conservative views, as well as far-right 
supporters, believe that immigrants undermine their country’s cultural life. This view likely 
ties into a protective view of national identity among those on the right, and the idea that 
immigrants influence, change, and ‘threaten’ the national identity of a country. It is also 
evident, through high life satisfaction and an idea that immigrants endanger cultural life, 
that xenophobia is high among the conservative right and far-right in both countries. 
However, it cannot be said that xenophobia is one of the strongest factors among these 
supporters as more variables would have to be tested to make this claim. 
It was found that, in both Hungary and Britain, a high satisfaction with life predicted 
both politically right and far-right attitudes. This is contrary to the idea in relative 
deprivation theory, often applied to explain support for the far-right, that individuals with 
far-right values have low satisfaction with their lives. Relative deprivation is essentially a 
320 
 
discrepancy between what people believe they should have and what they actually have; it 
is the very perception of deprivation that is the issue. These feelings of entitlement then tie 
into feelings of dissatisfaction, as they believe they are deprived of what should be theirs 
(McLaughlin, 1969). These results contradict the typical image of radical right movement 
supporters as ‘angry white men.’ Given the results of the statistical analyses, perhaps 
another explanation can be given. Likely, it is not in fact relative deprivation theory that 
can explain these phenomena, as movement members do not feel deprived or dissatisfied. 
Perhaps it is rather a fear of this deprivation; the belief that outsiders are a threat to this 
satisfaction they feel in their lives. Considering the insecurity of losing status or financial 
wellbeing felt by radical right supporters offers a new avenue in exploring the support of 
radical right attitudes. These results, combined with the results of the immigrants and 
cultural life variable, lead to the conclusion that this fear of outsiders, in other words 
xenophobia, is strong among both conservative right and far-right supporters in both 
Hungary and Britain.  
Similar is Merton’s strain theory (1938; 1968), which suggests that frustration can 
result from individuals prevented from achieving perceived economic goals. Statistical 
analysis indeed showed a concern for economics in the Hungarian sample but not in the 
UK sample. As seen throughout this study, one of the main concerns of radical right protest 
movement participants in Britain is the cultural influence of Islam, along with 
disenchantment in politicians and immigration having a negative impact on British identity; 
consistent with the statistical results. Strain theory is not a sufficient explanation for 
considering an individual’s radical right movement participation in Hungary, however, as 
all Hungarian interview respondents seemed to have financial stability and made no 
mention of economic concerns. Nevertheless, there was great concerned expressed about 
the financial wellbeing of fellow Hungarians. Therefore, in the context of the radical right, 
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strain theory could be applied to concern over other fellow nationals and not the individual 
self, as other members of the nation can be considered an extension of an individual’s own 
national identity.  
 When considering the results of the qualitative interviews from a theoretical 
viewpoint, criminology’s differential association theory does maintain validity. Again, this 
is the suggestion that criminal behaviour can be learnt through social interaction, often 
within intimate social groups (Treadwell, 2013). As this implies that a person’s subculture 
heavily influences their attitudes and ideas, if this is extrapolated outside of criminal 
behaviour to radical ideologies and attitudes, it can then be applied to membership in radical 
right social movement organisations. Given the ambiguity of some of the respondents about 
where their nationalist feelings came from, this may be applicable in at least certain cases. 
While new organisation members must at least sympathise with the movement when 
joining, their attitudes and ideology become much stronger as they feel part of a group and 
are surrounded by friends and ‘family’ who support those attitudes. 
 Biographical factors were shown to play a role in certain instances, but not as 
strongly as originally thought. Klatch’s (1999) findings that both left and right political 
activist are heavily influenced by their upbringing could only be confirmed in one case of 
the four Hungarian respondents, as EDL respondents did not mention their upbringing. Two 
respondents explicitly stated that they were not influenced by their parents and upbringing 
to sympathise with the radical right movement, and another two did not go into specifics 
but stated that they only began to sympathise with the movement in adulthood. However, 
one of the respondents (Peter) did state that both of his children were members of the 
movement and integral parts of the organisation. Snow and Soule (2010) imply that factors 
such as being married, having children, and having full time employment, in other words 
biographical availability, discourage individuals from social movement participation. This 
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was not shown to be the case among these respondents, but more research participants and 
more in-depth biographical interviews would be necessary to further explore this idea, most 
especially among EDL supporters. Finally, Snow and Soule’s (2010) resonant socialisation 
experiences could play a role in the activism of the Hungarian respondents, as some 
participants mentioned the role of primary school (László) and bullying (Peter) in 
developing their attitudes. 
 
6.1.2 Motivations to Collective Action 
Motivations to collective action in these radical right organisations was explored 
through two of the research phases: online analysis and qualitative interviews. Online 
analysis of websites, Facebook pages, Instagram accounts, and YouTube channels served 
to illuminate how the organisations attempt to recruit members and how they portray their 
group identity and self-image to the public. Questions of why individuals joined a radical 
right organisation were covered through the qualitative interviews. 
When it comes to recruitment, the organisations seem to have quite different 
strategies. The EDL places far less emphasis on recruitment than MÖM does, both on its 
website and their social media pages. The EDL does heavily promote demonstrations 
through posters and Facebook events, and a quite visible PayPal ‘donations’ button on their 
website. It seems, however, that they are less concerned with recruiting core members; the 
focus seems to be on sympathisers and supporters. MÖM post regularly on their website 
and social media pages, attempting to recruit new members. Organisation events are 
advertised to the public, as are events that are specifically for recruitment purposes. They 
do not organise demonstrations and protests but they do attend some organised by other 
radical right organisations. They generally do not publicly advertise their attendance at 
these events, however. They do openly advertise their charity events, such as a regular food 
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and clothing drives in the 14th district of Budapest, but do not openly advertise ‘patrols’ 
and other core group events. 
The organisations’ websites, social media accounts, and YouTube channels show 
that the EDL and MÖM fundamentally differ. MÖM seem to have a stronger membership 
identity, and perhaps collective identity, than the EDL. MÖM are looking for hardworking, 
loyal, ‘God-fearing’ members who will represent the organisation well and portray a good 
image. The EDL, on the other hand, seem to seek supporters to grow demonstration 
numbers. As the EDL are portrayed as a single-issue activist movement, they seek to 
increase the image that many are against Islam in Britain. MÖM, on the other hand, seem 
to want to promote solidarity and loyalty among members. This may account for the success 
of organisations in Hungary over those in Britain. 
Qualitative interviews were also used to explore the idea of pathways into radical 
right organisations. While difficult to generate distinctive pathways into MÖM with only 
four respondents, some pathways did become evident. All four respondents joined the 
organisation of their own will and were quite adamant about expressing this fact. Of the 
participants, two joined MÖM in its current form and two joined in its previous form as the 
For a Better Future Movement. Both groups are essentially the same organisation, however, 
as MÖM was formed after the For a Better Future Movement was disbanded. Two 
respondents were members of other radical right organisations before joining MÖM/For a 
Better Future and two respondents were not members of any organisation before joining 
MÖM/For a Better Future. Three of the respondents specifically sought out such an 
organisation for various reasons such as frustration and seeking a paramilitary movement, 
while one respondent was introduced to the idea of radical right organisations by a personal 
contact. One member in particular referred to being motivated to seek out collective action 
after becoming frustrated and angered by the previous (left-wing) Hungarian government. 
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Emotion is an important factor in promoting social movement activism (Goodwin, 
Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b; Jasper, 1998), and is ultimately tied to moral shock, which is 
often the first step of the recruitment process (Jasper, 1998). An unexpected event or piece 
of information can cause extreme outrage, so that people can become inclined toward 
activism (Jasper, 1998). In addition, organisations can point to someone to blame for this 
moral shock, which can result in externally-directed shared emotions that are held in 
common by group members (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001b). The EDL especially has 
used the moral shock of sex grooming gangs and terrorist events in order to place blame on 
the Muslim community, furthering the shared emotions among supporters. 
Textual interviews with EDL supporters revealed several pathways into the 
organisation. Crucially, empirical studies have suggested that one of the main pathways 
into the EDL was through football firms (Busher, 2016, Pilkington, 2016), but it was not 
mentioned by one respondent in this study. A few respondents cited coming from different 
radical right organisations and far-right political parties. Others mentioned hearing about 
the EDL online or through news media and deciding to join on their own accord. Some 
were brought to the organisation by family, friends, or colleagues, while others joined after 
attending a demonstration or other emotionally-charged event. 
The current data suggests similar pathways into the organisation, namely through 
existing relationships, through other radical right organisations, or joining after attending a 
protest or an event. However, the actual path to becoming a member in both organisations 
is quite different, which is also closely connected to the emotional investment that 
supporters have in the organisation. EDL respondents mentioned joining the organisation 
online, and indeed several respondents seemed to equate their involvement with the EDL 
with their online activity. This means that anyone can be a supporter of the EDL; much of 
the ‘protest’ is done online, members to not regularly meet in person, and a supporter does 
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not have to invest much energy into the organisation in order to label themselves as a 
member of the EDL. In order to join MÖM, however, potential recruits must go through a 
serious vetting process. They are not immediately allowed into the organisation but can 
first attend events and get to know members. Once seen fit they undergo some testing 
(exactly what this testing entails is unclear) and, if deemed worthy, they are then made to 
be a full member of MÖM and receive their waistcoat. This rite of passage creates a feeling 
of brotherhood and solidarity among members that is much more likely to keep people in 
the organisation and active. Supporters of the EDL, however, are in a way kept in a liminal 
state; they are members without ever being full members.  
 
6.1.3 Maintaining Membership 
The question of why individuals maintain membership in radical right organisations 
was mostly explored through qualitative and textual interviews. Unexpectedly, the online 
analysis phase also shed some light on this question. Empirical data from this research 
found that identity and emotion played the largest parts in individuals maintaining 
membership in radical right organisations. 
All four interview respondents from MÖM appear to have found a sense of identity 
through their interaction with other organisation members. While each organisation 
member’s identity differs, members develop an identity as part of the organisation; they 
become MÖM members, and many identify as protectors of the Hungarian people and part 
of a larger radical right movement. This identification as an organisation member then 
strengthens feelings of pride. Ideology may also play a role in their membership, but this is 
not something that is openly advertised outside of the organisation. They all also spoke of 
protecting their fellow Hungarians, which would also imply a motive of instrumentality in 
their membership. 
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Consideration of the representation of an organisation’s collective and movement 
identities is imperative, as the development of these identities can help motivate people to 
collective action, produce feelings of solidarity, and define moral boundaries. Through 
social media and the online sphere, feelings and emotions can today be promoted on a daily 
basis, regardless of a sympathiser’s location or time allowance. There is no longer the need 
to attend common demonstrations, meetings, and events to promote solidarity; it can now 
happen constantly. Radical right organisations can now promote feelings of solidarity 
before individuals even attend their first meeting or event and can also promote these 
feelings to those individuals who may live further away or are unable to travel.  
Busher (2015) and Pilkington (2016) both describe the importance of solidarity and 
pride to the membership of the EDL. Busher defines four positive emotional themes: the 
excitement felt from demonstrations, feelings of belonging and solidarity, collective agency 
and possibility, and pride and dignity. Pilkington describes emotional themes of 
‘togetherness,’ solidarity, friendship, and loyalty. She also discusses the importance of 
collective rituals, such as demonstrations, and the importance of symbolism. 
Demonstrations, the main activity of the EDL, help to magnify these feelings of belonging 
and solidarity, and create an othering of ‘them’ and ‘us.’  
Textual interviews with EDL members did not reveal as strong a feeling of 
solidarity, however. Few respondents revealed strong feelings of pride in their involvement 
in the EDL. Others tied their involvement in the EDL together with feelings of dignity and 
respect, hope, and their British identity. Some respondents mentioned the importance of 
community, stating the importance of the support of their fellow EDL supporters and other 
British people who rely on the EDL to stand up for their interests. Only two respondents 
specifically referred to the ideas of solidarity and brotherhood. Many respondents seemed 
frustrated and angry over feelings of injustice, often feeling like ‘others’ were given 
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privilege over British natives; this also led to feelings of anger toward politicians. Some 
respondents also expressed a desire to protect their British identity or feeling that the 
organisation provided them with a sense of identity. While supporters expressed different 
ideologies and reasons for joining the organisation, these generally came from a feeling of 
frustration rather than a particularly strong far-right ideology. This shows that in the EDL, 
shared emotions of frustration and anger towards common targets - like Muslims, 
immigrants, and politicians - seem to be more common than reciprocal emotions between 
group members themselves. This is unsurprising, given that much of the activity of EDL 
supporters seems to be online, meaning that they are less likely to form meaningful 
connections with other supporters. 
When it comes to members of MÖM, reciprocal emotions are much more common, 
or at least more openly discussed in the interview, than are shared emotions. All four 
respondents emphasised the ideas of friendship, solidarity, and family, implying that one 
of the reasons individuals maintain membership in the organisation is due to close ties with 
other members. The positive emotional themes that were most common among respondents 
were solidarity and pride. Solidarity was quite evident in several forms. Respondents 
discussed solidarity with fellow group members, feeling of a brotherhood, a family, and a 
close group of friends; and also with the Hungarian people. These feelings of family and 
solidarity are reinforced through community events, such as the annual children’s summer 
camp. Respondents were proud of being MÖM members and proud of being Hungarian. 
All respondents exhibited pride in being members of the organisation, which was shown in 
several ways: in simply stating that they are proud to be a member, in discussing their 
importance and how they have gained an intimate knowledge of the legal system, in 
discussing their role in the organisation as a leader and/or teacher, and when discussing the 
effects of their actions on encouraging law enforcement to act. 
328 
 
This feeling of a collective identity, even in the online sphere, can also help to 
promote ideas of togetherness and solidarity. Indeed, it is impossible to have one without 
the other (Gamson, 1992). This allows for organisations to encourage feelings of solidarity 
on an everyday basis, easily accessible through sympathisers’ computers and phones. There 
is no longer the necessity to attend common demonstrations, meetings, and events to 
promote solidarity; it can now happen constantly. Radical right organisations can now 
promote feelings of solidarity before individuals are even regularly physically active with 
the organisation and can also promote these feelings to those individuals who may live 
further away or are unable to travel. It can encourage the formation of new chapters of the 
organisation in areas where the movement is not yet active.  
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6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE 
 The results of these three analyses, when taken together, paint a picture of two 
different organisations who have been shaped by the culture and history of their respective 
countries while still holding commonalities. Great Britain historically has a much greater 
amount of immigration, especially from the Muslim world. Hungary is still relatively 
homogeneous, in spite of the Hungarian government’s recent attempt to scare citizens with 
the ‘migrant threat.’ This concern over immigration shows a common fear of the ‘other,’ 
which could be related to a fear of potential deprivation. Radical right political activists in 
Britain are afraid they will lose their national culture and national identity to an influx of 
immigrants; this fear has been seen in the larger British culture through the results of the 
Brexit referendum. On the other hand, those on the radical right in Hungary are desperately 
trying to regain a national identity which has been ostensibly weakened through Soviet rule 
and membership in the European Union. This shows that, in both contexts, there is a 
concern over the loss of a ‘true’ identity; radical right organisations are seeking to regain 
and/protect that identity in the face of perceived threat. 
  This research contributes to the literature of collective action, social movement 
organisations, and particularly radical right organisations in a comparative framework. It 
also adds to the literature on the Hungarian radical right, particularly on a radical right 
organisation that had not been previously studied in an academic context. Additionally, this 
study is one of the first to conduct in-depth interviews with MÖM members. Finally, it 
provides new empirical evidence of a relatively large sample of EDL supporters, with new 
insight into the EDL’s support-base in a post-Brexit campaign and referendum context. 
The statistical analysis adds to the literature on relative deprivation theory in 
showing that, at least in the Hungarian and British contexts, it cannot necessarily explain 
movement membership. It was found that, in both Hungary and the UK, a high satisfaction 
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with life predicted both politically right and far-right attitudes, not low satisfaction as would 
be expected. Likely, it is not in fact relative deprivation theory that can explain these 
phenomena, as movement members do not feel deprived or dissatisfied. Perhaps it is rather 
a fear of this deprivation or a strong feeling of insecurity; the belief that outsiders are a 
threat to this satisfaction they feel in their lives. These results, combined with the results of 
the immigrants and cultural life variable, lead to the conclusion that this fear of outsiders, 
in other words xenophobia, is strong among both conservative right and far-right supporters 
in both Hungary and the UK.  
 In a comparative framework, it shows both the British and Hungarian far-right are 
concerned with the perceived effect that immigrants might have on their country’s cultural 
life. This leads to the conclusion that this fear of outsiders, in other words xenophobia, is 
strong among both conservative right and far-right supporters in both Hungary and the UK. 
The statistical results also show a stronger feeling of xenophobia in the UK, consistent with 
the findings that radical right protest movement participants in Great Britain are highly 
concerned with immigration and the cultural influence of Islam.  
Additionally, conservative-right and far-right supporters in the UK are less 
concerned with the effect of immigrants on the economy than are Hungarian supporters. 
This result, combined with the results of the qualitative interviews with Hungarian radical 
right organisation members, shows that strain theory is not a sufficient explanation for 
considering an individual’s radical right movement participation in Hungary. Respondents 
did, however, express great concern about the financial wellbeing of fellow Hungarians. 
Therefore, in a radical right context strain theory could be applied to concern over other 
fellow nationals and not the individual self, as other members of the nation can be 
considered an extension of an individual’s own national identity. Perhaps people do not 
seek collective action in radical right movements for seemingly selfish reasons, rather they 
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see the nation as a larger community to which they belong. If members of this imagined 
community (Anderson, 1983) are perceived to suffer economically and socially, it could 
provoke the same mechanisms of frustration as is suggested through strain theory. 
 The online analysis adds to the literature on social movements and radical right 
organisations in an online sphere. It found that radical right organisations do rely on the 
internet, mostly social media, to recruit new supporters and members; this was proved 
effective by textual interviews with EDL supporters, where many stated that they joined 
the EDL online. They also, to differing extents, use the online sphere to promote collective 
and movement identities, and feelings of solidarity and loyalty. Social media has made it 
far easier for organisations to recruit, both in spreading the message of their activism and 
in pulling people into their movement. The reach of such groups has become far larger than 
in the past, and now organisations are able to promote solidarity among members before 
they attend their first event. This analysis had extended previous knowledge of social 
movement activity online, recruitment patterns of social movement organisations, and the 
use of the online sphere by radical right organisations. 
It is crucial to consider the option of joining a radical right organisation online, as 
this can be closely connected to the emotional investment that supporters have in the 
organisation. EDL respondents mentioned joining the organisation online, and indeed 
several respondents seemed to equate their involvement with the EDL with their online 
activity. This means that anyone can be a supporter of the EDL; much of the ‘protest’ is 
done online, members to not regularly meet in person, and a supporter does not have to 
invest much energy into the organisation in order to label themselves as a member of the 
EDL. In order to join MÖM, however, potential recruits must go through a serious vetting 
process and are only full members after a distinctive rite of passage. This creates a feeling 
of brotherhood and solidarity among members that is much more likely to keep people in 
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the organisation and active, as opposed to EDL supporters of which many seemed to 
question their level of involvement. 
 Lastly, this study is one of few to conduct interviews with radical right movement 
members in Hungary, and the only academic study to have conducted interviews with 
MÖM members. Radical right organisations from Eastern European countries are generally 
underrepresented in radical right and social movement studies, especially due to language 
barriers and a lack of scholars who are native-speakers of those languages. The ideology 
and attitudes of radical right organisations in Eastern Europe are unique in the landscape of 
the European far-right, which is why it is important they are studied. As the sample size is 
fairly small, it is difficult to draw elaborate conclusions. This research does, however, add 
to the discussion of why individuals are drawn to collective action and join radical right 
organisations, why they develop nationalist feelings, and why they maintain membership 
in radical right organisations.  
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6.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
As with any study constrained by time and other factors, this research encountered 
several limitations. The first is that this project was originally designed to look at more 
groups, in order to offer a better-rounded idea of differential recruitment and radical right 
organisation membership. As this was not possible, the study is now more limited in scope 
than was intended. The project was also originally designed to look at somewhat more 
‘extreme’ groups in Great Britain, such as National Action who were disbanded in 2016, 
as there was already a large body of work on the EDL. When it comes to the quantitative 
analysis, the study was limited by the use of only one social survey and by using only three 
variables to test. The online analysis is also somewhat limited by time, and by the 
assumption that what is seen online is how the organisations intended to portray 
themselves. Finally, four major limitations of the qualitative interviews were: not finding 
EDL members to participate in telephone interviews, conducting only a small number of 
interviews in Hungary, the necessity of conducting telephone interviews, and the large 
discrepancy in sample-size between the Hungarian and British interviews.  
This study was originally designed to look at more groups, as well as to examine 
less-studied and less well-known organisations. Studying more organisations would have 
been important in order to draw more accurate conclusions and gain a better understanding 
of the research questions. Unfortunately, this was limited by time and the availability of 
non-political party radical right organisations in Great Britain. There would have been more 
possibility to include radical right organisations in Hungary, but this was kept to one 
organisation to form a better balance in comparison with the British data. It was also the 
aim to study less well-known organisations, as the original idea was to look at the British 
organisations National Action. Unfortunately for this study, National Action was 
proscribed in December of 2016, making them impossible to include. 
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 Another limitation is that this study only tested data from one survey and three 
variables. A more well-rounded analysis may have been provided by including other survey 
data, although this was thought unnecessary at the time of analysis as other surveys (such 
as the European Values Study) largely cover similar variables. More variables could have 
also been tested, but for the purposes of testing relative deprivation theory and xenophobic 
attitudes these variables proved to be enough from those available. 
The online analysis would have perhaps benefited from a study conducted over a 
longer period of time. An additional element could have been added to the study if 
comments on social media posts were also studied to analyse the emotion and collective 
identity of sympathisers. As the original aim of this study was to examine recruitment from 
the point of view of the organisations, this was not included in the original plan of study. 
An analysis of social media posts was intended in spring of 2019. Unfortunately, the EDL 
were permanently banned from Facebook in April 2019, just before the planned 
commencement of that study (Hern, 2019). This posed a valuable lesson for future online 
research: when conducting research of social media posts, especially of radical 
oragnisations, screenshots should be made of each image and attached discussion. 
Similarly, videos should be downloaded, and comments under the videos screenshotted. 
Had these been done, later further analysis may have been possible. 
The qualitative interview analysis yielded several unexpected limitations. The 
original, quite ambitious, plan for this project was to interview five to ten members of 
organisations from Great Britain (EDL) and from Hungary (MÖM). Interviews were to be 
semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted in person. Due to a sudden university-
change in the midst of the project, a new ethics application had to be submitted just at the 
time interview respondents should have been sought out. Time was of the essence at this 
point, and the decision was made to conduct interviews via telephone in order both to speed 
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up the ethics process and limit travel time to conduct interviews. This also only allowed a 
few months to find interview participants. Due to having personal contacts in the Hungarian 
radical right, participants could be found from MÖM. However, as I was limited to finding 
EDL members online, all while not showing my image, I was originally not able to find 
members of the EDL to participate in interviews. The solution for this was to conduct 
textual interviews with EDL supporters; this way, respondents did not have to share any of 
their personal information or image. While textual interviews yielded far more responses 
than originally expected, many respondents gave very short or even one-word answers. Due 
to the nature of textual interviews it was impossible to follow-up on interesting cases and 
answers, and to dig deeper.  
The interviews with MÖM members were not without problems, either. First, only 
pre-selected members of MÖM were interviewed for this project. Other issues arise in the 
conducting of the interviews with MÖM members. Firstly, these participants were selected 
by the organisation’s leader and would have naturally been strategically chosen as those 
‘loyal’ to the group’s cause. This skews the data towards stronger feelings of solidarity and 
loyalty. It would have been more successful to find participants either online or at an event, 
and to interview a random sampling of members. Interviews were also conducted over the 
phone, which made building a rapport with interviewees quite a challenge. While perhaps 
not so desirable when considering safety, interviews conducted in person would likely yield 
more reliable results. 
Overcoming these limitations in the future is mostly a matter of allowing for more 
time. Time is needed in order to receive proper ethics clearance for larger and more 
complex studies, especially for those involving face-to-face interviews with those the 
university may deem unsafe. Time is also needed for a more in-depth statistical study 
including, for example, the European Values Study in addition to the European Social 
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Survey, adding more variables, and having several response years to plot trends. Time is 
also needed to build rapport with potential interview participants, which could lead to 
finding participants in groups like the EDL and more participants from MÖM. When it 
comes to interviews, it would be helpful for both rapport building and for the validity of 
the data to conduct interviews face-to-face, preferably in person. Of course, there is also a 
matter of time, money, and, potentially, safety.  
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6.4 IMPLICATIONS 
 The comparative analysis of the EDL and MÖM makes it clear that studying the 
use of the online sphere by radical right movements has broader implications for 
understanding recruitment and the use of the internet for creating collective identity and 
feelings of solidarity, and should be further investigated. It is obvious that the use of social 
media has made it easier for radical right organisations to recruit larger numbers of 
sympathisers than in the past, as well as to recruit sympathisers not excluded by proximity. 
Movement organisers can also constantly manipulate their supporters regarding ideology 
and identity formation through the strategic use of social media. This, of course, is not 
limited only the radical right, but it is valuable to understand the role that social media plays 
for all forms of social movement and collective action. 
 If the spread of radical right organisations is to be curtailed, limiting their use of the 
online sphere would be a natural starting point. Protest movements like the EDL rely on 
the internet to recruit supporters and advertise demonstrations. They rely on their website 
and social media to disseminate demonstration flyers, which is now free as they do not need 
to be printed, and they can reach a much wider audience in a very short period of time. 
They also used Facebook’s ‘event’ feature, which allows supporters to share the event 
instantly with their own circles, and to remind supporters of upcoming events. It remains 
to be seen how the EDL’s permanent banning from Facebook will affect numbers at their 
demonstrations. MÖM, on the other hand, use social media to advertise recruitment events 
(including the contact information of the organisation’s leader), demonstrations, and 
community-building events. Granted, not all organisations have as large an internet 
presence as these two, since these were specifically chosen for being active online.  
 It could be possible to try and limit more radical ideologies and attitudes online. A 
major problem with regulating the internet, however, is that domain names are controlled 
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by the governing bodies of different countries. Most domains are accessible from all over 
the world, regardless of country of origin; if banned in one country, organisations can 
simply use an American internet service provider, little limited due to the First Amendment 
and universal free speech (Foxman & Wolf, 2013). Policy and laws against hate speech 
have little effect in dealing with the issue of radicalism and hate online (Foxman & Wolf, 
2013). What is clear, however, is that any policy attempting to regulate extremism online 
must have a transnational approach, with cooperation between American and Europe 
(Littler, 2017). 
 This study has also shown the importance of collective identity and emotion to 
movement participation. While the Hungarian political and social context becomes more 
in line with the attitudes of the radical right, namely staunch nationalism, irredentism, anti-
Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, and homophobia, the radical right must seek out new aspects of 
collective identity to contrast themselves with the government. Otherwise, members of 
radical right organisations could lose the desire to protest and be active in the movement. 
Now, however unfounded, organisation members seem to be upset about the government's 
perceived help of minorities over Hungarians, the perceived inability of law enforcement 
to complete their duties, and the corruption of the Fidesz government.  
The political climate of both Hungary and Great Britain has changed over the course 
of this four-year study. Four years ago, both were indeed outside of the norm of Europe in 
terms of their history and culture, but not as clearly as they are today. The United Kingdom 
has now voted on a referendum to leave the European Union, which is now set to occur by 
the end of October 2019. Hungary has increasingly been seen in the news for the anti-EU 
and anti-democratic values and policies of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán. Now, more than ever, 
studies tackling nationalism and the far-right in Europe are critical. 
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Results of the textual interviews with EDL supporters showed that those in the 
British radical right are becoming more disenchanted, and less trusting, of politicians. 
These sentiments are combined with extremely negative views of the European Union and 
strong anti-immigrant attitudes. Strong anti-EU attitudes and distrust in politicians were not 
mentioned in studies conducted prior to the 2015 Vote Leave campaign, suggesting that 
Brexit had a strong influence on those who support, and indeed driving people to support, 
the radical right. Not only that, but several respondents mentioned anger over how Brexit 
was being handled by the government, suggesting that the government is ignoring the will 
of the people. 
This suggests that if Brexit were to be finalised and the UK indeed did leave the 
EU, those who support the EDL on the basis of anti-EU attitudes would lose their 
motivation for support. Naturally it is quite possible that these supporters would adopt other 
attitudes, such as stronger anti-immigrant attitudes. However, given that these supporters 
seemed altogether less invested in the EDL, it is likely they would lose their motivation for 
membership. A crucial development in UK politics is the election of Boris Johnson as the 
new British Prime Minister and Leader of the Conservative Party in July 2019. Boris 
Johnson’s new Cabinet is now nearly entirely made up of Vote Leave campaigners and 
‘Brexiteers’ (Blanchard, 2019); this combined with the building of new infrastructure in 
many pro-Brexit areas of England may indeed alleviate much of the frustration of some on 
the radical right. This raises a question relevant in many parts of Europe: that of what 
happens to radical right activists once the very thing they protest disappears. 
 The political climate in Hungary has also been changing since the start of this 
project. In recent years, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party have been facing 
increasingly sharp criticism for their radical politics from opponents, the European Union, 
and scholars. During the refugee crisis of 2015, Fidesz introduced a xenophobic campaign 
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against migrants and built fences along Hungary’s southern borders. Fidesz also rewrote 
the constitution, and now rule over a country in “which racist speech and prohibited far-
right paramilitary activities are tolerated” (Fekete, 2016). In 2017 Fidesz began what many 
are calling an anti-Semitic campaign against Hungarian-American philanthropist George 
Soros. Prior to the April 2018 elections, Fidesz announced that they had created a list of 
2000 ‘Soros agents,’ of which 200 were published in the pro-Fidesz Figyelő magazine 
immediately following the elections. On this list were people working for various 
humanitarian NGOs in Hungary and academics at the Central European University in 
Budapest, among others. In June of 2018 the ‘Stop Soros’ bill was approved in parliament, 
effectively criminalising any act or organisation which helps refugees in Hungary.  
At the same time, Hungary has a new extreme-right political party. The new Our 
Homeland movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom), led by ex-Jobbik member László Toroczkai, 
openly promotes radical right attitudes, with Toroczkai stating on national TV: “Hungary 
could be a white island in Europe. This is one of our goals” (ECHO TV, 2018). It becomes 
readily apparent when looking at the movement’s Facebook page that they are intimately 
connected with radical right organisations, including MÖM. 
 In a political climate where the ruling party has legitimised radical right ideology, 
the question arises of what need people have for being politically active in a radical right 
movement. However, Hungarian radical right organisations show no signs of disappearing, 
and new movements and parties have even appeared. Perhaps this is one reason why 
Hungarian radical right organisations do not tend to be political activist organisations as is 
the case in Great Britain; there is simply no need for them to be activists.  
 
 
 
341 
 
6.4.1 Policy and Practice 
 The findings of this research lead to several potential implications for public policy. 
It must be pointed out, however, that in the Hungarian political context it is realistically 
quite difficult to make policy suggestions. Suggesting policy recommendations about the 
limit or control of radical right organisations to a nationalist and far-right government 
seems futile, to say the least. Therefore, these recommendations will focus on the level of 
the European Union and abroad, and not on individual countries. 
The first policy implication is for the continued limiting of radical right 
organisations on social media. The difficulty here is that ownership of social media sites is 
most generally in the United States, but nevertheless there should be encouragement of site 
owners and administrators to be more vigilant. As shown in this study, radical right 
organisations often use social media to recruit members and to strengthen solidarity among 
supporters and members. The use of the internet, and most especially social media, allows 
distance not to be a factor any longer in supporter recruitment, meaning the organisation 
can grow more easily and rapidly. The removal of hate speech on social media has begun 
in the EU (Fioretti, 2018) as well as the removal of the social media pages of certain radical 
right organisations, but many organisations can continue. To do this most effectively would 
likely require the employment of local experts to find radical right organisations active 
online. 
 A second recommendation is that there must be a consensus on limiting hate speech 
that reaches internationally. A major problem with regulating the internet is that domain 
names are controlled by the governing bodies of different countries. Most domains are 
accessible from all over the world regardless of country of origin; if banned in one country, 
organisations can simply use an American internet service provider, little limited due to the 
First Amendment and universal free speech (Foxman & Wolf, 2013). However, it should 
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be noted that Foxman and Wolf (2013) emphasise that policy and laws against hate speech 
have little effect in dealing with the issue of nationalism and hate online.  
 A third recommendation is to limit demonstrations by radical right organisations. 
As previously discussed, demonstrations serve to strengthen feelings of solidarity among 
organisation members. This is especially important Great Britain, where besides online, 
one of the EDL’s main means of recruitment are their regular demonstrations around 
Britain. These are generally pre-advertised online, through images on social media and 
Facebook ‘events,’ and could be easily spotted and shut down before they occur. 
 Several of the Hungarian respondents pointed to learning about Hungarian history 
and traditional values in school. The Hungarian example illustrates the importance of 
education, especially when it comes to critical thinking and learning about other cultures 
throughout all of Europe. Indeed, at the moment the Fidesz government is trying to do the 
very opposite, by instituting the teaching of ‘Christian culture’ and the strengthening of 
‘national identity’ in kindergartens (Dull, 2018), as well as calling for the banning of gender 
studies programs in Hungary (Adam, 2018). 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, an EU-wide body for limiting hate speech 
and radical right organisations should be called for, especially given that some EU 
governments already support them. This is especially of concern in several Eastern and 
Southern European countries, such as Hungary, Poland, and Italy, but need is growing all 
over Europe. Limiting the activity of radical right organisations is virtually impossible in a 
country governed by those who support the same values; the control of this can only start 
on the level of the European Union. 
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6.4.2 Recommendations for Future Research  
 While this was a fairly small-scale study, nevertheless it suggests several future 
avenues of research due to the timely nature of the topic and to the political environment 
of the European region. It is, in today’s world, especially critical to understand why 
individuals adopt views of radical nationalism, and what drives these views in specific 
cultural and social contexts. If Europe continues to draw further to the right in the following 
years, it will become increasingly important for opposition parties, democratic 
governments, civil society, and NGOs to understand how to combat this trend. It is also 
important to understand why individuals join radical right organisations: without 
understanding motivation, protest activity cannot be forestalled. If democratic governments 
wish to prevent the growth of the radical right, especially more violent organisations, it is 
crucial that they understand what drives their citizens to join and maintain membership. 
 With these points in mind, the first avenue could be to expand this study to include 
several other European countries. This would obviously be a much larger-scale study and 
would require the involvement of native speakers of each country. Comparative studies 
could be approached from several angles: a survey or experimental analysis of several 
European countries examining social factors such as the influence of political climate on 
the rise of, and membership in, radical right organisations; the use of the online sphere in 
recruitment in various social and cultural contexts; and interviews with radical right 
organisation members in less-researched countries, for example in Eastern Europe. Further 
comparisons in a ‘east versus west’ dichotomy could also yield interesting results. 
It would also be important to compare the motivations to join and maintain 
membership in different radical right organisations within Hungary, as most have different 
membership profiles. More ‘peaceful’ groups could be compared to those who hold more 
demonstrations (such as HVIM), and to those who are far more violent (such as the Outlaw 
344 
 
Army). A comparison between those individuals who choose to join non-political radical 
right activist movements (such as MÖM, HVIM, and the Outlaw Army) could also be 
compared to those who join political parties (such as Jobbik and the newly-formed Our 
Homeland party), in order to illuminate what drives individuals towards radical right 
politics. 
 It is also critical to further explore the use of the internet by radical right 
organisations, especially in other social and cultural contexts. Specifically, would the 
limitation of internet use and exposure for such organisations influence the turnout at their 
demonstrations and events. If so, this could have major implications for future social media 
controls and regulations. 
 The ideas of emotions and collective identity in radical right social movement 
organisations and activist organisations could also be further explored. Do supporters and 
sympathisers differ in their feelings of solidarity and loyalty from full-fledged members, 
and if so, how? How do emotions and collective identity differ in these levels of support, 
and what are the factors determining whether someone remains a supporter or seeks 
membership? 
 As governments are tending toward the right in many countries, such as Hungary, 
Poland, and Italy, it would be important to understand how these trends are influencing 
radical right organisations and membership. As governments become more illiberal and 
radical, it can be argued that they support many of the same values and attitudes of radical 
right social movements. In such a political environment, do these social movements grow 
or shrink? Do individuals choose to become members of street-level organisations, political 
parties, or both? Do the lines between street-level movements and political parties begin to 
blur, and if so, how? 
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 If qualitative interviews are to be conducted with members of organisations, they 
should be conducted in person and not via telephone. Far more than just a few months is 
needed to develop a good rapport with participants, and especially to recruit participants. 
Follow-up interviews may also be necessary in some cases. Textual interviews could offer 
an excellent avenue for future research of hard-to-reach populations, if these interviews can 
be disseminated via a cite such as Facebook. Of course, this would require this organisation 
to be active on social media. In order to avoid the issue of short and one-word answers, a 
possible solution would be to find, or develop, a program to allow respondents to answer 
questions vocally. This way, the anonymity of the textual interview is maintained while 
overcoming the issue of participants potentially not wanting to type their answers. Of 
course, these textual interviews also do not allow for the building of any rapport with 
respondents, but they could be a good place to start. 
 In a larger-scale project with similar research questions, another important angle of 
study would be from the perspective of gender. The study could investigate how these 
groups are marketed toward males and females, and examine the general ‘masculine’ nature 
of radical right organisations. Interviews could be conducted with female and male 
members of several radical right movements to illuminate the origin of their nationalist 
attitudes, why they joined the movement, and why they maintain membership.  
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6.5 FINAL THOUGHTS 
 The aim of this study was to add to the discourse of radical right and political protest 
organisations, and of social movement studies. Namely, this study intended to explore the 
questions of why individuals adopt radical right views, why they join social movement 
organisations, and why they maintain membership in those organisations. These questions 
were examined through both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and intersect 
several disciplines: political sociology, criminology, social psychology, and sociology. 
 The question of why individuals adopt nationalist views was explored through both 
statistics and qualitative interviews. This research could not firmly answer these questions, 
but that was not the intention of the study. Obviously, such a small-scale study cannot 
answer such complex questions that have been studied for decades; the aim was rather to 
add to the discussion. This study succeeded in adding to discussions about relative 
deprivation theory and about the adoption of radical right attitudes in both the Hungarian 
and British context. 
 The question of why individuals join social movement organisations, and 
specifically those at the centre of this study, was explored through both online analysis and 
qualitative interviews, including primary source data on interviews conducted by other 
researchers. This study did not succeed in finding one specific path into activism, but rather 
learned that several pathways are found in each radical right organisation. A much larger 
and more detailed study would be necessary to further develop the intricacies of pathways 
into activism. The online analysis did find, however, that emotions are a major contributor 
for the support of radical right organisations and a factor for driving people to seek 
collective action.  
 The question of why individuals maintain membership in such organisations was 
explored through qualitative interviews and comparative primary-source data. It was found 
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that the main factors influencing individuals to maintain membership are emotions such as 
pride and also the solidarity and loyalty felt in an organisation considered to be a family, 
community, and brotherhood. It was also found that emotions like solidarity and loyalty are 
increased if the organisation has a strong definition of membership combined with a feeling 
of exclusivity. 
 This research endeavoured to add to the discourse on collective action and social 
movement activism, especially in the realm of radical right organisations. This is an 
incredibly timely topic, as a rise in the far-right, extreme right, radical right – whatever one 
chooses to call it – is very real across both Europe and around the world. It is important to 
understand what drive people to hate, and more so, what drive people to feel such hatred, 
or perhaps fear, that they seek social change to reflect their attitudes. While the more 
radicalised far-right is fading in Great Britain, a very different image has been appearing in 
Hungary. Hungary is a country where radical right movements thrive both in street-level 
movements and in the political sphere; understanding the motivations of its members and 
supporters will be increasingly essential in the years to come. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
LINEAR REGRESSION R AND ANOVA TABLES 
 
 
Table A1: R values for linear regression analysis for the effects of life satisfaction and predictors 
on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample. 
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Model 1 
 
.22a .049 .045 2.276 
Model 2 
 
.25b .063 .059 2.259 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, life satisfaction  
  
 
 
Table A2: ANOVA results for the effects of life satisfaction on left-right scale placement for 
Hungarian sample. 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Squares F p 
1       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
365.97 
7141.38 
7507.36 
5 
1379 
1384 
73.19 
5.18 
14.13 0a 
2       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
472.34 
7035.01 
7507.36 
6 
1378 
1384 
78.72 
5.11 
15.42 0b 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, life satisfaction  
 
 
 
Table A3: R values for linear regression analysis for the effects of opinion on whether 
immigrants or good or bad for the country’s economy and predictors on left-right scale 
placement for Hungarian sample. 
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Model 1 
 
.22a .047 .044 2.285 
Model 2 
 
.22b .050 .046 2.282 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants good or bad for 
economy  
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Table A4: ANOVA results for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for 
the country’s economy on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample. 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Squares F p 
1       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
343.19 
6910.48 
7253.67 
5 
1324 
1329 
68.64 
5.22 
13.15 0a 
2       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
364.28 
6889.40 
7253.67 
6 
1323 
1329 
60.71 
5.21 
11.66 0b 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants good or bad for 
economy  
 
 
 
Table A5: R values for linear regression analysis for the effects of opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life and predictors on left-right 
scale placement for Hungarian sample. 
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Model 1 
 
.22a .049 .045 2.283 
Model 2 
 
.24b .056 .052 2.276 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants undermine or 
enrich country’s cultural life 
  
 
 
 
Table A6: ANOVA results for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or enrich 
the country’s cultural life on left-right scale placement for Hungarian sample. 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Squares F p 
1       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
351.44 
6813.50 
7164.93 
5 
1307 
1312 
70.29 
5.21 
13.48 0a 
2       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
400.13 
6764.80 
7164.93 
6 
1306 
1312 
66.69 
5.18 
12.88 0b 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants undermine or 
enrich country’s cultural life  
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Table A7: R values for linear regression analysis for the effects of life satisfaction and predictors 
on left-right scale placement for British sample. 
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Model 1 
 
.20a .040 .037 1.971 
Model 2 
 
.22b .049 .046 1.962 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, life satisfaction  
  
 
 
Table A8: ANOVA results for the effects of life satisfaction on left-right scale placement for 
British sample. 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Squares F p 
1       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
315.65 
7652.73 
7938.38 
5 
1970 
1975 
63.13 
3.89 
16.25 0a 
2       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
391.54 
7576.84 
7968.38 
6 
1969 
1975 
65.26 
3.85 
16.96 0b 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, life satisfaction  
 
 
 
 
Table A9: R values for linear regression analysis for the effects of opinion on whether 
immigrants or good or bad for the country’s economy and predictors on left-right scale 
placement for British sample. 
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Model 1 
 
.20a .040 .037 1.973 
Model 2 
 
.21b .045 .042 1.968 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants good or bad for 
economy  
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Table A10: ANOVA results for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants are good or bad for 
the country’s economy on left-right scale placement for British sample. 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Squares F p 
1       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
312.50 
7586.01 
7898.51 
5 
1948 
1953 
62.50 
3.89 
16.05 0a 
2       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
356.58 
7541.92 
7898.51 
6 
1947 
1953 
59.43 
3.87 
15.34 0b 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants good or bad for 
economy  
 
 
 
Table A11: R values for linear regression analysis for the effects of opinion on whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life and predictors on left-
right scale placement for British sample. 
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Model 1 
 
.20a .041 .039 1.967 
Model 2 
 
.24b .058 .055 1.951 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants undermine or 
enrich country’s cultural life 
  
 
 
Table A12: ANOVA results for the effects of opinion on whether immigrants undermine or 
enrich the country’s cultural life on left-right scale placement for British sample. 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Squares F p 
1       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
325.10 
7553.41 
7878.51 
5 
1952 
1957 
65.02 
3.87 
16.80 0a 
2       Regression 
         Residual 
         Total 
453.22 
7425.29 
7878.51 
6 
1951 
1957 
75.54 
3.81 
19.85 0b 
 a. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership 
b. Predictors: (constant), education, sex, age, employment, partnership, immigrants undermine or 
enrich country’s cultural life  
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http://www.hud.ac.uk/hhs/research/srep/. 
 
Researcher(s) details 
 
Katherine Kondor 
 
Budapest 1071 
Dembinszky utca 33, III/4 
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor(s) details 
 
Dr Carla Reeves 
Dr Mark Littler 
 
All documentation has been 
read by supervisor (where 
applicable)  
YES / NO / NOT APPLICABLE 
This proposal will not be considered unless the supervisor has 
submitted a report confirming that (s)he has read all documents and 
supports their submission to SREP  
Aim / objectives 
 
The aim of my research is to understand what motivates people to: 
• adopt extremist (specifically right-wing) attitudes,  
• join extreme right organisations,  
• join the particular organisation to which they belong,  
• to maintain membership in these organisations.  
 
Brief overview of research 
methods 
 
This research will focus on two far-right street-level organisations 
from both the United Kingdom and Hungary, one from each country. 
I plan to conduct semi-structured interviews via telephone with 
approximately five members of each organisation. Phone calls will 
be made by me to the participant, from a program such as 
SkypeOut, using an account created for this research project, to 
ensure that they do not have access to my personal phone number. 
 
Semi-structured interviews would constitute the third empirical 
chapter of my dissertation. The first two chapters involved 
secondary survey analysis and online content analysis, 
respectively. Research was conducted at the University of Hull, 
where it received ethical approval and has already been completed. 
 
Project start date 
 
As soon as ethics approval has passed, hopefully January 2018 for 
this phase. 
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Project completion date 
 
Planned submission: September 2018. 
Permissions for study 
 
Permissions only from the individuals participating in interview, see 
below. 
Access to participants 
 
Participants will be members of the English Defence League in the 
United Kingdom and the Hungarian Defence Movement in Hungary. 
All participants will be above 18 years of age. 
 
In the Hungarian Defence Movement, “member” is more clearly 
defined as individuals must undergo an initiation ritual where they 
are given an official movement waistcoat. Only when they have this 
waistcoat are they considered full members of the organisation. Of 
course, as interviews will be conducted via phone it will be difficult 
to absolutely ensure someone is a full member, which is always a 
risk that must be considered. This will be based on self-
identification as a member and will not be checked. 
 
As for the English Defence League, “member” is more difficult to 
define as they do not have such strict initiations. In this case, I will 
seek active supporters of the group, with ‘active’ being defined as 
someone who regularly attends demonstrations and is in regular 
contact with other supporters of the group. Again, this is will be 
based on self-identification as an active supporter. 
 
Participants in Hungary will be recruited through pre-existing 
personal contacts, which can lead to snowball sampling to recruit 
more participants. In Hungary, I have contacts who have access to 
far-right groups, who will provide me with a contact to the 
Hungarian Defence Movement. 
 
Additionally, I can seek to gain access to participants in both 
Hungary and the UK through paid public advertising. This can be 
done over social media platforms such as Facebook, targeting the 
organisations’ pages. 
 
Participants will be briefed on my research, stressing that this is 
investigatory research on political activism. Participants will be 
provided with an information sheet and asked to sign or verbally 
approve a consent form. They will also be briefed on their rights, 
and on how I will be maintaining confidentiality.  
 
Confidentiality 
 
All data will be anonymised, with participants being given aliases. A 
list of names with their coinciding alias will be password protected 
and stored separately from any interview data or material. 
Participants will also be asked not to give any identifying 
characteristics. 
 
I will be the only person with direct access to the data. My 
supervisors may have access to portions of the anonymised data in 
the case where I am in need of aid with understanding or 
interpreting the data. 
 
Data will be encrypted and stored on my personal computer. Data 
will also be backed up on an external storage device, which will be 
stored in a safe and secured place.  
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Anonymity 
 
All data will be anonymised, with participants being given aliases. A 
list of names with their coinciding alias will be password protected 
and stored separately from any interview data or material. 
Participants will also be asked not to give any identifying 
characteristics, and I will refrain from using their names in the 
interview. 
 
Especially in the case of the Hungarian Defence Movement, the 
particular chapter to which the individual belongs may also have to 
be anonymised. Certain regional chapters have a very small 
number of members, in which case it would be easier to determine 
the identity of the participant. 
 
This research is only focused on interviewing members of the 
organisations, and not the movement leadership. This will avoid any 
problems associated with the ease of identifying the leaders of the 
groups. 
 
Right to withdraw 
 
I will be offering participants the right to withdraw, which can be 
done through personal communication with me. Communication will 
be through my University email address, where participants will be 
able to contact me with questions and concerns. If they choose to 
withdraw from the study and have their data destroyed, their data 
will be deleted in its entirety. Participants may withdraw until 30 
days from the time of the interview, after which they will lose their 
right to withdraw from the study. 
 
Data Storage 
 
Interviews will be audio recorded. Interviews will not be transcribed 
in their entirety, for the sake of time-constraints and confidentiality. 
 
Data will be encrypted and stored on my personal computer in a 
password-protected file. Data will also be backed up on an external 
storage device, which will be stored in a safe and secured place.  
 
Psychological support for 
participants 
Throughout the course of the interview I will endeavour to avoid 
asking any questions that can be considered personally distressing. 
Given the flight chance that this may cause distress, I will have the 
contact information of support services available (for example, the 
Samaritans in the UK). 
 
 
Researcher safety / support 
(attach completed University 
Risk Analysis and 
Management form) 
See attached. 
Information sheet 
 
See attached 
Consent form 
 
See attached. 
Letters / posters / flyers 
 
N/A 
Questionnaire / Interview 
guide 
 
See attached. 
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Debrief (if appropriate) 
 
After the conclusion of the interview, I will ensure the participant has 
information about the study, in the form of the information letter 
(which they will receive prior to the interview). I will also ensure the 
participants has my and my supervisor’s contact information, in the 
event they would like to follow up on the findings. I will also give 
information for psychological support, should it be required. 
 
Dissemination of results 
 
Portions of the data will be presented in my PhD thesis, as well as 
used for future publication. There is, of course, the option available 
to embargo my dissertation for a period after completion. 
 
Identify any potential conflicts 
of interest 
This project is self-funded and will not involve any participants 
previously known to the researcher. 
 
Does the research involve 
accessing data or visiting 
websites that could constitute 
a legal and/or reputational risk 
to yourself or the University if 
misconstrued?  
 
Please state Yes/No 
 
If Yes, please explain how you 
will minimise this risk 
No, as this phase of research requires qualitative interviews. I did 
access such websites, Facebook pages, and YouTube channels for 
earlier stages of my dissertation research, which was granted 
ethical approval by the University of Hull (where I attended until 
September 2017). It should be noted that these websites are all 
legal sites, relating to legal organisations.  
The next four questions in the grey boxes relate to Security Sensitive Information – please read the 
following guidance before completing these questions: 
http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2012/oversight-of-
security-sensitive-research-material.pdf 
Is the research commissioned 
by, or on behalf of the military 
or the intelligence services?  
 
Please state Yes/No 
 
If Yes, please outline the 
requirements from the funding 
body regarding the collection 
and storage of Security 
Sensitive Data 
No 
Is the research commissioned 
under an EU security call 
 
Please state Yes/No 
 
If Yes, please outline the 
requirements from the funding 
body regarding the collection 
and storage of Security 
Sensitive Data 
No 
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Does the research involve the 
acquisition of security 
clearances?  
 
Please state Yes/No 
 
If Yes, please outline how your 
data collection and storages 
complies with the 
requirements of these 
clearances 
No 
Does the research concern 
terrorist or extreme groups? 
 
Please state Yes/No 
 
If Yes, please complete a 
Security Sensitive Information 
Declaration Form 
No. While the groups I will be interviewing are considered “extreme 
right,” they are not classed as terrorist or extremist groups by their 
respective governments (for example, by being proscribed).  
Does the research involve 
covert information gathering or 
active deception? 
 
Please state Yes/No 
 
No 
Does the research involve 
children under 18 or 
participants who may be 
unable to give fully informed 
consent? 
 
Please state Yes/No 
 
No 
Does the research involve 
prisoners or others in custodial 
care (e.g. young offenders)? 
 
Please state Yes/No 
 
No 
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Does the research involve 
significantly increased danger 
of physical or psychological 
harm or risk of significant 
discomfort for the 
researcher(s) and/or the 
participant(s), either from the 
research process or from the 
publication of findings? 
 
Please state Yes 
 
As long as data is anonymised appropriately, participants are not at 
risk for harm. Of course, there is always the chance that 
participants will inform others of their participation in the study, but 
that is the participant’s choice to reveal that information. 
Participants also have the opportunity to withdraw from the study 
and have their data destroyed should any concern for their safety 
arise.  
 
There are certain instances in which I may have to breach 
confidentiality, as are certain types of information that I would be 
legally obliged to report to authorities. These are: 1) knowledge of 
terrorist activity or the financial involvement in terrorist activity, 2) 
money laundering, and 3) the abuse and/or neglect of a child. 
Participants will be reminded of this during the interview if deemed 
necessary. 
 
Risk of stress and/or anxiety should also be quite low for 
participants, as I only plan to ask broad questions. Participants can 
then decide how much information they are willing to share. I will 
not be debating with participants on their views, but asking them to 
describe their views and association with their respective groups. 
 
After considering the potential harm to myself, it was decided that 
interviews would be conducted via phone or skype (phone only), 
from an account used solely for this research project. Although risk 
for harm would be low if interviews were conducted in person, this 
eliminates any potential for physical harm that may arise. 
Participants will not have access to my image or any personal 
information about myself, other than my name and my attendance 
at the University of Huddersfield. I will also ensure that my picture is 
not publicly available on social media. 
 
As for my emotional well-being, I have resources available for 
support. I can go to my supervisors for assistance, and also utilise 
the University’s wellbeing services. I have the opportunity to end an 
interview if it should become difficult, or if a participant should 
become abusive. 
 
I have read and will adhere to the Code of Safety published by the 
Social Research Association, available at http://the-sra.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/safety_code_of_practice.pdf 
Does the research involve risk 
of unplanned disclosure of 
information you would be 
obliged to act on? 
 
Please state Yes 
 
There are certain types of information that I would be legally obliged 
to report to authorities. These are: 1) knowledge of terrorist activity 
or the financial involvement in terrorist activity, 2) money 
laundering, and 3) the abuse and/or neglect of a child. These topics 
will be avoided in the interview questioning, and participants will be 
asked to avoid these topics. They are covered in the information 
and consent forms.  
 
Other issues 
 
 
Where application is to be 
made to NHS Research Ethics 
Committee / External 
Agencies 
N/A 
Please supply copies of all relevant supporting documentation electronically. If this is not 
available electronically, please provide explanation and supply hard copy  
 
All documentation must be submitted to the SREP administrator. All proposals will be 
reviewed by two members of SREP. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist movements in Hungary and the 
United Kingdom  
 
Katherine Kondor, PhD Candidate 
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk 
 
 
 Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for 
the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw up to thirty (30) days after the date of the interview, 
without giving reason, in which case I may ask for my data to be 
destroyed. 
 
 
3.     I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
  
 Please initial box 
 
Yes              No 
4.   I agree to the interview being audio recorded    
5.    I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
 
  
6. I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it 
has been anonymised) and may be used for future research and 
publication. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date    Signature 
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BELEEGYEZÉSI NYILATKOZAT  
 
 
Európa Szélén: Egy összehasonlίtási tanulmány Angol meg Magyar nemzeti mozgalmokról [On 
the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist movements in Hungary and the United 
Kingdom]  
 
Kondor Katalin, PhD jelölt 
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Kérjuk jelőlje be a 
kockákat a neve 
kezdőbetuivel 
2. Megerősίtem, hogy elolvastam és megértettem a fenti tanulmány 
tályékoztató lapját, és hogy volt lehetőségem kérdéseket feltenni.  
 
 
 
 
3. Tudomásul veszem, hogy részvételem önkéntes, és szabadon 
visszavonhatom az interjút követő harminc (30) napig indokolás 
nélkül, mely esetben megkérhetem, hogy megsemmisítsék az 
adataimat. 
 
               
3.     Beleegyezem, hogy részt veszek a fenti tanulmányban.  
 
  
 
  
 Kérem, válassza a 
megfelelő kockát 
 
    Igen               Nem 
4.Beleegyezem, hogy az interjut hangfelvételre rögzίtsék.    
5. Beleegyezem, hogy idézeteimet névtelenul használhatják 
publikációkban.   
  
6. Beleegyezem, hogy a jelen tanulmányban összegyűjtött adataim 
tárolhatók (anonimizálás után), és felhasználhatók a jövőbeli 
kutatásokhoz és kiadványokhoz.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Résztvevő Neve     Dátum    Aláίrás 
 
 
 
 
 
Kutató Neve     Dátum    Aláίrás 
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APPENDIX D 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Katherine Kondor 
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk 
On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist social movement 
organisations in Hungary and the United Kingdom 
  
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully! 
 
This study is seeking to look at political activists in certain organisations. Specifically, I am 
interested in why someone becomes politically active, why someone joins a movement or 
organisation, and why they stay a member of that organisation. I am particularly 
interested in politically-motivated organisations concerned with cultural and political 
issues.   
 
The study is composed of three parts. First, I looked at the European Social Survey (ESS) 
data to gain an understanding of the wider national feelings towards specific things like 
immigration, politics, and economics. Then, I looked at websites and social media sites to 
better understand politically active social movements and organisations, such as the one 
you are a member of. The last part of this research involves interviews with members of 
these organisations. Interviews are planned for March 2018. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate because you, or someone else, has suggested that 
you are a member the organisation of interest to this study, namely the English Defence 
League. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part in this research. If you do decide to 
take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time during the interview and up until 30 
days after, and without giving a reason. 
 
In addition to being able to withdraw up to thirty days after the interview, should you feel 
uncomfortable about anything discussed in the interview you can contact Samaritans UK 
at 116 123, where people are available to anonymously discuss any issues you may have 
over the phone (www.samaritans.org). 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to take part in an interview with 
me, which will happen over the phone, at no cost to you. This interview can last 
anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour. This interview will be recorded, with your 
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consent, to aid my research and analysis of the interview. This recording will only be 
used for the purposes of this research, and will be kept absolutely secured. 
 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?  
Confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity will be ensured during the collection, storage, and 
publication of the research material. All information disclosed within the interview will be 
kept confidential, except where legal obligations would necessitate disclosure by the 
researchers to appropriate personnel. 
In order to ensure your privacy, data will be anonymised. I would ask that you not 
reveal any ‘tell-tale’ details about yourself (for example, a unique tattoo) or any specific 
names. You will be given an alias, and your real name will not be revealed throughout the 
research project. In all reporting of the research you will be anonymised and identifying 
information, if present, removed. 
The data collected (ie. the recording of the interview and any notes) will be kept 
secure at all times. Any computers and external storage devices on which data will be 
stored will be encrypted, and data will be password protected. The data generated over 
the course of this research must be kept securely in paper or electronic form for a period 
of ten years after the completion of the research project. 
 
I am conducting this research as a student at the University of Huddersfield for my PhD 
dissertation in Social Sciences. Parts of the dissertation will eventually be published in the 
form of conference presentations and journal publications, but no interview will be 
published in full. This research has been approved by a Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Huddersfield.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
Your participation in this study would greatly help further knowledge of social 
phenomena and activism. Specifically, as someone who is politically active, you would 
help us understand what motivates people to political activism. Not to mention, you 
would be greatly helping me with my PhD! 
 
What should I do if I want to take part?  
If you are willing to take part in the study, I would like to speak with you over the phone. 
This interview could last anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour. I will phone you so that 
you do not incur any of the cost of the phone call. 
 
If you wish to take part in this research or would like further information, please do not 
hesitate to contact me. I can be reached via email at katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk. If you 
have any concerns about the way in which the research was conducted, please contact 
my supervisor at the University of Huddersfield, Dr. Mark Littler, at m.littler@hud.ac.uk. 
 
I know your time is valuable, so thank you for taking the time to read this information 
sheet and for considering participation in this study. 
 
Sincerely, 
Katherine Kondor               
January 10, 2018 
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Résztvevő Információ Lap 
 
Kondor Katalin 
katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk 
Európa Szélén: Egy összehasonlίtási tanulmány Angol meg Magyar nemzeti 
mozgalmokról 
[On the Edges of Europe: A comparative study of nationalist social movement 
organisations in Hungary and the United Kingdom] 
  
Ön meghívást kap arra, hogy részt vegyen egy kutatási tanulmányban. Mielőtt eldöntené, 
hogy részt vesz-e vagy sem, fontos megérteni, hogy miért történik a kutatás, és mit fog 
tartalmazni. Kérem, alaposan olvassa el az alábbi információkat! 
 
Ez a tanulmány bizonyos szervezetek politikai aktivistáit vizsgálja. Konkrétan az érdekel, 
hogy miért válik politikailag aktívvá a személy, miért csatlakozik valaki egy mozgalomhoz 
vagy szervezethez, és miért maradnak a szervezeti tagok. Különösen érdekelnek a 
kulturális és politikai kérdésekkel foglalkozó, politikailag motivált szervezetek. 
 
A tanulmány három részből áll. Először az European Social Survey (ESS) adatokat 
vizsgáltam, hogy megértsem a szélesebb értelemben vett nemzeti érzelmeket olyan 
konkrét dolgok iránt, mint a bevándorlás, a politika és a közgazdaság. Ezután megnéztem 
a weboldalakat és a közösségi médiaközpontokat, hogy jobban megértsem a politikailag 
aktív társadalmi mozgalmakat és szervezeteket, például mint azt a szervezetet, aminek Ön 
tagja. A kutatás utolsó része az ilyen szervezetek tagjaival folytatott interjúkat tartalmazza. 
Az interjúkat 2018 februárra tervezem. 
 
Miért hívtak meg?  
Ön meghívást kapott arra, hogy részt vegyen, mert Ön vagy valaki más azt állította, hogy 
tagja a Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalomnak. 
 
Részt kell vennem? 
Önön áll, hogy eldöntse, hogy részt vesz-e ebben a kutatásban. Ha úgy dönt, hogy részt 
vesz, akkor kerjük, hogy ezt az adatlapot őrizze meg, és megkérem hogy irja alá a 
beleegyezési nyilatkozatot vagy az interjú elején szóban egyezzen bele. Ön indoklás nélkűl 
meggondolhatja magát és visszavonhatja a nyilatkozatait az interjú során vagy az azt 
követő 30 napon belűl. 
 
Hogyan fog történni az interjú?   
Ha úgy dönt, hogy részt vesz ebben a tanulmányban, akkor felkérem Önt, hogy vegyen 
részt egy általam készített interjúban, amely telefonon keresztül történik, az ön számára 
költségmentesen. Az interjú körülbelül 30 percet fog tartani. Ezt az interjút az ön 
beleegyezésével rögzítjük, hogy segítse a kutatásomat meg az interjú elemzését. Ezt a 
felvételt csak ezen kutatás céljára használom fel, és teljes mértékben biztonságban lesz. 
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Biztosan titokban tartják-e azt, amit ebben a tanulmányban mondok?   
Az anonimitás a kutatási anyag gyűjtése, tárolása és közzététele során biztosított. Az 
interjú során közzétett valamennyi információt bizalmasan kezelem, kivétel ha a jogi 
kötelezettségeknek kell eleget tenni.  
Annak érdekében, hogy a titoktartást biztosíthassam, az adatokat anonimizálom. 
Megkérem hogy az interjú során ne emlίtsen magáról semilyen névre, személyre utaló 
jelet (pl: egyedi tetoválás). Ön álnevet kap, és a valódi neve sosem fog megjelenni a 
kutatási projekt során. A kutatás minden felhasználásában Ön anonimizálva lesz és 
azonosító adatok, ha vannak, el lesznek távolítva. 
Az összegyűjtött adatok (pl. az interjú rögzítése és a jegyzetek) mindenkor 
biztonságban lesznek. Minden olyan számítógép és külső adattároló eszköz, amelyek az 
adatokat tárolják, titkosítva lesznek, és az adatok jelszóval védettek lesznek. A kutatás 
során keletkezett adatokat, papír vagy elektronikus formában biztonságban kell tartani a 
kutatási projekt befejezését követően tíz évig. 
 
Ezt a kutatást a Huddersfieldi Egyetem hallgatójaként vezetem a társadalomtudományi 
doktori disszertációmhoz. A disszertáció egyes részeit konferencia prezentációk és 
folyóiratcikkek formájában fogom majd publikálni, de teljes interjú egészben sosem kerül 
nyilvánosságra. Ezt a kutatást a Huddersfieldi Egyetem Kutatói Etikai Bizottsága hagyta 
jóvá. 
 
Milyen előnyökkel járhat a részvétel?   
A jelen tanulmányban való részvétele nagymértékben segítené a társadalmi jelenségek és 
az aktivizmus további megismerését. Pontosabban, Ön mint valaki, aki politikailag aktív, 
segítene nekünk megérteni, mi motiválja az embereket a politikai aktivizmusra. Nem is 
beszélve, nagyon segítene a PhD-mal! 
 
Mit tegyek, ha részt szeretnék venni?  
Ha Ön hajlandó részt venni a tanulmányban, szeretnék telefonon beszélni Önnel. Ez az 
interjú körülbelül 30 percig tart. A hívást én kezdeményezem, hogy önt ne terheljék 
költségek. 
 
Ha kellemetlenül érzi magát az interjúban tárgyalt témákkal kapcsolatban, akkor 
kapcsolatba léphet a Magyar Lelki Elsősegély Telefonszolgálatok Szövetségével (LESZ) a 
116-123-as számon, ahol telefonon keresztül az emberek névtelenül megvitathatják az 
esetleges kérdéseket (www.sos116-123.hu). 
Ha szeretne részt venni ebben a kutatásban, vagy további információkat szeretne, 
kérjem, ne habozzon kapcsolatba lépni velem a katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk e-mail 
címen. Ha a kutatás lefolytatásának módja bármilyen aggodalomra ad okot, kérjem, 
forduljon a témavezetőmhöz a Huddersfieldi Egyetemen, aki Dr. Mark Littler, és elérhető a 
m.littler@hud.ac.uk e-mail címen. 
Tudom, hogy az Ön ideje értékes, ezért köszönöm, hogy időt szánt az információs 
lap olvasására és hogy fontolóra vette a tanulmányban való részvételt. 
 
Köszönettel, 
Kondor Katalin       2018. Január 10 
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APPENDIX E 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
1. Demographics 
Age group  Hány éves? 
Employment status  Mi a munkakőre? 
Level of education achieved  Mi a legmagasabb tanulmányi végzetséged? 
Marital status  Házas? 
Date of entry into the organisation  Mikor léptél be a MÖMbe? Mióta tagja a MÖMnek? 
 
2. Ideology and Identity 
An introductory question: 
1. Could you tell me about the goals of your organisation? 
Tudnál beszélnél a szervezet céljairól? 
2. What is the ideology of the organisation? 
Milyen eszmékben hisz a szervezett? 
 
With some potential follow up questions: 
Could you tell me which of these ideas are most important to you? 
Ezekből mik a legfontosabbak számodra? 
Have you always felt this way about these issues?  
Mindig is ugy gondoltad ezeket a dolgokat? 
Do you remember what made you begin to feel this way? 
Arra emlékszel, hogy mi váltotta ki ezeket az érzéseket? 
 
3. Becoming and Staying a Member 
Can you tell me how you became a member of x? 
Hogy lettél tagja a MÖMnek? 
Why did you join x and not another group? What’s special about x? 
Miért MÖMhöz csatlakozot és nem egy másik szervezethez? Mi a különleges a MÖMbe? 
What made you originally want to join x? 
Mi késztetett arra hogy csatlakoz a MÖMhöz? 
Can you remember how happy you were with your life before you joined x? How has that 
changed? 
Vissza tudsz emlékezni hogy mennyire boldog voltál MÖM előtt? Hogy változott? 
Tudd e külömbséget tenni a MÖM csatlakozás előtti és jelenlegi élete közt? 
What does it mean to you, personally, to be a member of this organisation? 
Mit jelent neked, személyesen, a MÖM tagja lenni? 
What are the most important activities of x? 
Mik a MÖM legfontosabb tevékenységei? 
Can you tell me what you’ve learned from being a member of x? 
Mit tanultál a MÖMben eltöltött idő alatt? 
Have you ever considered leaving the organisation?  
Valaha gondolt e arra hogy elhagya a szervezetett? 
What would you lose if you did leave? 
Mit vesztenél, a elhagyná? 
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APPENDIX F1 
 
CODE LIST FOR ZOLTÁN 
 
 
CODES META-CODES 
Age Personal life 
Children  
Education  
Employment  
Marital Status  
New saying: Uniformed criminals Hungarian government 
Politics in Hungary are now nationalist  
Government pursuing nationalist groups  
B: Government doesn’t help people  
B: Government doesn’t help people  
B: Group unfairly disbanded  
Nationalism common in Hungary Nationalism in Hungary 
B: Hungarian people support nationalist group  
B: Hungarian people support nationalist group  
B: Only fraction of society is radical  
B: People were waiting for something in country 
to change 
 
Change in civilian soldier laws Civilian Soldiers 
Citizen soldiers  
Citizen soldiers  
Civil policing  
V: Importance of good Civilian Soldiers  
Disbanded nationalist groups Disbanded nationalist groups 
Disbanded nationalist groups  
Nationalist group was very strong  
B: They looked for reasons to disband movement  
B: They looked for reasons to disband group  
Hungarian Guard filled a void Involvement with other groups 
Hungarian Guard was very popular  
Creation of Hungarian Guard  
Creation of Hungarian Guard  
Involvement with Jobbik  
Jobbik and Hungarian Guard  
Other nationalist groups  
Other nationalist groups  
Other nationalist groups  
Other nationalist groups  
Other nationalist groups  
Szebb Jövő  
Szebb Jövő  
Szebb Jövő  
Other nationalist groups  
Other nationalist groups  
Other nationalist movements  
Importance of networking  
B: Other groups not good Civilian Soldiers  
B: People don’t trust other nationalist movements  
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Gypsies Roma 
Life before nationalism Origin of nationalist feelings 
Origin of nationalist feelings  
Origin of nationalist feelings  
Origin of nationalist feelings  
Heard of nationalist groups in past  
B: Nationalist feelings are innate  
B: Nationalist feelings are innate  
Internet Media 
Internet  
Media  
Media  
MÖM: Media won’t advertise  
Popularity of nationalist media  
MÖM active regions MÖM General information 
MÖM acts legally  
MÖM Foundation  
MÖM uniform  
MÖM: Foundation  
MÖM and police Law enforcement 
MÖM and police  
MÖM: Confrontations with police  
Working with police  
Followed by police  
Nationalist groups stronger than law enforcement  
A: Eventually get tired of police  
MÖM helps people Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people 
MÖM helps people  
MÖM helps people  
MÖM helps people  
MÖM helps people: Attention through media  
MÖM helps people: physical  
MÖM helps people: poor  
MÖM protects people  
MÖM protects people  
V: Must help own people  
V: Must help own people  
V: Must help own people  
V: Must help own people  
V: Must protect own people  
MÖM is a family MÖM as family, community, brotherhood 
MÖM: Importance of community  
MÖM: Importance of community  
MÖM: Importance of community  
MÖM: Importance of community  
MÖM: Show Hungarian people importance of 
community 
 
MÖM: Show Hungarian people importance of 
community 
 
B: Community most important to the survival of 
the nation 
 
MÖM: A lot of responsibility Personal experience in MÖM 
MÖM: A lot of responsibility  
MÖM: A lot of responsibility  
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MÖM: A lot of work  
MÖM: Can never leave  
MÖM: Can never leave  
MÖM: Would miss it  
MÖM: Would miss it  
MÖM: Would miss it  
If left MÖM  
Knows a lot of people  
Legal troubles  
MÖM: Gained respect  
My word is important  
Didn’t change after joining  
Self-sacrifice for MÖM  
Pressure of leadership  
A: Eventually get tired of not doing what you 
want 
 
A: Self-awareness  
A: This did not make me a bigger person  
A: Time in Szebb Jövő wasn’t easy  
A: Tired  
B: People count on me  
B: People trust me  
V: Important to keep your word  
V: Integrity  
MÖM: Hungarian nationalism MÖM ideology 
MÖM: Members MÖM members 
MÖM: Members  
MÖM: Members  
MÖM: Paramilitary MÖM paramilitary 
MÖM: protect themselves  
MÖM: Protect themselves  
MÖM: Protect themselves  
Time joined MÖM Joining MÖM 
Why joined MÖM  
Why people join specific groups  
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APPENDIX F2 
 
CODE LIST FOR PETER 
 
CODES META-CODES 
Age Personal life 
Children  
Children  
Education  
Employment  
Employment  
Marital Status  
A: Pride in self Personal attitudes and values 
V: Teaching  
V: Teaching  
A: Self-awareness  
A: Self-awareness  
A: Christian  Traditional values 
V: Importance of marriage  
V: Politeness  
A: Reality of Trianon Personal views: nationalism 
A: Racism  
A: Racism  
A: Racism  
A: Racism  
A: Racism  
A: Radical right  
A: Radical right  
V: Serving the nation  
B: Being Hungarian is beautiful  
B: Hungarian women are the most beautiful  
B: Hungarians are a proud people  
B: Hungarians are an intelligent people  
B: Hungarians are hard working  
B: Hungarians are hard working  
B: Hungarians had a hand in all important 
inventions 
 
B: MÖM is needed  
B: Hungarians as martyrs Hungarians as victims and martyrs 
Gypsies Roma 
Gypsies  
Gypsies  
Gypsies  
Knows major figures in Hungarian RR Involvement with other groups 
Szebb Jövő  
Szebb Jövő  
MÖM Foundation MÖM General information 
MÖM helps people Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people 
MÖM helps people: Legal  
MÖM helps people: Physical  
MÖM helps people: poor  
MÖM protects people  
V: Important to help people  
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MÖM is a family MÖM as family, community, 
brotherhood 
MÖM is a family  
MÖM: Helping fellow members  
  
MÖM: Autonomy for Hungarian lands MÖM ideology 
MÖM: Hungarian national identity  
MÖM: Hungarian nationalism  
MÖM: Hungarian nationalism  
MÖM: Hungarian pride  
MÖM: Hungarian pride  
MÖM: Hungarians stick together  
MÖM: Importance of Hungarian ancestors  
MÖM: Trianon  
MÖM: Members MÖM members 
Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings 
Road to nationalist feelings  
Position in MÖM Personal experience in MÖM 
Position in MÖM  
Position in MÖM  
Proud to be MÖM member  
Proud to be MÖM member  
Self-sacrifice for MÖM  
Would never leave MÖM  
Family involvement in MÖM  
Family involvement in MÖM  
Family involvement in MÖM  
Family involvement in MÖM  
Reason joined MÖM Joining MÖM 
Reason joined MÖM  
Time joined MÖM  
Way joined MÖM  
Way joined MÖM  
Way joined MÖM  
Why MÖM  
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APPENDIX F3 
CODE LIST FOR ÁRPÁD 
 
CODES META-CODES 
Age Personal life 
Education  
Employment  
Marital Status  
Children  
Parents  
V: Importance of nature  
B: Lives in a good region of country  
Children’s camp Children are important 
Children’s camp  
MÖM: Children  
MÖM: Children  
V: Guiding children  
MÖM helps people: Legal Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people 
MÖM helps people: poor  
B: Everyone in the country should help each other  
MÖM active regions MÖM General information 
MÖM active regions  
MÖM: Foundation  
MÖM: group structure  
MÖM: Hungarian national identity MÖM ideology 
MÖM: Hungarian nationalism  
MÖM: Hungarian nationalism  
MÖM: Hungarian nationalism  
MÖM: Hungarian nationalism  
MÖM: Hungarian pride  
What is national identity Personal views: nationalism 
V: Furthering nationalist knowledge  
B: Helping each other Hungarian trait  
B: Hungarian history mostly wrong  
B: Hungarians are hard working  
B: Hungarians are hard working   
B: Hungarians left mark on the world  
B: Multiculturalism is bad  
B: Magyars were strong  
B: Hungarians made to seem weak and stupid Hungarians as victims and martyrs 
B: Magyars were painted in a bad light  
B: They took away our history  
B: Communists ruined the country  
B: Problems in country Problems in Hungary 
B: What they taught in school was wrong  
Gypsies Roma 
Gypsies  
MÖM: A real team MÖM as family, community, brotherhood 
MÖM: Importance of community  
MÖM: Importance of community  
MÖM: Importance of community  
MÖM: helping fellow members  
MÖM: Helping fellow members  
MÖM: helping fellow members  
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MÖM: helping fellow members  
MÖM: Members MÖM members 
MÖM: Members  
MÖM: Members  
MÖM: Members  
MÖM: Members  
MÖM: paramilitary MÖM paramilitary 
MÖM: Physical  
MÖM: Large scale of radicalism Radicalism in MÖM 
MÖM: Radicalism  
MÖM: Radicalism  
MÖM: Radicalism  
Rest of interview was nice side of MÖM  
Origin of nationalist feelings Origin of nationalist feelings 
Origin of nationalist feelings  
Origin of nationalist feelings  
Origin of nationalist feelings  
Origin of nationalist feelings  
Origin of nationalist feelings  
B: I’m not so radical  
Involvement with Jobbik Involvement with other groups 
Involvement with Jobbik  
Other nationalist groups  
Other nationalist groups  
Being a MÖM member a good thing Personal experience in MÖM 
Belief in MÖM strengthened  
Personal involvement in MÖM  
Position in MÖM  
Proud to be a MÖM member  
Proud to be a MÖM member  
Involvement in MÖM  
B: MÖM is important  
Looked for nationalist group Joining MÖM 
Reason joined MÖM  
Reason joined MÖM  
Time joined MÖM  
Way joined MÖM  
Way joined MÖM  
Way joined MÖM  
Why MÖM  
How they knew they were a member  
Comparison with EDL Comparison with EDL 
Comparison with EDL  
Comparison with EDL  
Comparison with EDL  
Comparison with EDL  
Migrants  
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APPENDIX F4 
 
CODE LIST FOR LÁSZLÓ 
 
CODES META-CODES 
Age Personal life 
Education  
Employment  
Marital Status  
Friends outside of MÖM  
B: Hungarians always Christians in spirit Traditional values 
B: Importance of Christianity  
MÖM: Holy crown  
MÖM: Importance of Christianity  
B: Many police want to help Law enforcement 
B: Police aren’t brave enough  
B: Police don’t act due to politics  
MÖM and police  
MÖM encourages police to work  
Reasons why police may not act  
Children’s camp Children are important 
Children’s camp  
Children’s camp  
Children’s camp  
Helps with children’s camp  
Helps with children’s camp  
Helps with children’s camp  
MÖM: Children  
MÖM: Children  
Learned Hungarian pride in school Origin of nationalist feelings 
Origin of nationalist feelings  
Magyar Hiszek Egy  
MÖM: Trianon MÖM ideology 
MÖM: Trianon  
MÖM abroad MÖM outside of Hungary 
MÖM: Action in Transylvania  
MÖM and media Media 
MÖM helps people: Legal Ways MÖM helps Hungarian people 
MÖM helps people: Legal  
MÖM helps people: Physical  
MÖM helps people: Physical  
MÖM helps people: Physical  
MÖM helps people: poor  
MÖM helps people: poor  
MÖM is a family MÖM as a family, community, 
brotherhood 
MÖM is a family  
MÖM members everywhere  
MÖM: A real team  
B: Blood-brotherhood important  
MÖM: Community of friends  
MÖM: Creating a friendly community  
MÖM: helping fellow members  
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MÖM: Oath Personal experience in MÖM 
Personal involvement in MÖM  
Personal involvement in MÖM  
Preparation to join MÖM Joining MÖM 
Preparation to join MÖM  
Preparation to join MÖM  
Preparation to join MÖM  
Preparation to join MÖM: Careful what say and 
do 
 
Preparation to join MÖM: Legal  
Preparation to join MÖM: Legal  
Way joined MÖM  
Way joined MÖM  
Way joined MÖM  
Reason joined MÖM  
Time joined MÖM  
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APPENDIX G 
 
TEXTUAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR EDL 
 
Hi! My name is Katherine Kondor and I'm conducting some research on new political activist 
movements as part of my doctoral research at the University of Huddersfield. I am particularly 
interested in politically-motivated organisations concerned with cultural and political issues. I 
would be most grateful if you could answer a few questions about your involvement in the EDL. 
You're not required to answer all questions, if there's anything you're uncomfortable with (or 
nothing comes to mind), you can just skip it. We hear a lot of things about different organisations, 
so my goal here is to find out the truth from members and to be completely objective while doing 
so. 
 
Your answers will be kept completely anonymous; I will not ask you for your name and you are 
not required to give me any contact information. If you have any questions, however, you can 
contact me at katherine.kondor@hud.ac.uk. As this is for my doctoral research, by answering these 
questions you are giving me permission to use this (anonymous) information in my research and 
future publications. 
 
If you fill this out, THANK YOU! If not, thank you anyway for clicking. I'd greatly appreciate you 
passing this link along to anyone you think may fill it out! 
 
1. What are the biggest issues affecting the UK at the moment? 
 
2. Have you always felt this way about these issues? Do you remember what made you begin to 
feel this way? 
 
3. Can you tell me how you became a member/supporter of the EDL? How long have you been a 
supporter/member? How did you hear about the organisation? 
After Respondent 13: Can you tell me how you became a member/supporter of the EDL and how 
long you've been a member/supporter? How did you hear about the organisation (through friends, 
online...)? How did you join (did you just show up?)? 
 
4. What made you originally want to join the EDL? How did you join? 
After Respondent 13: What made you originally want to join the EDL? 
 
5. What does it mean to you, personally, to be a supporter/member of this organisation? 
 
6. Can you tell me what you’ve learned from being a member/supporter of the EDL? 
 
7. What would you lose if you left the EDL? 
 
8. Now for a few basic questions. What is your gender? M/F/Other 
 
9. How old are you? (age groups) 
 
10. Is there anything you’d like to add? Anything you think is important for me to know about the 
political situation in the UK, or otherwise?  
After Respondent 13: Is there anything you'd like to add? Anything you think is important for me 
to know about the political situation in the UK, or otherwise? Please include your email address if 
you'd be willing to have me contact you to clarify answers, if need be. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
CODE MAP FOR EDL INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX H: MAP OF CODES FOR EDL INTERVIEWS 
  
 
TURN TO 
NATIONALISM 
WHY EDL 
PATHWAYS TO 
ACTIVISM 
MAINTAINING 
MEMBERSHIP 
TERRORISM 
IMMIGRATION 
VETERANS 
DISENCHANTMENT 
/ FRUSTRATION 
POLITICIANS 
BREXIT 
EU 
MUSLIMS / 
ISLAM 
BRITISH CULTURE / 
IDENTITY 
COMMUNITY 
MAKES A 
DIFFERENCE 
PATRIOTISM 
DIGNITY 
AND RESPECT 
HOPE FOR 
BRITAIN 
PRIDE 
DEMO 
OTHER 
ORGANISATIONS ONLINE 
NEWS 
MEDIA 
FRIENDS / 
COLLEAGUES 
/ FAMILY 
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APPENDIX I 
 
TABLES OF CODES FOR EDL INTERVIEWS 
 
Research 
Themes 
First-Cycle Codes Second-Cycle Codes Description 
Adopting 
Radical Right 
Attitudes 
Immigration 
Muslims 
Politics and 
Politicians 
Media 
Brexit 
Anti-EU 
Social Concerns 
 
 
Immigration 
Muslims 
Politics and Politicians 
Media 
Brexit 
Anti-EU 
Social Concerns 
 
Personal views 
and attitudes; 
origin of 
nationalist 
feelings. 
Joining the 
EDL 
Level of 
membership 
 
 
 
 
Motivation to Join 
 
 
Not a member 
Member 
Supporter 
Sympathiser 
 
Through another organisation 
Heard of EDL online or in the 
news 
Pre-existing relationships 
Involvement 
with EDL, 
including why 
and how they 
joined and 
information 
about 
membership. 
Why the EDL Views of EDL 
 
Muslims/Islam 
Immigration 
Speak truth about politicians 
Feels heard/makes a 
difference 
Fighting for the nation and 
identity 
They support the troops 
Solidarity/brotherhood 
Why they 
support the 
EDL 
specifically 
and not 
another 
organisation. 
 
Connection to 
the EDL 
Investment  
 
 
Pride 
Self-Respect 
Community 
Doing something good 
 
Not invested 
Not a member/supporter 
How involved 
they are with 
the 
organisation 
and how loyal 
they are; 
questions of 
solidarity and 
why 
respondents 
maintain 
membership.  
 
 
 
377 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Adam, C (2018, August 10) Gender studies programs to be banned in Hungary. 
Hungarian Free Press. Available online: 
http://hungarianfreepress.com/2018/08/10/gender-studies-programs-to-be-banned-in-
hungary/ [Accessed 10/08/2018]. 
 
Adams, J & Roscigno, VJ (2005) White supremacists, oppositional culture, and the world 
wide web. Social Forces, 84(2), 759-778. 
 
Adorno, TW, Frenkel-Brunswik, E, Levinson, DJ, & Sanford, RN (1950) The 
Authoritarian Personality. New York: WW Norton. 
 
Agnew, R & Brezina, T (2010) Strain theories. In McLaughlin, E & Newburn, T (eds.), 
The SAGE Handbook of Criminological Theory. London: SAGE, 96-113. 
 
Ahmari, S (2012) Dancing of catastrophes: The far right and Roma in Hungary. Dissent, 
59: 16-21. 
 
Akçalı, E & Korkut, U (2012) Geographical metanarratives in East-Central Europe: Neo-
Turanism in Hungary. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53(5): 596-614. 
 
Alessio, D & Meredith, K (2013) Blackshirts for the twenty-first century? Fascism and 
the English Defence League. Social Identities, 20(1), 104-118. 
 
Allen, C (2011) Opposing Islamification or promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the 
English Defense League. Patterns of Prejudice, 45(4), 279-294. 
 
Allen, C (2014) Britain First: the ‘frontline resistance’ to the Islamification of Britain. 
The Political Quarterly, 85(3), 354-361. 
 
Allport, GW (1979 [1954]) The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Perseus. 
 
Altemeyer, B (1981) Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba 
Press. 
 
Altemeyer, B (1988) Enemies of Freedom: understanding right-wing authoritarianism. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Altemeyer, B (1996) The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Alvesson, M. (1991) Organizational symbolism and ideology. Journal of Management 
Studies, 28, 3: 207-225. 
 
Ágoston, G & Masters, B (2009) Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Facts 
on File, Inc. 
378 
 
 
Aminzade, R & McAdam, D (2001) Emotions and contentious politics. In Aminzade, RR, 
Goldstone, JA, McAdam, D, Perry, EJ, Sewell, Wh Jr, Tarrow, S, & Tilly, C (eds.), 
Silence and Voice n the Study of Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 14-50. 
 
Anderson, B (1983) Imagined Communities. London: Verso. 
 
Back, L (2002) Aryans reading Adorno: Cyberculture and twenty-first century racism. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25(4), 628-651. 
 
Bale, JM (2002) ‘National revolutionary’ groupuscules and the resurgence of ‘left-wing’ 
fascism: the case of France’s Nouvelle Résistance. Patterns of Prejudice, 36(3), 24-49. 
 
Barkan. SE, Cohn, SF, & Whitaker, W (1995) Beyond recruitment: predictors of 
differential participation in a National Antihunger Organization. Sociological Forum, 
10(1), 113-134. 
 
Bar-On, T. (2018) The radical right and nationalism. In Rydgren, J. (Ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Radical Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 17-41. 
 
Bartlett, J, Birdwell, J, & Littler, M (2011) The New Face of Digital Populism. London: 
Demos. 
 
Bartlett, J & Littler, M (2011) Inside the EDL: populist politics in a digital age. London: 
Demos. 
 
Bartlett, J, Birdwell, J, Krekó, P, Benfield, J, & Győri, G (2012) Populism in Europe: 
Hungary. London: Demos. 
 
Beirne, P & Hill, J (1991) Comparative Criminology: An annotated bibliography. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood.  
 
Benda, K (1986) Magyarország történeti Kronológiája I: A kezdetektől 1526-ig [The 
Chronology of Hungarian History I: From the beginnings to 1526]. Budapest: Akadémiai 
Kiadó. 
 
Benford, RD & Snow, DA (2000) Framing processes and social movements: an overview 
and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611-639. 
 
Berezin, M (2001) Emotions and political identity. In Goodwin, J, Jasper, JM, & Polleta, 
F (eds.), Passionate Politics: Emotions and social movements. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 83-98. 
 
Berger, J & Milkman, KL (2013) Emotion and virality: What makes online content go 
viral? Insights, 5(1), 18-23. 
 
379 
 
Berlet, C (2001) When hate went online. Northeast Sociological Association conference, 
Fairfield, CT, April 28. Available online: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.552.239&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 
Berman, E (2000) Sect, subsidy, and sacrifice: An economist’s view of Ultra-Orthodox 
Jews. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 905-953. 
 
Bernáth, G, Miklósi, G, & Mudde, C (2005) Hungary. In Mudde, C (Ed.), Racist 
Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Routledge, 80-100. 
 
Billig, M (1978) Fascists: A social psychological view of the National Front. London: 
Academic Press. 
 
Billig, M (1989) The extreme right continuities in anti-Semitic conspiracy theory in post-
war Europe. In Eatwell, R & O’Sullivan, N (eds.), The Nature of the Right: European and 
American Politics and Political Thought Since 1789. London: Pinter Publishers, 146-166. 
 
Bjørgo, T (1997) Racists and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: patterns, 
perpetrators, and responses. Leiden: University of Leiden. 
 
Blanchard, J (2019, July 25) Meet Boris Johnson’s new cabinet. Politico. Available 
online: https://www.politico.eu/article/boris-johnson-new-cabinet-whos-in/ [Accessed 
29/07/2019]. 
 
Blee, KM (2002) Inside Organized Racism: women in the hate movement. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Bogerts, L & Fielitz, M (2019) “Do you want a meme war?”: Understanding the visual 
memes of the German far right. In Fielitz, M & Thurston, N (eds.), Post-Digital Cutures 
of the Far Right: Online actions and offline consequences in Europe and the US. 
Bielefeld: Transcript, 137-153. 
 
Bordia, P (1996) Studying verbal interaction on the internet: The case of rumour 
transmission research. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments and Computers, 28, 149-
151. 
 
Bowen, GA (2009) Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative 
Research Journal, 9(2), 27-40. 
 
Bowker, N & Tuffin, K (2004) Using the online medium for discursive research about 
people with disabilities. Social Science Computer Review, 22(2), 228-241. 
 
Bowman-Grieve, L (2013) A psychological perspective on virtual communities 
supporting terrorist & extremist ideologies as a tool for recruitment. Security Informatics, 
2(9). 
 
 
380 
 
Boyce, DG (1999) Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997. Basingstoke: 
MacMillan. 
 
Brady, E & Guerin, S (2010) “Not the romantic, all happy, coochy coo experience”: A 
qualitative analysis of interactions on an Irish parenting web site. Family Relations, 59, 
14-27. 
 
Breuilly, J. (1993) Nationalism and the State. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
British Psychological Society (2013) Ethics Guidelines for Internet-Mediated Research. 
Available at: http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/inf206-guidelines-for-
internet-mediated-research.pdf [Accessed 07/28/16]. 
 
British Psychological Society (2014) Code of Human Research Ethics. Available at: 
http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/inf180_web.pdf [Accessed 07/28/16]. 
 
British Society of Criminology (2015) Statement of Ethics. Available at: 
http://www.britsoccrim.org/documents/BSCEthics2015.pdf [Accessed 07/28/16] 
 
Brown, C (2009) WWW.HATE.COM: White supremacist discourse on the internet and 
the construction of whiteness ideology. The Howard Journal of Communications, 20(2), 
189-208. 
 
Brubaker, R (2001) The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration 
and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
24(4), 531-548. 
 
Burk, K. (2003) The British Isles Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Burris, VAL, Smith, E, & Strahm, ANN (2000) White supremacist networks on the 
internet. Sociological Focus, 33(2), 215-235. 
 
Busher, J (2015) The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots activism in the English 
Defense League. London: Routledge. 
 
Buštíková, L (2018) The radical right in Eastern Europe. In Rydgren, J. (Ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Radical Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 565-581. 
 
Butler, D & Stokes, D (1969) Political Change in Britain. London: Macmillan. 
 
Butler, JC (2000) Personality and emotional correlates of right-wing authoritarianism. 
Social Behavior and Personality, 28, 1-14. 
 
Cachia, M & Millward, L (2011) The telephone medium and semi-structured interviews: 
A complementary fit. Qualitative Research in Organisations and Management, 6(3), 265-
277. 
 
381 
 
Caiani, M & Parenti, L (2013) The Italian extreme right and its use of the internet: a ‘bi-
front’ actor? In Mammone, A, Godin, E, and Jenkins, B (Eds.), Varieties of Right-Wing 
Extremism in Europe. Oxon: Routledge, 217-232. 
 
Campbell, D & Fiske, DW (1959) Convergent and discriminant validation by the 
multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 54, 297-312. 
 
Campbell, JL (2005) Where do we stand? Common mechanisms in organizations and 
social movements research. In Davis, GF, Scott, WR, & Zald, MN, Social Movements 
and Organization Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 41-68. 
 
Castano, Emanuelle (2004) European identity. In Herrmann, Richard, Thomas Risse, and 
Marilynn Brewer (eds.), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. Oxford: 
Rowan & Littlefield, p. 40-58. 
 
Castelli Gatinara, P & Pirro, ALP (2018) The far right as social movement. European 
Societies. Available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494301. 
 
Christie, R (1954) Authoritarianism re-examined. In Christie, R & Jahoda, M (eds.), 
Studies in the Scope and Method of “The Authoritarian Personality”. Glencoe, IL: The 
Free Press, 123-196. 
 
Cochrane, C & Nevitte, N (2012) Scapegoating: Unemployment, far-right parties and 
anti-immigrant sentiment. Comparative European Politics, 12(1), 1-32. 
 
Coenders, M & Scheepers, P (2003) The effect of education on nationalism and ethnic 
exclusionism: An international comparison. Political Psychology, 24(2), 313-343. 
 
Cohen, A. (1974) Two-Dimensional Man: an essay on the anthropology of power and 
symbolism in complex society. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Cohn, SF, Barkan, SE, & Whitaker, WH (1993) Activists against hunger: membership 
characteristics of a national social movement organisation. Sociological Forum, 8(1), 
113-131. 
 
Collins, R (2001) Social movements and the focus of emotional attention. In Goodwin, J, 
Jasper, JM, & Polletta, F (eds.), Passionate Politics: Emotions and social movements. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 27-44. 
 
Colliver, C, Pomerantsev, P, Applebaum, A & Birdwell, J (2018) Smearing Sweden: 
International Influence Campaigns in the 2018 Swedish Election. London: ISD.   
 
Colls, R (2002) Identity of England. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
382 
 
Conway M & McInerney L (2008) Jihadi video and auto-radicalisation: Evidence from an 
exploratory YouTube study. In Ortiz-Arroyo, D, Larsen, HL, Zeng, DD, Hicks, D, & 
Wagner G (eds.), Intelligence and Security Informatics. EuroIsI 2008. Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, vol 5376. Berlin: Springer. 
 
Copsey, N (2010) The English Defence League: A Challenge to our Country and our 
Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality. London: Faith Matters. 
 
Corrigall-Brown, C, Snow, DA, Smith, K, & Quist, T (2010) Explaining the puzzle of 
homeless mobilization: an examination of differential participation. Sociological 
Perspectives, 52(3), 309-335. 
 
Crick, B (2008) Citizenship, diversity and national identity. London Review of Education, 
6(1), 31-37.  
 
Davies, N (2007) Europe East and West. London: Pimlico. 
 
Davies, P & Lynch, D (2002) The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Dearden, L (2019, July 18) Far-right protests ‘attracting biggest numbers since 1930s’ in 
UK amid Brexit anger, report warns. The Independent. Available online: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/far-right-uk-brexit-muslims-tommy-
robinson-protests-extremism-a9011171.html [Accessed 27/08/2019]. 
 
Dekker, H, Malová, D, Hoogendoorn, S (2003) Nationalism and its explanations. 
Political Psychology, 24(2): 345-376. 
 
Della Porta, D & Diani, M (2006) Social Movements: an introduction. 2nd edition. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Della Porta, D & LaFree, G (2011) Guest editorial: Processes of radicalization and de-
radicalization. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 6(1), 4-10. 
 
Denzin, NK (1999) Cybertalk and the method of instances. In Jones, S (ed.), Doing 
Internet Research: Critical issues and methods for examining the net. London: Sage, 107-
125. 
 
Devenport, M (2018, June 8) Fewer NI people feel British than other UK regions – 
survey. BBC News. Available online: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-
44398502 [Acessed 05/05/2019]. 
 
Diani, M & McAdam, D (eds.) (2003) Social Movements and Networks: relational 
approached to collective action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dixon, M & Roscigno, VJ (2003) Status, networks, and social movement participation: 
the case of striking workers. American Journal of Sociology, 108(6), 1292-1327. 
383 
 
 
Dobratz, BA (2001) The role of religion in the collective identity of the white 
racialist movement. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40(2), 287-301. 
 
Doffman, Z (2019, January 15) Brexit on the brink as U.K.'s far-right extremists 'lie in 
wait'. Forbes. Available online: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/01/15/brexit-on-the-brink-as-uks-far-
right-extremists-lie-in-wait/#6468c7e54f33 [Accessed 05/05/2019]. 
 
Doffman, Z (2019, April 18) Facebook responds to U.K. regulation and bans far right 
groups EDL, BNP And Britain First. Forbes. Available online: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/04/18/facebook-permanently-bans-u-k-
far-right-including-bnp-edl-nick-griffin-and-paul-golding/#6ebc67d73103 [Accessed 
01/06/2019]. 
 
Drabble, L, Trocki, KF, Salcedo, B, Walker, PC, & Korcsa, RA (2016) Conducting 
qualitative interviews by telephone: Lessons learned from a study of alcohol use among 
sexual minority and heterosexual women. Qualitative Social Work, 15(1), 118-133. 
 
Driver, S (2011) Understanding British Party Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Dull, Sz (2018, August 6) Előírták a nemzeti nevelést az óvodákban [They’ve prescribed 
national education in kindergartens]. Index. Available online: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2018/08/06/eloirtak_a_nemzeti_nevelest_aM (z_ovodakban/ 
[Accessed 06/08/2018]. 
 
Earl, J & Schussman, A (2003) The new site of activism: on-line organizations, 
movement entrepreneurs, and the changing location of social movement decision-making. 
In Coy, PG (ed.), Consensus Decision Making, Northern Ireland and Indigenous 
Movements. London: JAI Press, 155-187. 
 
Eatwell, R (1989a) The rise of ‘left-right’ terminology: the confusions of social science. 
In Eatwell, R & O’Sullivan, N (eds.), The Nature of the Right: European and American 
Politics and Political Thought Since 1789. London: Pinter Publishers, 32-46. 
 
Eatwell, R. (1989b) The nature of the right: is there an ‘essentialist’ philosophical core? In 
Eatwell, R & O’Sullivan, N (eds.), The Nature of the Right: European and American 
Politics and Political Thought Since 1789. London: Pinter Publishers, 47-61. 
 
Eatwell, R (1989c) The nature of the right, 2: the right as a variety of ‘styles of thought’. 
In Eatwell, R & O’Sullivan, N (eds.), The Nature of the Right: European and American 
Politics and Political Thought Since 1789. London: Pinter Publishers, 62-76. 
 
Eatwell, R (1992) Why has the extreme right failed in Britain? In Hainsworth, P. (ed.), 
The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA. London: Pinter Publishers Limited, 175-192. 
 
Eatwell, R (1996) Fascism: A History. London: Vintage. [Eatwell, R. (1997) Fascism: A 
History. New York: Penguin Books.] 
384 
 
 
Eatwell, R (1996) On defining a fascist minimum: the centrality of ideology. Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 1(3), 303-319. 
 
Eatwell, R (2000) The extreme right and British exceptionalism: the primacy of politics. 
In Hainsworth, P (ed), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the margins to the 
mainstream. London: Pinter, 172-192. 
 
Ebner, J & Davey, J (2018) Mainstreaming Mussolini: How the Extreme Right 
aAttempted to ‘Make Italy Great Again’ in the 2018 Italian Election. London: ISD. 
 
ECHO TV (2018) The Our Home Movement will continue as a party [Pártként folytatja a 
Mi Hazánk Mozgalom – Toroczkai László – ECHO TV]. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aSLWnByXydY [Accessed 05/07/18]. 
 
Eckhart, F (1931) A Short History of the Hungarian People. Edinburgh: Neill & Co. 
 
Edelman, M. (1985) The Symbolic Use of Politics. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Elgenius, G. (2011) Symbols of Nations and Nationalism: celebrating nationhood. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Elliott, J (2005) Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. London: SAGE. 
 
Engel, P (2001) The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary 895-1526. 
New York: I.B. Tauris. 
 
ESRC (2012) The Research Ethics Guidebook: a resource for social scientists. Available 
online: http://www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk/Secondary-analysis-106 [Accessed 
08/06/2018]. 
 
Eynon, R, Fry, J, & Schroeder, R (2012) The ethics of internet research. In Hughes, J 
(ed.), Sage Internet Research Methods: Core issues, debates and controversies in internet 
research, Vol. 1. London: SAGE, 279-304. 
 
Facebook (2018) What does Facebook consider to be hate speech? Facebook. Available 
online: https://www.facebook.com/help/135402139904490?helpref=uf_permalink. 
 
Farrington, DP & Wikstrom, P-OH (1994) Criminal careers in London and Stockholm: A 
cross-national comparative study. In Weitekamp, EGM & Kerner, HJ (eds.), Cross-
National Longitudinal Research on Human Development and Criminal Behavior . 
Dordrecht: Springer, 65-89. 
 
Fekete, L (2016) Hungary: power, punishment and the ‘Christian-national ideal’. Race 
and Class, 57(4), 39-53.  
 
385 
 
Feldman, M & Stocker, P (2017) The post-Brexit far-right in Britain. In Kallis, A, S 
Zeiger, & B Öztürk (eds.), Violent Radicalisation and Far-Right Extremism in Europe. 
Ankara: SETA, 123-171. 
 
Field, A (2013) Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics. 4th Ed. London: SAGE. 
 
Field, J (2008) Social Capital. Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Fielitz, M & Thurston, N (eds.) (2019) Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right: 
Online actions and offline consequences in Europe and the US. Bielefeld: Transcript 
Verlag. 
 
Finch, E (2001) Issues of confidentiality in research into criminal activity: the legal and 
ethical dilemma. Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies, 5, 34-50. 
 
Fioretti, J (2018, January 19) Social media companies accelerate removals of online hate 
speech: EU. Reuters. Available online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
hatespeech/social-media-companies-accelerate-removals-of-online-hate-speech-eu-
idUSKBN1F806X [Accessed 11/08/2018]. 
 
Firth, R. (1973) Symbols: Public and Private. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
 
Fitzgerald, R & Jowell, R (2010) Measurement equivalence in comparative surveys: The 
European Social Survey (ESS) – from design to implementation and beyond. In Harkness, 
JA, Braun, M, Edwards, B, Johnson, TP, Lyberg, L, Mohler, PPh, Pennell, B-E, & Smith, 
TW, Survey Methods in Multinational, Multiregional, and Multicultural Contexts. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 485-495. 
 
Flam, H (1990) Emotional “Man”. International Sociology, 5, 39-56. 
 
Fletcher, HA, Donoghue, HD, Holton, J, Pap, I, & Spigelman, M (2003) Widespread 
occurrence of Mycobacterium tuberculosis DNA from 18th-19th century Hungarians. 
American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 120(2), 144-152. 
 
Flick, U (2006) An Introduction to Qualitative Research. 3rd edition. London: Sage. 
 
Ford, R & Goodwin, MJ (2010) Angry white men: individual and contextual predictors of 
support for the British National Party. Political Studies, 58, 1-25. 
 
Forrest, A (2018, October 13) Democratic Football Lads' Alliance march erupts into 
violence with one supporter threatening 'to kill police officer'. The Independent. Available 
online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/democratic-football-lads-
alliance-march-violence-riot-kill-police-officer-london-protest-a8582636.html [Accessed 
05/05/2019]. 
 
Foxman, A & Wolf, C (2013) Viral Hate: Containing its spread on the internet. New 
York: Palgrave Mcmillan. 
386 
 
 
Froio, C & Ganesh, B (2018) The transnationalisation of far right discourse on Twitter. 
European Societies. Available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295. 
 
Gamson, WA (1968) Power and Discontent. Homewood, IL: Dorsey. 
 
Gamson, WA (1975) The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood, IL: Dorsey. 
 
Gamson, WA (1992) The social psychology of collective action. In Morris, AD & 
Mueller, CM (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale University, 
53-76. 
 
Garner, R (1997) Fifty years of social movement theory: an interpretation. In Garner, R & 
Tenuto, J (eds.), Social Movement Theory and Research: an annotated bibliographical 
guide. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 1-58. 
 
Gellner, E (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Gerber, AS & Malhotra, N (2008) Publication bias in empirical sociological research: Do 
arbitrary significance levels distort published results? Sociological Methods and 
Research, 37(1), 3-30. 
 
Gilmour, I (1977) Inside Right: a study of conservatism. London: Hutchinson. 
Goffman, E (1974) Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of the experience. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
 
Goodwin, J & Jasper, JM (2015) The Social Movement Reader: cases and concepts. 3rd 
ed. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Goodwin, J, Jasper, JM, & Polletta, F (eds.) (2001a) Passionate Politics: emotions and 
social movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Goodwin, J, Jasper, JM, & Polletta, F (2001b) Why emotions matter. In Goodwin, J, 
Jasper, JM, & Polletta, F (eds.), Passionate Politics: emotions and social movements. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1-24. 
 
Goodwin, M (2011) New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Goodwin, MJ (2012) Backlash in the ‘hood’: exploring support for the British National 
Party (BNP) at the local level. In Mammone, A, Godin, E, & Jenkins, B (eds.), Mapping 
the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: from local to transnational. Oxon: 
Routledge, 17-32 
 
 
 
387 
 
Goodwin, M (2013, October 9) Tommy Robinson’s EDL resignation was disingenuous 
nonsense. The Guardian. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/09/tommy-robinson-resignation-
edl-non-event [Accessed 22/08/2018]. 
 
Goodwin, MJ, Cutts, D, & Janta-Lipinski, L (2016) Economic losers, protestors, 
Islamophobes, or xenophobes? Predicting public support for a counter-Jihad movement. 
Political Studies, 64(1), 4-26. 
 
Goodwin, MJ & Dennison, J (2018) The radical right in the United Kingdom. In Rydgren, 
J, The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Goodwin, MJ & Milazzo, C (2017) Taking back control? Investigating the role of 
immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit. The British Journal of Political and 
International Relations, 19(3), 450-464. 
 
Goulard, H (2016, August 24) Hungary gives award to writer fined for racism. Politico. 
Available online: http://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-anger-grows-viktor-orban-
award-writer-racism/ [Accessed 05/07/18]. 
 
Gould, D (2009) Moving Politics: Emotions and Act Up’s fight against AIDS. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Gould, RV (2003) Why do networks matter? Rationalist and structuralist interpretations. 
In Diani, M & McAdam, D (eds.), Social Movements and Networks: relational 
approaches to collective action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 233-257. 
 
Griffin, A (2019, April 18) Facebook bans EDL, Britain First and BNP from social 
network. The Independent. Available online: https://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-ban-edl-britain-first-bnp-far-right-racist-
immigration-islamophobic-a8876036.html [Accessed 01/06/2019]. 
 
Griffin, R (1995) Fascism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik, 
15(3), 287-300. 
 
Griffin, R (1998) International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus. 
London: Hodder Headline Group. 
 
Griffin, R (2003) From Slime Mould to Rhizome: an introduction to the groupuscular 
right. Patterns of Prejudice, 31(1), 27-50. 
 
Griffin, R (2004) Fascism’s new face (and new facelessness) in the ‘post-fascist’ epoch.  
 
Griffin, R & Feldman, M (eds) (2004) Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. 
Vol. 1. London: Routledge  
 
388 
 
Grimm, R & Pilkington, H (2015) ‘Loud and proud’: youth and the politics of silencing. 
In Pilkington, H & Pollock, G (Eds.), Radical Futures? Youth, politics and activism in 
contemporary Europe. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 206-230. 
 
Grootaert, C (2001) Social capital: the missing link? In Dekker, P & Uslaner, EM (eds.), 
Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life. London: Routledge, 9-29. 
 
Gurr, TR (1970) Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hajdú, T & Nagy, ZsL (1990) Revolution, counterrevolution, consolidation. In Sugar, PF, 
Hanák, P, & Frank, T (eds.), A History of Hungary. London: IB Tauris and Co, 295-318. 
 
Halász, K (2009) The rise of the radical right in Europe and the case of Hungary: ‘Gypsy 
crime’ defines national identity? Development, 52, 490-494. 
 
Halla, M, Wagner, AF, & Zweimüller, J (2017) Immigration and voting for the far right. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(6), 1341-1385. 
 
Hamilton, A (1971) The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism, 1919-
1945. London: Anthony Blond. 
  
Hanspeter, K, Koopmans, R, Duyvendak, JW, & Giugni, MG (2015[1995]) New Social 
Movements in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. New York: Routledge. 
 
Hardin, R (2002) The crippled epistemology of extremism. In Breton, A, Galeotti, G, 
Salmon, P, & Wintrobe, R (eds.), Political Extremism and Rationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2-33. 
 
Haslam, SA & Turner, JC (1998) Extremism and deviance: Beyond taxonomy and bias. 
Social Research, 65 (2), 435-448. 
 
Heald, G & Wybrow, RJ (1986) The Gallup Survey of Britain. London: Croom Helm. 
 
Heberle, R (1951) Social Movements: an introduction to political sociology. New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
 
Heilweil, R (2017, July 18) Facebook removes only a fraction of hate groups flagged by 
activists. Forbes. Available online: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccaheilweil1/2017/07/18/facebook-removes-only-a-
fraction-of-hate-groups-flagged-by-activists/#72bf02db2711. 
 
Heimbach, I & Hinz, O (2016) The impact of content sentiment and emotionality on 
content virality. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 33, 695-701. 
 
 
 
389 
 
Hern, A (2019, April 18) Facebook bans far-right groups including BNP, EDL and 
Britain First. The Guardian. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/18/facebook-bans-far-right-groups-
including-bnp-edl-and-britain-first [Accessed 02/05/2019]. 
 
Hewson, C (2007) Gathering data on the internet: Qualitative approaches and possibilities 
for mixed methods research. In Joinson, AN, McKenna, K, Reips, U, & Postmes, T (eds.), 
Oxford Handbook of Internet Psychology. Oxford University Press. Available online: 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199561803.001.0001/oxf
ordhb-9780199561803-e-026. 
 
Hewson, C (2014) Qualitative approaches in internet-mediated research: opportunities, 
issues, possibilities. In Leavy, P (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 423-451. 
 
Hoensch, JK (1988) A History of Modern Hungary 1867-1986. London: Longman. 
 
Holdsworth, J & Kondor, K (2017) Understanding violence and the Hungarian far-right. 
In Kallis, A, S Zeiger, & B Öztürk (eds.), Violent Radicalisation and Far-Right 
Extremism in Europe. Ankara: SETA, 173-216. 
 
Horváth, B (2018, July 4) Two members of the Szekler Sixty-Four Counties Youth 
Movement in Romania have been sentenced to five years in jail [Terrorizmusért öt év 
börtönre ítélték a Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom két székelyföldi tagját 
Romániában]. 444. Available online: https://444.hu/2018/07/04/terrorizmusert-ot-ev-
bortonre-iteltek-a-hatvannegy-varmegye-ifjusagi-mozgalom-szekelyfoldi-tagjait-
romaniaban [Accessed 05/05/2019]. 
 
Hourihane, C (Ed.) (2012) The Grove Encyclopedia of Medieval Art and Architecture. 
Oxord: Oxford University Press. 
 
HVG (2015, June 2) “You cannot take work from Hungarians” – Orban and his people 
are preparing with strongly worded billboards ["Nem veheted el a magyarok munkáját" – 
Orbánék erős szövegű plakáttal készülnek]. HVG. Available online: 
https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150602_Nem_veheted_el_a_magyarok_munkajat__Orba 
[Accessed 21/08/2019]. 
 
HVIM (n.d.) A mozgalomról [About the movement]. Available online: 
http://www.hvim.hu/mozgalomrol [Accessed 03/11/2015]. 
 
Hyman, HH & Sheatsley, PB (1954) “The Authoritarian Personality” - A methodological 
critique. In Christie, R & Jahoda, M (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of “The 
Authoritarian Personality”. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 50-122. 
 
Ignotus, P (1972) Hungary.  New York: Praeger. 
 
 
390 
 
Ignazi, P (1997) The extreme right in Europe: a survey. In Merkl, P. H. & Weinberg, L. 
(eds.) The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties. London: Frank Cass, 47-64. 
 
Ignazi, P (2003) Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Imber C (2002) The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Jackman, RW (1985) Cross-national statistical research and the study of comparative 
politics. American Journal of Political Science, 29(1), 161-182. 
 
Jackson, P (2011) The English Defence League: Anti-Muslim politics online. In Jackson, 
P & Gable, G (eds.), Far-Right.com: Nationalist extremism on the internet. Ilford: 
Searchlight Magazine, 7-20. 
 
Jackson, P (2011a) The English Defence League and the ‘new far right’. In Jackson, P & 
Feldman, M (eds.), The EDL: Britain’s ‘new far right’ social movement. Northampton: 
The University of Northampton, 7-13. 
 
Jackson, P (2015) #hitlerwasright: National Action and national socialism for the 21st 
century. Journal for Deradicalization, 1, 97-115. 
 
James, W (2019, January 6) Britons would now vote to stay in EU, want second 
referendum: poll. Reuters. Available online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-
eu-poll/britons-would-now-vote-to-stay-in-eu-want-second-referendum-poll-
idUSKCN1P006O [Accessed 05/05/2019]. 
 
Janecskó, K (2014, October 8) Jogerős: feloszlatták a Szebb Jövőért Egyesületet [Legally 
binding: They dissolved the For a Better Future Organisation]. Index. Available online: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2014/10/08/jogeros_feloszlatjak_a_szebb_jovoert_egyesuletet/ 
[Accessed 08/07/2018]. 
 
Jasper, JM (1997) The Art of Moral Protest: culture, biography, and creativity in social 
movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Jasper, JM (1998) The emotions of protest: affective and reactive emotions in and around 
social movements. Sociological Forum, 13(3), 397-424. 
 
Jasper, JM & McGarry, A (2015) Introduction: the identity dilemma, social movements, 
and contested identity. In McGarry, A & Jasper, J (eds.), The Identity Dilemma: social 
movements and collective identity. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1-17. 
 
Juhász, A (2010) “A ‘cigánybűnözés’ szó politikai karrierje” [The political career of the 
word “Gypsy crime”]. The Political Capital Institute. Available at: 
http://www.politicalcapital.hu/blog/?p=1937578 [Accessed 20/07/17]. 
 
391 
 
Kassimeris, G & Jackson, L (2014) The ideology and discourse of the English Defense 
League: ‘Not racist, not violent, just no longer silent.’ The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 17, 171-188. 
 
Kaur-Ballagan, K, Gottfried, G, & Holden, S (2019, March 13) Britons are more positive 
than negative about immigration’s impact on Britain. Ipsos MORI. Available online: 
https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/britons-are-more-positive-negative-about-
immigrations-impact-britain [Accessed 16/05/2019]. 
 
Keoghan, J (2018, August 31) The far-right is attempting to return to football. These are 
the fans fighting it. NewStatesman. Available online: 
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/sport/2018/08/football-lads-alliance-far-right-
extremism-fighting-islamophobia [Accessed 05/05/2019]. 
 
Kiecolt, KJ & Nathan, LE (2004) Secondary Analysis of Survey Data. In Seale, C (ed.), 
Social Research Methods: A reader. London: Routledge, 133-135. 
 
Király, BK (1969) Hungary in the Late Eighteenth Century. New York: Columbia 
University. 
 
Kittensinurface (2016, February 6) BETYÁRSEREG: Hungary’s most infamous 
nationalist group. YouTube. Available online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stDtqxMVN3g [Accessed 08/07/2018]. 
 
Kitts, JA (1999) Not in our backyard: solidarity, social networks, and the ecology of 
environmental mobilization. Sociological Inquiry, 69(4), 551-574. 
 
Klandermans, B (1984) Social psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory. 
American Sociological Review, 49, 583-600. 
 
Klandermans, B (2013) Extreme right activists: recruitment and experiences. In von 
Mering, S & Wyman McCarty, T (eds), Right-Wing Radicalism Today: Perspectives from 
Europe and the US. New York: Routledge, 60-84. 
 
Klandermans, B & de Weerd, M (2000) Group identification and political protest. In 
Stryker, S, Owens, TJ, & White, RW (eds), Self, Identity, and Social Movements. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 68-90. 
 
Klandermans, B & Mayer, N (2006) Extreme Right Activists in Europe: Through the 
magnifying glass. Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Klandermans, B & Mayer, N (2006a) Through the magnifying glass: the world of 
extreme right activists. In Klandermans, B & Mayer, N (eds.), Extreme Right Activists in 
Europe: Through the magnifying glass. Oxon: Routledge, 269-276. 
 
392 
 
Klandermans, B & Oegema, D (1987) Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: 
steps towards participation in social movements. American Sociological Review, 52(4), 
519-531. 
 
Klatch, RE (1999) A Generation Divided: the new left, the new right, and the 1960s. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Koch, A (2017) The new crusaders: Contemporary extreme right symbolism and rhetoric. 
Perspectives on Terrorism, 11(5), 13-24.  
 
Koehler, D (2014) The radical online: individual radicalization processes and the role of 
the internet. Journal for Deradicalization, Winter 2014/15(1), 116-134. 
 
Kornhauser, W (1959) The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 
 
Koronaiou, A, Lagos, E, Sakellariou, A, Kymionis, S, & Chiotaki-Poulou, I (2015) 
Golden Dawn, austerity and young people: the rise of fascist extremism among young 
people in contemporary Greek society. In Pilkington, H & Pollock, G (Eds.), Radical 
Futures? Youth, Politics and Activism in Contemporary Europe. Chichester: John Wiley 
and Sons, 231-249  
 
Kosáry, DG (1969) Part I of History of the Hungarian Nation. Hungarian Heritage Books 
Vol.2. Astor Park, Florida: Danubian Press. 
 
Kovács, A (2013) The post-communist extreme right: the Jobbik party in Hungary. In 
Wodak, R, KhosraviNik, M, & Mral, B (eds.), Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics 
and discourse. London: Bloomsbury, 223-233. 
 
Krekó, P & Juhász, A (2017) The Hungarian Far Right: Social demand, political supply 
and international context. Shekhovtsov, A (Ed.). Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag. 
 
Kristó, Gy (1999) A Tizenegyedik Század Töténete [The History of the Eleventh Century]. 
Budapest: Pannonica Kiadó. 
 
Kristó, Gy (2001) Szent István Király [King Saint Stephen]. Budapest: Vince Kiadó. 
 
Kumar, K (2000) Nation and empire: English and British national identity in comparative 
perspective. Theory and Society, 29, 575-608. 
 
Kumar, K (2003) The Making of English National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Kürti, L (2006) Hungary. In Blamires, CP & Jackson, P (eds.), World Fascism: A 
historical encyclopedia. Vol. 1: A-K. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 324-327. 
 
393 
 
Kyriazi, A (2015) Ultranationalist discourses of exclusion: A comparison between the 
Hungarian Jobbik and the Greek Golden Dawn. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
42, 2528-2547. 
 
Lang, S (2011) British History for Dummies, 3rd edition. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
LeBoer, A (2008) Marching back to the future: Magyar Garda and the resurgence of the 
right in Hungary. Dissent, 55(2), 34-38. 
 
Lee, SY, Poon, WY, & Bentler, PM. (1995) A two-stage estimation of structural equation 
models with continuous and polytomous variables. British Journal of Mathematical and 
Statistical Psychology, 48(2), 339-358. 
 
Linden, A & Klandermans, B (2007) Revolutionaries, wanderers, converts, and 
compliants: life histories of extreme right activists. Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, 36(2), 184-201. 
 
Littler, M (2017) Online radicalisation, risk and terrorism in the digital space. In Kallis, 
A, S Zeiger, & B Öztürk (eds.), Violent Radicalisation and Far-Right Extremism in 
Europe. Ankara: SETA, 79-121. 
 
Lynn, P, Scherpenzeel, A, Liberts, M, Kaminska, O, & Goedemé, T (2018) European 
Social Survey Round 9 Sampling Guidelines: Principles and Implementation. European 
Social Survey. Available online: 
https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round9/methods/ESS9_sampling_guidelines.
pdf.  
 
Macartney, CA (1962) Hungary: A Short History.  Alva, Scotland: Robert Cunningham 
and Sons. 
 
Macaulay, TB (1986 [1848-1861]) The History of England. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Mach, Z. (1993) Symbols, Conflict, and Identity: essays in political anthropology. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Mackey, R (2019, April 4) Specter of far-right violence haunts crisis talks over Brexit. 
The Intercept. Available online: https://theintercept.com/2019/04/04/specter-far-right-
violence-haunts-brexit-britain/ [Accessed 05/05/2019]. 
 
Macklin, G (2006) Great Britain. In Blamires, CP & Jackson, P (eds.), World Fascism: A 
historical encyclopedia. Vol. 1: A-K. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 287-290. 
 
Makk, F (2000) A Tizenkettedik Század Története [The History of the Twelfth Century]. 
Budapest: Pannonica. 
 
 
 
 
394 
 
Mammone, A & Peace, T (2012) Cross-national ideology in local elections: the case of 
Azione Sociale and the British National Party. In Mammone, A, Godin, E, & Jenkins, B 
(eds.), Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to 
Transnational. Oxon: Routledge, 288-302. 
 
Mammone, A, Godin, E, & Jenkins, B (Eds.) (2012) Mapping the Extreme Right in 
Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational. Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Mammone, A, Godin, E, & Jenkins, B (Eds.) (2013) Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism 
in Europe. Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Mandel, DR & Omorogbe, P (2014) Political differences in past, present, and future life 
satisfaction: Republicans are more sensitive than democrats to political climate. PLoS 
One, 9(6), e98854. 
 
Mann, R (2011) ‘It just feels English rather than multicultural’: Local interpretations of 
Englishness and non-Englishness. The Sociological Review, 59(1), 109-128. 
 
Marczali, H (1971) Hungary in the Eighteenth Century. New York: Arno Press. 
 
Markham, A & Buchanan, E (2012) Ethical decision-making and internet research: 
Recommendations from the AoIR ethics working committee (Version 2.0). AOIR Ethics 
Committee. Available at: http://www.aoir.org/reports/ethics2.pdf [Accessed 28/07/16]. 
 
Marwell, G & Oliver, P (1993) The Critical Mass in Social Action: a micro-social theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
McAdam, D (1986) Recruitment to high risk activism: the case of freedom summer. 
American Journal of Sociology, 92(1), 64-90. 
 
McAdam, D (1999) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-
1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
McAdam, D (2003) Beyond structural analysis: toward a more dynamic understanding of 
social movements. In Diani, M & McAdam, D (eds.), Social Movements and Networks: 
relational approaches to collective action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 281-298. 
 
McAdam, D & Scott, WR. (2005) Organizations and movements. In Davis, GF, 
McAdam, D, Scott, WR, & Zald, MN (eds.), Social Movements and Organization Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4-40. 
 
McAdam, D, McCarthy, JD, & Zald, MN (1996) Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
McCarthy, JD & Zald, MN. (1977) Resource mobilization and social movements: a 
partial theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. 
395 
 
 
McCauley, C & Moskalenko, S (2008) Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways 
toward terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20, 415-433. 
 
McKim, CA (2017) The value of mixed methods research: A mixed methods study. 
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 11(2), 202-222. 
 
McLaughlin, B (ed.) (1969) Studies in Social Movements: a social psychological 
perspective. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Merton, R (1938) Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review. 3, 672-
682. 
 
Merton, R (1968) Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press. 
 
Michaels, WB (1995) Our America: Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
 
Mieriņa, I & Koroļeva, I (2015) Support for far right ideology and anti-migrant attitudes 
among youth in Europe: A comparative analysis. In Pilkington, H & Pollock, G (Eds.), 
Radical Futures? Youth, politics and activism in contemporary Europe. Chichester: John 
Wiley and Sons, 183-205. 
 
Milgram, S (1974) Obedience to Authority: An experimental view. London: Tavistock. 
 
Miller, RL (2000) Researching Life Stories and Family Histories. London: Sage. 
 
Minkenberg, M (2002) The radical right in postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe: 
Comparative observations and interpretations. East European Politics and Societies: 
16(2): 335-362. 
 
Minkenberg, M (2007) The radical right in public office: Agenda-setting and policy 
effects. Western European Politics, 24(4), 1-21. 
 
Mitchell, C (2005) Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of 
belonging and belief. London: Routledge. 
 
Molnár, M (2001) A Concise History of Hungary. Cambridge: Cambridge University. 
 
Morse, JM (2003) Principles of mixed methods and multimethod research design. In 
Tashakkori, A & Teddlie, G (eds.), Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral 
Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 189-208. 
 
Mosse, G (1979) International Fascism: new thoughts and new approaches. London: 
Sage Publications. 
 
 
396 
 
Mosse, GL (1980) Towards a general theory of fascism. In Mosse, GL (ed.), Masses and 
Man. New York: Howard Fertig, 194-196. 
 
Mudde, C (1996) The war of words: defining the extreme right party family. West 
European Politics, 19, 225-248. 
 
Mudde, C (2000) The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
 
Mudde, C (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Mudde, C (2012) Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So 
what? European Journal of Political Research, 52(1), 1-19. 
 
Mudde, C (2015, August 10) Is Hungary run by the radical right? Washington Post. 
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/10/is-
hungary-run-by-the-radical-right/?utm_term=.2416548fcb2c [Accessed 07/07/18]. 
 
Napier, JL & Jost, JT (2008) Why are conservatives happier than liberals? Psychological 
Science, 19(6), 565-572. 
 
National Action (no longer exists) What is National Action? Was available online: 
http://national-action.info/what-is-national-action-a-joint-statement/ [Accessed 
17/01/2016]. 
 
Nepstad, SE & Smith, C (2001) The social structure of moral outrage in recruitment to 
the U.S. Central America Peace Movement. In Goodwin, J, Jasper, JM, & Polletta, F 
(eds.), Passionate Politics: emotions and social movements. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 158-174. 
 
Nivette, AE (2011) Cross-national predictors of crime: A meta-analysis. Homicide 
Studies, 15(2), 103-131. 
 
Nolan, D & Walker, S (2018, April 13) Hungarian journalists admit role in forging anti-
migrant ‘atmosphere of fear’. The Guardian. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/13/hungary-journalists-state-tv-network-
migrants-viktor-orban-government [Accessed 09/08/2018]. 
 
Norris, P & Inglehart, R (2019) Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian 
Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Oaten, A (2014) The cult of the victim: an analysis of the collective identity of the 
English Defense League. Patterns of Prejudice, 48(4), 331-349. 
 
Oberschall, A (1973) Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
 
397 
 
Oberschall, A & Kim, H (1996) Identity and action. Mobilization, 1, 63-85. 
 
Oegema, D & Klandermans, B (1994) Why social movement sympathizers don’t 
participate: erosion and nonconversion of support. American Sociological Review, 59(5), 
703-722. 
 
Olson, M (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: public goods and the theory of groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Onraet, E, van Hiel, A, & Dhont, K (2013) The relationship between right-wing 
ideological attitudes and psychological well-being. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 39(4), 509-522. 
 
Ormos, M (1990) The early interwar years, 1921-1938. In Sugar, PF, Hanák, P, & Frank, 
T (eds.), A History of Hungary. London: IB Tauris and Co, 319-338. 
 
Pai, H-H (2016) Angry White People: Coming face-to-face with the British far right. 
London: Zed Books. 
 
Pálffy, G (2009) The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth 
Century. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Pálffy, S (1998) The Kings of Hungary.  In Simon, AL (ed.), Made in Hungary.  Safety 
Harbor, Florida: Simon Publications, 357-400. 
 
Passy, F & Giugni, M (2001) Social networks and individual perceptions: explaining 
differential participation in social movements. Sociological Forum, 16(1), 123-153. 
 
Payne, S (1980) Fascism: Comparison and Definition. Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press. 
 
Payne, SG (1995) A History of Fascism 1914-45. London: Routledge.  
 
Pelinka, A (2013) Right-wing populism: concept and typology. In Wodak, R, 
KhosraviNik, M, & Mral, B (eds.), Right-Wing Populism in Europe: politics and 
discourse. London: Bloomsbury, 3-22. 
 
Perraudin, F (2018, February 23) Police appeared to punish victims of Newcastle 
grooming gangs, review finds. The Guardian. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/23/northumbria-police-operation-
sanctuary-newcastle-grooming-gangs-case-review [Accessed 29/08/2019]. 
 
Perry, B (2000) “Button-down terror”: The metamorphosis of the hate movement. 
Sociological Focus, 33(2), 113-131. 
 
Pfeiffer, T, Greven, T, & Grumke, T (2006) Eine Schnellstraße zum Volk. In Greven, T & 
Grumke, T (eds.), Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Heidelberg: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 160-180. 
398 
 
 
Phalet, K & Poppe, E (1997) Competence and morality dimensions of national and ethnic 
stereotypes: A study in six eastern-European countries. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 27, 703-723. 
 
Pickles, W (1964) Left and right. In Gould, J & Kolb, W (eds.), A Dictionary of the Social 
Sciences. London: Travistock, 381-384. 
 
Pilkington, H (2016) Loud and Proud: Passion and politics in the English Defence 
League. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Pilkington, H & Pollock, G (2015) ‘Politics are bollocks’: youth, politics and activism in 
contemporary Europe. The Sociological Review, 63(S2), 1-35. 
 
Pirro, ALP (2014) Populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
different context and issues of the prophets of the Patria. Government and Opposition, 
49(4), 599–628. 
 
Pirro, ALP (2015) The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, 
impact, and electoral performance. Oxon, UK: Routledge. 
 
Pirro, ALP & Róna, D (2018) Far right activists in Hungary: Youth participation in 
Jobbik and its networks. European Societies. Available online: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494292. 
 
Popper, KR (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Putnam, RD (1996) Who killed civic America? Prospect, 7(24), 66-72. 
 
Putnam, RD (2000) Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community. 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Ray, B & Marsh, GE II (2001) Recruitment by extremist groups on the Internet. 
First Monday, 6(2), https://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/834/743. 
 
Rhodes, J (2011) ‘It’s not just them, it’s whites as well’: whiteness, class and BNP 
support. Sociology, 45(1), 102-117. 
 
Richard, J (2017) Extremism, Radicalization, and Security: The identity theory approach. 
Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Richardson, JE (2013) Ploughing the same furrow? Continuity and change on Britain’s 
extreme-right fringe. In Wodak, R, KhosraviNik, M, & Mral, B (eds.), Right-Wing 
Populism in Europe: politics and discourse. London: Bloomsbury, 105-119. 
 
Robbins, K (1998) Great Britain: Identities, institutions and the idea of Britishness. New 
York: Longman. 
399 
 
 
Roberts, J (2017, December 18) Twitter suspends EDL’s account in latest ‘purge’ of the 
far-right. Metro. Available online: http://metro.co.uk/2017/12/18/twitter-suspends-edls-
account-latest-purge-far-right-7169683/. 
 
Rodgers, L, Qurachi, S, & Connor, S (2015) 7 July London Bombings: What happened 
that day? Available online: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598 [Accessed 
21/01/2016]. 
 
Rosenberger, S & Hadj-Abdou, L (2013) Islam at issue: anti-Islamic mobilization of the 
extreme right in Austria. In Mammone, A, Godin, E, and Jenkins, B (Eds.), Varieties of 
Right-Wing Extremism in Europe. Oxon: Routledge, 149-163. 
 
Rydgren, J (2007) The sociology of the radical right. Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 
241-262. 
 
Saldaña, J (2009) The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. London: SAGE. 
 
Schatz, RT & Lavine, H (2007) Waving the flag: national symbolism, social identity, and 
political engagement. Political Psychology, 28(3), 329-355. 
 
Schatz, RT, Staub, E, & Lavine, H (1999) On the varieties of national attachment: blind 
versus constructive patriotism. Political Psychology, 20(1), 151-174. 
 
Schlenker, BR, Chambers, JR, & Le, BM (2012) Conservatives are happier than liberals, 
but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 46(2), 127-146. 
 
Schussman, A & Soule, SA (2005) Process and protest: accounting for individual protest 
participation. Social Forces, 84(2), 1081-1106. 
 
Scrivens, R, Davies, G, & Frank, R (2018) Measuring the evolution of radical right-wing 
posting behaviors online. Deviant Behavior. 
 
Scruton, R (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought. London: Pan. 
 
Seale, C (2013) Using computers to analyse qualitative data. In Silverman, D (ed.), Doing 
Qualitative Research. London: Sage, 264-278. 
 
Selznick, P (1948) Foundations of the theory of organization. American Sociological 
Review, 13, 25-35. 
 
Selznick, P (1952) The Organizational Weapon: A study of Bolshevik strategy and tactics. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Shaw, I (2008) Ethics and the practice of qualitative research. Qualitative Social Work, 7, 
400-414. 
400 
 
 
Silber, M D & Bhatt, A (2007) Radicalization in the West - The Homegrown Threat. 
New York: NYPD Intelligence Division. 
 
Simi, P & Futrell, R (2015) American Swastika: Inside the white power movement’s 
hidden spaces of hate. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.  
 
Simon, AL (1998) Made in Hungary.  Safety Harbor, Florida: Simon Publications. 
 
Simon, B, Loewy, M, Sturmer, S, Weber, U, Freytag, P, Habig, C, Kampmeier, C, & 
Spahlinger, P (1998) Collective identification and social movement participation. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(3), 646-658. 
 
Smith, AD (1995) The dark side of nationalism: the revival of nationalism in late 
nineteenth century Europe. In Cheles, L, Fergwon, R, & Vaughan, M (eds.), The Far 
Right in Western and Eastern Europe, 2nd edition. London: Longman, 13-19. 
 
Smith, AD (2001) Nationalism: Theory, ideology, history. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Smith, A & Anderson, M (2018, March 1) Social media use in 2018. Pew Research 
Center. Available online: https://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-
2018/ [Accessed 29/08/2019].  
 
Smith, M (2019, April 16) Most voters have only become more sure about their EU 
referendum vote. YouGov. Available online: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-
reports/2019/04/16/most-voters-have-only-become-more-sure-about-their [Accessed 
05/05/2019]. 
 
Snow, DA (2001) Collective identity and expressive forms. In Smelser, N & Baltes, PD 
(eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. New York: 
Elsevier, 2212-2219. 
 
Snow, DA & Soule, SA (2010) A Primer on Social Movements. New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company. 
 
Snow, DA, Rochford, EB Jr., Worden, SK, & Benford, RD (1986) Frame alignment 
processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological 
Review, 51(4), 464-481. 
 
Snow, DA, Zurcher, LA Jr., Ekland-Olson, S (1980) Social networks and social 
movements: a microstructural approach to differential recruitment. American Sociological 
Review, 45, 878-801. 
 
Social Research Association (2003) Ethical Guidelines. Available at: http://the-
sra.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ethics03.pdf [Accessed 07/28/2016]. 
 
Solomos, J (1993) Race and Racism in Britain. 2nd edition. London: Macmillan. 
401 
 
 
Solomos, J (2013) Contemporary forms of racist movements and mobilization in Britain. 
In Wodak, R, KhosraviNik, M, & Mral, B (eds.), Right-Wing Populism in Europe: 
Politics and Discourse. London: Bloomsbury, 121-133. 
 
Spencer, L, Ritchie, J, & O’Connor, W (2006) Analysis: practices, principles, and 
processes. In Ritchie, J & Lewis, J (eds.), Qualitative Research Practice: A guide for 
social science students and researchers. London: Sage, 199-218. 
 
Spranger, E (1928) Types of Men: the psychology and ethics of personality. Halle: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag. 
 
Stephan, WG & Stephan, CW (1996) Predicting prejudice. International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations, 20(3/4), 409-426. 
 
Sternhell, Z (1987) Fascism. In Miller, D. (ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political 
Though. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 148. 
 
Sternhell, Z (1994) The Birth of Fascist Ideology: from cultural rebellion to political 
revolution. Translated from French by David Maisel. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Stockemer, D (2015) Immigration, immigration perception and the radical right-wing 
vote in Europe: What is the empirical link? CETD/CES Policy Brief. Available online: 
https://labs.carleton.ca/canadaeurope/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/Stockemer-policy-
brief.pdf [Accessed 06/08/2018]. 
 
Stryker, S (2000) Identity competition: key to differential social movement participation? 
In Stryker, S, Owens, TJ, & White, RW (eds.), Self, Identity, and Social Movements. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 21-40. 
 
Sturges, JE & Hanrahan, KJ (2004) Comparing telephone and face-to-face qualitative 
interviewing: A research note. Qualitative Research, 4(1), 107-118. 
 
Sugar, PF, Hanák, P, & Frank, T (1994) A History of Hungary. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
 
Sunstein, CR (2009) Going to Extremes: How like minds unite and divide. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Sweney, M (2018, April 12) BBC under fire over Enoch Powell ‘river of blood’ 
broadcast. The Guardian. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/apr/12/bbc-to-air-reading-of-enoch-powells-
rivers-of-blood-speech [Accessed 10/08/2018]. 
 
Symonds, T (2013, October 8) EDL Tommy Robinson quits group. BBC. Available 
online: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-24442953 [Accessed 22/08/2018]. 
402 
 
 
Szayna, TS (1997) The extreme-right political movements in post-communist central 
Europe. In Merkl, PH & Weinberg, L (eds.), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the 
Nineties. London: Frank Cass, 111-148. 
 
Szele, Á (2012) Extraordinary situations, extraordinary means: The regenerative projects 
of the Hungarian radical right. CEU Political Science Journal, 2, 123-144. 
 
Szűcs, J (1993) Az utolsó Árpádok [The Last Árpáds]. Budapest: MTA 
Történettudományi Intézete. 
 
Tajfel, H (1981) Human Groups and Social Categories. London: Academic Press. 
 
Tarrow, SG (2011) Power in Movement: Social movements and contentious politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Taylor, TL (1999) Life in virtual worlds: Plural existence, multimodalities, and other 
online research challenges. American Behavioral Scientist, 43(3), 436-449. 
 
Taylor, V & Whittier, NE (1992) Collective identity in social movement communities: 
lesbian feminist mobilization. In Morris, AD & Mueller, OH (eds.), Frontiers in Social 
Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 104-129. 
 
Teddlie, C & Tashakkori, A (2003) Major issues and controversies in the use of mixed 
methods in the soial and behavioral sciences. In Tashakkori, A & Teddlie, G (eds.), 
Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 3-50. 
 
Thorpe, N (2016, November 15) Is Hungary’s Jobbik leader really ditching far-right past? 
BBC News. Available online https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37976687 
[Accessed 07/07/2018]. 
 
Tilly, C. (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Tilly, C, Tilly, L, & Tilly, R (1975) The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Thurlow, R (1987) Fascism in Britain: A History, 1918-1985. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Todosijević, B & Enyedi, Zs (2002) Authoritarianism vs. cultural pressure anti-gypsy 
prejudice in Hungary. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 40(5), 31-54. 
 
Todosijević, B & Enyedi, Zs (2008) Authoritarianism without dominant ideology: 
political manifestations of authoritarian attitudes in Hungary. Political Psychology, 29(5), 
767-787. 
 
403 
 
Travis, A (2017, September 28) Rudd extends ban to two National Action-related neo-
Nazi groups. The Guardian. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/28/amber-rudd-neo-nazi-ban-national-
action-scottish-dawn-ns131 [Accessed 08/07/18]. 
 
Treadwell, J (2013) The English Defence League and the counter jihad. Criminal Justice 
Matters, 93(1): 8-9. 
 
Treadwell, J & Garland, J (2011) Masculinity, marginalization and violence: a case study 
of the English Defense League. British Journal of Criminology, 51, 621-634. 
 
Umoh, R (2017, August 16) How companies like Google and Facebook are standing up to 
neo-Nazis and other hate groups. CNBC. Available online: 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/16/google-and-facebook-are-standing-up-to-neo-nazis-
and-other-hate-groups.html [Accessed 07/07/2018]. 
 
Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom (2013, April 26) Az Új Magyar Gárda becsületkódexe! [The 
New Hungarian Guard’s Honour Code]. Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom. Available online: 
http://ujmagyargardamozgalom.com/az_új_magyar_gárda_becsületkódexe [Accessed 
17/01/2017]. 
 
Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom (n.d. 1) Céljaink [Our Goals]. Available online: 
http://www.gardamozgalom.org/celjaink [Accessed 17/01/2017]. 
 
Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom (n.d. 2) Tájékoztató [Information]. Available online: 
http://ujmagyargardamozgalom.com/az_%C3%BAj_magyar_g%C3%A1rda_becs%C3%
BCletk%C3%B3dexe [Accessed 17/01/2016]. 
 
Vagg, J (1993) Context and linkage: Reflections on comparative research and 
‘internationalism’ in criminology. British Journal of Criminology, 33(4), 541-554. 
 
van der Valk, I & Wagenaar, W (2010) The Extreme Right: entry and exit. Leiden: Anne 
Frank House/Leiden University. 
 
Van Iterson, S & Heezen, L (2013) All for Hungary. Documentary video. Available 
online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1A60j5KC8xc 
 
Van Laer, J (2011) Activists ‘online’ and ‘offline’: The internet as an information channel 
for protest demonstrations. Mobilization, 15(3), 405-419. 
 
Van Stekelenburg, J & Klandermans, B (2013) The social psychology of protest. Current 
Sociology Review, 61(5-6), 886-905. 
 
Van Troost, D, van Stekelenburg, J, & Klandermans, B (2013) Emotions of protest. In 
Demertzis, N (ed.), Emotions in Politics: The affect dimension in political tension. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 186-203. 
 
404 
 
Várhalmi, P (2009) History from the Perspective of Radical Nationalism [Történelem 
nemzeti radikális szemmel] (unpublished Master thesis). Eötvös Loránd 
Tudományegyetem, Budapest. 
 
Virchow, F (2004) The groupusculization of neo-Nazism in Germany: the case of the 
Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland. Patterns of Prejudice, 38(1), 56-70. 
 
Virchow, F (2007) Performance, emotion, and ideology: on the creation of ‘collectives of 
emotion’ and worldview in the contemporary German far right. Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, 36(2): 147-164. 
 
Walker, S (2018, May 29) Hungary to criminalise migrant helpers with ‘Stop Soros’ 
legislation. The Guardian. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/29/hungary-criminalises-migrant-helpers-
stop-george-soros-legislation [Accessed 09/08/2018]. 
 
Webster, S, Jane, L, & Brown, A (2014) Ethical considerations in qualitative research. In 
Ritchie, J, Lewis, J, McNaughton Nicholls, C, & Ormston, R (eds.), Qualitative Research 
Practice: A guide for social science students and researchers, 2nd Ed. London: Sage, 75-
110. 
 
Weiss, H (2003) A cross-national comparison of nationalism in Austria, the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland. Political Psychology, 24(2), 377-401. 
 
Whipple, A (2009) Revisiting the “Rivers of Blood” controversy: Letters to Enoch 
Powell. Journal of British Studies, 48, 717-735. 
 
Whittier, N (2002) Meaning and structure in social movements. In Meyer, DS, Whittier, 
N, & Robnett, B (eds.), Social Movements: Identity, culture, and the state. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 289-307. 
 
Wilkinson, P (1971) Social Movement. London: Pall Mall Press. 
 
Wilkinson, P (1987) Fascism. In Bogdanor, V (ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Political Institutions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 226-228. 
 
Wilcox, A, Weinberg, L, & Eubank, W (2003) Explaining national variations in support 
for far right political parties in western Europe, 1990-2000. In Merkl, PH & Weinberg, L 
(eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century. London: Frank Cass, 126-142. 
 
Williams, B (2013) Right-wing extremism and the integration of the European Union: 
electoral strategy trumps political ideology. In Mammone, A, Godin, E, and Jenkins, B 
(Eds.), Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe. Oxon: Routledge, 134-148. 
 
Wiltfang, G & McAdam, D (1991) The costs and risks of social activism: a study of 
sanctuary movement activism. Social Forces, 69(4), 987-1010. 
 
405 
 
Winlow, S, Hall, S, & Treadwell, J (2017) The Rise of the Right: English nationalism and 
the transformation of working-class politics. Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Wintrobe, R (2002) Leadership and passion in extremist politics. In Breton, A, Galeotti, 
G, Salmon, P, & Wintrobe, R (eds.), Political Extremism and Rationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 23-43. 
 
Wintrobe, R (2006) Rational Extremism: The political economy of radicalism. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wodak, R, KhosraviNik, M, & Mral, B (Eds.) (2013) Right-Wing Populism in Europe: 
Politics and Discourse. New York: Bloomsbury.  
 
Wojcieszak, M (2010) ‘Don’t talk to me’: Effects of ideologically homogeneous online 
groups and political dissimilar offline ties on extremism. New Media and Society, 12(4), 
637-655. 
 
Wolfreys, J (2013) The European extreme right in comparative perspective. In 
Mammone, A, Godin, E, and Jenkins, B (Eds.), Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in 
Europe. Oxon: Routledge, 19-37. 
 
Wong, MA, Frank, R, & Allsup, R (2015) The supremacy of online white supremacists – 
an analysis of online discussions by white supremacists. Information & Communications 
Technology Law, 24(1), 41-73. 
 
Yasin, NAM (2017) The evolution of online extremism in Malaysia. Counter Terrorist 
Trends and Analyses, 9(7). 
 
Yeo, A, Legard, R, Keegan, J, Ward, K, McNaughton Nicholls, C, & Lewis, J (2014) In-
depth Interviews. In Ritchie, J, Lewis, J, McNaughton Nicholls, C, & Ormston, R (eds.), 
Qualitative Research Practice: A guide for social science students and researchers, 2nd 
Ed. London: Sage, 177-210. 
 
Zald, MN & Ash, R (1966) Social movement organizations: growth, decay and change. 
Social Forces, 44, 327-340. 
 
Zald, MN & Berger, MA (1978) Social movements in organisations: coup d’etat, 
insurgency, and mass movements. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 823-861. 
 
Zald, MN & McCarthy, JD (1987) Social movement industries: competition and conflict 
among social movement organizations. In Zald, MN & McCarthy, JD (eds.), Social 
Movements in an Organizational Society: collected essays. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 161-180. 
 
Zimmer, M (2010) “But the data is already public”: on the ethics of research in Facebook. 
Ethics and Information Technology, 12, 313-325. 
 
406 
 
Zsoldos, A (1999) A szent király szabadjai: Fejezetek a várjobbágyság történetéből [The 
Saint King’s Freemen: Chapters from the Serfs’ History].  Budapest: MTA 
Történettudományi Intézete. 
 
 
